Chapter III. The Fruits Of Justification, Or The Merit Of Good Works
The principal fruit of justification, according to the Tridentine Council,[1220] is the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state of sanctifying grace.
Merit (meritum), as we have explained in the first part of this treatise,[1221] is that property of a good work which entitles the doer to a reward (praemium, merces).
Ethics and theology distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the term (meritum adaequatum sive de condigno), and (2) congruous merit or quasi-merit (meritum inadaequatum sive de congruo). Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return. It is measured by commutative justice and confers a strict claim to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of strict proportion between service and recompense, confers no such claim except on grounds of equity.[1222]
In this treatise we are concerned with merit only in the theological sense of the term, i.e. supernatural merit. We shall consider (1) its Existence,[1223] (2) its Requisites,[1224] and (3) its Objects.[1225]
Section 1. The Existence Of Merit
1. Heretical Errors and the Teaching of the Church.—a) The medieval Beguins and Beghards held that man is able to attain such a perfect state of holiness here below as no longer to require an increase of grace or good works.[1226] Luther, holding that justification consists in the covering up of sin and the external imputation of the justice of Christ, consistently though falsely asserted that “the just man sins in every good work,”[1227] that “a good work, no matter how well performed, is a venial sin,”[1228] and that “every work of the just deserves damnation and is mortally sinful, if it be considered as it really is in the judgment of God.”[1229] Calvin rejected good works as “impurities and defilements,”[1230] which God covers with the cloak of the merits of Jesus Christ and which He sometimes rewards with temporal blessings but never [pg 400] with eternal life. Modern Protestantism has given up or at least attenuated these harsh doctrines.[1231]
b) The Church had defined her teaching on this point centuries before the time of the “Reformers.” Thus the Second Council of Orange declared as early as 529: “Good works, when performed, deserve a reward; but grace, which is a free gift, precedes good works and is a necessary condition of them.”[1232] The Fourth Lateran Council reiterated this doctrine: “Not only virgins and those who practice continence, but the married also, who please God by having the right faith and performing good works, deserve to obtain eternal happiness.”[1233] The Tridentine Council goes into the matter at length in the sixteenth Chapter of its Sixth Session, where we read inter alia: “And for this reason life eternal is to be proposed to those working well unto the end and hoping in God, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward which is according to the promise of God Himself to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits.”[1234]
The same Council formally condemned the Lutheran position as heretical: “If anyone saith that in every good work the just man sins at least venially, or, which is more intolerable still, mortally, and consequently deserves eternal punishments; and that for this cause only he is not damned that God does not impute those works unto salvation; let him be anathema.”[1235] The positive teaching of the Church may be gathered from the following condemnation: “If anyone saith that the just ought not, for their good works done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if so be that they persevere to the end in well-doing and in keeping the commandments; let him be anathema.”[1236] The existence of merit in the true and proper sense of the term is specially emphasized as follows: “If anyone saith that ... the justified, by the good works which he performs through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, does not truly merit increase of grace...; let him be anathema.”[1237] The quietistic errors of Michael de Molinos [pg 402] were condemned by Pope Innocent XI, Nov. 20, 1687.[1238]
2. The Meritoriousness of Good Works Demonstrated from Scripture and Tradition.—Both Holy Scripture and Tradition employ opus bonum and meritum as reciprocal or correlative terms.
a) In the Old Testament the good deeds of the just are often declared to be meritorious in the sight of God. Cfr. Wisd. V, 16: “But the just shall live for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord.”[1239] Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “Be not afraid to be justified even to death, for the reward of God continueth for ever.”[1240] The New Testament teaching culminates in the “eight beatitudes,” each of which is accompanied by a special reward. After enumerating them all, with the promises attached to each, our Divine Saviour significantly adds: “Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is very great in heaven.”[1241]
St. Paul, who so strongly insists on the absolute gratuitousness of Christian grace, nevertheless acknowledges the existence of merits to which a reward is due from God. Cfr. Rom. II, 6 sq.: “[God] will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who according [pg 403] to patience in good work, seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.”[1242] 2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day, and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming.”[1243] 1 Cor. III, 8: “Every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labor.”[1244] Col. III, 23 sq.: “Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart, as to the Lord, and not to men, knowing that you shall receive of the Lord the reward of inheritance.”[1245] The most eloquent exponent of the necessity of good works is St. James, who also insists on their meritoriousness: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.”[1246] In the Apocalypse Jesus says: “Be thou faithful until death, and I will give thee the crown of life.”[1247]
b) The teaching of the Fathers is an effective commentary on the Scriptural doctrine just expounded, [pg 404] as may be seen from their homilies reproduced in the Roman Breviary.
