The Career of Leonard Wood

by Joseph Hamblen Sears

THE SOLDIER

{76}

{77}

[IV]
THE SOLDIER

The name "Rough Riders" will forever mean to those who read American history the spontaneous joy of patriotism and the high hearts of youth in this land. It was the modern reality of the adventurous musketeers--of those who loved romance and who were ready for a call to arms in support of their country. They came from the cowboys of the west, from the stockbrokers' offices of Wall Street, from the athletic field, from youth wherever real youth was to be found. Something over 20,000 men applied for enrollment. None of them knew anything of war. None of them wanted to die, but they all wanted to try the great adventure under such leaders. And they have left an amazing record of the joyousness of the fight and the recklessness that goes with it.

Now and then there have been organizations of a similar character in our history, but only here and there. It was the first outburst of that day {78} of the spirits filled with high adventure; and the record cheers the rest of us as we plod along our way, just as it cheers us when we are ill in bed with indigestion to read again the old but ever-young Dumas.

It would have been impossible for any one to have organized and controlled such a group without the enthusiasm of men like Roosevelt and Wood, as well as the knowledge these two had of the West, the Southwest and the South.

It detracts nothing from Roosevelt's greatness of spirit to say that it was Wood who did the organizing, the equipping of the regiment. In fact Roosevelt declined to be the Rough Riders' first Colonel, but consented to be the second in command only if Wood were made its commander. The fact that Roosevelt was not only known in the East but in the Northwest, and that Wood was quite as well known in the Southwest and the South meant that men of the Rough Riders type all over the country knew something of one or the other of the regiment's organizers.

It detracts nothing from Wood's amazing activity in organization and capacity for getting {79} things done, to say that had it not been for Roosevelt's wonderful popularity amongst those of the youthful spirit of the land the regiment would never have had its unique character or its unique name.

This is not the place to tell the story of that famous band of men. But its organization is so important a part of Wood's life that it comes in for mention necessarily.

In the Indian campaign with the regulars he had known the great importance of being properly outfitted and ready for those grilling journeys over the desert. In the Spanish War he learned, as only personal experience can teach, the amazing importance of preparation for volunteers and inexperienced men. The whole story of the getting ready to go to Cuba was burned into his brain so deeply that it formed a second witness in the case against trusting to luck and the occasion which has never been eradicated from his mind. Yet this episode brought strongly before him also the fact that prepared though he might be there was no success ahead for such an organization without the sense of subordination to the {80} state and the nation which not only brought the volunteers in, but carried them over the rough places through disease and suffering and death to the end.

Eight days after the telegram calling upon the Governors of New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma and Indian Territory for men to form the regiment, the recruits gathered at San Antonio where Wood was waiting to meet them. The most important thing about them for the moment was that they knew nothing of military life. Wood believed with Old Light-Horse Harry Lee "That Government is a murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are meeting men of the same age and strength mechanized by education and disciplined for battle."

Furthermore during the years that he had been in Washington Wood had used some of his spare time in studying parts of American history that are not included in school books. He knew that the volunteer system in the Revolutionary War had worn General Washington sick with discouragement and fear lest all that he had built up be {81} broken down through lack of discipline. He knew also that in the Civil War the volunteer system proved inadequate on both sides and that it was not until the war had gone on for two years that either the North or the South had what could properly be called an army.

To aid him in the training of these troops he had the assistance of a number of officers who had seen service in the Regular Army, and together they mapped out a course of drills and maneuvers that worked the men from a valueless mob into a regiment trained for battle. The human material that they had to work with was the best; for these men had been selected from many applicants. The lack of discipline and the ignorance of military etiquette led to many amusing incidents. Colonel Roosevelt in his history of the Rough Riders tells of an orderly announcing dinner to Colonel Wood and the three majors by remarking genially:

"If you fellers don't come soon, everything'll get cold."

The foreign attachés said: "Your sentinels do not know much about the Manual of Arms, but {82} they are the only ones through whose lines we could not pass. They were polite; but, as one of them said, 'Gents, I'm sorry, but if you don't stop I shall kill you.'"

The difficulties to be surmounted were enormous; and any officers less democratic and understanding might have made a mess of it. Both Roosevelt and Wood understood the frontiersmen too well to misjudge any breaches of etiquette or to humiliate the extremely sensitive natures of men long used to life in the open.

