The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature / To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.

by Joseph Butler

CONCLUSION.

• 1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible.
• 2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them.
• 3. There are no presumptions against them, peculiar to them, as distinguished from other unusual phenomena.

CHAPTER III.
OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM GOD.

Beside the objectors to the evidences of Christianity, there are many who object to its nature. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.

It is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.

Let the student look to the force of the proofs, rather than any consequences which may be drawn from them.

I. The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to the material laws of the world.

• 1. If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace.
• 2. Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior to experience.
• 3. Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.
• 4. If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the general laws of his government, he is equally incompetent to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or deviated from.

II. We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted.

Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly.

• 1. We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be given by revelation.
• 2. Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to transmit any revelation he might make.
• 3. Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or doubtful.
• 4. Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.
• 5. Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be said that if not in writing it would not have answered its purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best suit God’s general government?
• 6. All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation as unsuitable.

III. Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, whether it is a revelation.

• 1. No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a revelation.
• 2. It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.
• 3. Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed, it still should control our conduct.

IV. Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other books, are not so as to the Bible.

• 1. We are competent judges of common books, but not of Scripture.
• 2. Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.
• 3. In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are improbabilities.
  • 1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, will imagine they find improbabilities.
  • 2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things.
    • —It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns him.
    • —Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, even when thinking of something else, which we had been vainly trying to discover for years.
    • —Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every man may be a deceiver.
    • —Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.

V. Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence.

For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age used their miraculous gifts.

• 1. This does not prove the acts not miraculous.
• 2. The person having any such gift, would have the same power over it which he would have over any other ability, and might pervert it.
• 3. To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain its use, is but saying why did not God give a higher degree of miraculous endowment? As to which we are not competent judges.
• 4. God does not confer his natural gifts, (memory, eloquence, knowledge, &c.) only on those who are prudent and make the best use of them.
• 5. Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in the happiest manner.

VI. There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several other respects.

• 1. In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go on to perfection” in either, requires exact and laborious study.
• 2. The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, are the same in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought about,
  • 1.) By the progress of learning and liberty.
  • 2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the generality.
• 3. It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should be small; for the natural world has laid open to inspection, for thousands of years, and yet only lately are any great discoveries made.
• 4. Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of opening and ascertaining Bible truth.
• Objec. The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is of no consequence, compared to spiritual.
  • Ans. 1. The cases are parallel; for natural knowledge is as important to our natural well-being, as spiritual knowledge is to our spiritual well-being.
  • Ans. 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of other analogies, which show that God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of their value.
• Objec. 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of men, why not sooner introduced, and more widely diffused?
  • Ans. The objection is just as strong against the natural sciences. Nay, if the light of nature and of revelation are both from the same source, we might expect that revelation would have been introduced and diffused just as it is.
    • 1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not known at all, nor to any without care and study.
    • 2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated with derision, and the use rejected by thousands whom they might have cured.
    • 3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so made to produce more disease.
    • 4.) Their benefit may come very slowly.
    • 5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual.
    • 6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to use them, even with the prospect of a cure.
    • 7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we were ready to take it.

All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.

VII. Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its containing things we should not have expected, we will now consider the objections against its morality.

• 1. Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things contrary to justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are taught by natural religion. But no such objections are advanced, except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature.
• 2. There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, which would be immoral, but for the precept. The precept changes the nature of the action.
• 3. None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, &c.
• 4. God may command the taking of life or property because these are his.
• 5. The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and to mislead the weak. But such objections do not lie against revelation, as such, but against the very notion of religion as a trial.
• 6. The sum of the whole is, objections against the scheme of Christianity do not affect its truth; since there are no objections against its morality. Hence objections against it, aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the evidence, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, [i.e. ch. vii.]

CHAPTER IV.
CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD.

In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections.

This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.

But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good, or credible.

It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course of nature, that it was a scheme, imperfectly comprehended.

If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.

[In studying this chapter, let [chap. vii. part i.] be kept in view.]

I. Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension.

• 1. God’s general plan is to conduct things gradually, so that, finally, every one shall receive what he deserves.
• 2. Christianity is a particular arrangement, under this general plan: is a part of it, and conduces to its completion.
• 3. It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy.
  • 1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man.
  • 2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were preparatory to it.
  • 3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus Christ came.
  • 4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy.
  • 5.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, judge the world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c.
• 4. Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme.
• 5. We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very much unrevealed.
• 6. Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging as to the whole system of religion, as we are as to the whole system of nature.