St. Ignatius of Antioch says: “Suffer me to be eaten by the beasts, through whom I can attain to God.”[1248] St. Irenæus: “Precious should be to us the crown which we gain in battle, ... and the more we obtain it by combat, the more precious it is.”[1249] St. Ambrose: “Is it not evident that the reward and punishment of merits endure after death?”[1250] St. Augustine: “Eternal life contains the whole reward in the promise of which we rejoice; nor can the reward precede desert, nor be given to a man before he is worthy of it. What can be more unjust than this, and what is more just than God? We should not then demand the reward before we deserve to get it.”[1251] And again: “As death is given, so to speak, to reward the merit of sin, so eternal life is given to reward the merit of justice, ... and hence it is also called reward in many Scriptural passages.”[1252]
c) Theologically the meritoriousness of good works is based on the providence of God. There must be some sort of sanction to enforce the divine laws,—not only the natural law (lex naturae), [pg 405] but, a fortiori, the “law of grace” (lex gratiae), as the supernatural order is so much more important than the natural.
α) By the good works which he performs in the state of sanctifying grace, and with the aid of actual graces (in gratia et ex gratia), man acquires a twofold merit,—he helps to execute the divine plan of governance in regard to his fellow-creatures and assists in furthering the external glory of God, which is the ultimate purpose of creation. For this he is entitled to a double reward, just as the sinner is deserving of a double punishment for the injury he does to his fellowmen and the dishonor he reflects upon his Creator.[1253]
It is objected against this argument that our supernatural merits, being finite, are in no proportion to the possession and enjoyment of an Infinite Good. This objection vanishes in the light of the following considerations: (1) Sanctifying grace is a kind of deificatio, which raises man above himself to a quasi-divine dignity that colors all his actions.[1254] (2) The ability of the justified to perform supernaturally good works is based entirely upon the infinite merits of Jesus Christ.[1255] (3) The Infinite Good is possessed by the creature, not in an infinite but in a merely finite manner. Hence there is a due proportion between good works and merit.[1256]
One difficulty still remains, viz.: By what title do infants who die in the state of baptismal innocence attain to eternal beatitude, which they have been unable to merit? We answer: The just man has two distinct claims to Heaven, one as a child of God,[1257] and another as a laborer in His vineyard. Baptized infants who have not yet arrived at the use of reason, possess only the first claim, while adult Christians who lead a good life enjoy also the titulus mercedis and consequently are entitled to a richer reward. Both claims ultimately rest on the merits of Jesus Christ.[1258]
β) What we have said is sufficient to disprove the groundless assertion that the Catholic doctrine concerning the meritoriousness of good works derogates from the merits of Christ and fosters “self-righteousness.” Would it not be far more derogatory to the honor of our Saviour to assume that He failed to obtain for those for whom He suffered and died, a limited capacity for gaining merits? Does it in any way impair the dignity of God as the causa prima to assume that He communicates to His creatures a limited causality, by which they are enabled to act as true causae secundae, instead of being mere causae occasionales, as the Occasionalists assert?[1259] As regards the other charge, no true Catholic is guilty of “self-righteousness” because he regards his good works [pg 407] as “fruits of justification,” owing purely to grace. The “self-righteousness” of which Luther speaks is incompatible with the virtue of humility. The faithful Christian, according to St. Paul, may safely rejoice over his merits, because the uncertainty of justification and the consciousness that his good works are but limited at best, are a sufficient protection against self-righteousness and presumption.[1260]
3. Explanation of the Catholic Doctrine.—Though the Tridentine Council merely defined in general terms that all good works performed in the state of sanctifying grace are meritorious,[1261] it is theologically certain that the merit due to good works is the merit of condignity.
