Slavery and four years of war

by Joseph Warren Keifer

CHAPTER V Mine Run Campaign and Battle of Orange Grove, November, 1863—Winter Cantonment (1863-64) of Army of the Potomac at Culpeper Court- House, and its Reorganization—Grant Assigned to Command the Union Armies, and Preparation for Aggressive War

Though the roads were bad from frequent rains and much use, and November winds warned that winter was at hand to stop further field campaigning on an extended scale, and though all attempts to cross the Rapidan in the fine weather of the spring and summer had failed, yet, when the Army of the Potomac was again bivouacked at Culpeper, the public cry was heard—"On to Richmond!"

Lee's last campaign was looked upon in high quarters as a big bluff that should have been "called" by Meade while the Army of Northern Virginia was north of the Rappahannock. Meade, however, acted persistently and conscientiously on his own judgment, formed in the light of the best knowledge he could obtain. He would not stand driving, and was something of a bulldozer himself, and sometimes—said to have been caused by fits of dyspepsia—was unreasonably irascible, and displayed a most violent temper towards superiors and inferiors. Notwithstanding this, he never lost his equipoise or acted upon impulse alone, and he never permitted mere appearances to move him. Nor could his superiors induce him to act against his judgment as to a particular military situation. It will be remembered that he was urged to fight Lee north of the Potomac after Gettysburg. He was urged to bring on a battle before the departure of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps for the West, and when Lee moved north on his flank his opportunity seemed to have come to fight a battle, but his fear of the same strategy displayed by the Confederate Army in the second Bull Run campaign against Pope induced him to be over-cautious, and to so concentrate his army as to avoid the possibility of its being beaten in detachments.

The next day (October 16th), after Meade reached Centreville, the President, in his anxiety that Lee should not again escape without a general battle, addressed this characteristic note to Halleck:

"If General Meade can now attack him (Lee) on a field no more than equal for us, and do so with all the skill and courage which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails.

"Yours truly,
"A. Lincoln."

This note was forwarded to Meade.

To this he answered that it had been his intention to attack the enemy when his exact whereabouts was discovered; that lack of information as to Lee's position and intentions and the fear of jeopardizing his communications with Washington had prevented his doing so sooner. But the pressure continued. Halleck, the 18th, wired Meade:

"Lee is unquestionably bullying you. If you cannot ascertain his movements, I certainly cannot. If you pursue and fight him, I think you will find out where he is. I know of no other way."

This was too much for Meade's temper. He responded:

" . . . If you have any orders to give me I am prepared to receive and obey them, but I must insist on being spared the infliction of such truisms in the guise of opinion as you have recently honored me with, particularly as they have not been asked for. I take this occasion to repeat what I have before stated, that if my course, based on my own judgment, does not meet with approval, I ought to be, and I desire to be, relieved from command."

Although Halleck apologized "if he had unintentionally given offence," and Meade thanked him for the "explanation," these and other like occurrences had their influence on Meade's conduct.

As he had failed to bring Lee to bay at Culpeper, the only opportunity to do so must be sought south of the Rapidan. Meade was not averse to battle.

On November 26, 1863, Meade's army was put in motion with a view to a general concentration south of the Rapidan, at Robertson's Tavern on the turnpike road, by evening of that day. Lee's army of about 50,000 men was mainly massed and in winter quarters in front of Orange Court-House, with an intrenched line in its front across the plank road and turnpike, extending to the river.

Meade's design was, by a rapid movement, to carry this line before
Lee had time to concentrate behind it.

The Fifth Corps (Sykes) was directed to cross the Rapidan at Culpeper Mine Ford, and thence move by the plank road to Parker's Store and the junction of the road to Robertson's Tavern; the First Corps (Newton), with two divisions, to follow the Fifth. The Second Corps (Warren) was to force a crossing at Germanna Ford, thence march directly to Robertson's Tavern, and there await the arrival of other corps.

