Slavery and four years of war

by Joseph Warren Keifer

CHAPTER III Personal Mention—Occupancy of Western Virginia under McClellan (1861)—Campaign and Battle of Rich Mountain, and Incidents

Events leading, as we have seen, to the secession of States; to the organization of the Confederate States of America; to the assembling of Confederate forces in large numbers; to the firing on Fort Sumter and its subsequent capitulation, and to the summons to arms of seventy-five thousand volunteer United States troops, ended all thoughts of peace through means other than war.

President Lincoln and his advisers did not delude themselves with the notion that three months would end the war. He and they knew too well how deep-seated the purpose was to consummate secession, hence before the war had progressed far the first three years' call was made.

By common judgment, South as well as North, Virginia was soon the be the scene of early battle. Its proximity to Washington, the Capital, made it necessary to occupy the south side of the Potomac. The western part of the State was not largely interested in slaves or slave labor, and it was known to have many citizens loyal to the Union. These it was important to protect and recognize. The neutral and doubtful attitude Kentucky at first assumed made its occupation a very delicate matter.

While many volunteer troops were hastened to the defense of
Washington, large numbers were gathered in camps throughout the
North for instruction, organization, and equipment.

When Lincoln's first call for troops was made I was at Springfield, Ohio, enjoying a fairly lucrative law practice as things then went, but with competition acutely sharp for future great success.

I had, in November, 1856, come from the common labor of a farm to a small city, to there complete a course of law reading, commenced years before and prosecuted at irregular intervals. After my removal to Springfield I finished a preparatory course, and January 12, 1858, when not yet twenty-two years of age, I was admitted to practice law by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and settled in Springfield, where I had the good fortune to enjoy a satisfactory share of the clientage. I had from youth a desire to learn as much as possible of war and military campaigns, but, save a little volunteer militia training of a poor kind, obtained as a member of a uniformed military company, and a little duty on a militia general's staff, I had no education or preparation for the responsible duties of a soldier— certainly none for the important duties of an officer of any considerable command.

Thus situated and unprepared, on the first call for volunteers I enlisted as a private soldier in a Springfield company, and went with it to Camp Jackson, now Goodale Park, Columbus, Ohio.( 1)

The first volunteers were allowed to elect their own company and
field officers. I was elected Major of the 3d Ohio Volunteer
Infantry, and commissioned, April 27, 1861, by Governor William
Dennison.

A few days subsequently, my regiment was sent to Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati, to begin its work of preparation for the field. Here I saw and came to know in some sense Major-General George B. McClellan, also Wm. S. Rosecrans, Jacob D. Cox, Gordon Granger, and others who afterward became Major-Generals. I also met many others, whom in the campaigns and battles of the succeeding four years I knew and appreciated as accomplished officers. But many I met there fell by the way, not alone by the accidents of battle but because of unfitness for command or general inefficiency.

The Colonel of my regiment (Marrow) so magnified a Mexican war experience as to make the unsophisticated citizen-soldier look upon him with awe, yet he never afterwards witnessed a real battle. John Beatty, who became later a Colonel, then Brigadier-General, was my Lieutenant-Colonel; he did not, I think, even possess the equivalent of my poor pretense of military training. He was, however, a typical volunteer Union soldier; brainy, brave, terribly in earnest, always truthful, and what he did not know he made no pretense of knowing, but set about learning. He had by nature the spirit of a good soldier; as the war progressed the true spirit of the warrior became an inspiration to him; and at Perryville, Stone's River, Chickamauga, and on other fields he won just renown, not alone for personal gallantry but for skill in handling and personally fighting his command.

The 3d Ohio and most of the three-months' regiments at Camp Dennison were promptly re-enlisted under the President's May 3d call for three years' volunteers, and I was again (June 12, 1861) commissioned its Major.

In early June, McClellan, who commanded the Department of Ohio, including Western Virginia, crossed the Ohio and assembled an army, mainly at and in the vicinity of Grafton.