a) According to Pallavicini[1262] the Fathers of Trent without exception were convinced that the merit inherent in good works is a meritum de condigno, based upon divine justice, and they purposely employed the term vere to exclude that quasi-merit which in the technical terminology of the Schools is called meritum de congruo.[1263] They refrained from expressly employing the term meritum de condigno, because meritum verum is a plain and adequate term, and for this additional reason that they wished to avoid certain theological controversies [pg 408] regarding the nature of the meritum de condigno and its requisites.[1264]
b) We need not enter into these controversies to understand that condign merit supposes an equality between service and reward. The proposition can be proved from Sacred Scripture by an indirect argument. The meritum de condigno is based on a strict claim of justice, not on mere equity. Now the Bible leaves no doubt that God meant to make himself a debtor to man in strict justice. Cfr. Heb. VI, 10: “For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work.”[1265] 2 Tim. IV, 8: “... there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming.”[1266] James I, 12: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.”[1267] That there must be a condignitas between service and reward is clearly apparent from such texts as these:—Wis. III, 5: “... God hath tried them and found them worthy of himself.”[1268] 2 Thess. I, 4 sq.: “... in all your persecutions and tribulations, which you endure, for an example [as a token] of the just judgment of God, that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which also you suffer.”[1269] Apoc. III, 4: “... they shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy.”[1270] Not merely as their benefactor but as the just judge, Christ will say [pg 409] to the elect on judgment day: “Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat....”[1271] Justly therefore is sanctifying grace, as the principium dignificativum operum, called the “seed of God,”[1272] because it contains a celestial reward even as an acorn contains the oak. True, St. Thomas, to whom we are indebted for this simile,[1273] in another part of the Summa[1274] defends the theological axiom: “Deus punit circa condignum et remunerat ultra condignum,” but he does not mean to deny the equality between service and reward, but merely to exalt the generosity that prompts God to bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than they deserve. Cfr. Luke VI, 38: “Give, and it shall be given to you: good measure and pressed down and shaken together and running over shall they give into your bosom.”[1275]
Section 2. The Requisites Of Merit
As we are dealing with the “fruits of justification,” it becomes necessary to ascertain the requisites or conditions of true merit. There are seven such; four have reference to the meritorious work itself, two to the agent who performs it, and one to God who gives the reward.
1. Requisites of Merit on the Part of the Meritorious Work.—A work, to be meritorious, must be morally good, free, performed with the assistance of actual grace, and inspired by a supernatural motive.
a) As every evil deed implies demerit and is deserving of punishment, so the notion of merit supposes a morally good work (opus honestum).
Cfr. Eph. VI, 8: “Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man shall do, the same shall he receive from the Lord.”[1276] 2 Cor. V, 10: “We must all be manifested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.”[1277] There are no morally indifferent works in individuo, i.e. practically; and if there were, they could be neither meritorious nor [pg 411] demeritorious, but would become meritorious in proportion as they are made morally good by means of a “good intention.” It would be absolutely wrong to ascribe merit only to the more perfect works of supererogation (opera supererogatoria), such as the vow of perpetual chastity, excluding all works of mere obligation, such as the faithful observance of the commandments. Being morally good, the works of obligation are also meritorious, because goodness and meritoriousness are correlative terms.[1278] Whether the mere omission of an evil act is in itself meritorious, is doubtful.[1279] But most theologians are agreed in holding that the external work, as such, adds no merit to the internal act, except in so far as it reacts on the will and sustains and intensifies its operation. This and similar questions properly belong to moral theology.
b) The second requisite of merit is moral liberty (libertas indifferens ad actum), that is to say, freedom from both external and internal compulsion. This has been dogmatically defined against Jansenius.[1280]
That there can be no merit without liberty is clearly inculcated by Sacred Scripture. Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 17: “For if I do this willingly, I have a reward.”[1281] Matth. XIX, 17: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”[1282] [pg 412] “Where there is compulsion,” says St. Jerome, “there is neither a crown nor damnation.”[1283] The morality of an act depends entirely on its being an actus humanus. Now no act is truly “human” unless it be freely performed. Consequently, freedom of choice is an indispensable condition of moral goodness and therefore also of merit.
What kind of liberty is necessary to enable the will to acquire merit? Theologians answer by saying that it is libertas contradictionis sive exercitii. If I do a good deed which I am free to do or not to do, I perform a morally good and therefore meritorious work. As regards the libertas specificationis, (that freedom by which a person may act thus or otherwise, e.g. give alms to one applicant in preference to another, or mortify himself in this or that particular manner), there can be no doubt that, whatever the choice made, the action is always good and meritorious. However, theologians have excogitated a hypothetical case in which an action may be physically free without being meritorious. It is when one is compelled to do a certain thing and is free only in so far as he is able to choose between two actions exactly equal in moral worth. This would be the case, for instance, if he had to pay a debt of ten dollars and were left free to pay it either in [pg 413] coin or in currency. The more common opinion is that in a case of this kind there would be a lack of that liberty which is necessary to render an act morally good and therefore meritorious.[1284]
c) The third requisite of merit is actual grace. Its necessity is evident from the fact that, to be meritorious, an act must be supernatural and consequently cannot be performed without the aid of prevenient and coöperating grace.[1285]
d) Merit further requires a supernatural motive, for the reason that every good work must be supernatural, both as regards object and circumstances (ex obiecto et circumstantiis), and the end for which it is performed (ex fine). In determining the necessary qualities of this motive, however, theologians differ widely.
