SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
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I


THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM AND THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL


 Introductory statement: Limitations of the undertaking [3]
I. Definition of Insight, and of Religious Insight. Arbitrarylimitation of the definition of religion here in question. The problemtraditionally called that of the "salvation of man" as the main problemupon which the sources of insight here in question are to throwlight [5]
II. Generalised conception of "salvation." Variety of forms in whichthis conception has been defined and used. Resulting problem regardingthe meaning of human life [9]
III. Outline of the programme to be followed in the subsequent discussion [17]
IV. The concept of revelation, and the "religious paradox." First statement of this paradox [19]
V. Individual experience and the "inner light." What sort ofreligious insight is thus to be gained. Its limitations. Prospect ofan appeal to other sources for aid [26]
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II


INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE AND SOCIAL EXPERIENCE AS SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS INSIGHT

I. The definition of the religious problem, as given in the formerlecture, simplifies our undertaking in certain respects, but seems tocomplicate it in others. Review of the situation. Outlook for furtherstudy [37]
II. Outline of the undertaking of the present lecture [41]
III. The motives that lead to religion are natural and human. Reasonswhy the objects of religious insight are nevertheless conceived assuperhuman, and, as, for our individual experience,mysterious [44]
IV. Can these objects be defined as realities or as "values" that oursocial experience sufficiently brings to our knowledge? Socialexperience as a source of religious insight. Its scope andimportance [54]
V. The inadequacy of social experience as a source of religiousinsight. Objections urged by tradition, by recent individualism, and byWilliam James [58]
VI. The social consciousness as an indispensable factor in religion.The consciousness of guilt as a sense of loneliness. Love as a glimpseof something saving and divine. The mystical aspect of our socialconsciousness. Despite this mystical aspect of all our better sociallife, our literal social relations are never sufficient to meet thereligious need. The resulting outlook toward still further sources ofenlightenment [65]
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III

THE OFFICE OF THE REASON

I. Current objections to the Reason as a source of insight.Intuition vs. Reason. Reason vs. Experience. Usual view of the reasonas "abstract" and as "analytic" in itsprocedure [80]
II. But, in common usage, the words "reason" and "reasonable" oftenrefer to something which does not wholly depend upon "abstractthinking" and mere "analysis." The "rule of reason." The concrete useof the reason. Reason as a survey of the connections of experience, assynthetic, and as involving broader intuitions. The alternative:"Either inarticulate intuition or else barren abstract reasoning," isfalsely stated. The antithesis: "Either experience or else reason,"also involves failure to see how both may be combined. Abstractthinking as a means to an end. This end is the attainment of a new andbroader intuition. Relation between "becoming as a little child" and"putting away childish things" [84]
III. Examples of the synthetic use of the reason. The fecundity ofdeductive reasoning. Novelties discovered by the purely deductivesciences. Reason and insight in their generalrelations [93]
IV. The reason and the "religious paradox." The "paradox" as notpeculiar to religion. Common sense as an appeal to standards which arein some sense superhuman. No human individual personally experiences orverifies what "human experience," in its conceived character as anintegral whole, is supposed to confirm. The concepts of truth and errorare dependent upon the concept of an appeal to an insight which nohuman individual ever possesses. This latter concept cannot be limitedto the mere world of "common sense," but must be universalised. Thewhole real world as the object of an all-seeing comprehension of factsas they are. Otherwise our opinions about the world cannot even befalse. Resulting synthetic insight of the reason. The world as theobject present to the divine wisdom [102]
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IV


THE WORLD AND THE WILL

I. Historical relations of philosophical idealism. General bearingof this doctrine upon the religious interest, and upon the history ofreligion [120]
II. Objections to our doctrine of the reason as having no value forlife, and as failing to help toward solving the problem ofsalvation [129]
III. First answer to these objections. Reports of religious experiencethat show some relations of our doctrine to the problem inquestion [131]
IV. Relations of knowledge and will in general. Statement of theposition of Pragmatism. Resulting objections to our whole doctrine ofthe reason. Truth as tested through "workings." Absolute truth asindefinable. Pragmatism as taught by James has defined its own formsand tests of religious insight. These forms and tests of insight areasserted to be superior to our own. Religious insight as saving, butas also empirical, in James's sense of that term, and as neverabsolute [135]
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V. Answer to pragmatism. Our agreement with some of its principalpositions. Our intelligence as the counsellor of our actions. The pointwhere we are at issue with pragmatism. Reason and will, their generalrelations. Vindication of the position taken in the former lecture [144]
VI. The problem as to the absoluteness of truth. The close relationsof knowledge and action do not throw doubt upon, but rather emphasisethis absoluteness. For all action is expressed in individual andabsolutely irrevocable deeds. These deeds, if the practical issues oflife are sharply defined, remain irrevocably on the "score of life" as"hits" or "misses." This irrevocable character of our deeds insures thefact that the "counsels" or "ideas" of the intellect, which guide ourindividual deeds, are as absolutely "hits" or "misses" as are the deedswhich they counsel. Resulting definition of absolute truth, which issomething perfectly concrete, and as accessible as lifeitself [151]
VII. Application of this view to the definition of reality. The realworld as a life of counsels and of deeds. The divine wisdom and thedivine will as inseparable. The eternal as, not the "timeless," but the"time-inclusive" insight and survey oflife [158]