The Third Corps (General William H. French), followed closely by the Sixth (Sedgwick), was directed to cross at Jacob's Ford (Mill), and continue the march, bearing to the left, to Robertson's Tavern. Jacob's Ford, with its steep banks, proved so difficult to pass that some delay occurred, and the artillery had to be sent around by Germanna Ford, and did not rejoin the corps until the morning of the 27th. Jacob's Ford was the highest up the river, and consequently brought French, on passing it, in close proximity to the enemy. Lee, by the evening of the 26th, had thrown forward cavalry and some infantry of Hill's corps to the vicinity of Robertson's Tavern, though not in sufficient force to prevent Warren taking his designated position. Nor was Sykes seriously interfered with. The cavalry crossed at Ely's and other fords. French, with the aid of pontoons, safely passed the river, but he did not advance on the 26th more than three miles beyond the crossing, time having been lost in hunting blind country roads, waiting for artillery to arrive, and reconnoitering. A force of the enemy showed itself on intersecting roads to his right, where were a number of such roads leading from Sisson, Witchell, Tobaccostick and Morton's Fords, and one which led from Raccoon Ford—still higher up the river—to an intersection at Jones' house, with the most direct road to the Tavern. The enemy's intrenchments covered a considerable part of this last road, from which he could easily debouch and attack the flank and rear or the trains of the marching columns.( 1) These conditions rendered French's situation perilous, and caused him to move with extreme caution, as the Sixth Corps could not arrive until he was out of the way. Notwithstanding French had some miles farther to march than Warren, and unusual difficulties to overcome or guard against, Meade dispatched him, as early as 1 P.M. of the 26th, that his delay was retarding the operations of Warren, and again at 3 P.M. he dispatched French:

"I would not move forward farther from the river than to clear the way for General Sedgwick, until he comes up and crosses."

The Second Division, General Henry Prince, with some cavalry, was in the advance; the Third, Carr's, and the First, General David B. Birney's, following in the order named. At the Widow Morris', a somewhat obscure road bore off abruptly to the left, but which, somewhat circuitously, led to Robertson's Tavern. The head of Prince's column, however, was on the more direct road to Tom Morris' house, with flankers and cavalry well to the right. These were soon attacked and driven in or recalled.

It seems Prince was led to believe he was in communication with
Warren's left.( 2)

It soon became evident that the head of French's column was near the Raccoon Ford road, and the intrenchments held by at least two divisions of Ewell's corps of Lee's army, and there seemed to be no possible chance to extricate it without a battle.

At 11.45 A.M., on the 27th, Meade dispatched French:

"If you cannot unite with Warren by the route you are on, you must move through to him by the left."

At 1.45 P.M. Meade again dispatched French:

"Attack the enemy in your front immediately, throwing your left forward to connect with General Warren at Robertson's Tavern. The object of an attack is to form junction with General Warren, which must be effected immediately."

Prince had, by this time, formed line of battle and engaged the enemy. Carr's division was ordered forward to take position on Prince's left, and at 3 P.M. Birney's division was ordered to form in support of Carr.

Prince covered the road leading to a junction with the Raccoon Ford road. The First Brigade of Carr's division (General W. H. Morris) moved to the left of Prince, my brigade—the Second—was ordered to pass behind Morris, and take position on his left, and Colonel B. F. Smith's brigade—the Third—was sent to my left.

Morris became somewhat entangled in a ravine and in thick timber, and was slow in forming good line. In this position he was fired upon from a ridge not two hundred yards from his front, the bullets falling among my men as they passed his rear. I appealed to Morris to face to the front, charge, and take the ridge, but he declined to do so for want of orders.

As soon as I could get my two leading regiments, 110th and 122d Ohio, on Morris' left, I led them to the crest of the ridge, captured some prisoners, and posted the regiments in good position behind a fence on the summit. My other regiments, 6th Maryland and 138th Pennsylvania, successively, on their arrival, took position on the left of the Ohio troops. The ridge which extended to my right along Morris' front was still held by the enemy in strong force, and both my flanks were threatened. Through a misunderstanding of orders the Ohio regiments fell back a short distance, but soon retook the crest and were again fiercely engaged, though under an enfilading fire of artillery and a galling fire of musketry. The ground being somewhat open to the front, I could see the enemy massing for an attack. I again, but vainly, appealed to Morris to advance and close the gap, as otherwise his position in the ravine and thick woods could not be held. The assault came, and Morris was forced, in some confusion, to retire. By refusing my right somewhat, I maintained my isolated position and threatened the enemy's right. The First Brigade, though composed in part of regiments not before in strong battle, was quickly re-formed, and, under Carr's order, soon obtained full possession of the ridge by a splendid charge, and thus the gap was closed. The battle by this time raged furiously all along the front. Colonel Smith, passing too far to the rear, lost his way in the thickets, and failed to come up on my left. He did not rejoin the division until the battle was over. This misfortune was hard to account for, as Colonel Smith was an intelligent, brave, and skilled officer—a graduate of West Point. He met some scouting parties of the enemy, and, as directed, sought to find a connection with troops of Warren's corps. His failure caused my left to remain uncovered.