Upon Colonel Wood fell practically all the details of organization. There were materials and supplies of many kinds to be secured from the War Department; there were men to be drilled in the bare rudiments of military life; non-commissioned officers and officers to be schooled, and a thousand and one other details. At first the men were drilled on foot, but soon horses were purchased and mounted drill commenced, much to the delight of many of the cowpunchers who by years of training had become averse to walking a hundred yards if they could throw their legs over a horse. There was no end to the {83} excitement when the horses arrived. Most of them were half-broken, but there were some that had never seen, much less felt, a saddle. The horses were broken to the delight of every one in camp, because training them meant bucking contests, and the more vicious the animal the better they liked it.

From simple drills and evolutions the men advanced to skirmish work and rapidly became real soldiers--not the polished, smartly uniformed military men of the Regular type, but hard fighters in slouch hats and brown canvas trousers with knotted handkerchiefs round their necks.

The commander of any military unit at that time had much to worry about. It depended solely on him personally whether his men were properly equipped, whether they had food; and when orders came to move whether they had anything to move on. The advice that he could get, if he was willing to listen to it, was lengthy and worthless, and the help he could get from Washington amounted to little or nothing.

In May the regiment was ordered to proceed to Tampa. After a lengthy struggle with the {84} railway authorities cars were put at the disposal of Colonel Wood, who left San Antonio on the 29th with three sections, the remaining four sections being left to proceed later in charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt. The confusion of getting started was reduced to a minimum by Wood, who had worked out a scheme for embarkation; but due to delay on the part of the railway authorities in providing proper facilities for handling the troops and equipment they were delayed four days. Everywhere along the line of travel they were cheered enthusiastically by people who came to greet the train on its arrival in towns and cities.

Tampa was in chaos. There seemed to be no order or system for the disembarkation of troops. Every one asked for information and no one could give it. Officers, men, railroad employees and longshoremen milled about in a welter of confusion. The troops were dumped out with no prearranged schedule on the part of the officers in charge of the camp. There were no arrangements for feeding the men and no wagons in which to haul impedimenta. In such conditions it {85} required all the native vigor characteristic of their Colonel to bring some sort of order--all the knowledge he had gained from his Indian campaign. And even then there was still needed an unconquerable spirit that did not know what impossibilities were.

After a few days at Tampa, Colonel Wood was notified that his command would start for destination unknown at once, leaving four troops and all the horses behind them. On the evening of June 7th notification came that they would leave from Port Tampa, nine miles away, the following morning, and that if the troops were not aboard the transport at that time they could not sail. No arrangements were made by the port authorities for the embarkation. No information could be obtained regarding transportation by rail to the port. There was no information regarding the transport that the troops were to use. In an official report made to the Secretary of War Colonel Roosevelt had the following remarks to make about the conditions that confronted them in Tampa:

". . . No information was given in advance {86} what transports we should take, or how we should proceed to get aboard, nor did any one exercise any supervision over the embarkation. Each regimental commander, so far as I know, was left to find out as best he could, after he was down at the dock, what transport had not been taken, and then to get his regiment aboard it, if he was able, before some other regiment got it. Our regiment was told to go to a certain switch and take a train for Port Tampa at twelve o'clock, midnight. The train never came. After three hours of waiting, we were sent to another switch, and finally at six o'clock in the morning got possession of some coal cars and came down in them. When we reached the quay where the embarkation was proceeding, everything was in utter confusion. The quay was piled with stores and swarming with thousands of men of different regiments, besides onlookers, etc. The Commanding General, when we at last found him, told Colonel Wood and myself that he did not know what ship we were to embark on, and that we must find Colonel Humphrey, the Quarter-master General. Colonel Humphrey was not in his office, and nobody knew where he was. The {87} commanders of the different regiments were busy trying to find him, while their troops waited in the trains, so as to discover the ships to which they were allotted--some of these ships being at the dock and some in mid-stream. After a couple of hours' search, Colonel Wood found Colonel Humphrey and was allotted a ship. Immediately afterward I found that it had already been allotted to two other regiments. It was then coming to the dock. Colonel Wood boarded it in midstream to keep possession, while I double-quicked the men down from the cars and got there just ahead of the other two regiments. One of these regiments, I was afterward informed, spent the next thirty-six hours in cars in consequence."

The conditions at Tampa provided material for a spirited exchange of letters and telegrams between General Miles, who had taken command, and Secretary of War Alger.

