History of the World War, Volume 1 (of 7)

by Jr. Francis A. March; Richard J. Beamish

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The Nations that formally severed relations whether afterward declaring war or not, are as follows:

Austria against Japan, Aug. 26, 1914.

Austria against Portugal, March 16, 1916.

Austria against Serbia, July 26, 1914.

Austria against United States, April 8, 1917.

Bolivia against Germany, April 14, 1917.

Brazil against Germany, April 11, 1917.

China against Germany, March 14, 1917.

Costa Rica against Germany, Sept. 21, 1917.

Ecuador against Germany, Dec. 7, 1917.

Egypt against Germany, Aug. 13, 1914.

France against Austria, Aug. 10, 1914.

Greece against Turkey, July 2, 1917. (Government of Alexander.)

Greece against Austria, July 2, 1917. (Government of Alexander.)

Guatemala against Germany, April 27, 1917.

Haiti against Germany, June 17, 1917.

Honduras against Germany, May 17, 1917.

Nicaragua against Germany, May 18, 1917.

Peru against Germany, Oct. 6, 1917.

Santo Domingo against Germany, June 8, 1917.

Turkey against United States, April 20, 1917.

United States against Germany, Feb. 3, 1917.

Uruguay against Germany, Oct. 7, 1917.

CHAPTER V
The Great War Begins

YEARS before 1914, when Germany declared war against civilization, it was decided by the German General Staff to strike at France through Belgium. The records of the German Foreign Office prove that fact. The reason for this lay in the long line of powerful fortresses along the line that divides France from Germany and the sparsely spaced and comparatively out-of-date forts on the border between Germany and Belgium. True, there was a treaty guaranteeing the inviolability of Belgian territory to which Germany was a signatory party. Some of the clauses of that treaty were:

Article 9. Belgium, within the limits traced in conformity with the principles laid down in the present preliminaries, shall form a perpetually neutral state. The five powers (England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia), without wishing to intervene in the internal affairs of Belgium, guarantee her that perpetual neutrality as well as the integrity and inviolability of her territory in the limits mentioned in the present article.

Article 10. By just reciprocity Belgium shall be held to observe this same neutrality toward all the other states and to make no attack on their internal or external tranquillity while always preserving the right to defend herself against any foreign aggression.

This agreement was followed on January 23, 1839, by a definitive treaty, accepted by Belgium and by the Netherlands, which treaty regulates Belgium’s neutrality as follows:

Article 7. Belgium, within the limits defined in Articles 1, 2 and 4, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. She is obligated to preserve this neutrality against all the other states.

To convert this solemn covenant into a “scrap of paper” it was necessary that Germany should find an excuse for tearing it to pieces. There was absolutely no provocation in sight, but that did not deter the German High Command. That august body with no information whatever to afford an excuse, alleged in a formal note to the Belgian Government that the French army intended to invade Germany through Belgian territory. This hypocritical and mendacious note and Belgium’s vigorous reply follow:

Note handed in on August 2, 1914, at 7 o’clock P. M., by Herr von Below-Saleske, German Minister, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, 2d August, 1914.

Imperial German Legation in Belgium
(Highly confidential)

The German Government has received reliable information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France of marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial Government cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty of a threat directed against Germany.

It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy.

The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory.

In order to dissipate any misunderstanding the German Government declares as follows:

1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about to commence to take up an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government on its part undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent.

2. Germany undertakes under the conditions laid down to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.

3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy against cash all that is required by her troops, and to give indemnity for the damages caused in Belgium.

4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the German troops, and in particular raises difficulties against their advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse, or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two states toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring states will become closer and more lasting.

The Reply by Belgium

Note handed in by M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below-Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, 3d August, 1914.
(7 o’clock in the morning.)

By the note of the 2d August, 1914, the German Government has made known that according to certain intelligence the French forces intend to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur and that Belgium, in spite of her good-will, would not be able without help to beat off an advance of the French troops.

The German Government felt it to be its duty to forestall this attack and to violate Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany proposes to the King’s Government to take up a friendly attitude, and undertakes at the moment of peace to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of her possessions in their whole extent. The note adds that if Belgium raises difficulties to the forward march of the German troops Germany will be compelled to consider her as an enemy and to leave the later settlement of the two states toward one another to the decision of arms.

This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King’s Government.

The intentions which it attributed to France are in contradiction with the express declarations which were made to us on the 1st of August, in the name of the government of the republic.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfil all her international duties and her army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the powers, and particularly of the Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it respected.

The attempt against her independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of that law.

The Belgian government would, by accepting the propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe.

Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights.

The German attack upon Belgium and France came with terrible force and suddenness. Twenty-four army corps, divided into three armies clad in a specially designed and colored gray-green uniform, swept in three mighty streams over the German borders with their objective the heart of France. The Army of the Meuse was given the route through Liége, Namur and Maubeuge. The Army of the Moselle violated the Duchy of Luxemburg, which, under a treaty guaranteeing its independence and neutrality, was not permitted to maintain an army. Germany was a signatory party to this treaty also. The Army of the Rhine cut through the Vosges Mountains and its route lay between the French cities of Nancy and Toul.

Photo Trans-Atlantic News Service Co.

KING ALBERT AT THE HEAD OF THE HEROIC SOLDIERS OF BELGIUM

It is universally agreed that the Belgian monarch was no figurehead general but a real leader of his troops. These were the men who, facing annihilation, astonished the world by opposing the German military machine successfully enough to allow France to get her armies into shape and prevent the immediate taking of Paris that was planned by Germany.

The heroic defense of the Belgian army at Liége against the Army of the Meuse delayed the operation of Germany’s plans and in all probability saved Paris. It was the first of many similar disappointments and checks that Germany encountered during the war.

The defense of Liége continued for ten heroic days. Within that interval the first British Expeditionary Forces were landed in France and Belgium, the French army was mobilized to full strength. The little Belgian army falling back northward on Antwerp, Louvain and Brussels, threatened the German flank and approximately 200,000 German soldiers were compelled to remain in the conquered section of Belgium to garrison it effectively.

Liége fortifications were the design of the celebrated strategist Brialmont. They consisted of twelve isolated fortresses which had been permitted to become out of repair. No field works of any kind connected them and they were without provision for defense against encircling tactics and against modern artillery.

The huge 42-centimeter guns, the first of Germany’s terrible surprises, were brought into action against these forts, and their concrete and armored steel turrets were cracked as walnuts are cracked between the jaws of a nut-cracker. The Army of the Meuse then made its way like a gray-green cloud of poison gas through Belgium. A cavalry screen of crack Uhlan regiments preceded it, and it made no halt worthy of note until it confronted the Belgian army on the line running from Louvain to Namur. The Belgians were forced back before Louvain on August 20th, the Belgian Government removed the capital from Brussels to Antwerp, and the German hosts entered evacuated Brussels.

During this advance of the Army of the Meuse, strong French detachments invaded German soil, pouring into Alsace through the Belfort Gap. Brief successes attended the bold stroke. Mûlhausen was captured and the Metz-Strassburg Railroad was cut in several places. The French suffered a defeat almost immediately following this first flush of victory, both in Alsace and in Lorraine, where a French detachment had engaged with the Army of the Moselle. The French army thereupon retreated to the strong line of forts and earthworks defending the border between France and Germany.

England’s first expeditionary force landed at Ostend, Calais and Dunkirk on August 7th. It was dubbed England’s “contemptible little army” by the German General Staff. That name was seized upon gladly by England as a spur to volunteering. It brought to the surface national pride and a fierce determination to compel Germany to recognize and to reckon with the “contemptible little army.”

The contact between the French, Belgian and British forces was speedily established and something like concert resistance to the advance of the enemy was made possible. The German army, however, followed by a huge equipment of motor kitchens, munition trains, and other motor transport evidencing great care in preparation for the movement, swept resistlessly forward until it encountered the French and British on a line running from Mons to Charleroi.

The British army was assigned to a position between two French armies. By some miscalculation, the French army that was to have taken its position on the British left, never appeared. The French army on the right was attacked and defeated at Charleroi, falling back in some confusion. The German Army of the Moselle co-operating with the Army of the Meuse then attacked the British and French, and a great flanking movement by the German joint commands developed.

This was directed mainly at the British under command of Sir John French. There followed a retreat that for sheer heroism and dogged determination has become one of the great battles of all time. The British, outflanked and outnumbered three to one, fought and marched without cessation for six days and nights. Time after time envelopment and disaster threatened them, but with a determination that would not be beaten they fought off the best that Germany could send against them, maintained contact with the French army on their right, and delayed the German advance so effectively that a complete disarrangement of all the German plans ensued. This was the second great disappointment to Germany. It made possible the victory of the Marne and the victorious peace of 1918. The story of that immortal retreat is best told in the words of Sir John French, transmitting the report of this encounter to the British War Office. It follows:

“The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its destination well within the scheduled time.

“The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the force during Saturday, the 22d, to positions I considered most favorable from which to commence operations which the French commander-in-chief, General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the campaign.

“The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as follows:

“From Condé to Mons, inclusive, was assigned to the Second Corps, and to the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The Fifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.

“In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the cavalry divisions as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward reconnoissance was intrusted to Brig. Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.

“During the 22d and 23d these advanced squadrons did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took place in which our troops showed to great advantage.

“2. At 6 A. M., on August 23d, I assembled the commanders of the First and Second Corps and cavalry division at a point close to the position and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to be General Joffre’s plan. I discussed with them at some length the immediate situation in front of us.

“From information I received from French headquarters I understood that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy’s army corps, with perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position; and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitering operations. The observations of my airplanes seemed to bear out this estimate.

“About 3 P. M. on Sunday, the 23d, reports began coming in to the effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened.

“The commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high ground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche, moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.

“The right of the Third Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the commander of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the center behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 P. M., I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three German corps, viz., a reserve corps, the Fourth Corps and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the Fifth French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre, between Charleroi and Namur.

“3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitered. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended west to Jenlain, southwest to Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings made the placing of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.

“When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I endeavored to confirm it by airplane reconnoissance; and as a result of this I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.

“A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout the night and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division from the neighborhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the First and Second Divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the neighborhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second Corps retired on the line Dour-Quaroule-Framéries. The Third Division on the right of the corps suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.

“The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially intrenched themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 P. M. Toward midday the enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.

“I had previously ordered General Allenby with the cavalry to act vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavor to take the pressure off.

“About 7.30 A. M. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles Ferguson, commanding the Fifth Division, saying that he was very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message General Allenby drew in the cavalry and endeavored to bring direct support to the Fifth Division.

“During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the Second Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyze the further advance of the enemy’s infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire about five hundred yards from his objective, and the Ninth Lancers and the Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the brigade.

“The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line of communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22d and 23d. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.

“With the assistance of the cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great losses in doing so.

“At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in position between Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank.

“4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.

“I had every reason to believe that the enemy’s forces were somewhat exhausted and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting my object.

“The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops.

“The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a position in the neighborhood of Le Cateau, and rear guards were ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eih Road by 5.30 A. M.