Two assaults were made upon my line by the enemy in columns not less than three lines deep. The first came in front of Horn's regiment, but was anticipated, and McClennan's regiment, moving into the open ground, struck the right flank of the enemy and (firing buck and ball from .69 calibre muskets) did great execution. McClennan was severely wounded, and in consequence was obliged to leave the field.

The battle raged with unabated fury until dark, and as late as 8 P.M. enfilading shells from heavy guns on our right screamed and crashed through the timber over our heads, bursting with loud noise, producing a most hideous and weird appearance, but really doing little damage.

As night approached, the ammunition of my regiments gave out, and all my command, save one regiment, was relieved by regiments of Birney's division.( 3)

The bravery and fighting skill of Colonels Ball, Horn, and McClennan, also of Lieutenant-Colonels M. M. Granger and W. N. Foster, and Major Otho H. Binkley, and others, was most conspicuous. Lieutenant James A. Fox of the 110th here lost his life. He had risen from the ranks, but was a proud-spirited and promising officer. We buried him at midnight, in full uniform, wrapped in his blanket, behind a near-by garden fence.

I wish to bear testimony also, at this late day, to the quiet gallantry and high soldierly qualities of the long-since-dead General David B. Birney.( 4) He did not obey orders to the letter only. His division being in reserve and support, he took position where he could watch the progress of the battle, and note in time when and where he was needed. He made no display on the field. When he noticed, by the slackening fire of my men, that their ammunition was about exhausted, he rode to my side and quietly suggested that he be allowed to order regiments from his own command to take their places. That there might not be, even momentarily, a break in the line, his regiments were moved up, and my men lay down while his stepped over them and opened fire. The relieved troops were then withdrawn and resupplied with ammunition.

While the battle was in progress, the Sixth Corps, still some distance to the rear, was directed by another road on Robertson's Tavern, and during the night the Third Corps was ordered to withdraw and follow the Sixth.

The enemy retired at the close of the battle, leaving in our possession his dead, unburied, and his wounded on the field and in hospitals. We fought a great part, if not all, of Ewell's corps.

Casualties were reported in thirteen Confederate brigades, in forty- four regiments, and in the artillery of Early, Johnson, and Rodes' divisions, total 601.( 5)

The losses in the Third Corps were 10 officers and 115 enlisted men killed, 28 officers and 719 enlisted men wounded, total 872.

The brigades of Morris and Keifer suffered the most severely, although Prince's division was first engaged. My own killed and wounded numbered 172, those of Prince's division 163. There were no captured or missing men of my command.

This engagement has been called by the Confederates the battle of Payne's Farm;( 5) but by the Union side it is generally known as the battle of Orange Grove; the place, however, is sometimes referred to as Locust Grove, and by both sides it is often mentioned as Mine Run, though in no proper sense did the contest occur on that stream.

The battle, fought by French under the circumstances narrated, gave rise to much crimination and recrimination between Generals Meade and French, and probably led to a reorganization of the Army of the Potomac four months later.

Meade attributed the miscarriage of the campaign to French's failure on the 26th, and his further failure on the 27th, to connect with Warren's left at Robertson's Tavern. He claimed that if such junction had been made he could have fallen on the portion of Lee's army on the turnpike and destroyed it, and that he would then have been able to seize the line behind Mine Run before Lee could occupy it with his united forces. Meade further contended that, on the 27th, French got on the wrong road, and, consequently, had to fight a fruitless battle alone, while the other corps of the army were standing idle, waiting for him. French stoutly insisted that his march, being on the extreme right and exposed flank, on the longest line, and via a difficult ford, without a good guide and over blind roads, with a doubt as to which one should be taken, warranted him in acting with caution, and in fighting where he did when he found his command attacked; and he further claimed that when he brought Ewell's corps to battle, Meade should have fallen on the enemy in Warren's front and overwhelmed it; that by fighting when and where he did, he was doing more than he otherwise could have done to prevent a concentration of the Confederate Army, especially in preventing it from massing in front of Robertson's Tavern. A considerable part of the Union Army sympathized with French, yet the fact remained that Meade's plan of concentration and of battle at the appointed time and place failed.