On June 4th, General Miles filed by telegraph the following report to the Secretary of War:

"Several of the volunteer regiments came here without uniforms; several came without arms, and some without blankets, tents, or camp equipage. {88} The 32d Michigan, which is among the best, came without arms. General Guy V. Henry reports that five regiments under his command are not fit to go into the field. There are over three hundred cars loaded with war material along the roads about Tampa. Stores are sent to the Quartermaster at Tampa, but the invoices and bills of lading have not been received, so that the officers are obliged to break open seals and hunt from car to car to ascertain whether they contain clothing, grain, balloon material, horse equipments, ammunition, siege guns, commissary stores, etc. Every effort is being made to bring order out of confusion. I request that rigid orders be given requiring the shipping officers to forward in advance complete invoices and bills of lading, with descriptive marks of every package, and the number and description of car in which shipped. To illustrate the embarrassment caused by present conditions, fifteen cars loaded with uniforms were sidetracked twenty-five miles from Tampa, and remained there for weeks while the troops were suffering for clothing. Five thousand rifles, which were discovered yesterday, were needed by {89} several regiments. Also the different parts of the siege train and ammunition for same, which will be required immediately on landing, are scattered through hundreds of cars on the sidetracks of the railroads. Notwithstanding these difficulties, this expedition will soon be ready to sail."

In answer to this dispatch was sent the following reply from Secretary Alger:

"Twenty thousand men ought to unload any number of cars and assort contents. There is much criticism about delay of expedition. Better leave a fast ship to bring balance of material needed, than delay longer."

This slight difference of opinion which a shrewd observer can discover between the lines was characteristic of the whole preparation of the United States army that undertook to carry on the war with Spain. As one remembers those days, or reads of them in detail, it seems as if every one did something wrong regularly, as if no one of ability was anywhere about. As a matter of fact, however, the organizing and shipping of a suddenly acquired expeditionary volunteer force has never been accomplished in any other way. The truth {90} of the matter is that it can never be run properly at the start for the simple reason that there is no organization fitted to carry out the details.

The officials in Washington who had to do with the army--good men in many cases, poor men in some cases--if they had been in office long had been handling a few hundred men here and there in the forts, on the plains, or at the regular military posts. They could no more be molded into a homogeneous whole than could the cowboys, stockbrokers, college athletes, and southern planters maneuver until they had been drilled.

To Colonel Wood, busy most of the hours of the day and night trying to get order out of chaos in his small part of the great rush, the whole episode was a graphic demonstration of the need of getting ready. Many years later a much-advertised politician of our land said that an army was not necessary since immediately upon the need for defense of our country a million farmers would leave their plows and leap to arms. To an officer trying to find a transport train in the middle of the night with a thousand hungry, tired, half-trained men under him such logic aught well have {91} caused a smile, if nothing worse. Leave his plow at such a call the American Citizen will--and by the millions, if need be. He has done just that in the last two years. He will leap to arms--to continue the rhetoric--but what can he do if he finds no arms, or if they do not exist and cannot be made for nine months?

But the thing was not new to Wood even in those days. As he talks of that period now he says that it was not so bad. There was food, rough, but still food, and enough. There were transports. It only needed that they be found. If you could not get uniforms of blue, take uniforms of tan. If you could not find sabers, go somewhere, in or out of the country, and buy them or requisition them and put in the charge later.

Yet, even so, no man in such a position, going through what he went through, worrying hour by hour, could fail to see the object lesson and take the first opportunity when peace was declared to begin to preach the necessity for getting ready for the next occasion. And it was largely due to Leonard Wood, as the world well knows, that what {92} little preparation was made in 1915 and 1916 in advance of the United States declaring war was made at all. It was the lessons acquired in the Spanish War and in the study of other wars that made of him the great prophet of preparedness.

For several days the troops remained aboard the transport in Tampa harbor awaiting orders. The heat and discomfort told upon the men, but on the evening of June 13th orders came to start and the next morning found them at sea. On the morning of the 20th the transport came off the Cuban coast; but it was not until the 22d that the welcome order for landing came. The troops landed at the squalid little village of Daiquiri in small boats, while the smaller war vessels shelled the town.

In the afternoon of the next day, the Rough Riders received orders to advance; and Wood, leading his regiment, pushed on so as to be sure of an engagement with the enemy the next morning. It was due to his energy that the Rough Riders did not miss the first fight. Under General Young's orders the Rough Riders took up a {93} position at the extreme left of the front. The next day the action of "Las Guasimas" began.