“Two cavalry brigades, with the divisional cavalry of the Second Corps, covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the cavalry division, with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command of General Allenby, covered the west flank.

“The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade of artillery with divisional staff were available for service.

“I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south of La Chaprie. In this position the division rendered great help to the effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.

“Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been partially prepared and intrenched, I had grave doubts, owing to the information I had received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy against me—as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.

“Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy’s western corps (II) to envelope me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat until I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the corps commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could toward the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.

“The cavalry under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement.

“Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of the Forêt de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o’clock. I had intended that the corps should come further west so as to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further in without rest.

“The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30 P. M. a report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his First Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the commander of the two French reserve divisions on my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skillful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march south toward Wassigny on Guise.

“By about 6 P. M. the Second Corps had got into position with their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighborhood of Caudry, and the line of defense was continued thence by the Fourth Division toward Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.

“During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th, General Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.

“The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the general officer commanding the Second Army Corps.

“On the 24th the French cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my ‘Poste de Commandement’ during the fighting of the 23d and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his army commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable, for the reasons given, to afford me any support on the most critical day of all, viz., the 26th.

“At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the Fourth Division.

“At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack.

“I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement.

“The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way.

“There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

“The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

“At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 P. M. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.

“Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit.

“I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

“I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my command on the morning of the 26th of August, could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.

“The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy’s pursuit.

“On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the French cavalry division which he commands for materially assisting my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.

“General D’Amade also, with the Sixty-first and Sixty-second French Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighborhood of Arras on the enemy’s right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British forces.

“This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23d August, and which really constituted a four days’ battle.

“At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present dispatch.

“I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British forces have suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the fact that the British army—only two days after a concentration by rail—was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five Germany army corps.

A SCENE FROM EARLY TRENCH WARFARE

From the woods in the background the British charge on an angle of the German breastworks under cover of artillery and machine-gun fire. This illustrates the early French warfare before the development of elaborate concrete structures like the Hindenburg line which the Germans later devised.

“It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the two general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops by divisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smaller units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers and men.

“I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship’s notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.

“Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy’s machines.”

The combined French and British armies, including the forces that had retreated from Alsace and Lorraine, gave way with increasing stubbornness before von Kluck. That German general disregarding the fortresses surrounding Paris, swung southward to make a junction with the Army of the Crown Prince of Germany advancing through the Vosges Mountains. General Manoury’s army opposed the German advance on the entrenched line of Paris. General Gallieni commanding the garrison of Paris, was ready with a novel mobile transport consisting of taxicabs and fast trucks. The total number of soldiers in the French and British armies now outnumbered those in the German armies opposed to them.

General Joffre, in supreme command of the French, had chosen the battleground. He had set the trap with consummate skill. The word was given; the trap was sprung; and the first battle of the Marne came as a crashing surprise to Germany.

CHAPTER VI
The Trail of the Beast in Belgium

GERMANY’S onrush into heroic Belgium speedily resolved itself into a saturnalia that drenched the land with blood and roused the civilized world into resentful horror. As the tide of barbarity swept forward into Northern France, stories of the horrors filtered through the close web of German censorship. There were denials at first by German propagandists. In the face of truth furnished by thousands of witnesses, the denials faded away.

What caused these atrocities? Were they the spontaneous expression of dormant brutishness in German soldiers? Were they a sudden reversion of an entire nation to bestiality?

The answer is that the private soldier as an individual was not responsible. The carnage, the rapine, the wholesale desolation was an integral part of the German policy of schrecklichkeit or frightfulness. This policy was laid down by Germany as part of its imperial war code. In 1902 Germany issued a new war manual entitled “Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege.” In it is written this cold-blooded declaration:

All measures which conduce to the attainment of the object of war are permissible and these may be summarized in the two ideas of violence and cunning. What is permissible includes every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be attained. All means which modern invention affords, including the fullest, most dangerous, and most massive means of destruction, may be utilized.

Brand Whitlock, United States Minister to Belgium, in a formal report to the State Department, made this statement concerning Germany’s policy in permitting these outrages:

“All these deliberate organized massacres of civilians, all these murders and outrages, the violation of women, the killing of children, wanton destruction, burning, looting and pillage, and whole towns destroyed, were acts for which no possible military necessity can be pleaded. They were wilfully committed as part of a deliberately prepared and scientifically organized policy of terrorism.”

And now, having considered these outrages as part of the German policy of terrorism, let us turn to the facts presented by those who made investigations at first hand in devastated Belgium and Northern France.

Let us first return to the tragic story of the destruction of Louvain. The first document comes in the form of a cable sent from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs under date of August 8, 1914:

“On Tuesday evening a body of German troops who had been driven back retired in disorder upon the town of Louvain. Germans who were guarding the town thought that the retiring troops were Belgians and fired upon them. In order to excuse this mistake the Germans, in spite of the most energetic denials on the part of the authorities, pretended that Belgians had fired on the Germans, although all the inhabitants, including policemen, had been disarmed for more than a week. Without any examination and without listening to any protest the commanding officer announced that the town would be immediately destroyed. All inhabitants had to leave their homes at once; some were made prisoners; women and children were put into a train of which the destination was unknown; soldiers with fire bombs set fire to the different quarters of the town; the splendid Church of St. Pierre, the markets, the university and its scientific establishments, were given to the flames, and it is probable that the Hotel de Ville, this celebrated jewel of Gothic art, will also have disappeared in the disaster. Several notabilities were shot at sight. Thus a town of 40,000 inhabitants, which, since the fifteenth century, has been the intellectual and scientific capital of the Low Countries, is a heap of ashes. Americans, many of whom have followed the course at this illustrious alma mater and have there received such cordial hospitality, cannot remain insensible to this outrage on the rights of humanity and civilization which is unprecedented in history.”

Minister Whitlock made the following report on the same outrage:

“A violent fusillade broke out simultaneously at various points in the city (Louvain), notably at the Porte de Bruxelles, Porte de Tirlemont, Rue Leopold, Rue Marie-Thérèse, Rue des Joyeuses Entrées. German soldiers were firing at random in every street and in every direction. Later fires broke out everywhere, notably in the University building, the Library, in the old Church of St. Peter, in the Place du Peuple, in the Rue de la Station, in the Boulevard de Tirlemont, and in the Chaussée de Tirlemont. On the orders of their chiefs, the German soldiers would break open the houses and set fire to them, shooting on the inhabitants who tried to leave their dwellings. Many persons who took refuge in their cellars were burned to death. The German soldiers were equipped with apparatus for the purpose of firing dwellings, incendiary pastils, machines for spraying petroleum, etc....

“Major von Manteuffel (of the German forces) sent for Alderman Schmidt. Upon the latter’s arrival, the major declared that hostages were to be held, as sedition had just broken out. He asked Father Parijs, Mr. Schmidt, and Mgr. Coenraedts, First Vice-Rector of the University, who was being held as a hostage, to make proclamations to the inhabitants exhorting them to be calm and menacing them with a fine of twenty million francs, the destruction of the city and the hanging of the hostages, if they created disturbance. Surrounded by about thirty soldiers and a few officers, Major Manteuffel, Father Parijs, Mr. Schmidt and Mgr. Coenraedts left in the direction of the station, and the alderman, in French, and the priest, in Flemish, made proclamations at the street corners....

“Near the statue of Juste-Lipse, a Dr. Berghausen, a German surgeon, in a highly excited condition, ran to meet the delegation. He shouted that a German soldier had just been killed by a shot fired from the house of Mr. David Fishbach. Addressing the soldiers, Dr. Berghausen said: ‘The blood of the entire population of Louvain is not worth a drop of the blood of a German soldier!’ Then one of the soldiers threw into the interior of the house of Mr. Fishbach one of the pastils which the German soldiers carried and immediately the house flared up. It contained paintings of a high value. The old coachman, Joseph Vandermosten, who had re-entered the house to try to save the life of his master, did not return. His body was found the next day amidst the ruins....

“The Germans made the usual claim that the civil population had fired upon them and that it was necessary to take these measures, i. e., burn the churches, the library and other public monuments, burn and pillage houses, driving out and murdering the inhabitants, sacking the city in order to punish and to spread terror among the people, and General von Luttwitz had told me that it was reported that the son of the burgomaster had shot one of their generals.

“But the burgomaster of Louvain had no son, and no officer was shot at Louvain. The story of a general shot by the son of a burgomaster was a repetition of a tragedy that had occurred at Aerschot, on the 19th, where the fifteen-year-old son of the burgomaster had been killed by a firing squad, not because he had shot a general, but because an officer had been shot, probably by Belgian soldiers retreating through the town. The story of this tragedy is told by the boy’s mother, under oath, before the Belgian Commission, and is so simple, so touching, so convincing in its verisimilitude, that I attach a copy of it in extenso to this report. It seems to afford an altogether typical example of what went on all over the stricken land during those days of terror. (In other places it was the daughter of the burgomaster who was said to have shot a general.)

“The following facts may be noted: From the avowal of Prussian officers themselves, there was not one single victim, among their men at the barracks of St. Martin, Louvain, where it was claimed that the first shot had been fired from a house situated in front of the Caserne. This would appear to be impossible had the civilians fired upon them point blank from across the street. It was said that when certain houses near the barracks were burning, numerous explosions occurred, revealing the presence of cartridges; but these houses were drinking houses much frequented by German soldiers. It was said that Spanish students shot from the schools in the Rue de la Station, but Father Catala, rector of the school, affirms that the schools were empty....

“If it was necessary, for whatever reason, to do what was done at Vise, at Dinant, at Aerschot, at Louvain, and in a hundred other towns that were sacked, pillaged and burned, where masses were shot down because civilians had fired on German troops, and if it was necessary to do this on a scale never before witnessed in history, one might not unreasonably assume that the alleged firing by civilians was done on a scale, if not so thoroughly organized, at least somewhat in proportion to the rage of destruction that punished it. And hence it would seem to be a simple matter to produce at least convincing evidence that civilians had fired on the soldiers; but there is no testimony to that effect beyond that of the soldiers who merely assert it: Man hat geschossen. If there were no more firing on soldiers by civilians in Belgium than is proved by the German testimony, it was not enough to justify the burning of the smallest of the towns that was overtaken by that fate. And there is not a scintilla of evidence of organized bands of francs-tireurs, such as were found in the war of 1870.”

From a painting by F. Gueldry to illustrate an official report.

GERMAN ATROCITIES

At Senlis, Department of Oise, on September 2, 1914, French captives were made to walk in the open so as to be hit by French bullets. Many were killed and wounded. The townsman on the left was struck in the knee. A German officer asked to see the wound and shot him through the shoulder. On the right a German officer is seen torturing a wounded French soldier by beating him in the face with a stick.