II. In both material and spiritual things, means are used to accomplish ends.

• 1. Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know its object and end.
• 2. Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so.

III. Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature.

• 1. Why do we say there are laws of nature?
  • 1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many things, e.g.
    • · Pestilence.
    • · Storms.
    • · Earthquakes.
    • · Diversities of human powers.
    • · Association of ideas.
  • 2.) Hence we call many things accidental, which we know are not matters of chance, but are subject to general laws.
  • 3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their general laws.
  • 4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy.
• 2. Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with God’s general laws of wisdom. These laws may be unknown to us; but no more so than those by which some die as soon as born, or live to old age, or have superior understandings, &c.
• 3. We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of nature as a scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such.
  • 1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would be likely to be a scheme.
  • 2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an arrangement to accomplish ends, there would of course seem to us, in it, irregularities; just as we see in nature.
  • 3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the same manner as objections against the other.

---

Having, in a previous chapter, [[ch. iii.],] answered objections to Christianity as a matter of fact, and in this, as a general question of wisdom and goodness, the next thing is to discuss objections in particular.

As one of these is directed against the scheme, as just now described, it will be considered here.

• Objec. Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; just such as men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged to adopt, in their designs.
  • Ans. 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the natural world. The mystery is quite as great in nature as in grace.
  • 2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends.
  • 3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but progressive.
  • 4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; e.g. animals, vegetables, geological periods, &c.
  • 5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining another.
  • 6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate.

CHAPTER V.
OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM.

Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation.

I. Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of others.

• 1. If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual?
• 2. The objection therefore is not only against Christ’s mediation, but all mediation.

II. We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by whom he should punish.

• 1. Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a broken limb is of falling from a precipice.
• 2. This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events from miraculous.

III. In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad consequences of actions do not always follow.

• 1. We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he permits it, and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect remedies for it.
  • 1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be prevented by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance.
  • 2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad consequences of our misdeeds.
  • 3.) Still more if assisted.
• 2. It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but that it is so, shows compassion, as distinguished from goodness.
• 3. The course of nature affords many instances of such compassion.
• 4. Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous consequences of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some cases.
• 5. If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which we scarcely call vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend that the bad consequences will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is greater.
• 6. A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a religion, is incomparably more reprehensible than the mere neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life.
• 7. As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often misery, ruin, and even death, no one can say what may be the consequences of blasphemy, contempt of God, and final impenitence.
• 8. Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great wickedness can possibly be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right.
• 9. Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for pardon.

IV. There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities.

• 1. We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it should be fit to remit punishment.
• 2. Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should not know how to prevent them.
• 3. Vice impairs men’s abilities for helping themselves.
• 4. Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would not have been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our future interests?
• 5. In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not repair old errors, why should it as to future things?
• 6. Were it so in all cases it would be contrary to all our notions of government.
• 7. It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases, it would be so, even if we knew it might in some cases.
• 8. The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to atonement, is contrary to the general sense of mankind; as shown by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices.

V. In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature, revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of pardon and safety.

• 1. Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin.
• 2. Declares the world to be in a state of ruin.
• 3. That repentance alone will not secure pardon.
• 4. That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition.
• 5. That God’s moral government is compassionate, as well as his natural government.
• 6. That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to save men.
• 7. All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless degradation. But it is not Christianity which puts him so. All philosophy and history show man to be degraded and corrupt.

VI. Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory sacrifice.

• 1. He is “that prophet.”
  • 1.) Declared the will of God.
  • 2.) Published anew the law of nature.
  • 3.) Taught with authority.
  • 4.) Revealed the right manner of worship.
  • 5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance.
  • 6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments.
  • 7.) Set us a perfect example.
• 2. He has a kingdom which is not of this world.
  • 1.) Founded a church.
  • 2.) Governs it.
  • 3.) Of it, all who obey him are members.
  • 4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever.
• 3. He is a propitiatory sacrifice.
  • 1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly told.
  • 2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain.
  • 3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him produce his claim to it.
  • 4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their creed; and regard Christ only as a teacher.
  • 5.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about how it was procured.

VII. We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whether a mediator was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his office.

• 1. We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted.
• 2. Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary.
• 3. The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as indifferent whether he punishes the innocent or guilty.
  • 1.) We see, in this world, the innocent forced to suffer for the faults of the guilty.
  • 2.) But Christ suffered voluntarily.
• 4. Though, finally, every one shall receive according to his own deserts; yet, during the progress of God’s scheme, vicarious sufferings may be necessary.
  • 1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it costs us suffering and toil.
  • 2.) One person’s sufferings often tend to relieve another.
• 5. Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and to deter men from sin.
• 6. Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not objections to Christianity, but to the whole course of nature.
• 7. The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than saying that a divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, because the objector does not see it to be so; though he must own he is no judge, and could not understand why it should be necessary, if it were so!