On the 28th the armies were brought face to face, the Confederate army in fortifications behind and along the high west bank of Mine Run, both armies extending from a short distance south of the plank road to the north of the turnpike, in the direction of the battle- field of the 27th.( 6) The Third Corps held the Union centre. Warren's corps, with a division of the Third Corps, was sent to reconnoitre for a point of attack on the Confederate right. Warren reported an attack there feasible. Other reconnoissances were made on the 29th, and Meade decided to assault from both flanks the next morning, the Sixth and Fifth Corps under Sedgwick on the enemy's left and the Second Corps and two divisions of the Third on his right. Carr's division of the Third marched at 4 A.M. two miles to the left and joined Warren's column. The night was cold and there was much suffering.

Warren had about 20,000 men in readiness, and was to attack at 8 A.M. at a signal from the batteries of the centre. Sedgwick was to attack an hour later. The signal batteries opened, and we stood, in grand array, soberly withing for the order to charge. The enemy's strong works, with guns bristling in the morning sun, were in our immediate front. Minutes of delay were as hours to the waiting troops. Many sent up silent prayers for safety, and not unfrequently through the column there could be seen on a soldier's breast a paper giving his name, company, regiment, and home address, so, if killed, his body could be identified. Warren hesitated, and just before 9 A.M. dispatched Meade, then four miles distant:

"The full light of sun shows me that I cannot succeed."

Meade suspended Sedgwick's attack, then in progress, and hastened to Warren. I saw the two men at a small, green, pine wood fire, earnestly discussing the critical situation. Meade seemed to be censuring Warren, yet the latter adhered to his view that the assault could not be successfully made, and Meade yielded. Somehow the troops of the great column, before the final decision was announced, came to believe the charge would not be made, and they cautiously commenced badgering each other, soldier like, over wasted prayers. The different commands were later ordered to their former positions.

French opposed an assault on the centre. The enemy's position, naturally a strong one, had been greatly strengthened by labor. The wisdom of not making any assault, in the light of all the facts, was, I think, generally recognized. The season was unfavorable; Meade was a long distance from his base; success could only have been temporary and could not have been followed up, and defeat under the circumstances would have been a fatal catastrophe. Even Grant, in 1864, was "all summer" in trying to gather fruits of what were called successes.

The 1st of December was spent by both armies in watching each other, and behaving as if they dared each other to attack.

"One was afraid and the other dare not"—but which?

The campaign had been delayed beyond all expectation; all hope of gaining an advantage by a surprise or otherwise was passed, food was becoming scarce, and hence Meade decided to retire his army to its base of supplies. At dusk of the 1st, therefore, the Union Army moved by different roads to various fords of the Rapidan, the Third Corps to Culpeper Mine Ford, the farthest down the river of any used, and by 8 A.M. of the coming morning all had recrossed, and on the 3d they were in their former camps at Brandy Station. The Army of the Potomac lost in this campaign, killed and wounded, 1272.( 7)

Thus ended the Mine Run campaign; not bloodless, yet disappointing, as were many others. In it Meade demonstrated his willingness to fight, and that his army was loyal to him. Another opportunity to fight a great battle in independent command on the field never came to him. His chief glory for all time must rest on Gettysburg.

Lee, the night of December 1st, feeling certain Meade would not assault him in his strong position, and knowing the latter was far from his base, in an unfamiliar country, encumbered with trains, determined to assume the offensive by throwing two of his divisions against Meade's left on the following morning. But Meade was safely away when morning came, and pursuit impossible.