α) A considerable number, mostly of the Thomist persuasion, demand the motive of theological charity, and consequently regard the state of charity (caritas habitualis sive status caritatis et gratiae) as essential for the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state of grace, even if they are performed from some other, truly supernatural though inferior motive, such as obedience, the fear of God, etc. This rigorous school is constrained to raise the question whether every single good work, to be supernaturally meritorious, must proceed from an act of divine charity (toties quoties), or [pg 414] whether the virtual influence of one act is sufficient to endow a series of subsequent acts with meritoriousness. Only a few Thomist theologians[1286] defend the first-mentioned theory. The majority[1287] hold that the influxus virtualis caritatis is sufficient. This view is vigorously defended by Cardinal Bellarmine, who says: “It is not enough to make a general good intention at the beginning of a year, or month, or day, by which all future actions are referred to God; but it is necessary to refer each particular act to God before it is performed.”[1288] The advocates of this theory base their opinion on certain Scriptural and Patristic texts, and especially on St. Thomas, whose teaching they misunderstand.[1289]
The dogmatic question whether good works can be meritorious without being inspired by supernatural charity, has nothing to do with the moral problem whether there is an obligation to make an act of charity from time to time, except in so far as habitual charity,—i.e. the state of charity, which is always required for merit, nay even for the preservation of sanctifying grace,—cannot be permanently sustained unless renewed from time to time and effectuated by a fresh act of that virtue.[1290] St. [pg 415] Alphonsus teaches that every man is obliged to make an act of charity at least once a month, but he is contradicted by other eminent moralists. In practice it is well to insist on frequent acts of charity because such acts not only confirm and preserve the state of grace, but render our good works incomparably more meritorious in the sight of God. Hence, too, the importance of making a “good intention” every morning before beginning the day's work.[1291]
β) There is a second group of very eminent theologians, including Suarez,[1292] Vasquez,[1293] De Lugo, and Ballerini, who hold that, to be meritorious, the good works of a just man, who has habitual charity, need only conform to the divine law, no special motive being required. These writers base their teaching on the Tridentine decree which says: “For this is that crown of justice which the Apostle declared was, after his fight and course, laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the Just Judge, and not only to him, but also to all that love His coming. For, whereas Jesus Christ Himself continually infuses His virtue into the said justified,—as the head into the members and the vine into the branches,—and this virtue always precedes, and accompanies, and follows their good works, which without it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God (can. 2), we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified to prevent their being accounted to have, by those very works which have been done in God, fully satisfied the divine law according to the state of this life, and to have truly merited eternal life, [pg 416] to be obtained also in its [due] time, if so be, however, that they depart in grace.”[1294] This teaching is in harmony with Scripture. The Bible nowhere requires an act of charity to make good works meritorious for Heaven. In the “eight beatitudes”[1295] our Lord Himself promises eternal glory for works which are not all works of charity, nor even dictated by charity, either formal or virtual. When He was asked: “Master, what good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?”[1296] he did not answer with Bellarmine: “Steep all thy works in the motive of charity,” but declared: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”[1297] And when requested to specify, He simply cited the ordinary precepts of the Decalogue.[1298] We also know that at the Last Judgment He will receive the elect into the “kingdom of His Father” solely in consideration of the works of mercy they have done.[1299]
Theological reasoning lends its support to this view. If good works performed without the motive of charity were not supernaturally meritorious, this would be attributable to one of three causes. Either the just would [pg 417] sin by doing good; or good works performed without charity would not be deserving of eternal beatitude; or, finally, there would be no strict equality between service and reward. All three of these suppositions are untenable. The first would lead to Bajanism or Jansenism.[1300] The second and third overlook the fact that the requisite proportion (condignitas) between service and reward is furnished by sanctifying grace or habitual charity, which, as deificatio, adoptive sonship, and union with the Holy Ghost, actually supplies that for which the motivum caritatis is demanded.