Under date of September 12, 1917, Minister Whitlock, in a report to the State Department of the United States, made the following summary: “As one studies the evidence at hand, one is struck at the outset by the fact so general that it must exclude the hypothesis of coincidence, and that is that these wholesale massacres followed immediately upon some check, some reverse, that the German army had sustained. The German army was checked by the guns of the forts to the east of Liége, and the horrors of Vise, Verviers, Bligny, Battice, Hervy and twenty villages follow. When they entered Liége, they burned the houses along two streets and killed many persons, five or six Spaniards among them. Checked before Namur they sacked Andenne, Bauvignies, and Champignon, and when they took Namur they burned one hundred and fifty houses. Compelled to give battle to the French army in the Belgian Ardennes they ravaged the beautiful valley of the Semois; the complete destruction of the village of Rossignlo and the extermination of its entire male population took place there. Checked again by the French on the Meuse, the awful carnage of Dinant results. Held on the Sambre by the French, they burn one hundred houses at Charleroi and enact the appalling tragedy of Tamines. At Mons, the English hold them, and after that all over the Borinage there is a systematic destruction, pillage and murder. The Belgian army drive them back from Malines and Louvain is doomed. The Belgian army falling back and fighting in retreat took refuge in the forts of Antwerp, and the burning and sack of Hougaerde, Wavre, Ottignies, Grimde, Neerlinter, Weert, St. George, Shaffen and Aerschot follow.

“The Belgian troops inflicted serious losses on the Germans in the South of the Province of Limbourg and the towns of Lummen, Bilsen, and Lanaeken are partially destroyed. Antwerp held out for two months, and all about its outer line of fortifications there was blood and fire, numerous villages were sacked and burned and the whole town of Termonde was destroyed. During the battles of September the village of Boortmeerbeek near Malines, occupied by the Germans, was retaken by the Belgians, and when the Germans entered it again they burned forty houses. Three times occupied by the Belgians and retaken by the Germans Boortmeerbeek was three times punished in the same way. That is to say, everywhere the German army met with a defeat it took it out, as we say in America, on the civil population. And that is the explanation of the German atrocities in Belgium.”

A committee of the highest honor and responsibility was appointed by the British Government to investigate the whole subject of atrocities in Belgium and Northern France. Its chairman was the Rt. Hon. Viscount James Bryce, formerly British Ambassador to the United States. Its other members were the Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock, the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Clark, Sir Alfred Hopkinson, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sheffield, Mr. Harold Cox and Sir Kenelm E. Digby.

The report of the commission bears upon its face the stamp of painstaking search for truth, substantiates every statement made by Minister Whitlock and makes known many horrible instances of cruelty and barbarity. It makes the following deductions as having been proved beyond question:

1. That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organized massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.

2. That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children murdered.

3. That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, being, indeed, part of a system of general terrorization.

4. That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the white flag.

The Bryce Commission’s report on the destruction of Dinant is an example of testimony laid before them. It follows:

“A clear statement of the outrages at Dinant, which many travelers will recall as a singularly picturesque town on the Meuse, is given by one witness, who says that the Germans began burning houses in the Rue St. Jacques on the 21st of August, and that every house in the street was burned. On the following day an engagement took place between the French and the Germans, and the witness spent the whole day in the cellar of a bank with his wife and children. On the morning of the 23d, about 5 o’clock, firing ceased, and almost immediately afterward a party of Germans came to the house. They rang the bell and began to batter at the door and windows. The witness’ wife went to the door and two or three Germans came in. The family were ordered out into the street. There they found another family, and the two families were driven with their hands above their heads along the Rue Grande. All the houses in the street were burning.

“The party was eventually put into a forge where there were a number of other prisoners, about a hundred in all, and were kept there from 11 A. M. till 2 P. M. They were then taken to the prison. There they were assembled in a courtyard and searched. No arms were found. They were then passed through into the prison itself and put into cells. The witness and his wife were separated from each other. During the next hour the witness heard rifle shots continually and noticed in the corner of a courtyard leading off the row of cells the body of a young man with a mantle thrown over it. He recognized the mantle as having belonged to his wife. The witness’ daughter was allowed to go out to see what had happened to her mother, and the witness himself was allowed to go across the courtyard half an hour afterward for the same purpose. He found his wife lying on the floor in a room. She had bullet wounds in four places but was alive and told her husband to return to the children and he did so.

“About 5 o’clock in the evening, he saw the Germans bringing out all the young and middle-aged men from the cells, and ranging their prisoners, to the number of forty, in three rows in the middle of the courtyard. About twenty Germans were drawn up opposite, but before anything was done there was a tremendous fusillade from some point near the prison and the civilians were hurried back to their cells. Half an hour later the same forty men were brought back into the courtyard. Almost immediately there was a second fusillade like the first and they were driven back to the cells again.

“About 7 o’clock the witness and other prisoners were brought out of their cells and marched out of the prison. They went between two lines of troops to Roche Bayard, about a kilometer away. An hour later the women and children were separated and the prisoners were brought back to Dinant passing the prison on their way. Just outside the prison, the witness saw three lines of bodies which he recognized as being those of his neighbors. They were nearly all dead, but he noticed movement in some of them. There were about one hundred and twenty bodies. The prisoners were then taken up to the top of a hill outside Dinant and compelled to stay there till 8 o’clock in the morning. On the following day they were put into cattle trucks and taken thence to Coblenz. For three months they remained prisoners in Germany.

“Unarmed civilians were killed in masses at other places near the prison. About ninety bodies were seen lying on the top of one another in a grass square opposite the convent. A witness asked a German officer why her husband had been shot, and he told her that it was because two of her sons had been in the civil guard and had shot at the Germans. As a matter of fact, one of her sons was at that time in Liége and the other in Brussels. It is stated that besides the ninety corpses referred to above, sixty corpses of civilians were recovered from a hole in the brewery yard and that forty-eight bodies of women and children were found in a garden. The town was systematically set on fire by hand grenades. Another witness saw a little girl of seven, one of whose legs was broken and the other injured by a bayonet. We have no reason to believe that the civilian population of Dinant gave any provocation, or that any other defense can be put forward to justify the treatment inflicted upon its citizens.”

The Bryce Commission reports the outrages in a number of Belgian villages in this terse fashion:

“In Hofstade a number of houses had been set on fire and many corpses were seen, some in houses, some in back yards, and some in the streets. Two witnesses speak of having seen the body of a young man pierced by bayonet thrusts with the wrists cut also. On a side road the corpse of a civilian was seen on his doorstep with a bayonet wound in his stomach and by his side the dead body of a boy of five or six with his hands nearly severed. The corpses of a woman and boy were seen at the blacksmith’s. They had been killed with the bayonet. In a café, a young man, also killed with the bayonet, was holding his hands together as if in the attitude of supplication.

“In the garden of a house in the main street, bodies of two women were observed, and in another house, the body of a boy of sixteen with two bayonet wounds in the chest. In Sempst a similar condition of affairs existed. Houses were burning and in some of them were the charred remains of civilians. In a bicycle shop a witness saw the burned corpse of a man. Other witnesses speak of this incident. Another civilian, unarmed, was shot as he was running away. As will be remembered, all the arms had been given up some time before by the order of the burgomaster.

“At Weerde four corpses of civilians were lying in the road. It was said that these men had fired upon the German soldiers; but this is denied. The arms had been given up long before. Two children were killed in the village of Weerde, quite wantonly as they were standing in the road with their mother. They were three or four years old and were killed with the bayonet. A small barn burning close by formed a convenient means of getting rid of the bodies. They were thrown into the flames from the bayonets. It is right to add that no commissioned officer was present at the time. At Eppeghem, on August 25th, a pregnant woman who had been wounded with a bayonet was discovered in the convent. She was dying. On the road six dead bodies of laborers were seen.

“At Boortmeerbeek a German soldier was seen to fire three times at a little girl five years old. Having failed to hit her, he subsequently bayoneted her. He was killed with the butt end of a rifle by a Belgian soldier who had seen him commit this murder from a distance. At Herent the charred body of a civilian was found in a butcher’s shop, and in a handcart twenty yards away was the dead body of a laborer. Two eye witnesses relate that a German soldier shot a civilian and stabbed him with a bayonet as he lay. He then made one of these witnesses, a civilian prisoner, smell the blood on the bayonet. At Haecht the bodies of ten civilians were seen lying in a row by a brewery wall. In a laborer’s house, which had been broken up, the mutilated corpse of a woman of thirty to thirty-five was discovered.”

Concerning the treatment of women and children in general, the report continues: “The evidence shows that the German authorities, when carrying out a policy of systematic arson and plunder in selected districts, usually drew some distinction between the adult male population on the one hand and the women and children on the other. It was a frequent practice to set apart the adult males of the condemned district with a view to the execution of a suitable number—preferably of the younger and more vigorous—and to reserve the women and children for milder treatment. The depositions, however, present many instances of calculated cruelty, often going the length of murder, toward the women and children of the condemned area.

“At Dinant sixty women and children were confined in the cellar of a convent from Sunday morning till the following Friday, August 28th, sleeping on the ground, for there were no beds, with nothing to drink during the whole period, and given no food until Wednesday, when somebody threw into the cellar two sticks of macaroni and a carrot for each prisoner. In other cases the women and children were marched for long distances along roads, as, for instance, the march of the women from Louvain to Tirlemont, August 28th, the laggards pricked on by the attendant Uhlans. A lady complains of having been brutally kicked by privates. Others were struck at with the butt end of rifles. At Louvain, at Liége, at Aerschot, at Malines, at Montigny, at Andenne, and elsewhere, there is evidence that the troops were not restrained from drunkenness, and drunken soldiers cannot be trusted to observe the rules or decencies of war, least of all when they are called upon to execute a preordained plan of arson and pillage. From the very first women were not safe. At Liége women and children were chased about the streets by soldiers.

“Witnesses recount how a great crowd of men, women and children from Aerschot were marched to Louvain, and then suddenly exposed to a fire from a mitrailleuse and rifles. ‘We were all placed,’ recounts a sufferer, ‘in Station Street, Louvain, and the German soldiers fired on us. I saw the corpses of some women in the street. I fell down, and a woman who had been shot fell on top of me.’ Women and children suddenly turned out into the streets, and, compelled to witness the destruction of their homes by fire, provided a sad spectacle to such as were sober enough to see.

“A humane German officer, witnessing the ruin of Aerschot, exclaimed in disgust: ‘I am a father myself, and I cannot bear this. It is not war but butchery.’ Officers as well as men succumbed to the temptation of drink, with results which may be illustrated by an incident which occurred at Campenhout. In this village there was a certain well-to-do merchant (name given) who had a cellar of good champagne. On the afternoon of the 14th or 15th of August three German cavalry officers entered the house and demanded champagne. Having drunk ten bottles and invited five or six officers and three or four private soldiers to join them, they continued their carouse, and then called for the master and mistress of the house.

“‘Immediately my mistress came in,’ says the valet de chambre, ‘one of the officers who was sitting on the floor got up, and, putting a revolver to my mistress’ temple, shot her dead. The officer was obviously drunk. The other officers continued to drink and sing, and they did not pay any great attention to the killing of my mistress. The officer who shot my mistress then told my master to dig a grave and bury my mistress. My master and the officer went into the garden, the officer threatening my master with a pistol. My master was then forced to dig the grave and to bury my mistress in it. I cannot say for what reason they killed my mistress. The officer who did it was singing all the time.’