VIII. We have no reason to expect the same information touching God’s conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty.

• 1. God instructs us by experience.
• 2. This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an infinitely small part of his providence.
• 3. The things not understood involve God’s appointment, and Christ’s execution; but what is required of us, we are clearly informed.
• 4. Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious.

CHAPTER VI.
SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.

It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed.

But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly the same for everybody else.

Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.

I. Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence.

• 1. It is often absolutely impossible to say which of two modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit.
• 2. If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our pleasure.
• 3. We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.
• 4. Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter us.
• 5. We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our passions, &c.
• 6. Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, even when the probabilities of success are against them.

II. As to the light of Christianity not being universal.

• 1. Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures of the same species.
• 2. Yet it is certain that God governs.
• 3. We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.
• 4. The Jewish religion was not universal.
• 5. If it be intended that Christianity should be a small light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be perfectly uniform with other parts of God’s providence.
• 6. If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God’s natural dispensations.
• 7. No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his circumstances.
• 8. Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he can, and to instruct his neighbor.
• 9. If revelation were universal, in extent and degree, different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present.

III. Practical reflections.

• First. That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all, may be part of our probation.
  • 1. It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs.
  • 2. Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.
• Secondly. If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation.
  • 1. If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would if there were no reason to think so.
  • 2. So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity may be true, we are as much bound to examine, &c. as we would be bound to obey, if we knew it was true.
  • 3. Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same.
  • 4. Doubts presuppose some evidence, belief more, and certainty more still. Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things.
  • 5. It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering.
• Thirdly. Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it.
  • 1. They constitute a wholesome discipline.
    • 1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.
    • 2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties.
  • 2. In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of religion is the principal trial. A full conviction of its truth would constrain some to obedience.
• Fourthly. The difficulties may be in the objector rather than in the religion.
  • 1. Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.
  • 2. Secretly wishes religion not to be true.
  • 3. Looks at objections rather than replies.
  • 4. Treats the subject ludicrously.
• Fifthly. The proof of Christianity is level to common men.
  • 1. They are capable of being convinced of the existence of God, and of their moral accountability.
  • 2. And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the fulfilment of prophecy.
  • 3. If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are capable of understanding the proof.
  • 4. If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just as they do as to the sciences.
    • Objec. Our directions should be too plain to admit of doubt; like those of an earthly master.
      • Ans. The earthly master only wants his work done, and is careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are not parallel.
  • Finally. The credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion. Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty, and then whether we choose to do it.
    Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when there may be doubt, is often fatal.

CHAPTER VII.
POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of Christianity, and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to consider the positive evidence of its truth; i.e. what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence.

There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, direct and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now consider the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY.

I. Miracles.

• 1. Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles described, as for common events.
  • 1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as speeches are by historians and poets put into the mouths of heroes.
  • 2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by various writers, from that day to this.
  • 3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the miracles alone, can account for those events.
  • 4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, and their reception in the world, is that the things really happened.
  • 5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if doubtful.
• 2. Paul’s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what can attach to mere history.
  • 1.) Additional. His evidence is quite detached. He received the gospel not in common with the other apostles, but separately, and direct from Christ, after his ascension.
  • 2.) Peculiar. He speaks of Christ’s miracles and those of others incidentally, as familiar facts, fully believed by those to whom he wrote.
• 3. Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, and was so received by great numbers, at the time and on the spot; which is the case with no other religion.
  • 1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground.
  • 2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such fearful sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these miracles.
  • 3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of evidence as if they had testified to the truth of the miracles in writing.
  • 4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to inform themselves.
  • 5.) It is a sort of evidence distinct from direct history, though of the same nature.
  • 6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to believe against their interests, as these did.
• 4. It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof is to be rejected; but in such an important concern we shall proceed to notice some possible objections.
  • Objec. 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle follies.
    • Ans. 1. This objection ignores the distinction between opinions and facts. Suffering for an opinion is no proof of its truth; but in attestation of observed facts, it is proof.
    • 2. Enthusiasm weakens testimony, it is true, even as to facts; and so does disease, in particular instances. But when great numbers, not weak, nor negligent, affirm that they saw and heard certain things, it is the fullest evidence.
    • 3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires that the things testified be incredible; which has not been shown, as to religion, but the contrary.
    • 4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which witnesses are liable to enthusiasm. In common matters, we get at the truth through witnesses, though influenced by party spirit, custom, humor, romance, &c. &c.
  • Objec. 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the apostles and first Christians.
    • Ans. Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in Scripture; but not more in religious than in common affairs. Men in all matters deceive themselves and others, in every degree, yet human testimony is good ground of belief.
  • Objec. 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles.
    • Ans. Not oftener than by other pretences.
  • Objec. 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence.
    • Ans. 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles, the evidence for the latter would not be impaired. The objection really amounts to this, that evidence proved not to be good, destroys evidence which is good and unconfuted! Or to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, testify, in cases not related to each other, and one is proved false, the other must not be believed!
    • 2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is incompetent, or misled.
    • 3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that Christianity was too serious a matter to allow the first converts to be careless as to its evidence; and also that their religion forbid them to deceive others.