We might ask the advocates of the more rigorous opinion, whence the act of charity which they demand for every meritorious work, derives its peculiar proportionality or condignitas with the beatific vision. Surely not from itself, because as an act it is merely primus inter pares, without in any essential respect excelling other motives. There is no alternative but to attribute it to that quasi-divine dignity which is imparted to the just man and his works by sanctifying grace.
For these reasons present-day theology regards the second theory as sufficiently well established and the faithful are largely guided by it in practice.[1301]
2. Requisites of Merit on the Part of the Agent who Merits.—The agent who merits must be a wayfarer and in the state of sanctifying grace.
a) The wayfaring state (status viae) is merely another name for life on earth. Death as the [pg 418] natural, though not essentially necessary limit of life, closes the time of meriting. Nothing is more clearly taught in Holy Scripture than that we must sow in this world if we desire to reap in the next.[1302]
b) The second requisite is the state of sanctifying grace. Only the just can be “sons of God” and “heirs of heaven.”[1303] Cfr. John XV, 4: “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in me.”[1304] Rom. VIII, 17: “And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ.”[1305]
Does the degree of sanctifying grace existing in the soul exert a decisive influence on the amount of merit due to the good works performed? This question can be easily solved on the theological principle that the supernatural dignity of the soul increases in proportion to its growth in sanctifying grace. Vasquez holds that, other things being equal, one who is holier gains no greater merit by performing a given work than one who is less [pg 419] holy.[1306] All other theologians[1307] hold with St. Thomas[1308] that the meritoriousness of a good deed is larger in proportion to the godlike dignity of the agent, which in turn is measured by the degree of sanctifying grace in the soul. This explains why God, in consideration of the greater holiness of some saints who are especially dear to Him, often deigns through their intercession to grant favors which He refuses to others.[1309]
3. The Requisites of Merit on the Part of God.—Merit requires but one thing on the part of God, viz.: that He accept the good work in actu secundo as deserving of reward. Since, however, theologians are not agreed on this point, we are dealing merely with a more or less well-founded opinion.
Though the good works of the just derive a special intrinsic value from the godlike dignity of adoptive sonship, and, consequently, in actu primo, are truly meritorious prior to and apart from their acceptance by God, yet human service and divine remuneration are separated by such a wide gulf that, in order to make a good deed meritorious in actu secundo, the divine acceptance and promise of reward must be expressly superadded.
In regard to the relation between service and reward Catholic theologians are divided into three schools.
The Scotists[1310] hold that the condignitas of a good work [pg 420] rests entirely on God's gratuitous promise and free acceptance, without which even the most heroic act would be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it even naturally good works may become meritorious. This rather shallow theory almost completely loses sight of the godlike dignity peculiar to the just in their capacity of “adopted children of God” and “temples of the Holy Ghost,” and is unable to account for such important Biblical terms as “crown of justice,” “prize of victory,” “just judge,” etc.
Suarez and his school contend that there is such a perfectly balanced equality between merit and reward that God is obliged in strict justice (ex obligatione iustitiae), prior to and apart from any formal act of acceptance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the beatific vision. This view is scarcely tenable because there is no common basis on which to construe a relation of strict justice between the Creator and His creatures,[1311] and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that “The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come.”[1312]
Hence we prefer to hold with Lessius,[1313] Vasquez,[1314] and De Lugo[1315] that the condignitas or equality existing between merit and reward, owes its origin both to the intrinsic value of the good work itself and to the free acceptance and gratuitous promise of God. This solution duly respects the intrinsic value of merit in actu primo, without derogating from the sublime dignity of God, who rewards good works not because He is obliged to do so [pg 421] by the merits of a mere creature, but solely because He is bound by His own truthfulness and fidelity. Thus God's justice towards His creatures is placed upon a free basis, and there is no violation of justice (iniuria) on His part. “From the fact that our actions have no merit except on the supposition that God so ordained,” says St. Thomas, “it does not follow that God is simply our debtor; He is His own debtor, i.e. He owes it to Himself to see that His commands are obeyed.”[1316] This teaching can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr. James I, 12: “He shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.”[1317] It is reechoed by St. Augustine: “God is made our debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but because it pleased Him to promise us something. For it is in a different sense that we say to a man: You are indebted to me because I have given you something, and: You owe this to me because you have promised it. To God we never say: Give back to me because I have given to Thee. What have we given to God, since it is from Him that we have received whatever we are and whatever good we possess? We have therefore given Him nothing.... In this manner, therefore, may we demand of God, by saying: Give me what Thou hast promised, because we have done what Thou didst command, and it is Thyself that hast done it because Thou hast aided our labors.”[1318] The Tridentine [pg 422] Council seems to endorse this view when it says: “Life eternal is to be proposed to those ... hoping in God ... as a reward which is, according to the promise of God Himself, to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits.”[1319]
Section 3. The Objects Of Merit
After defining the existence of merit the Tridentine Council enumerates its objects as follows: “If anyone saith that the justified, by the good works which he performs, ... does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,—if it be so, however, that he depart in grace,—and also an increase of glory: let him be anathema.”[1320] Hence merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an increase of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; and (3) an increase of that glory. The expression “vere mereri” shows that all three of these objects can be merited in the true and strict sense of the term (de condigno). This is, however, no more than a theologically certain conclusion.