“In the evidence before us there are cases tending to show that aggravated crimes against women were sometimes severely punished. One witness reports that a young girl who was being pursued by a drunken soldier at Louvain appealed to a German officer, and that the offender was then and there shot. Another describes how an officer of the Thirty-second Regiment of the Line was led out to execution for the violation of two young girls, but reprieved at the request or with the consent of the girls’ mother. These instances are sufficient to show that the maltreatment of women was no part of the military scheme of the invaders, however much it may appear to have been the inevitable result of the system of terror deliberately adopted in certain regions. Indeed, so much is avowed. ‘I asked the commander why we had been spared,’ says a lady in Louvain, who deposes to having suffered much brutal treatment during the sack. He said: ‘We will not hurt you any more. Stay in Louvain. All is finished.’ It was Saturday, August 29th, and the reign of terror was over.

“The Germans used men, women and children of Belgium as screens for advancing infantry, as is shown in the following: Outside Fort Fleron, near Liége, men and children were marched in front of the Germans to prevent the Belgian soldiers from firing. The progress of the Germans through Mons was marked by many incidents of this character. Thus, on August 22d, half a dozen Belgian colliers returning from work were marching in front of some German troops who were pursuing the English, and in the opinion of the witnesses, they must have been placed there intentionally. An English officer describes how he caused a barricade to be erected in a main thoroughfare leading out of Mons, when the Germans, in order to reach a crossroad in the rear, fetched civilians out of the houses on each side of the main road and compelled them to hold up white flags and act as cover.

“Another British officer who saw this incident is convinced that the Germans were acting deliberately for the purpose of protecting themselves from the fire of the British troops. Apart from this protection, the Germans could not have advanced, as the street was straight and commanded by the British rifle fire at a range of 700 or 800 yards. Several British soldiers also speak of this incident, and their story is confirmed by a Flemish witness in a side street.”

The French Government also appointed a commission, headed by M. Georges Payelle. This body made an investigation of outrages committed by German officers and soldiers in Northern France. Its report showed conditions that outstripped in horror the war tactics of savages. It makes the following accusations:

“In Rebais, two English cavalrymen who were surprised and wounded in this commune were finished off with gunshots by the Germans when they were dismounted and when one of them had thrown up his hands, showing thus that he was unarmed.

“In the department of the Marne, as everywhere else, the German troops gave themselves up to general pillage, which was carried out always under similar conditions and with the complicity of their leaders. The Communes of Heiltz-le-Maurupt, Suippes, Marfaux, Fromentieres and Esternay suffered especially in this way. Everything which the invader could carry off from the houses was placed on motor lorries and vehicles. At Suippes, in particular, they carried off in this way a quantity of different objects, among these sewing machines and toys. A great many villages, as well as important country towns, were burned without any reason whatever. Without doubt, these crimes were committed by order, as German detachments arrived in the neighborhood with their torches, their grenades, and their usual outfit for arson.

“At Marfaux nineteen private houses were burned. Of the Commune of Glannes practically nothing remains. At Somme-Tourbe the entire village has been destroyed, with the exception of the Mairie, the church and two private buildings. At Auve nearly the whole town has been destroyed. At Etrepy sixty-three families out of seventy are homeless. At Huiron all of the houses, with the exception of five had been burned. At Sermaize-les-Bains only about forty houses out of 900 remain. At Bignicourt-sur-Saultz thirty houses out of thirty-three are in ruins.

“At Suippes, the big market town which has been practically burned out, German soldiers carrying straw and cans of petrol have been seen in the streets. While the mayor’s house was burning, six sentinels with fixed bayonets were under orders to forbid any one to approach and to prevent any help being given.

“All this destruction by arson, which only represents a small proportion of the acts of the same kind in the Department of Seine-et-Marne, was accomplished without the least tendency to rebellion or the smallest act of resistance being recorded against the inhabitants of the localities which are today more or less completely destroyed. In some villages the Germans, before setting fire to them, made one of their soldiers fire a shot from his rifle so as to be able to pretend afterward that the civilian population had attacked them, an allegation which is all the more absurd since at the time when the enemy arrived, the only inhabitants left were old men, sick persons, or people absolutely without any means of aggression.

“Numerous crimes against the person have also been committed. In the majority of the communes hostages have been taken away; many of them have not returned. At Sermaize-les-Bains, the Germans carried off about one hundred and fifty people, some of whom were decked out with helmets and coats and compelled, thus equipped, to mount guard over the bridges.

“At Bignicourt-sur-Saultz thirty men and forty-five women and children were obliged to leave with a detachment. One of the men—a certain Emile Pierre—has not returned nor sent any news of himself. At Corfelix, M. Jacqet, who was carried off on the 7th of September with eleven of his fellow-citizens, was found five hundred meters from the village with a bullet in his head.

“At Champuis, the curé, his maid-servant, and four other inhabitants who were taken away on the same day as the hostages of Corfelix had not returned at the time of our visit to the place.

“At the same place an old man of seventy, named Jacquemin, was tied down in his bed by an officer and left in this state without food for three days. He died a little time after. At Vert-la-Gravelle a farm hand was killed. He was struck on the head with a bottle and his chest was run through with a lance. The garde champetre Brulefer of le Gault-la-Foret was murdered at Maclaunay, where he had been taken by the Germans. His body was found with his head shattered and a wound on his chest.

“At Champguyon, a commune which has been fired, a certain Verdier was killed in his father-in-law’s house. The latter was not present at the execution, but he heard a shot and next day an officer said to him, ‘Son shot. He is under the ruins.’ In spite of the search made the body has not been found among them. It must have been consumed in the fire.

“At Sermaize, the roadmaker, Brocard, was placed among a number of hostages. Just at the moment when he was being arrested with his son, his wife and his daughter-in-law in a state of panic rushed to throw themselves into the Saulx. The old man was able to free himself for a moment and ran in all haste after them and made several attempts to save them, but the Germans dragged him away pitilessly, leaving the two wretched women struggling in the river. When Brocard and his son were restored to liberty, four days afterward, and found the bodies, they discovered that their wives had both received bullet wounds in the head.

© Underwood and Underwood, N. Y.

THE SUPREME EXPONENTS OF GERMAN FRIGHTFULNESS

On the left, General von Bissing, military commander of Belgium. On the right, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, who inspired the German submarine campaign.

“At Triaucourt the Germans gave themselves up to the worst excesses. Angered doubtless by the remark which an officer had addressed to a soldier, against whom a young girl of nineteen, Mlle. Helene Proces, had made complaint on account of the indecent treatment to which she had been subjected, they burned the village and made a systematic massacre of the inhabitants. They began by setting fire to the house of an inoffensive householder, M. Jules Gand, and by shooting this unfortunate man as he was leaving his house to escape the flames. Then they dispersed among the houses in the streets, firing off their rifles on every side. A young man, seventeen years, Georges Lecourtier, who tried to escape was shot. M. Alfred Lallemand suffered the same fate. He was pursued into the kitchen of his fellow-citizen Tautelier, and murdered there, while Tautelier received three bullets in his hand.

“Fearing, not without reason, for their lives, Mlle. Proces, her mother and her grandmother of seventy-one and her old aunt of eighty-one, tried to cross the trellis which separates their garden from a neighboring property with the help of a ladder. The young girl alone was able to reach the other side and to avoid death by hiding in the cabbages. As for the other women, they were struck down by rifle shots. The village curé collected the brains of the aunt on the ground on which they were strewn and had the bodies carried into Proces’ house. During the following night, the Germans played the piano near the bodies.

“While the carnage raged, the fire rapidly spread and devoured thirty-five houses. An old man of seventy and a child of two months perished in the flames. M. Igier, who was trying to save his cattle, was pursued for 300 meters by soldiers, who fired at him ceaselessly. By a miracle this man had the good fortune not to be wounded, but five bullets went through his clothing.”

This summary merely hints at the atrocities that were perpetrated. And these are the crimes that France and Belgium will remember after indemnities have been paid, after borders have been re-established and after generations shall have passed. The horrors of blazing villages, of violated womanhood, of mutilated childhood, of stark and senseless butcheries, will flash before the minds of French and Belgian men and women when Germany’s name shall be mentioned long after the declaration of peace.

Schrecklichkeit had its day. It took its bloody toll of the fairest and bravest of two gallant nations. It ravaged Poland as well and wreaked its fiendish will on wounded soldiers on the battlefields.

But Schrecklichkeit is dead. Belgium and France have shown that murder and rape and arson cannot destroy liberty nor check the indomitable ambitions of the free peoples of earth.

The lesson to Germany was taught at a terrible cost to humanity, but it was taught in a fashion that nations hereafter who shall dream of emulating the Hun will know in advance that frightfulness serves no end except to feed the lust for destruction that exists only in the most debased and brutish of men.

CHAPTER VII
The First Battle of the Marne

FRANCE and civilization were saved by Joffre and Foch at the first battle of the Marne in August, 1914.

Autocracy was destroyed by Foch at the second battle of the Marne, 1918.

This in a nutshell embraces the dramatic opening and closing episodes of the World War on the soil of France. Bracketed between these two glorious victories were the agonies of martyred France, the deaths and life-long cripplings of millions of men, the up-rooting of arrogant militarism, the liberation of captive nations.

The first battle of the Marne was wholly a French operation. The British were close at hand, but had no share in the victory. Generals Gallieni and Manoury, acting under instructions from Marshal Joffre, were driven by automobile to the headquarters of the British commander, Sir John French, in the village of Melun. They explained in detail General Joffre’s plan of attack upon the advancing German army. An urgent request was made that the British army halt its retreat, face about, and attack the two corps of von Kluck’s army then confronting the British. Simultaneously with this attack General Manoury’s forces were to fall upon the flank and the rear guard of von Kluck along the River Ourcq. This operation was planned for the next day, September 5th. Sir John French replied that he could not get his tired army in readiness for battle within forty-eight hours. This would delay the British attack in all probability until September 7th.

Joffre’s plan of battle, however, would admit of no delay. The case was urgent; there was grave danger of a union between the great forces headed by the Crown Prince and those under von Kluck. He resolved to go ahead without the British, and ordered Manoury to strike as had been planned.

He fixed as an extreme limit for the movement of retreat, which was still going on, the line of Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and the region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if the troops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack before reaching it, as soon as there was a possibility of bringing about an offensive disposition, permitting the co-operation of the whole of the French forces.

On September 5 it appeared that this desired situation existed.

The First German army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued its endeavor to envelop the French left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reached the region of Chauffry, to the south of Rebais and of Esternay. It aimed then at cutting Joffre off from Paris, in order to begin the investment of the capital.

The Second army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergères, and Vertus.

The Third and Fourth armies reached to Châlons-sur-Marne and Bussy-le-Répos. The Fifth army was advancing on one side and the other from the Argonne as far as Triaucourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. The Sixth and Seventh armies were attacking more to the east.