II. As to the evidence from prophecy.

• 1. Obscurity as to part of a prophecy does not invalidate it, but is, as to us, as if that part were not written, or were lost. We may not see the whole prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough fulfilled to perceive in it more than human foresight.
• 2. A long series of prophecies, all applicable to certain events, is proof that such events were intended. This answers the objection that particular prophecies were not intended to be applied as Christians apply them.
  Mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy. Now we apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing it capable of such application.
  So if a long series of prophecies be applicable to the present state of the world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that they were so intended.
  Besides, the ancient Jews, before Christ, applied the prophecies to him, just as Christians do now.
• 3. If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand their own predictions, or that their prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than those to which Christians apply them, it would not abate the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those instances. For,
  • 1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the whole meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is not knowing the whole mind of the author.
  • 2.) If the book is a compilation, the authors may have meanings deeper than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke by inspiration, they are not the authors, but the writers of prophecy, and may not have known all that the Divine Spirit intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy shows a foresight more than human.

REMARK.

This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those will be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor of understanding it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to allow an argument its due weight; or who wilfully discard the whole investigation.

---

THE GENERAL ARGUMENT

We now proceed to THE GENERAL ARGUMENT embracing both direct and circumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and cannot be expected here; but something should be said, especially as most questions of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by evidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other.

The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring himself to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and disclosing a plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising them to perfect and final happiness.

I. Consider this revelation as a history.

• 1. It furnishes an account of the world, as God’s world.
  • 1.) God’s providence, commands, promises, and threatenings.
  • 2.) Distinguishes God from idols.
  • 3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors, in a world considered as apostate and wicked.
  • 4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not for their importance as mere political events.
  • 5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the world.
• 2. It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and moral.
  • 1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism.
  • 2.) So that doubts of its truth confirm that truth, for in this enlightened age the claims of a book of such a nature could be easily and finally shown to be false, if they were so.
  • 3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that Christianity has been thus confuted.
• 3. It contains a minute account of God’s selecting one nation for his peculiar people, and of his dealings with them.
  • 1.) Interpositions in their behalf.
  • 2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled.
  • 3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince; so clearly as to raise a general expectation, &c.
  • 4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be the Savior of the Gentiles.
• 4. Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his life and labors; and the result, in the establishment of a new religion.

II. As to the authenticity of this history.

Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not knowing even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of authenticity, he would find,

• 1. That natural religion owes its establishment to the truths contained in this book. This no more disproves natural religion, than our learning a proposition from Euclid, shows that the proposition was not true before Euclid.
• 2. The great antiquity of revelation.
• 3. That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by known facts.
• 4. That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken suspicion of its fidelity.
  • 1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is conformable to the manners of that age and country.
  • 2.) The characters are all perfectly natural.
  • 3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some of these, taken alone, seem strange to some, in this day; but not more so than things now occurring.
  • 4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more numerous than in other ancient books; and none of them impair the narrative.
• 5. That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts.
• 6. That the credibility of the general history, confirms the accounts of the miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make but one statement.
• 7. That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews; whose form of government was founded on these very books of Moses; and whose acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept them a distinct race.
• 8. That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time when the Jews expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was prophesied, and was received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied.
• 9. That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the religion of the world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; and has continued till now.
• 10. That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people dispersed into all lands; and still for many centuries, continue to be a distinct race, professing the law of Moses. If this separateness be accounted for, in any way, it does not destroy the fact that it was predicted.