He had issued, May 26th, 1861, from his headquarters at Cincinnati, a somewhat bombastic proclamation to the people of Western Virginia, relating in part to the recent vote on secession, saying his invasion was delayed to avoid the appearance of influencing the result. It promised protection to loyal men against armed rebels, and indignantly disclaimed any disposition to interfere with slaves or slavery, promising to crush an attempted insurrection "with an iron hand."

The proclamation closed thus:

"Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized with interference with your slaves, understand one thing clearly—not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on their part. Now that we are in your midst, I call upon you to fly to arms and support the General Government.

"Sever the connection that binds you to traitors. Proclaim to the world that the faith and loyalty so long boasted by the Old Dominion are still preserved in Western Virginia, and that you remain true to the Stars and Stripes."( 2)

This proclamation won no friends for the Union in the mountains of
Western Virginia, where slaves were few and slavery was detested.
The mountaineers were naturally for the Union, and such an appeal
was likely to do more harm than good.

The proclamation, however, was in harmony with the then policy of the Administration at Washington and with public sentiment generally in the North.

Colonel George A. Porterfield, on May 4th, was ordered by Robert E. Lee, then in command of the Virginia forces, to repair to Grafton, the junction of two branches of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and there assemble the Confederate troops with a view to holding that part of the State of Virginia; in case, however, he failed in this and was unable permanently to hold that railroad, he was instructed to cut it.

On June 8th, General R. S. Garnett was assigned by Lee to the command of the Confederate troops of Northwestern Virginia.

The Union forces under Col. B. F. Kelley, 1st Virginia Volunteers, occupied Grafton May 30th, the forces under Porterfield having retired without a fight to Philippi, about sixteen miles distant on a turnpike road leading from Webster (four miles from Grafton) over Laurel Hill to Beverly. As roads are few in Western Virginia, and as this road proved to be one of great importance in the campaign upon which we are just entering, it may be well to say that it continues through Huttonville, across Tygart's Valley River, through Cheat Mountain Pass over the summit of Cheat Mountain, thence through Greenbrier to Staunton at the head of the Shenandoah Valley. At Beverly it is intersected by another turnpike from Clarksburg, through Buchannon via Middle Fork Bridge, Roaring Creek (west of Rich Mountain), Rich Mountain Summit, etc. From Huttonville a road leads southward up the Tygart's Valley River, crossing the mouth of Elk Water about seven miles from Huttonville, thence past Big Springs on Valley Mountain to Huntersville, Virginia. The region through which these roads pass is mountainous.

Ohio and Indiana volunteers made up the body of the army under McClellan. These troops assembled first in the vicinity of Grafton. The first camp the 3d Ohio occupied was at Fetterman, two miles west of Grafton. Porterfield made a halt at Philippi, where he gathered together about eight hundred poorly-armed and disciplined men. Detachments under Col. B. F. Kelley and Col. E. Dumont of Indiana, surprised him, June 3d, by a night march, and captured a part of his command, much of his supplies, and caused him to retreat with his forces disorganized and in disgrace. There Colonel Kelley was seriously wounded by a pistol shot. General Garnett, soon after the affair at Philippi, collected about four thousand men at Laurel Hill, on the road leading to Beverly. This position was naturally a strong one, and was soon made formidable with earthworks and artillery. He took command there in person. At the foot of Rich Mountain (western side), on the road leading from Clarksville through Buchannon to Beverly, a Confederate force of about two thousand, with considerable artillery, was strongly fortified, commanded by Colonel John Pegram, late of the U.S.A. Beverly was made the base of supplies for both commands. Great activity was displayed to recruit and equip a large Confederate force to hold Western Virginia. They had troops on the Kanawha under Gen. Henry A. Wise and Gen. J. B. Floyd. The latter was but recently President Buchanan's Secretary of War.

Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Morris of Indiana was given about 4000 men after the affair at Philippi to hold and watch Garnett at Laurel Hill. McClellan having concentrated a force at Clarksburg on the Parkersburg stem of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, moved it thence on the Beverly road, via Buchannon, to the front of Pegram's position.