The First German Dash for Paris

The French left army had been able to occupy the line Sezanne, Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps. This was precisely the disposition which the General-in-Chief had wished to see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it, and ordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from his right two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisions of cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his center.

© Underwood and Underwood, N. Y.

GENERAL PERSHING AND MARSHAL JOFFRE

The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces chatting with the veteran Marshal of France, the hero of the first battle of the Marne.

On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies a message ordering them to attack.

“The hour has come,” he wrote, “to advance at all costs, and to die where you stand rather than give way.”

If one examines the map, it will be seen that by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck was exposing his right to the offensive action of the French left. This is the starting point of the victory of the Marne.

On the evening of September 5th the French left army had reached the front Penchard-Saint-Souflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second and Fourth army corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. But in spite of this pressure the French held their ground. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and being reinforced prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th the French established themselves on the Aisne.

Why did the German forces which were confronting the French, and on the evening before attacking so furiously, retreat on the morning of the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to the north to face the French left, the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the now rested British, who had immediately faced around toward the north, and to those of the French armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on September 8th and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it was to effect.

On the 6th the British army set out from the line Rozcy-Langny and that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Château-Thierry—the town that was to become famous for the American stand in 1918—taking in flank the German forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, the French left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval.

The rôle of the French army, which was operating to the right of the British army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left. It had on its right to support the center, which, from September 7th, had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it.

On the 7th, it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and a million cartridges. On the 12th it established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with the French center, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste.

The French center consisted of a new army created on August 29th and of one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated, on August 29th to September 5th, from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front Sezanne-Mailly.

The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line Humbauville-Château-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy.

The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 19th to pierce the French center to the west and to the east of Fere-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of the new French army, which retired as far as Gouragançon. On the 9th, at 6 o’clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant-Connantre.

Despite this retreat General Foch, commanding the army of the center, ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the divisions which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sezanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold maneuver, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat. This marked Foch as the most daring and brilliant strategist of the war.

On the 11th the French crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of them in disorder. On the 12th they were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Champ de Châlons. The reserve army of the center, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained, and two French center armies were solidly established on the ground gained.

MARSHAL FERDINAND FOCH, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

The crushing defeat of the armies of the Central Powers is due in large measure to the remarkable strategy and superb leadership of this great French soldier.

To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them from the French center. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant success for the French artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the Sixteenth German army corps.

On the 10th inst., the Eighth and Fifteenth German army corps counter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th French progress continued with new successes, and on the 12th the French were able to face round toward the north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th.

The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before the two French armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of the French right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by the left and center.

Such was this seven days’ battle, in which more than two millions of men were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road to its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversary which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of one articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of intention and method animating the supreme command.

To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to meet the whole German army. Under their pressure the German retreat at certain times had the appearance of a rout.

In spite of the fatigue of the poilus, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery, the French took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, and thousands of prisoners. One German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery.

In that great battle the spectacular rush of General Gallieni’s army defending Paris, was one of the dramatic surprises that decided the issue. In that stroke Gallieni sent his entire force forty miles to attack the right wing of the German army. In this gigantic maneuver every motor car in Paris was utilized, and the flying force of Gallieni became the “Army in Taxicabs,” a name that will live as long as France exists.

General Clergerie, Chief of Staff of Gallieni, told the story for posterity. He said:

“From August 26, 1914, the German armies had been descending upon Paris by forced marches. On September 1st they were only three days’ march from the advanced line of the intrenched camp, which the garrison were laboring desperately to put into condition for defense. It was necessary to cover with trenches a circuit of 110 miles, install siege guns, assure the coming of supplies for them over narrow-gauge railways, assemble the food and provisions of all kinds necessary for a city of 4,000,000 inhabitants.

“But on September 3rd, the intelligence service, which was working perfectly, stated about the middle of the day, that the German columns, after heading straight for Paris, were swerving toward the southeast and seemed to wish to avoid the fortified camp.

“General Gallieni and I then had one of those long conferences which denoted grave events; they usually lasted from two to five minutes at most. The fact is that the military government of Paris did little talking—it acted. The conference reached this conclusion: ‘If they do not come to us, we will go to them with all the force we can muster.’ Nothing remained but to make the necessary preparations. The first thing to do was not to give the alarm to the enemy. General Manoury’s army immediately received orders to lie low and avoid any engagement that was not absolutely necessary.” Then care was taken to reinforce it by every means. All was ready at the designated time.

In the night of September 3rd, knowing that the enemy would have to leave only a rear guard on one bank of the Ourcq, General Gallieni and General Clergerie decided to march against that rear guard, to drive it back with all the weight of the Manoury army, to cut the enemy’s communications, and take full advantage of his hazardous situation. Immediately the following order was addressed to General Manoury:

Because of the movement of the German armies, which seem to be slipping in before our front to the southeast, I intend to send your army to attack them in the flank, that is to say, in an easterly direction. I will indicate your line of march as soon as I learn that of the British army. But make your arrangements now so that your troops shall be ready to march this afternoon and to begin a general movement east of the intrenched camp tomorrow.

At ten in the morning a consultation was held by Generals Gallieni, Clergerie, and Manoury, and the details of the plan of operations were immediately decided. General Joffre gave permission to attack and announced that he would himself take the offensive on the 6th. On the 5th, at noon, the army from Paris fired the first shot; the battle of the Ourcq, a preface to the Marne, had begun.

General Clergerie then told what a precious purveyor of information he had found in General von der Marwitz, cavalry commander of the German first army, who made intemperate use of the wireless telegraph and did not even take the trouble to put into cipher his dispatches, of which the Eiffel Tower made a careful collection. “In the evening of September 9th,” he said, “an officer of the intelligence corps brought me a dispatch from this same Marwitz couched in something like these terms: ‘Tell me exactly where you are and what you are doing. Hurry up, because XXX.’ The officer was greatly embarrassed to interpret those three X’s. Adopting the language of the poilu, I said to him, ‘Translate it, “I am going to bolt.”’ True enough, next day we found on the site of the German batteries, which had been precipitately evacuated, stacks of munitions; while by the roadside we came upon motors abandoned for the slightest breakdown, and near Betz almost the entire outfit of a field bakery, with a great store of flour and dough half-kneaded. Paris and France were saved.

“Von Kluck could not get over his astonishment. He has tried to explain it by saying he was unlucky, for out of a hundred Governors not one would have acted as Gallieni did, throwing his whole available force nearly forty miles from his stronghold. It was downright imprudence.”

CHAPTER VIII
Japan in the War

ON August 15, 1914, the Empire of Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany. She demanded the evacuation of Tsing-tau, the disarming of the warships there and the handing over of the territory to Japan for ultimate reversion to China. The time limit for her reply was set at 12 o’clock, August 24th. To this ultimatum Germany made no reply, and at 2:30 P. M., August 23d, the German Ambassador was handed his passports and war was declared.

The reason for the action of Japan was simple. She was bound by treaty to Great Britain to come to her aid in any war in which Great Britain might be involved. On August 4th a note was received from Great Britain requesting Japan to safeguard British shipping in the Far East. Japan replied that she could not guarantee the safety of British shipping so long as Germany was in occupation of the Chinese province of Tsing-tau. She suggested in turn that England agree to allow her to remove this German menace. The British Government agreed, on the condition that Tsing-tau be subsequently returned to China.

The Japanese Government in taking this stand was acting with courage and with loyalty. Toward individual Germans she entertained no animosity. She had the highest respect for German scholarship and German military science. She had been sending her young men to German seats of learning, and had based the reorganization of her army upon the German military system. But she did not believe that a treaty was a mere “scrap of paper,” and was determined to fulfil her obligations in the treaty with England.

It seems to have been the opinion of the highest Japanese military authorities that Germany would win the war. Japan’s statesmen, however, believed that Germany was a menace to both China and Japan and had lively recollections of her unfriendly attitude in connection with the Chino-Japanese war and in the period that followed. Germany had been playing the same game in China that she had played in the Mediterranean and which had ultimately brought about the war.

The Chino-Japanese war had been a great Japanese triumph. One of Japan’s greatest victories had been the capture of Port Arthur, but the joy caused in Japan had not ended before it was into mourning because of German interference. Germany had then compelled Japan to quit Port Arthur, and to hand over that great fort to Russia so that she herself might take Kiao-chau without Russia’s objection.

Japan had never forgotten or forgiven. The German seizure of Kiao-chau had led to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur, the British occupation of Wei-hai-wei and French occupation of Kwan-chow Bay. The vultures were swooping down on defenseless China. This had led to the Boxer disturbance of 1910, where again the Kaiser had interfered.

Japan, who recognized that her interests and safety were closely allied with the preservation of the territorial integrity of China, had proposed to the powers that she be permitted to send her troops to the rescue of the beleaguered foreigners, but this proposition was refused on account of German suspicion of Japan’s motives. Later on, during the Russo-Japanese war, Russia was assisted in many ways by the German Government.

Furthermore, the popular sympathy with the Japanese was strongly with the Allies. It was the Kaiser who started the cry of the “yellow peril,” which had deeply hurt Japanese pride. Yet, even with this strong feeling, it was remarkable that Japan was willing to ally herself with Russia. She knew very well that after all the greatest danger to her liberties lay across the Japan Sea. Russian autocracy, with its militarism, its religious intolerance, its discriminating policy against foreign interests in commerce and trade, was the natural opponent of liberal Japan.

The immediate object of Japan in joining hands with England was to destroy the German menace in the Pacific. Before she delivered her ultimatum the Germans had been active; ignoring the rights of Japan while she was still neutral they had captured a Russian steamer within Japanese jurisdiction, as well as a number of British merchant vessels, and even a few Japanese ships had been intercepted by German cruisers. This was the disturbance to general peace in the Far East, which had prompted England to request Japan’s assistance.

Japan, when she entered the war, was at least twice as strong as when she began the war with Russia. She had an army of one million men, and a navy double the size of that which she had possessed when the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. As soon as war was declared she proceeded to act. A portion of her fleet was directed against the German forces in the Pacific, one squadron occupying Jaluit, the seat of government of the Marshall Islands, on October 3d, but her main forces were directed against the fortress of Tsing-tau.

The Germans had taken great pride in Tsing-tau, and had made every effort to make it a model colony as well as an impregnable fortress. They had built costly water works, fine streets and fine public buildings. They had been making great preparations for a state of siege, although it was not expected that they would be able to hold out for a long time. There were hardly more than five thousand soldiers in the fortress, and in the harbor but four small gunboats and an Austrian cruiser, the Kaiserin Elizabeth. As Austria was not at war with Japan the authorization of Japan was asked for the removal of the Kaiserin Elizabeth to Shanghai, where she could be interned. The Japanese were favorable to this proposition, but at the last moment instructions arrived from Vienna directing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to ask for his passports at Tokio and the commander of the Kaiserin Elizabeth to assist the Germans in the defense of Tsing-tau. The Germans also received orders to defend their fortress to the very last. A portion of the German squadron, under Admiral von Spee, had sailed away before the Japanese attack, one of these being the famous commerce raider, the Emden.