1. Increase of Sanctifying Grace.—The first grace of justification (gratia prima) can never be merited;[1321] hence the meaning of the above-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be increased by good works. This increase is technically [pg 424] called gratia secunda. All Scriptural texts which assert that sanctifying grace is unequal in different individuals, also prove that it can be increased or augmented by the performance of meritorious works.[1322]
a) No adult person can merit the first grace of assistance (gratia prima actualis), nor any one of the series of actual graces which follow it, and by which justification ultimately comes to pass. They are all purely gratuitous. Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (gratia prima habitualis) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner preparing for justification. This is the express teaching of Trent: “But we are therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things which precede justification—whether faith or works—merit the grace itself of justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now by works; otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace.”[1323] To deny this would not only imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace (because if the first grace given before active justification could be strictly merited, this would necessarily involve the gratia prima actualis), but it would also start a vicious circle (because the gratia prima habitualis is an indispensable condition of merit). This explains why St. Paul and St. Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both of the first grace of assistance and the grace of justification proper.[1324] “This grace of Christ,” says St. Augustine, “without which neither infants nor adults can be saved, [pg 425] is not bestowed for any merits, but is given freely, on account of which it is also called grace. ‘Being justified,’ says the Apostle, ‘freely through His blood.’ ”[1325]
In the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the question, raised by Vasquez, whether perfect contrition justifies the sinner merely per modum dispositionis or per modum causae formalis. Both contrition and charity, be they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose the soul for justification.[1326] Hence, no matter how perfect, neither is capable of effecting justification itself by way of merit (merendo), nay, of entering even partially, as Vasquez would have it, into the formal cause of justification, because, according to the Tridentine Council, sanctifying grace and not perfect contrition is the unica causa formalis of justification.[1327]
b) In connection with the dogma just explained theologians discuss the question whether a just man may strictly (de condigno) merit the actual graces which God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theologians commonly hold[1328] that merely sufficient graces may be merited de condigno, not so efficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would necessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (donum perseverantiae), [pg 426] which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. Assuming that the justified could by good works strictly merit the prima gratia efficax (an impossible hypothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious grace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth grace—and ultimately to the final grace of perseverance, which, in matter of fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict right to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from righteousness.[1329] For this reason the Tridentine Council mentions neither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of merit.[1330]
2. Eternal Life or Heavenly Glory.—The second object of merit is eternal life. The dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given above.[1331] Eternal life is described by the Tridentine Council[1332] both as a grace and as a reward.