His army on this road numbered about 10,000.

Gen. Wm. S. Rosecrans, the second in command, led a brigade; Gen.
N. Schleich, a three-months' general from Ohio, and Col. Robert L.
McCook (9th O.V.I.), also in some temporary way commanded brigades.

The 3d Ohio Infantry was of Schleich's brigade.

While the troops were encamped at Buchannon, Schleich, on July 6th, without the knowledge of McClellan, sent two companies under Captain Lawson of the 3d Ohio on a reconnoitring expedition to ascertain the position of the enemy. Lawson found the enemy's advance pickets at Middle Fork Bridge, and a spirited fight occurred in which he lost one man killed and inflicted some loss on the enemy. This unauthorized expedition caused McClellan to censure Schleich, who was only to be excused on the score of inexperience.

By the evening of July 9th the Union army reached and camped on Roaring Creek, near the base of Rich Mountain, about one and a half miles from the front of Pegram's fortified position.

General Morris was ordered at this time to take up a position immediately confronting Garnett's entrenched position at Laurel Hill, to watch his movements, and, if he attempted to retreat, to attack and pursue him.

On the 10th of July the 4th and 9th Ohio Regiments with Capt. C. O. Loomis' battery (Cold Water, Mich.), under the direction of Lieut. O. M. Poe of the engineers, made a reconnoissance on the enemy's front, which served to lead McClellan to believe the enemy's "intrenchments were held by a large force, with several guns in position to command the front approaches, and that a direct assault would result in heavy and unnecessary loss of life."

This belief, he says, determined him to make an effort to turn the enemy's flank and attack him in the rear.

Rosecrans, however, has the honor of submitting, about 10 P.M. of the night of July 10th, a plan for turning the enemy's position, which, with some reluctance, McClellan directed him to carry out.

Rosecrans' brigade consisted of the 8th, 10th, and 13th Indiana, 19th Ohio and Burdsell's company of cavalry, numbering in all 1917 men.

The plan proposed by Rosecrans and approved by McClellan was first suggested by a young man by the name of Hart, whose father's house stood on the pike near the summit of Rich Mountain, two miles in the rear of Pegram's position. Young Hart had been driven from home by the presence of Confederates, and was eager to do what he could for the Union cause. He sought Rosecrans, and proposed to lead him by an unfrequented route around the enemy's left, and under cover of the dense timber, by a considerable circuit, to the crest of Rich Mountain, thence to the road at his old home in the enemy's rear. He so impressed himself on Rosecrans and those around him as to secure their confidence in him and his plan. In arranging details it was ordered that Rosecrans, guided by Hart, should, at daylight of the 11th, leave the main road about one mile in front of the enemy's fortifications, keep under cover of the declivities of the mountain spurs, avoid using an axe or anything to make a noise, reach the road at the mountain summit, establish himself there as firmly as possible, and from thence attack the enemy's rear by the main road. While Rosecrans was doing this McClellan was to move the body of the army close under the enemy's guns and be in readiness to assault the front on its being known that Rosecrans was ready to attack in the rear.

The whole distance the flanking column would have to make was estimated to be five miles, but it proved to be much greater. The mountain was not only steep, but extremely rocky and rugged. Pegram, after inspection, had regarded a movement by his left flank to his rear as absolutely impossible.( 3)

His right flank, however, was not so well protected by nature, and to avoid surprise from this direction he kept pickets and scouts well out to his right. Hart regarded a movement around the enemy's right as certain of discovery, and hence not likely to be successful.

Promptly at day-dawn Rosecrans passed into the mountain fastness, whither the adventurous hunter only had rarely penetrated, accompanied by Col. F. W. Lander, a volunteer aide-de-camp of McClellan's staff —a man of much frontier experience in the West. In a rain lasting five hours the column slowly struggled through the dense timber, up the mountain, crossing and recrossing ravines by tortuous ways, and by 1 P.M. it had arrived near the mountain top, but yet some distance to the southward of where the Beverly road led through a depression, over the summit. After a brief rest, when, on nearing the road at Hart's house, it was discovered and fired on unexpectedly by the enemy.