On the 27th of August the Japanese made their first move by taking possession of some of the small islands at the mouth of the harbor of Kiao-chau. From these points as bases they swept the surrounding waters for mines, with such success that during the whole siege but one vessel of their fleet was injured by a mine. On the 2d of September they landed troops at the northern base of the peninsula upon which Tsing-tau was situated, with the object of cutting off the fortress from the mainland.

The heavy rains which were customary at that season prevented much action, but airplanes were sent which dropped bombs upon the wireless station, electric power station and railway station of Kiao-chau, and upon the ships in the harbor. On September 13th General Kamio captured the railway station of Kiao-chau which stands at the head of the bay. This placed him twenty-two miles from Tsing-tau itself. On September 27th he captured Prince Heinrich Hill, giving him a gun position from which he could attack the inner forts. On the 23d a small British force arrived from Wei-hai-wei to co-operate with the Japanese.

The German Gibraltar in the Far East Which Fell to the Japanese

The combined forces then advanced until they were only five miles from Tsing-tau. The German warships were bombarding the Japanese troops fiercely, and were being replied to by the Japanese squadron in the mouth of the harbor. The great waste of German ammunition led General Kamio to the opinion that the Germans did not contemplate a long siege. He then determined on a vigorous assault.

Before the attack was made he gave the non-combatants an opportunity of leaving, and on the 15th of October a number of women and children and Chinese were allowed to pass through the Japanese lines. On October 31st the bombardment began, and the German forts were gradually silenced. On November 2d the Kaiserin Elizabeth was sunk in the harbor.

The Allied armies were pushing their way steadily down, until, on November 6th, their trenches were along the edge of the last German redoubts. At 6 o’clock on that day white flags were floating over the central forts and by 7.30 Admiral Waldeck, the German Governor, had signed the terms of capitulation.

Germany’s prize colony on the continent of Asia had disappeared. The survivors, numbering about three thousand, were sent to Japan as prisoners of war. Japanese losses were but two hundred and thirty-six men killed. They had, however, lost one third-class cruiser, the Takachiho, and several smaller crafts. The whole expedition was a notable success. It had occupied much less time than either Japan or Germany had expected, and the news was received in Germany with a universal feeling of bitterness and chagrin.

After the Japanese capture of Kiao-chau Japan’s assistance to the Allies, while not spectacular, was extremely important, and its importance increased during the last two years of the war. Her cruiser squadrons did continuous patrol duty in the Pacific and in the China Sea and even in the Indian Ocean. She occupied three groups of German Islands in the South Sea, assisted in driving German raiders from the Pacific, and by her efficiency permitted a withdrawal of British warships to points where they could be useful nearer home. She patrolled the Pacific coast of North and South America, landed marines to quell riots at Singapore, and finally entered into active service in European waters by sending a destroyer squadron to the assistance of the Allies in the Mediterranean.

The Japanese fleet was one of the strongest in the world. It had twenty-one first- and second-class cruisers, ten superb new destroyers, with a reserve of twenty others, as well as twenty battle-ships and battle cruisers.

One of Japan’s most important contributions to the cause of the Allies was her assistance in convoying to Europe the Anzac troops, and it was because of the approach of her fleet that the German raiding squadron in the South Pacific was driven to the point near the Falkland Islands where it was destroyed by Admiral Cradock’s British cruisers.

But while the aid of Japan’s navy was important to the Allies, her greatest assistance to the Allied cause was what she did in supplying Russia with military supplies. The tremendous struggle carried on by Russia’s forces during the first years prevented an easy German victory, and was only made possible through the assistance of Japan. Enormous quantities of guns, ammunition, military stores, hospital and Red Cross supplies, were sent into Russia, with skilled officers and experts to accompany them. Before the Russian revolution disorganized Russia the total value of those supplies had reached $250,000,000. This tremendous exportation, of course, enormously benefited Japan, but it was essential to Russia. Japan also shipped to both England and France vast quantities of flour, beans, peas and canned goods, and other supplies in proportion. Japan’s financial aid was also of great value. She made great loans, to Russia $60,000,000; to Great Britain $50,000,000. She has become today a great workshop, and her merchant shipping has grown in proportion to the growth of her manufactures. Immense cargoes were moved, not only from Japan to Allied countries, but from the American seaboard to Vladivostok. More than one hundred thousand Chinese laborers were put at the service of the Allies in France and England, and a great part of her magnificent merchant fleet was sent as a reinforcement to the merchant fleets of the Atlantic powers when they had been depleted by the attacks of the German submarines.

In the last year of the war Japan once more came prominently in the public eye in connection with the effort made by the Allies to protect from the Russian Bolsheviki vast stores of ammunition which had been landed in ports of Eastern Siberia. She was compelled to land troops to do this and to preserve order in localities where her citizens were in danger. Upon the development of the Czecho-Slovak movement in Eastern Siberia a Japanese force, in association with troops from the United States and Great Britain, was landed to protect the Czecho-Slovaks from Bolsheviki treachery. These troops succeeded in their object, and throughout the latter period of the war kept Eastern Siberia friendly to the Allied cause. In this campaign there was but little blood shed. The expedition was followed by the strong sympathy of the allied world which was full of admiration for the loyalty and courage of the Czecho-Slovaks and their heroic leaders.

CHAPTER IX
Campaign in the East

LONG before the declaration of war the German military experts had made their plans. They recognized that in case of war with Russia, France would come to the rescue of its ally. They hoped that Italy, and felt sure that England, would remain neutral, but, no doubt, had provided for the possibility that these two nations would join the ranks of their foes. They recognized that they would be compelled to fight against greatly superior numbers, but they had this advantage, that they were prepared to move at once, while England was unprepared, and Russia, with enormous numbers, was so unprovided with railroad facilities that it would take weeks before her armies would be dangerous.

Their plan of campaign, then, was obvious. Leaving in the East only such forces as were necessary for a strong defense, they would throw the bulk of their strength against the French. They anticipated an easy march to Paris, and then with France at their mercy they would gather together all their powers and deal with Russia. But they had underestimated both the French power of resistance, and the Russian weakness, and in particular they had not counted upon the check that they were to meet with in gallant Belgium.

The Russian mobilization was quicker by far than had been anticipated. Her armies were soon engaged with the comparatively small German forces, and met with great success.

To understand the Russian campaign one must have some knowledge of the geography of western Russia. Russian Poland projects as a great quadrilateral into eastern Germany. It is bounded on the north by East Prussia, on the south by Galicia, and the western part reaches deep into Germany itself. The land is a broad, level plain, through which from south to north runs the River Vistula. In the center lies the capital, Warsaw, protected by a group of fortresses. The Russian army, therefore, could not make a direct western advance until it had protected its flanks by the conquest of East Prussia on the north, and Galicia on the south.

By the beginning of the third week in August the first Russian armies were ready. Her forces were arranged as follows: Facing East Prussia was the Army of the Niemen, four corps strong; the Army of Poland, consisting of fifteen army corps, occupied a wide front from Narev on the north to the Bug Valley; a third army, the Army of Galicia, directed its line of advance southward into the country between Lemberg and the River Sareth. The fortresses protecting Warsaw, still further to the east, were well garrisoned, and in front of them to the west were troops intended to delay any German advance from Posen. The Russian commander-in-chief was the Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the late Czar, and one of the most admirable representatives of the Russian at his best; a splendid soldier, honest, straightforward, and patriotic, he was the idol of his men. He had with him a brilliant staff, but the strength of his army lay in its experience. They had learned war in the bitter school of the Manchurian campaign.

The German force on the frontier was not less than five hundred thousand men, and they were arranged for defense. Austria, in Galicia, had gathered nearly one million men under the auspices of Frederick. The first movement of these armies took place in East Prussia. The Army of the Niemen had completed its mobilization early in August, and was under the command of General Rennenkampf, one of the Russian leaders in Manchuria. In command of the German forces was General von François, an officer of Huguenot descent.

The first clash of these armies took place on the German frontier near Libau, on August 3d. Two days later, the Russians crossed the frontier, drove in the German advance posts, and seized the railway which runs south and east of the Masurian Lakes. The German force fell back, burning villages and destroying roads, according to their usual plan. On the 7th of August the main army of Rennenkampf crossed the border at Suwalki, advancing in two main bodies: the Army of the Niemen moving north from Suwalki, the Army of the Narev marching through the region of the Masurian lakes. In the lake district they advanced toward Boyen, and then directed their march toward Insterburg, the most important town in the neighborhood.

To protect Insterburg, General von François made his first stand at Gumbinnen, where, on the 16th of August, the first important battle of this campaign took place. The result was the defeat and retirement of the Germans, and von François was forced to fall back on Koenigsberg.

Meantime, the Army of the Narev, under General Samsonov, was advancing through the country west of the Masurian Lakes. On the 20th his vanguard came upon a German army corps, strongly entrenched at the northwest end of the lakes. The Germans were defeated, and fled in great disorder toward Koenigsberg, abandoning their guns and wagons. Many prisoners were taken, and the Russians found themselves masters of all of East Prussia except that inside the Koenigsberg line. They then marched on Koenigsberg, and East Prussia was for a moment at the mercy of the conqueror.

COSSACKS OF THE DON ATTACKING PRUSSIAN CAVALRY

In a fierce encounter near the Dneister River the Russian horsemen put to flight the Kaiser’s best soldiers.

Troops were left to invest Koenigsberg, and East Prussia was overrun with the enemy. The report as to the behavior of these troops met with great indignation in Germany; but better information insists that they behaved with decorum and discretion. The peasantry of East Prussia, remembering wild tales of the Cossacks of a hundred years before, fled in confusion with stories of burning and slaughter and outrage.

Germany became aroused. To thoroughly understand the effect of the Russian invasion of east Prussia, one must know something of the relations of that district with the German Empire. Historically, this was the cradle of the Prussian aristocracy, whose dangerous policies had alarmed Europe for so many decades. The Prussian aristocracy originated in a mixture of certain west German and Christian knights, with a pagan population of the eastern Baltic plain. The district was separate from Poland and never fell under the Polish influence. It was held by the Teutonic knights who conquered it in a sort of savage independence. The Christian faith, which the Teutonic knights professed to inculcate, took little root, but such civilization as Germany itself had absorbed did filter in. The chief noble of Borussia, the governing Duke, acquired in time the title of King, and it was here, not in Berlin, nor in Brandenburg, that the Hohenzollern power originated.

East Prussia, therefore, had a sentimental importance in the eyes of the Prussian nobility. The Prussian Royal House, in particular, had toward this country an especial regard. Moreover, it was regarded by the Germans as a whole as their rampart against the Slav, a proof of the German power to withstand the dreaded Russian. That this sacred soil should now be in the hands of a Cossack army was not to be borne. The Kaiser acted at once.