a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Section the same Council[1333] enumerates four apparently separate and distinct objects of merit, viz.: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, and increase of glory. Why the distinction between “eternal life” and the “attainment of eternal life”? Does this imply a twofold reward, and consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was the intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently coincides with the right to the payment of the [pg 427] same. An unattainable eternal life would be a chimera.[1334] Nevertheless, the distinction is not superfluous, since the attainment of eternal life does not coincide with the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then depends upon the condition of the soul: “si tamen in gratia decesserit” (provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod also wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying grace ipso facto entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired merits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal sin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new justification.[1335]
b) A close analysis of the Tridentine canon under review gives rise to another difficulty. Can the gloria prima be merited? In defining the gratia secunda as an object of strict merit, the Council expressly excludes the gratia prima. It makes no such distinction in regard to glory, but names both “eternal life” (gloria prima) and “increase of glory” (gloria secunda) as objects of merit. This naturally suggests the query: Why and to what extent can the just man merit the gloria prima, seeing that he is unable to merit the gratia prima? Some theologians[1336] contend that the justified are entitled to the gloria prima only as a heritage (titulo haereditatis), never as a reward (titulo mercedis). Because of its intimate causal connection with the gratia prima, which is beyond [pg 428] the reach of merit, the gloria prima, they argue, cannot be regarded as an object of merit except on the assumption that the merits which precede justification confer a claim to the gloria prima. This assumption is false, because without sanctifying grace no condign merits can be acquired.[1337] In spite of this difficulty, however, most theologians[1338] hold that, unlike the gratia prima, the gloria prima may under certain conditions be an object of strict merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is not a necessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good works, while the state of grace is, the former may positis ponendis be an effect of the meritum de congruo, though the latter may not. A mere statement of the problem shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we distinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of two distinct hypotheses. It is generally agreed that infants dying in the state of baptismal grace owe that grace, and the state of glory which they enjoy in Heaven, solely to God's mercy and have no claim to beatitude other than that of heredity (titulus hereditatis). Adults who preserve their baptismal innocence until death, manifestly cannot merit the gloria prima by their good works, because they already possess a legal title to it through Baptism.[1339] It follows that their good works increase, but do not merit, the gloria prima, to which these souls are already entitled titulo haereditatis. The case is quite different with catechumens and Christians guilty of mortal sin, who are justified by an act of perfect contrition before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament of Penance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that they merit for themselves de condigno, not [pg 429] indeed the first grace of justification, but the gloria prima, because perfect contrition, being an opus operans, at the very moment of its infusion becomes an opus meritorium entitled to eternal glory.[1340] As regards the great majority of adult Catholics who, because of defective preparation, never get beyond imperfect contrition (attritio), and therefore are not justified until they actually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe whatever grace they possess and whatever glory they have a claim to, entirely to the opus operatum of the Sacrament.[1341]
3. Increase of Heavenly Glory.—The third object of merit, according to the Tridentine Council, is “increase of glory.” This must evidently correspond to an increase of grace, which in its turn is conditioned upon the performance of additional good works. That there is a causal connection between meritorious works performed on earth and the glory enjoyed in Heaven is clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. XVI, 27: “For the Son of man shall ... render to every man according to his works.”[1342] 1 Cor. III, 8: “And every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labor.”[1343] A [pg 430] further argument may be derived from the unequal apportionment of glory to the elect in Heaven.[1344] This inequality is based on inequality of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact that grace can be augmented by good works. Consequently, the inequality of glory depends ultimately on good works.[1345]
4. Note on the Meritum de Congruo.—Congruous, as distinguished from condign merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a quasi-claim based on equity (ex quadam aequitate, congruentia, decentia).
Hence congruous merit and condign merit are not species of the same genus, but merely analogous terms. Because of the ambiguity of the word “equity” Dominicus Soto, Becanus, and a few other Scholastics rejected the use of the term meritum de congruo in theology. But this was a mistake. The Fathers engaged in the Semipelagian controversy, notably St. Augustine,[1346] did not assert that the justifying faith of the sinner is entirely without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are identical with those of condign merit[1347] in all respects except one,—the meritum de congruo does not require the state of grace.
a) According to the common opinion, from which but few theologians dissent,[1348] a Christian in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment he [pg 431] begins to coöperate with supernatural grace, merit de congruo by good works, and obtain by prayer the dispositions necessary for justification, and ultimately justification itself.
“Prayer relies on mercy,” says St. Thomas, “condign merit on justice. And therefore man obtains from the divine mercy many things by prayer which he does not merit in strict justice.”[1349] This teaching is based partly on Holy Scripture and partly on the writings of St. Augustine, and is confirmed by certain utterances of the Council of Trent. By conscientiously preparing himself with the aid of actual grace, the sinner probably merits an additional claim (in equity) to justification. Cfr. Ps. L, 19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.”[1350] Dan. IV, 24: “Redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor: perhaps he [God] will forgive thy offences.”[1351] St. Augustine says: “The remission of sins itself is not without some merit, if faith asks for it. Nor is that faith entirely unmeritorious by which the publican was moved to say: ‘God, be merciful to me, a sinner,’ and then went away justified through the merit of faithful humility.”[1352]
b) By good works the just may merit for themselves, not in strict justice (de condigno), but as a matter of equity (de congruo), final perseverance, conversion from mortal sin, spiritual favors for others, and also such temporal blessings as may be conducive to eternal salvation.