To understand how it turned out that the enemy was found near the summit where he was not expected, it is necessary to recur to what McClellan was doing in the enemy's front. Hart had assured Rosecrans there was no hostile force on the summit of the mountain, and on encountering the Confederates there, Rosecrans for the time suspected his guide of treachery.

But first an incident occurred in the 3d Ohio Regiment worth mentioning. I. H. Marrow, its Colonel, who professed to be in confidential relations with McClellan, returned from headquarters about midnight of the 10th, and assuming to be possessed of the plans for the next day, and pregnant with the great events to follow, called out the regiment, and solemnly addressed it in substance as follows:

"Soldiers of the Third: The assault on the enemy's works will be made in the early morning. The Third will lead the column. The secessionists have ten thousand men and forty rifled cannon. They are strongly fortified. They have more man and more cannon than we have. They will cut us to pieces. Marching to attack such an enemy, so intrenched and so armed, is marching to a butcher-shop, rather than to a battle. There is bloody work ahead. Many of you, boys, will go out who will never come back again."( 4)

This speech, thus delivered to soldiers unused to battle was calculated to cause the credulous to think of friends, home—death, and it certainly had no tendency to inspire the untried volunteers with hope and confidence. The speech was, of course, the wild, silly vaporings of a weak man.

I was sent with a detachment of the 3d Ohio to picket the road in front of the enemy and in advance of the point from whence Rosecrans had left it to ascend the mountain. My small force took up a position less than one half mile from the enemy's fortified position, driving back his pickets at the dawn of day through the dense timber on each side of the road. About 9 A.M. a mounted orderly from McClellan came galloping from camp carrying a message for Rosecrans, said to be a countermand of former orders, and requiring him to halt until another and better plan of movement could be made. The messenger was, as he stoutly insisted, directed to overtake Rosecrans by pursuing a route to the enemy's right, whereas Rosecrans had gone to our right and the enemy's left. Of this the orderly was not only informed by me, but he was warned of the proximity of the Confederate pickets. He persisted, however, in the error, and presented the authority of the commanding General to pass all Union pickets. This was reluctantly respected, and the ill-fated orderly galloped on in search of a route to his left. In a moment or two the sharp crack of a rifle was heard, and almost immediately the horse of the orderly came dashing into our picket lines, wounded and riderless. The story was told. The dispatch, with its bearer, dead or alive, was in the enemy's hands. The orderly was, however, not killed, but had been seriously hurt by a rifle ball. He and his dispatch for Rosecrans gave Pegram his first knowledge of the movements of the column to the mountain summit.

For reasons already stated, Pegram entertained no fear of an attack on his left and rear, but was somewhat apprehensive that his right was not equally secure, and hence, early on the 11th, he had sent a small picket to near Hart's house and taken the further precaution to have his right vigilantly watched. The message found on the captured orderly informed Pegram that Rosecrans was leading a column to his rear.( 5) The latter thereupon sent a strong reinforcement under Captain Julius A. De Lagnel to the picket already on the mountain summit. By reason of the expected approach of a force around the right, breastworks were hastily thrown up and two pieces of artillery put in position to repel an attack from that direction. Pegram, in his uncertainty, concluded that Rosecrans might take a still wider circuit around his right and thus pass over the mountain by a pathway or road leading into the turnpike one and a half miles from Beverly; and to guard against this he ordered Col. Wm. C. Scott, with the 44th Virginia, then at Beverly, to take position with two pieces of artillery at the junction of the roads mentioned, and to scout well the flanking road.( 6)

The unexpected presence of the enemy at the summit of the mountain is thus explained, and the reliability and faithfulness of the guide vindicated. Captain De Lagnel, as well as Rosecrans, was doomed also to a surprise.

Rosecrans' command debouched from the wooded mountain and along its crest upon the rear of De Lagnel's position, and new dispositions of the Confederate force had to be made to meet the attack.