V

THE RELIGION OF LOYALTY

I. Objections to all the foregoing sources of insight asinadequate,--if considered as separate sources,--to furnish a basis fora vital and positive religion. Need of a new source. Appeal to life tofurnish such a source. The new source is due to men's efforts to solvethe problem of duty, and results from the relations between thereligious and the moral motives [166]
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II. The historical conflicts between religion and morality. Therelations between faith and works, divine grace and moralstrenuousness. Review of these conflicts. Need of some unifyingmotive [170]
III. Analysis of the bases of morals. Individual and social elementsin the idea of duty. Resulting first statement of the search for amoral principle. Incompleteness of this firststatement [182]
IV. The contribution of the reason to the definition of a moralprinciple. Practical inadequacy of the result thus farattained [186]
V. The loyal spirit illustrated [190]
VI. The motives of Loyalty analysed. Definition of what is meant by aCause to which one is loyal. The principal of Loyalty, stated anddeveloped. The religious aspect of the loyal spirit. The finding of thecause is not due to the will of the loyal being; his service of thecause is due to his will. Resulting reconciliation of the moral andreligious motives. The cause as a free gift of grace. The service asone's own. The absoluteness of the principle of loyalty. The solutionof the "religiousparadox" [197]


VI

THE RELIGIOUS MISSION OF SORROW

I. The consideration of Loyalty leads over to a new problem."Tribulation" as a hindrance to religious insight. Reasons why this isthe case, introduced by a statement regarding our experience of evil.The principle that "Evil ought to be altogether put out of existence"stated, and the reasons therefore indicated. Man as in intent a"destroyer of evil." Our natural interest in destructiveprowess [215]
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II. Resulting situation in which religion seems to be placed.Religion appears (1) To presuppose as well as to experience a vastrange of evils in the real world; (2) To depend upon the assurance thatthe ruling principle of the real world is good; and (3) To agree withmorality in making use of the principle that "Evil ought to bealtogether put out of existence." Resulting apparent dilemma: Religionseems either superfluous or else doomed tofailure [219]
III. Illustrations of the dilemma as it appears in practical life, andas a barrier in the way of the religious life. Need of an abstractstatement of the dilemma as a means of discounting our emotionalconfusions [227]
IV. Reconsideration of the principle that has led to the dilemma. Notall evils equally worthy of abolition. Idealised ills. Definition ofSorrow. The process and the results of idealisation. Creative synthesisvs. mere destruction. The winning over and conquest of ill. Strength ofspirit involved in such creative synthesis, which, in its turn, isnever passive, but always morally active. Suggestions toward a solutionof the dilemma. Sorrow as a source of religiousinsight [232]
V. A recent literary instance of such insight [241]
VI. Summary and suggestion of possible results of such insight [250]
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VII

THE UNITY OF THE SPIRIT AND THE INVISIBLE CHURCH

I. The sense in which the religious objects are "superhuman" and"supernatural." Our present "form of consciousness" and the "form ofconsciousness" that belongs to the "Spirit" in the sense in which thatterm is here used [257]
II. The Church, visible and invisible [272]
III. The membership of the invisible church [282]
IV. Communion with the invisible church [291]
V. The Spiritual Gifts of the invisible church. Charity, Toleranceand Loyalty as the Fruits of the Spirit. The work of the invisiblechurch [293]


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I
THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM AND THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL

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I
THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM AND THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL

My first task must be to forestall possible disappointments regarding the scope of our inquiry. In seven lectures upon a vast topic very little can at best be accomplished. I want to tell you at the outset what are some of the limitations to which I propose to subject my undertakings.

I come before you as a philosophical inquirer addressing a general audience of thoughtful people. This definition of my office implies from the outset very notable limitations. As a philosophical inquirer I am not here to preach to you, but to appeal to your own thoughtfulness. Again, since my inquiry concerns the Sources of Religious Insight, you will understand, I hope, that I shall not undertake to present to you any extended system of religious doctrine. Upon sources of insight we are to concentrate our attention. What insight may be obtained from those sources we shall only attempt to indicate in the most general way, not at length to expound. What theologians would call a system of dogmas, I shall not undertake to define. What [{4}] philosophers would regard as a comprehensive philosophy of religion I shall have no time to develop within our limits. I am to make some comments upon the ways in which religious truths can become accessible to men. What truths thus become accessible you must in large measure discover by your own appeal to the sources of which I shall try to tell you.

These somewhat narrow limitations may have, as I hope, their correlative advantages. Since I am to speak of sources, rather than of creeds or of philosophies, I may be able to appeal to people of decidedly various opinions without directing undue attention to the motives that divide them. I need not presuppose that my hearers are of the company of believers or of the company of doubters; and if they are believers, it matters little, for my present purpose, to what household of the faith they belong. I am not here to set people right as to matters of doctrine, but rather to point out the way that, if patiently followed, may tend to lead us all toward light and unity of doctrine. If you listen to my later lectures you may, indeed, be led to ask various questions about my own creed, which, in these lectures, I shall not attempt to answer. But I shall be content if what I say helps any of you, however little, toward finding for yourselves answers to your own religious questions.

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