Lee, it is said, was greatly chagrined over his lost opportunity, and exclaimed to his generals:

"I am too old to command this army; we should never have permitted these people to get away."( 8)

Before starting on this campaign Meade expressed a purpose to take position in front of Fredericksburg, but Halleck disapproved the plan.( 9)

The Army of the Potomac, having ended its historic work of the memorable year 1863, went into winter quarters around Culpeper Court-House, with Brandy Station for its base of supplies. My brigade occupied log huts on John Minor Botts' (10) farm, partly constructed by the Confederates prior to November 8th.

The caring, in winter, for a large army calls for great vigilance, skill, and energy. The season not permitting much opportunity for drill, discipline is hard to maintain. Sickness becomes prevalent, and there is much unrest, both of officers and soldiers.

Camp guards, however, had to be maintained; also grand-guards and pickets around the front and flanks of the whole army. The freezing and thawing and the constant moving of supply trains caused deep mud in the roads and camps. The brigade commanders of the Third Corps, and of other corps as well, were, alternately, detailed as corps officer-of-the-day, the duties of which lasted twenty-four hours, and required the officer to be with the advance-guard and on the corps' picket lines to see that vigilance was preserved; that orders were understood and obeyed, and to report any unusual occurrences. He was required to visit all guards and pickets, personally, at least once by day and once by night. The Third Corps' advance line was from Mt. Pony, its left, around the front of Culpeper Court-House, covering the Madison Court-House road; in length about five miles. This service was arduous, trying, and, by night, attended with danger.

During my service as corps officer-of-the-day, in March, 1864, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Townsend (106th N. Y.), in charge of the grand-guard on the Sperryville road, in violation of orders, admitted some refugee ladies, who presented a pass from an officer of an outer cavalry picket. The orders were to recognize no pass for a citizen not emanating from army headquarters. The Colonel reported the occurrence to me, and I disapproved his action, but made no report of it. The ladies, on some errand, reached headquarters, and told of their admittance on this road. Meade ordered me to report the delinquent officer, which I did, giving all excuses I could for him, but they were unavailing. I was ordered to prefer charges against Colonel Townsend, "for disobedience of orders." A general court-martial was called for his trial, of which General D. B. Birney was President, and, notwithstanding I had preferred the charges, I was made a member of it.

On the trial I protested my interest and asked the court to excuse me from sitting, but my request was refused. The court found Townsend guilty and sentenced him: "To be suspended from rank and pay for two months." This sentence was approved by General Meade, April 1st, but Townsend's suspension from rank was remitted, and he was ordered to duty. He was a gallant and accomplished officer, and, feeling keenly the disgrace, rushed to his death at Cold Harbor just after the sixty days' suspension of pay elapsed. The incident illustrates the severity of discipline and the fate of war.

The soldiers of the army, as far as possible, were kept active, but the cold winter, with frequent rains, caused much discomfort, and many were in hospital; few were furloughed. Many rude log chapels were erected and used, often alternately, for religious worship, lectures, concerts, readings, and dances. Civilian visitors were, at times, numerous. One most notable army ball was given at the headquarters of General Joseph B. Carr. This event took place January 25, 1864, and was attended generally by officers of the army, by some military officials from Washington and elsewhere, by officers' wives and their friends visiting the army, and by invited ladies and gentlemen from Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore. Over four thousand attended. The ball was held in large communicating tents, erected for the purpose. Ample floors were laid for promenades and dancing. Dinner was provided, where everything obtainable from land or sea was served, with liquors and wines without stint. The night was entirely devoted to it. It was brilliant beyond descriptions. To hundreds it was their last ball, or appearance in social life.

Notwithstanding the necessarily promiscuous character of the participants, and though no scandal attended it, and all decorum usual on such occasions was observed, it was at the time the subject of much severe criticism through the press, from the pulpit, and by people generally. General Carr and his good wife were adepts in social affairs, and are entitled to the distinction of having assembled and directed the most numerously attended ball of its kind ever held in the United States.

Horse racing and other sports were indulged in, especially by the cavalry. But all these were mere diversions, and did not indicate that the army was not preparing for the bloody work yet ahead of it.