The position of De Lagnel's force was on and near the line of the turnpike as it passed over the mountain, and hence Rosecrans' column, in its approach from the southward, having gained the heights some distance from the road, was from a greater elevation.

The 10th Indiana, under Colonel Manson, was in advance and received the first fire of the enemy.

After a delay of some forty minutes, during which time the enemy was receiving reinforcements, and both sides rectifying their positions to the real situation, the order to advance and attack was given by Rosecrans, and though the troops were new and little drilled, they were well led and responded gallantly. The battle proper did not last beyond fifteen minutes. The Confederates made a brave resistance, but they were not exceeding 800 strong, and though they had the advantage of artillery, they were not advantageously posted, consequently were soon overthrown, their commander being shot down, and 21 prisoners, about 50 stand of arms, 2 pieces of artillery, and some supplies taken. The Union loss was 12 killed and 69 wounded, and the Confederate loss probably about the same.

Captain De Lagnel was, by both sides, reported killed, and his gallantry was highly lauded.( 7) General McClellan and others of the regular army officers assumed next day to recognize his body and to know him, and to deplore his early death. He had been shortly before, as we have seen, captured as a Union officer at Fayetteville, N. C., and had at a still later date resigned from the U.S.A. His alleged death, being generally reported through the Confederacy, was made the occasion of many funeral sermons and orations, eulogizing his Southern loyalty and glorious sacrifice of life "on the heights of Rich Mountain" in the cause of human slavery, called Southern rights, or Southern freedom.

But we shall hear of De Lagnel again.

Pegram, learning of the disaster on the mountain in his rear, called his best troops around him and in person started to attack and dislodge Rosecrans. He reached the proximity of the battlefield about 6 P.M., but being advised by his officers that his men were demoralized, and could not be relied on, desisted from attacking, and returned to his main camp and position.( 8)

Of the dispersed Confederate forces some escaped towards Beverly, joining Scott's 44th Virginia on the way, and some were driven back to the fortified camp and to join Pegram.

While Rosecrans was operating on the enemy's rear, McClellan was inactive in front. McClellan claimed he was to receive hourly word from Rosecrans during his progress through and up the rugged mountain, and not thus often hearing from him, he, in the presence of his officers, denounced the movement, and put upon Rosecrans the responsibility of its then predicted certain failure.

The only information received from Rosecrans during the day was a message announcing the successful progress of the column at 11 A.M. on the 11th; it was then approaching Hart's house, and about one and a half miles distant from it.( 9)

The arrangement made in advance was that on Rosecrans gaining a position on the mountain he was to move down it upon Pegram's rear, and McClellan with the main army was to attack from the front. It was not contemplated that Pegram should be fully advised of the plan before it could be, in considerable part, executed. Rosecrans' men, being much exhausted by the laborious ascent of the precipitous mountain, and having to fight an unexpected battle, did not advance to attack the enemy's intrenchments in the rear, but awaited the sound of McClellan's guns on the front. The day was too far spent the communicate the situation by messenger, and McClellan remained for the day and succeeding night in total ignorance of the real result of the battle; and though its smoke could be plainly seen, and the sound of musketry and artillery distinctly heard from his position, from circumstances which appeared to be occurring in the enemy's camp after the sound of the battle had ceased, McClellan reached the conclusion that Rosecrans was defeated, if not captured and destroyed, and this led McClellan and certain members of his staff to industriously announce that Rosecrans had disobeyed orders and would be held responsible for the disaster which had occurred. McClellan remained with the main body of his army quietly in camp on Roaring Creek until about midday when, he states in his report, "I moved up all my available force to the front and remained in person just in rear of the advance pickets, ready to assault when the indicated movement arrived."