THE EASTERN FIGHTING ZONE

Large forces were detached from the west and sent to the aid of the eastern army. A new commander was appointed. He was General von Hindenburg, a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War who had been for some years retired. After his retirement he devoted his time to the study of East Prussia, especially the ground around the Masurian Lakes. He became more familiar with its roads, its fields, its marshes, its bogs than any of the peasants who spent their lives in the neighborhood of the lakes. Before his retirement, in the annual maneuvers, he had often rehearsed his defense against Russian invaders. Indeed report, perhaps unfounded, described his retirement to the displeasure of the Emperor William at being badly worsted in one of these mimic combats. He had prevented the country from being cleared and the swamps from being drained, arguing that they were worth more to Germany than a dozen fortresses. A man of rugged strength, his face suggesting power and tenacity, he was to become the idol of the German people.

His chance had come. His army consisted of remnants of the forces of von François and large reinforcements sent him from the west. In all, perhaps, he had with him 150,000 men, and he had behind him an admirable system of strategic railways.

The Russian High Command was full of confidence. Rennenkampf had advanced with the army of the Niemen toward Koenigsberg, whose fall was reported from time to time, without foundation. Koenigsberg was in fact impregnable to armies no stronger than those under Rennenkampf’s command. Samsonov with the Army of the Narev, had pushed on to the northeastern point of the lakes, and defeated the German army corps at Frankenau. Misled by his success, he decided to continue his advance through the lake region toward Allenstein. He marched first toward Osterode, in the wilderness of forest, lake and marsh, between Allenstein and the Lower Vistula. His force numbered 200,000 men, but the swamps made it impossible to proceed in mass. His column had to be temporarily divided, nor was he well informed as to the strength of his enemy. On Wednesday, the 26th of August, his advance guards were everywhere driven in. As he pushed on he discovered the enemy in great numbers, and late in the day realized that he was facing a great army.

Von Hindenburg had taken a position astride the railway from Allenstein to Soldau, and all access to his front was barred by lakes and swamps. He was safe from frontal attack, and could reinforce each wing at pleasure. From his right ran the only two good roads in the region, and at his left was the Osterode railway. On the first day he stood on the defensive, while the Russians, confident of victory, attacked again and again. Some ground was won and prisoners captured, and the news of a second victory was sent to western Europe.

The battle continued, however, until the last day of August and is known as the battle of Tannenberg, from a village of that name near the marshes. Having worn down his enemy, von Hindenburg counter-attacked. His first movement was on his right. This not only deceived Samsonov and led him to reinforce his left, but also enabled von Hindenburg to seize the only good road that would give the Russian army a chance of retreat. Meanwhile the German general was hurrying masses of troops northeastward to outflank the Russian right. While the Russians were reinforcing one flank, he was concentrating every man he could upon the other. Then his left swept southward, driving in and enveloping the Russian right, and Samsonov was driven into a country full of swamps and almost without roads.

To thoroughly understand the plight of the Russian army one must have some idea of the character of the Masurian Lake district. It was probably molded by the work of ice in the past. Great glaciers, in their progress toward the sea, have ground out hundreds of hollows, where are found small pools and considerable lakes. From these glaciers have been dropped patches of clay which hold the waters in wide extents of marsh and bog. The country presents a monotonous picture of low, rounded swells and flats, interspersed with stunted pine and birch woods. The marshes and the lakes form a labyrinth, difficult to pass even to those familiar with the country. The Masurian region is a great trap for any commander who has not had unlimited acquaintance with the place. Causeways, filled with great care, and railroads permit an orderly advance, but in a confused retreat disaster at once threatens.

This was the ground that von Hindenburg knew so well. The Russians resisted desperately, but their position could not be held. Disaster awaited them. They found their guns sinking to the axle-trees in mire. Whole regiments were driven into the lakes and drowned. On the last day of battle, August 31st, Samsonov himself was killed, and his army completely destroyed. Fifty thousand prisoners were taken with hundreds of guns and quantities of supplies. Von Hindenburg had attained the triumph of which he had so long dreamed.

It was an immensely successful example of that enveloping movement characteristic of German warfare, a victory recalling the battle of Sedan, and upon a scale not inferior to that battle. The news of this great triumph reached Berlin upon the anniversary of the battle of Sedan, and on the same day that the news came from the west that von Kluck had reached the gates of Paris and it had a profound effect upon the German mind. They had grown to believe that the Germans were a sort of superman; these wonderful successes confirmed them in this belief.

No longer did they talk of a mere defense in the east; an advance on Warsaw was demanded and von Hindenburg was acclaimed the greatest soldier of his day. The Emperor made him Field Marshal, and placed him in command of the Teutonic armies in the east.

But von Hindenburg was not satisfied. The remnant of the defeated army had fled toward Narev, and without losing a moment von Hindenburg set off in pursuit. Rennenkampf, all this time, strange to say, had made no move, and at the news of Samsonov’s disaster he abandoned the siege of Koenigsberg and retreated toward the Niemen. At Gumbinnen he fought a rear-guard action with the German left, but had made up his mind that the Niemen must be the Russian line of defense. Von Hindenburg, following, crossed the Russian frontier and in the wide forests near Augustovo there was much fighting.

This action, described as the first battle of Augustovo, was only a rear-guard action, the Russians desiring merely to delay the enemy for a day or two. German reports, however, described it as a victory only second in importance to Tannenberg. Von Hindenburg then occupied Suwalki. He apparently had become over confident, and hardly realized that Rennenkampf was continually being reinforced by the Russian mobilization.

The Russian High Command understood the situation very well. Their aim was to keep von Hindenburg busy on the Niemen, while their armies in the south were overwhelming the fleeing Austrians. Von Hindenburg was deceived, and continued his advance until he got into serious trouble. His movement had begun on September 7th; his army consisted of the four corps with which he had won Tannenberg, and large reinforcements from Germany, including at least one guards battalion, and a number of Saxons and Bavarians. The country is one vast mixture of marsh and lake and bog. The roads are few, and advance must therefore be slow and difficult. Rennenkampf made no attempt to delay him beyond a little rear-guard fighting. The German army reached the Niemen on September 21st, and found behind it the Russian army in prepared positions, with large reinforcements from Vilna.

The river at this point was wide and deep, and hard to cross. The battle of the Niemen Crossings was an artillery duel. The Russians quietly waited in their trenches to watch the Germans build their pontoon bridges. Then their guns blew the bridges to pieces. Thereupon von Hindenburg bombarded the Russian lines hoping to destroy the Russian guns. On Friday, the 26th, his guns boomed all day; the Russians made no reply. So on the morning of the 27th he built bridges again, and again the Russians blew them to pieces. Moreover the marshy ground made maneuvering almost impossible. On the 28th he gave the order for retreat.

He realized that the game wasn’t worth the candle; he might easily be kept fighting on the Niemen for months, while the main armies of the Russians were crossing Austria. Von Hindenburg conducted the retreat with a skill which came to him naturally from his knowledge of the marshes.

Rennenkampf followed him closely, keeping up persistent attacks through the woods and marshes. The path of the retreating army lay through the forest of Augustovo, a country much like that around the Masurian Lakes, and there the Germans suffered heavy losses. Von Hindenburg managed, however, to get the bulk of his forces back across the frontier and continued his retreat to the intrenchments on the Masurian Lakes.

The Germans lost 60,000 men in killed, wounded and prisoners, and von Hindenburg handed over the command of the German armies in East Prussia to General von Schubert, and hastened southward to direct the movement to relieve the Austrians at Cracow.

But quite as important as the campaign in East Prussia was the struggle in Galicia. When the war began the Germans contemplated merely defense in their own domain; such offense as was planned was left to the Austrians farther south.

Galicia is a long, level country lying north of the Carpathian Mountains, and in this country Austria-Hungary had gathered together a force of hardly less than one million men. A quarter of these lay in reserve near the mountains; the remaining three-quarters was divided into two armies; the first, the northern army, being under the command of General Dankl, the second was that of von Offenberg. The base of the first army was Przemysl; that of the second was Lemberg.

The first army, it was planned, was to advance into Russian territory in the direction of Lublin. The second army, stationed southeast of the first army, was to protect it from any Russians who might strike in upon the south. The first army, therefore, contained more picked material than the second, which included many troops from the southern parts of the empire, including certain disaffected contingents. The first army made its advance as soon as possible, and entered Russian territory on the 11th of August. It went forward with very little loss and against very little resistance. The Russian forces which were against it were inferior in number, and fell back towards the Bug. The Austrians followed, turning somewhat toward the East, when their advance was checked by news of catastrophe in their rear. On the 14th of August the Russian army under General Ruzsky crossed the frontier, and advanced toward the Austrian second army.

The Russian army was in far greater strength than had been expected, and when its advance was followed by the appearance, upon the right flank of von Offenberg’s command, of yet another Russian army, under Brussilov, the Austrian second army found itself in great danger. Ruzsky advanced steadily from August 14th until, on the 21st, it was not more than one day’s advance from the outer works of Lemberg, and the third Russian army under Brussilov was threatening von Offenberg’s right flank.

Von Offenberg, understanding the strength of the enemy, undertook to give battle. The first outpost actions were successful for the Austrians, and helped them in their blunder. On the 24th of August the two Russian armies effected a junction, and their Austrian opponents found themselves threatened with disaster. An endeavor was made to retreat, but the retreat turned into a rout. On the 28th Tarnopol was captured by the Russians, and the Austrian army found itself compelled to fall back upon defense positions to the south and east of Lemberg itself.

The attack of the Russian armies was completely successful. The Austrian army was driven from its positions, and on September 4th the Austrians evacuated Lemberg and the Russian forces took possession of the town. The Austrians fled. The population welcomed the conquerors with the greatest enthusiasm. An immense quantity of stores of every kind were captured by the Russians together with at least 100,000 prisoners. There was no looting, nor any kind of outrage. The Russian policy was to make friends of the inhabitants of Galicia.

But there was no halt after Lemberg. Brussilov divided his army, and sent his left wing into the Carpathian passes; his center and right moved west toward Przemysl; while Ruzsky moved northwest to reinforce the Russian army on the Bug. Meanwhile the position of Dankl’s army was perilous in the extreme. There were two possible courses, one to fall back and join the remnants of von Offenberg’s army, the other to attack at once, before the first Russian army could be reinforced, and if victorious to turn on Ruzsky.

Dankl’s army was now very strong. He had received reinforcements, not only from Austria but from Germany. On the 4th of September he attacked the Russian center; his attack was a failure, although he outnumbered the Russians. The battle continued until the tenth.

Everywhere the Austrians were beaten, and driven off in ignominious retreat. The whole Austrian force fled southward in great disorder; a part directed its flight toward Przemysl, others still farther west toward Cracow. Austria had been completely defeated; except for a few German detachments near the border, Poland was clear of the enemy. The Russian flag flew over Lemberg, while the Russian army was marching toward Cracow. The Russian star was in the ascendant.

But the Austrian armies had not been annihilated. An army of nearly a million men cannot be destroyed in so short a time. The Austrian failure was due in part to the disaffection of some of the elements of the army, and in part to the poor Austrian generalship. They had underestimated their foe, and ventured on a most perilous plan of campaign.