α) It is a theologically certain conclusion, accepted by all theologians without exception, that the grace of final perseverance (donum perseverantiae) cannot be merited in the strict sense (de condigno). Most authors hold, however, that it can be merited de congruo. This meritum is technically called meritum de congruo fallibili. Those who deny that it can be merited at all, admit that it can be infallibly obtained by fervent and unremitting prayer.[1353]
β) It is impossible to answer with anything like certainty the question whether the just man is able to merit for himself in advance the grace of conversion against the eventuality of a future lapse into mortal sin. Following the lead of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas takes a negative view,[1354] on the ground that mortal sin interrupts the state of grace and annihilates all former merits. In another passage of his writings, however, the Angelic Doctor says: “There are two kinds of merit, one based on justice, and this is called condign; and another based solely upon mercy, and this is called congruous. Of the latter St. Paul says that it is just, i.e. congruous, that a man who has performed many good works should merit.... And in this wise God does not forget our work and [pg 433] love.”[1355] Scotus,[1356] Bonaventure,[1357] and Suarez[1358] regard this as “a pious and probable opinion,” well supported by Holy Scripture. The prophet Jehu said to Josaphat, King of Juda: “Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord; but good works are found in thee.”[1359] To this argument add the following consideration: If previous mortal sin does not prevent those acts whereby man is disposed for justification from being at least to a limited extent meritorious, there is no reason to assume that merits cancelled by subsequent mortal sin will not be imputed to the sinner, with due regard, of course, to a certain proportion between past merits and future sins.[1360] To pray for the grace of conversion against the eventuality of future mortal sin, is always good and useful,[1361] because it cannot but please God to know that we sincerely desire to be restored to His friendship if we should ever have the misfortune of losing it.[1362]
γ) The just man may congruously merit for others [pg 434] whatever he is able to merit for himself, e.g. the grace of conversion, final perseverance, and also the first prevenient grace (gratia prima praeveniens), which no man in the state of original sin is able to merit for himself.[1363] The reason for this, according to St. Thomas, is the intimate relation of friendship which sanctifying grace establishes between the just man and God.[1364] However, as Sylvius rightly observes, it is not in the power of the just to obtain by this friendship favors which would involve the abrogation of the divinely established order of salvation. Such a favor would be, for example, the justification of a sinner without the medium of grace, or of a child without the agency of Baptism. An unreasonable petition deserves no consideration, even if made by a friend. What may be obtained by the merit of good works may be even more effectively obtained by prayer for others. The Apostle St. James teaches: “Pray for one another that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth much.”[1365] This consoling truth is confirmed by the dogma of the Communion of Saints, by many illustrious examples from the Bible[1366] and ecclesiastical history,[1367] and by the traditional practice of the Church in praying God to give strength and perseverance to the faithful and the grace of conversion to the heathen and the sinner.[1368]
δ) A final question remains to be answered: Can the just congruously merit such temporal blessings as good health, a comfortable living, and success in business? They can, but only in so far as these favors are conducive to eternal salvation; for otherwise they would not be graces. St. Thomas seems to go even further than this by describing temporal favors as objects of condign merit when they are conducive to salvation, and of congruous merit when they bear no relation to that end.[1369] We have no space left to enter into an argument on this point, but in conclusion wish to call attention to two important facts: first, that prayer is more effective than good works in obtaining temporal as well as spiritual favors; and secondly, that we should not strive with too much anxiety for earthly goods, but direct our thoughts, desires, prayers, and actions to God, the Infinite Good, who has promised to be our “exceeding great reward.”[1370]
Readings:—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1 sqq.—Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 8, art. 1-5.—*Bellarmine, De Iustificatione, V, 1-22.—*Suarez, Opusc. de Divina Iustitia.—Idem, De Gratia, l. XII, cap. 1 sqq.—Oswald, Lehre von der Heiligung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnodenwahl, § 7, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.—Tepe, Institutiones Theologicae, Vol. III, pp. 223 sqq., Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 473 sqq., Mainz 1897.—Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 215 sqq., Freiburg 1908.—*S. [pg 436] Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 594 sqq., Freiburg 1901.—Kneib, Die Lohnsucht der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904.—I. J. Remler, C. M., Supernatural Merit, St. Louis 1914.—A. Devine, C. P., The Sacraments Explained, 3rd ed., London 1905, pp. 74-89.—L. Labauche, S. S., God and Man, pp. 254-270, N. Y. 1916. (On merit in general see M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 544 sqq.)—B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 249 sqq.
On the Protestant idea of the fruits of justification see Möhler, Symbolik, § 21 sqq. (English edition, pp. 157 sqq.).