While the troops were waiting for the "indicated movement," the enemy had drawn in his skirmishers in expectation of an assault. I was on the front with the skirmishers, and in my eagerness and inexperience naturally desired to see the real situation of the enemy's fortifications and guns. With two or three fearless soldiers following closely, and without orders, by a little detour through brush and timber to the left of the principal road, I came out in front of the fortifications close under some of the guns and obtained a good survey of them. The enemy, apprehending an assault, opened fire on us with a single discharge from one piece of artillery,(10) which he was not able to depress sufficiently to do us any harm. We, however, withdrew precipitately, and I attempted at once to report to McClellan the situation and location of the guns of the enemy and the strength and position of his fortified camp, but, instead of thanks for the information, I received a fierce rebuke, and was sharply told that my conduct might have resulted in bringing on a general battle before the General was ready. I never sinned in that way again while in McClellan's command.

Late in the afternoon of the 11th, when the sound of the battle on the mountain had ceased, an officer was seen to gallop into the camp of the enemy on the mountain side; he made a vehement address to the troops there, and the loud cheers with which they responded were distinctly heard in our camp.

This proceeding being reported to McClellan, at once settled him and others about him in the belief that Rosecrans had been defeated. A little later Confederate troops were seen moving to the rear and up the mountain. This, instead of being as reinforcements for defeated troops, as it really was, was taken as a possible aggressive movement which, in some occult way, must assail and overthrow the main army in front. As the day wore away, Poe, of the engineers, was sent to our right to find a position on the immediate left of the enemy where artillery could be used. I was detailed with two companies of the 3d Ohio to accompany him. We climbed a mountain spur and soon reached a position within rifle-musket range of the enemy which completely commanded his guns and fortifications. So near was my command that I desired permission to open fire without awaiting the arrival of artillery, but this not being given by Poe, of the headquarters staff, and being fresh from a rebuke from that quarter, I gave a peremptory order not to fire unless attacked. On discovering us in his rear, the enemy turned his guns and fired a few artillery shots at us, doing no harm, but affording a plausible excuse for a discharge of musketry that seemed to silence the enemy's guns, as their firing at once ceased.

Poe was a young officer of fine personal appearance, superb physique,
a West Point graduate, and a grandson of one of the celebrated
Indian fighters, especially noted for killing the Wyandot Chief,
Big Foot, on the Ohio River in 1782.

Poe was on staff duty throughout the war; became a Brevet-Brigadier, corps of engineers, and died as a Colonel in the United States army at Detroit, Michigan, October 2, 1895.

My acquaintance with him commenced on the spur of Rich Mountain under the circumstances mentioned.

McClellan, in his report, says:

"I sent Lieutenant Poe to find such a position for our artillery as would enable us to command the works. Late in the afternoon I received his report that he had found such a place. I immediately detailed a party to cut a road to it for our guns, but it was too late to get them into position before dark, and as I had received no intelligence whatever of General Rosecrans' movements, I finally determined to return to camp, leaving merely sufficient force to cover the working party. Orders were then given to move up the guns with the entire available infantry at daybreak the following morning. As the troops were much fatigued, some delay occurred in moving from camp, and just as the guns were starting intelligence was received that the enemy had evacuated their works and fled over the mountains, leaving all their guns, means of transportation, ammunition, tents, and baggage behind.

"Then for the first time since 11 o'clock the previous day, I received a communication from General Rosecrans, giving me the first intimation that he had taken the enemy's position at Hart's farm."(11)

Here was a commanding general in the peculiar situation that he could almost see and could plainly hear a battle raging, but did not learn its successful result until fifteen hours after it ceased.

I remained on the mountain spur in command of a few companies of infantry with orders to keep the men standing in line of battle, without fires, during the entire night. It rained most of the time, and the weather becoming cold the men suffered intensely. The rest of the army retired to its camp a mile and a half distant.

Pegram gathered his demoralized forces together, and with such as were supposed able to make a long march, started about midnight to escape by a mountain path around to the westward of the Hart farm, hoping to gain the main road and join Garnett's forces, still supposed to be at Laurel Hill.

On the morning of the 12th of July we found a few broken-down men in Pegram's late camp, and a considerable number of mere boys— students from William and Mary and Hamden-Sidney colleges—too young yet for war.