"Shoot--don't swear" growled Wood as the fighting began. He strolled about encouraging his men and urging them to action. Under his quiet, cool direction they advanced slowly, forcing the enemy back, and finally driving him to his second line of defense. Soon the Rough Riders' right joined the left of the main body and in a concerted attack the Spaniards were routed, leaving much of their equipment in their hasty retreat.

At this juncture it was reported to Roosevelt, whose detachment was separate from that of Wood, that Wood had been killed. Roosevelt immediately began taking over the command of the entire regiment, since it naturally devolved upon him. As he was consolidating his troops he came upon Wood himself very much alive.

Major-General Joseph Wheeler made the following report of the Rough Riders:

"Colonel Wood's Regiment was on the extreme left of the line, and too far-distant for me to be a personal witness of the individual conduct of his officers and men; but the magnificent and brave {94} work done by the regiment, under the lead of Colonel Wood, testifies to his courage and skill. The energy and determination of this officer had been marked from the moment he reported to me at Tampa, Fla., and I have abundant evidence of his brave and good conduct on the field, and I recommend him for consideration of the Government."

On the 25th, General Young was stricken by the fever and Wood took charge of the brigade on the 30th, leaving Roosevelt in command of the Rough Riders. The afternoon of the 30th brought orders to march on Santiago, and the morning of July 1st found them in position three miles from the city, with Leonard Wood commanding the second dismounted cavalry brigade. During the next two days, the enemy fought fiercely to regain his lost positions, but the cool persistence of the American troops forced him constantly backward.

In endorsing Wood's report of this action, General Wheeler said, "He showed energy, courage, and good judgment. I heretofore recommended him for promotion to a Brigadier-General. He {95} deserves the highest commendation. He was under the observation and direction of myself and of my staff during the battle."

After a short siege the Spanish command capitulated on the afternoon of July 17th and the American forces entered Santiago.

Wood's promotion to Brigadier-General of the United States Volunteers came at once, and Roosevelt was made Colonel and placed in command of the 2d Cavalry Brigade.

The condition of our forces at this time, struggling against the unaccustomed and virulent dangers of the tropics, was pitiable. The "Round Robin" incident in which the commanding officers of the various divisions in the command reported to Major-General W. R. Shafter, that "the Army must be moved at once, or it will perish," has become a part of the record of the history of those times. Whether the sickness and disease they suffered could have been prevented became a matter of great controversy.

This "Round Robin" was a document signed by practically all general officers present, in order to bring to the attention of the War Department {96} the conditions existing in the army that had captured Santiago showing that it was suffering severely from malaria and yellow fever; that these men must be replaced; and that if they were not replaced thousands of lives would be lost. It was sent because instructions from Washington clearly indicated that the War Department did not understand the conditions, and it was feared that delay would cause enormous loss of life. The men had been in mud and water--the yellow fever country--for weeks and were thoroughly infected with malaria. Although he had signed the "Round Robin"' with the other officers General Wood later on gave the following testimony before the War Investigation Committee:

"We had never served in that climate, so peculiarly deadly from the effects of malaria, and in this respect my opinions have changed very much since the close of the war. If I had been called before you in the first week of August, I might have been disposed to have answered a little differently in some respects. I have been there ever since, and have seen regiments come to Cuba in perfect health and go into tents with floors and {97} with flies camped up on high hills, given boiled water, and have seen them have practically the identical troubles we had during the campaign. The losses may not have been as heavy, as we are organized to take them into hospitals protected from the sun which seemed to be a depressing cause. All the immune regiments serving in my department since the war have been at one time or another unfit for service. I have had all the officers of my staff repeatedly too sick for duty. I don't think that any amount of precaution or preparation, in addition to what we had, would have made any practical difference in the sickness of the troops of the army of invasion. This is a candid opinion, and an absolutely frank one. If I had answered this question in August, without the experience I have had since August, I might have been disposed to attribute more to the lack of tentage than I do now; but I think the food, while lacking necessarily in variety, was ample."

Only a few years later the explanation of yellow fever transmission became clear to all the world. This discovery and the definite methods of {98} protection against its spread and the spread of malaria were largely the result of Wood's administrative ability and his knowledge of medicine. For it was as the result of studies and experiments conducted under his direct supervision that it became known that yellow fever was the result of the bite of the mosquito and not of bad food or low, marshy country or bad air or any of the other factors which had so long been supposed to be its cause. The taking of Santiago practically ended the Spanish War. But for the military commander of the City of Santiago it began a new and epoch-making work.

{99}