Grant, with the armies under General George H. Thomas, W. T. Sherman, and Joseph Hooker, November 25, 1863, drove Bragg from his perch on Missionary Ridge and to a precipitate retreat, and the Army of the Tennessee under Sherman subsequently relieved Burnside, besieged at Knoxville by Longstreet, thus closing the campaigns of 1863 in the West about the time they closed in the East. Soon thereafter rumors were current that Grant was to be promoted to chief command of all the Union armies. A law passed Congress February 29, 1864, reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General, and President Lincoln, the next day, appointed Ulysses S. Grant to the office, and the Senate, the succeeding day, confirmed the appointment. March 10, 1864, Halleck was relieved from duty as General-in-Chief, and became thereafter Chief of Staff of the Army. Grant was, the same day, assigned by the President, "pursuant to the act of Congress, to command the Armies of the United States," headquarters of the Army to be in Washington, and "with General Grant in the field." Grant established his field-headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, March 26, 1864, and remained with the Army of the Potomac until Appomattox came. Just prior to his joining the Army of the Potomac, March 23, 1864, it was reorganized, the First and Third Corps being broken up as separate organizations, and the troops composing them distributed to the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, they retaining their former corps badges. Hancock resumed command of the Second Corps. Warren was assigned to command the Fifth. Carr was transferred to the Second. The Third Division, Third Corps, became the Third Division of the Sixth (Sedgwick's) Corps, the old Third Division of the Sixth being consolidated with its other divisions.

General H. Prince was assigned to command the Third Division of the Sixth. The Second Brigade (Keifer's) of this division, with the 126th Ohio (Colonel Smith) and the 67th Pennsylvania (Colonel Staunton) added, was placed under the command of General David A. Russell,(11) but he was soon transferred to another command, and Colonel B. F. Smith for a time succeeded him. Major-General James B. Ricketts, before April 30, 1864, relieved General Prince, and thereafter the Third Division of the Sixth Corps was known as "Ricketts' Division."

Much bad feeling existed on the part of Generals French, Sykes, Newton, and others over the breaking up of their commands and their being relieved from field duty. The consolidation of divisions and brigades in the corps retained, also caused much discontent, and excited jealousies towards the organizations from the disbanded corps which took their old designations. This was the second time troops I commanded had this experience. While in camp or on marches an officer may become disliked by his men, but a great battle in which he does his duty will always restore him to popularity. The Third Corps badge was a diamond; the Sixth a Greek cross. The Third Division for a time adhered to the diamond, but later, wore both proudly, and finally rejoiced alone under the Greek cross.

The Army of the Potomac was for the first time reduced to three corps. There was, however, belonging to this army, a large artillery reserve, not attached to any corps, but under a chief, General Henry J. Hunt; also a cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions and a reserve brigade, which Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was assigned (April 5, 1864) to command.(12) To each corps was attached an artillery brigade. This army, like any other well-appointed one, also had (each with a chief officer) its Commissary, Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Medical Departments; also a Provost-Guard, consisting of a brigade of infantry and a regiment of cavalry under a Provost Marshal-General;(13) also Signal and Engineer Corps, and other minor and somewhat independent organizations, such as body-guards to commanding generals, pioneers, pontoniers, etc.

The Army of the Potomac, thus organized, commanded, and appointed, with the new commander of all the armies of the Union with it, now awaited good weather to enter upon the bloodiest campaign civilized man has ever witnessed.

( 1) See sketch attached to Meade's report, War Records, vol. xxix, Part I., p. 19.

( 2) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 738.

( 3) Birney's Report, War Records, vol. xxvii., Part I., p. 750.

( 4) He died of disease October 18, 1864.

( 5) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 836-8.

( 6) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 19. (Sketch).

( 7) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 686.

( 8) Battles and Leaders, vol. iii., p. 241 (Col. Venable).

( 9) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 18.

(10) Botts was then on his farm—a Union man. He had been an old line Whig, and was personally hostile to Jeff. Davis.

(11) War Records, vol. xxxiii., pp. 717, 722, 732, 745.

(12) Ibid., 798, 806.

(13) A badge for each fighting corps of the Union Army was adopted (January, 1863), its color indicating the number of the division in a corps. Three divisions of three brigades each usually constituted a corps. Each officer and soldier wore on his hat or cap his proper corps badge; the first division being red, second white, and third blue. The badge appeared prominently in the centre of all headquarters flags. Division flags were square, brigade, tri-cornered, all of white ground save those of a second division which were blue; the flag of a second brigade had a red border next to the pole, and of a third brigade a red border on all sides.