McClellan and his staff, with dazzling display, rode through the deserted works, viewed the captured guns, gazed on the dejected prisoners, and then wired the War Department: "In possession of all the enemy's works up to a point in sight of Beverly. Have taken all his guns. . . . Behavior of troops in action and towards prisoners admirable."

The army moved up the mountain to the battle-field, and halted a few moments to view it. The sight of men with gunshot wounds was the first for the new volunteers, and they were deeply impressed by it; all looked upon those who had participated in the battle as veritable heroes.

Late on the 12th the troops reached Beverly, the junction of the turnpike roads far in the rear of Laurel Hill, and there bivouacked.

Garnett, learning of Pegram's disaster at Rich Mountain, abandoned his intrenchments at Laurel Hill, and leaving his tents and other property hastily retreated towards Beverly, pursued rather timidly by Morris' command. Had Garnett pushed his army rapidly through Beverly he could have passed in safety on the afternoon of the 12th, but being falsely informed that it was occupied in the morning of that day by McClellan's troops, he turned off at Leadsville Church, about five miles from Beverly, and retreated up the Leading Creek road, a very rough and difficult one to travel. A portion of Morris' command, led by Captain Benham of the regular army, followed in close pursuit, while other went quietly into camp under Morris' orders.

Pegram, with his fleeing men, succeeded in finding a way over the mountain, and at 7 P.M. of the 12th reached Tygart's Valley River, near the Beverly and Laurel Hill road, about three miles from Leadsville Church. They had travelled without road or path about twelve miles, and were broken down and starving. Pegram here learned from inhabitants of Garnett's retreat, the Union pursuit, and of the Union occupancy of Beverly. All hope of escape in a body was gone, and though distant six miles from Beverly, he dispatched a note to the commanding officer of the Union forces, saying:

"Owing to the reduced and almost famished condition of the force now here under my command, I am compelled to offer to surrender them to you as prisoners of war. I have only to ask that they receive at your hands such treatment as Northern prisoners have invariably received from the South."

McClellan sent staff officers to Pegram's camp to conduct him and his starving soldiers to Beverly, they numbering 30 officers and 525 men.(12) Others escaped.

The prisoners were paroled and sent South on July 15th, save such of the officers, including Colonel Pegram, as had recently left the United States army to join the Confederate States army; these were retained and sent to Fort McHenry.(13)

Garnett retreated through Tucker County to Kalea's Ford on Cheat River, where he camped on the night of the 12th. His rear was overtaken on the 13th at Carrick's Ford, and a lively engagement took place, with loss on both sides; during a skirmish at another ford about a mile from Carrick's, Garnett, while engaged in covering his retreat and directing skirmishers, was killed by a rifle ball.(14)

Garnett had been early selected for promotion in the Confederate army, and he promised to become a distinguished leader. His army, now much demoralized and disorganized, continued its retreat via Horse-Shoe Run and Red House, Maryland, to Monterey, Virginia. General C. W. Hill, through timidity or inexperience, permitted the broken Confederate troops to pass him unmolested at Red House, where, as ordered, he should have concentrated a superior force.

McClellan, July 14th, moved his army over the road leading through Huttonville to Cheat Mountain Pass, and a portion of it pursued a small force of the enemy to and beyond the summit of Cheat Mountain, on the Staunton pike, but no enemy was overtaken, and the campaign was at an end.

It was the first campaign; it had the appearance of success, and McClellan, by his dispatches, gathered to himself all the glory of it. He received the commendation of General Scott, the President, and his Cabinet.(15)

From Beverly, July 16, 1861, McClellan issued a painfully vain, congratulatory address to the "Soldiers of the Army of the West."(16)

As early as July 21, 1861, he dispatched his wife that he did not "feel sure that the men would fight very well under any one but himself"; and that it was absolutely necessary for him to go in person to the Kanawha to attack General Wise. Thus far he had led no troops in battle. The Union defeat, on this date, at Bull Run, however, turned attention to McClellan, as he alone, apparently, had achieved success, though a success, as we have seen, mainly, if not wholly, due to Rosecrans.

On July 22, 1861, he was summoned to Washington, and on the 24th left his "Army of the West" to assume other and more responsible military duties, of which we will not here speak. In dismissing him from this narrative, I desire to say that I wrote to a friend in July, 1861, an opinion as to the capacity and character of McClellan as a military leader, which I have not since felt called on to revise, and one now generally accepted by the thoughtful men of this country. McClellan was kind and generous, but weak, and so inordinately vain that he thought it unnecessary to accept the judgment of men of higher attainments and stronger character. Even now strong men shudder when they recall the fact that George B. McClellan apparently had, for a time, in his keeping the destiny of the Republic.

To indicate the state of his mind, and likewise the immensity of his vanity, I here give an extract from a letter, of August 9, 1861, to his wife, leaving the reader to make his own comment and draw his own conclusions.

"General Scott is the great obstacle. He will not comprehend the danger. I have to fight my way against him. To-morrow the question will probably be decided by giving me absolute control independently of him. . . . The people call on me to save the country. I must save it, and cannot respect anything that is in the way.

"I receive letter after letter, have conversation after conversation, calling on me to save the nation, alluding to the presidency, dictatorship, etc. . . . I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved," etc.(17)

General McClellan was not disloyal, nor did he lack a technical military education. He was a good husband, an indulgent father, a kind and devoted friend, of pure life, but unfortunately he was for a time mistaken for a great soldier, and this mistake he never himself discovered.

He had about him, while holding high command, many real and professed friends, most of whom partook of his habits of thought and possessed only his characteristics. President Lincoln did not fail to understand him, but sustained and long stood by him for want of a known better leader for the Eastern army, and because he had many adherents among military officers.

Greeley, in the first volume of his American Conflict, written at the beginning of the war, has a page containing the portraits of twelve of the then most distinguished "Union Generals." Scott is the central figure, and around him are McClellan, Butler, McDowell, Wool, Fremont, Halleck, Burnside, Hunter, Hooker, Buell, and Anderson. All survived the war, and not one of them was at its close a distinguished commander in the field. One or two at most had maintained only creditable standing as officers; the others (Scott excepted, who retired on account of great age) having proved, for one cause or another, failures.

In Greeley's second volume, published at the close of the war, is another group of "Union Generals." Grant is the central figure, and around him are Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, Hancock, Blair, Howard, Terry, Curtis, Banks, and Gilmore—not one of the first twelve; and he did not even then exhaust the list of great soldiers who fairly won eternal renown.

The true Chieftains had to be evolved in the flame of battle, amid the exigencies of the long, bloody war, and they had to win their promotions on the field.

( 1) For a summary life of the writer before and after the war, see Appendix A.

( 2) War Records, vol. ii., p. 48.

( 3) Colonel Pegram's Rep., War Records, vol. ii., p. 267.

( 4) Citizen Soldier (John Beatty), p. 22.

( 5) It seems that this orderly did decline to say which flank Rosecrans was turning, as he must have had doubts after what had transpired as to his instructions; nevertheless Pegram decided Rosecrans was passing around his right, and so notified Garnett.— War Records, vol. ii., pp. 256, 260, 272.

( 6) Ibid., vol. ii., p. 275.

( 7) War Records, vol. ii., p. 245.

( 8) Ibid., (Pegram's Report), vol. ii., p. 265.

( 9) War Records (McClellan's Report), vol. ii., p. 206.

(10) Citizen Soldier (Beatty), p. 24.

(11) War Records, vol. ii., p. 206.

(12) War Records (Pegram's Report), vol. ii., p. 267.

(13) At Beverly lived a sister of Thomas J. Jackson (Stonewall), Mrs. Arnold, who, though her husband was also disloyal, was a pronounced Union woman and remained devoted to the Union cause throughout the war.

(14) War Records, vol. ii., p. 287.

(15) Ibid., p. 204.

(16) Ibid., p. 236.

(17) McClellan's Own Story, p. 84.