Russian generalship had been most admirable, and the Russian generals were men of ability and experience. Brussilov had seen service in the Turkish War of 1877. Ruzsky was a professor in the Russian War Academy. In the Japanese war he had been chief of staff to General Kaulbars, the commander of the Second Manchurian army. Associated with him was General Radko Dmitrieff, an able officer with a most interesting career. General Dmitrieff was born in Bulgaria, when it was a Turkish province. He graduated at the Military School at Sofia, and afterwards at the War Academy at Petrograd. On his return to Bulgaria he commanded a regiment in the Serbian-Bulgarian war. Later he became mixed up in the conspiracy against Prince Alexander, and was forced to leave Bulgaria. For ten years he served in the Russian army, returning to Bulgaria on the accession of Prince Ferdinand. Later on he became Chief of the General Staff, and when the Balkan war broke out he commanded one of the Bulgarian armies, won several important victories, and became a popular hero of the war. Disgusted with the political squabbles which followed the war, he returned to Russia as a general in the Russian army. With men like these in command, the Russian Empire was well served.

After the decisive defeat of the Austrian army under General Dankl, certain changes were made in the Russian High Command. General Ruzsky was made commander of the center, which was largely reinforced. General Ivanov was put in command of the armies operating in Galicia with Dmitrieff and Brussilov as his chief lieutenants. Brussilov’s business was to seize the deep passes in the Carpathians and to threaten Hungary. Dmitrieff’s duty was to press the Austrian retreat, and capture the main fortresses of central Galicia.

There are two great fortresses on the River San, Jaroslav and Przemysl, both of them controlling important railroad routes. Jaroslav on the main line from Lemberg to Cracow, Przemysl with a line which skirts the Carpathians, and connects with lines going south to Hungary. Jaroslav was fortified by a strong circle of intrenchments and was looked to by Austria for stout resistance. The Austrians were disappointed, for Ivanov captured it in three days, on the 23d of September. Dmitrieff found Przemysl a harder nut to crack. It held out for many months, while operations of greater importance were being carried on by the Russian armies. The plans of the Russian generals in some respects were not unlike the plan previously suggested as that of the German High Command. At the beginning of the war they had no desire to carry on a powerful offensive against Germany. The expedition into East Prussia was conducted more for political than for military purposes. The real offensive at the start was to be against Austria. The Russian movements were cautious at first, but the easy capture of Lemberg, the fall of Jaroslav, and the demoralization of the Austrian armies, encouraged more daring strategy. With the Germans stopped on the north, little aid to the Austrians could come from that source. The Grand Duke Nicholas was eager to strike a great blow before the winter struck in, so his armies swept to the great Polish city of Cracow. The campaign against Austria also had a political side.

Russia had determined upon a new attitude toward Poland. On August 15th the Grand Duke Nicholas, on behalf of the Czar, had issued a proclamation offering self-government to Russian Poland. Home rule for Poland had long been a favorite plan with the Czar. Now he promised, not only to give Russian Poland home rule, but to add to it the Polish peoples in Austria and Germany. This meant that Austria and Germany would have to give up Galicia on the one hand, and Prussian Poland on the other, if they should lose the war. In the old days Poland had been one of the greatest kingdoms in Europe, with a proud nobility and high civilization. She was one of the first of the great Slav peoples to penetrate the west. Later she had protected Europe against Tartar invasion, but internal differences had weakened her, and, surrounded by enemies, she had first been plundered, and later on divided between Austria, Russia and Prussia. Never had the Poles consented to this destruction of their independence. Galicia had constantly struggled against Austria; Prussian Poland was equally disturbing to the Prussian peace, and Russia was only able to maintain the control of her Polish province by the sword. Of the three the Pole was probably more inclined to keep on friendly terms with Russia, also a Slav people. The policy of the Czar encouraged this inclination and produced disaffection among the Poles in Galicia and in Posen. Moreover, it gave Russia the sympathy of the world which had long regarded the partition of Poland as a political crime. It encouraged the Czecho-Slavs and other dissatisfied portions of the Austrian Empire.

The results were seen immediately in the demoralization of the Austrian armies where considerable numbers of Czecho-Slovak troops deserted to the Russian army, and later in the loyalty to Russia of the Poles, and their refusal, even under the greatest German pressure, to give the German Empire aid.

CHAPTER X
New Methods and Horrors of Warfare

WHEN Germany embarked upon its policy of frightfulness, it held in reserve murderous inventions that had been contributed to the German General Staff by chemists and other scientists working in conjunction with the war. Never since the dawn of time had there been such a perversion of knowledge to criminal purposes; never had science contributed such a deadly toll to the fanatic and criminal intentions of a war-crazed class.

As the war uncoiled its weary length, and month after month of embargo and privation saw the morale of the German nation growing steadily lower, these murderous inventions were successively called into play against the Allies, but as each horror was put into play on the battlefield, its principles were solved by the scientists of the Allied nations, and the deadly engine of destruction was turned with trebled force against the Huns.

This happened with the various varieties of poison gas, with liquid fire, with trench knives, with nail-studded clubs, with armor used by shock troops, with airplane bombs, with cannon throwing projectiles weighing thousands of pounds great distances behind the battle lines. Not only did America and the Allies improve upon Germany’s pattern in these respects, but they added a few inventions that went far toward turning the scale against Germany. An example of these is the “tank.” Originally this was a caterpillar tractor invented in America and adopted in England. At first these were of two varieties, the male, carrying heavy guns only, and the females, equipped with machine guns. To these was later added the whippet tank, named after the racing dog developed in England. These whippet tanks averaged eighteen miles an hour, carrying death and terror into the ranks of the enemy. All the tanks were heavily armored and had as their motto the significant words “Treat ’Em Rough.” The Germans designed a heavy anti-tank rifle about three feet longer than the ordinary rifle and carrying a charge calculated to pierce tank armor. These were issued to the German first line trenches at the rate of three to a company. That they were not particularly effective was proved by the ease with which the tanks of all varieties tore through the barbed-wire entanglements and passed over the Hindenburg and Kriemhild lines, supposed by the Germans to be impregnable.

The tanks in effect were mobile artillery and were used as such by all the Allied troops. Germany frantically endeavored to manufacture tanks to meet the Allied monsters, but their efforts were feeble when compared with the great output opposed to them.

Before considering other inventions used for the first time in this war, it is well to understand the tremendous changes in methods and tactics made necessary by these discoveries.

Put into a sentence, the changed warfare amounts to this: it is a mobilization of material, of railroads, great guns, machine guns, food, airplanes and other engines of destruction quite as much as it is a mobilization of men.

The Germans won battle after battle at the beginning of the war because of their system of strategic railways that made it possible to transport huge armies to selected points in the shortest possible time both on the eastern and the western fronts. Lacking a system of transportation to match this, Russia lost the great battles that decided her fate, Belgium was overrun, and France, once the border was passed, became a battlefield upon which the Germans might extend their trench systems over the face of the land.

Lacking strategic railways to match those of Germany, France evolved an effective substitute in the modern system of automobile transportation. When von Kluck swung aside from Paris in his first great rush, Gallieni sent out from Paris an army in taxicabs that struck the exposed flank and went far toward winning the first battle of the Marne. It was the truck transportation system of the French along the famous “Sacred Road” back of the battle line at Verdun that kept inviolate the motto of the heroic town, “They Shall Not Pass.” Motor trucks that brought American reserves in a khaki flood won the second battle of the Marne. It was the automobile transportation that enabled Haig to send the British, Canadians and Australians in full cry after the retreating Germans when the backbone of the German resistance was broken before Lens, Cambrai, and Ostend.

America’s railway transportation system in France was one of the marvels of the war. Stretching from the sector of seacoast set apart for America by the French Government, it radiated far into the interior, delivering men, munitions and food in a steady stream. American engineers worked with their brothers-in-arms with the Allies to construct an inter-weaving system of wide-gauge and narrow-gauge roads that served to victual and munition the entire front and further serve to deliver at top speed whole army corps. It was this network of strategic railways that enabled the French to send an avalanche clad in horizon blue to the relief of Amiens when Hindenburg made his final tremendous effort of 1918.

In its essentials, military effort in the great conflict may be roughly divided into

Open warfare,

Trench warfare,

Crater warfare.

The first battle of the Marne was almost wholly open warfare; so also were the battles of the Masurian Lakes, Allenstein, and Dunajec in the eastern theater of war, and most of the warfare on the Italian front between the Piave River and Gorizia.

In this variety of battle, airplanes and observation balloons play a prominent part. Once the enemy is driven out of its trenches, the message is flashed by wireless to the artillery and slaughter at long range begins. If there have been no intrenchments, as was the case in the first battle of the Marne, massed artillery send a plunging fire into the columns moving in open order and prepare the way for machine gunners and infantry to finish the rout.

In previous wars, cavalry played a heroic rôle in open warfare; only rarely has it been possible to use cavalry in the Great War. The Germans sent a screen of Uhlans before its advancing hordes into Belgium and Northern France in 1914. The Uhlans also were in the van in the Russian invasion, but with these exceptions, German cavalry was a negligible factor.

British and French cavalry were active in pursuit of the fleeing Teutons when the Hindenburg line was smashed in September of 1918. Outside of that brief episode, the cavalry did comparatively nothing so far as the Allies were concerned. It was the practice on both sides to dismount cavalry and convert it into some form of trench service. Trench mortar companies, bombing squads, and other specialty groups were organized from among the cavalrymen. Of course the fighting in the open stretches of Mesopotamia, South Africa and Russia involved the use of great bodies of cavalry. The trend of modern warfare, however, is to equip the cavalryman with grenades and bayonets, in addition to his ordinary gear, and to make of him practically a mounted infantryman.

Trench warfare occupied most of the time and made nine-tenths of the discomforts of the soldiers of both armies. If proof of the adaptive capacity of the human animal were needed, it is afforded by the manner in which the men burrowed in vermin-infested earth and lived there under conditions of Arctic cold, frequently enduring long deprivations of food, fuel, and suitable clothing. During the early stages of the war, before men became accustomed to the rigors of the trenches, many thousands died as a direct result of the exposure. Many thousand of others were incapacitated for life by “trench feet,” a group of maladies covering the consequences of exposure to cold and water which in those early days flowed in rivulets through most of the trenches. The trenches at Gallipoli had their own special brand of maladies. Heatstroke and a malarial infection were among these disabling agencies. Trench fever, a malady beginning with a headache and sometimes ending in partial paralysis and death, was another common factor in the mortality records.

But in spite of all these and other discomforts, in spite of the disgusting vermin that crawled upon the men both in winter and in summer, both sides mastered the trenches and in the end learned to live in them with some degree of comfort.

FORTS, FLYING AND NAVAL BASES ON THE NORTH SEA

At first the trenches were comparatively straight, shallow affairs; then as the artillery searched them out, as the machine gunners learned the art of looping their fire so that the bullets would drop into the hiding places of the enemy, the trench systems gradually became more scientifically involved. After the Germans had been beaten at the Marne and had retired to their prepared positions along the Aisne, there commenced a series of flanking attempts by one side and the other which speedily resolved itself into the famous “race to the sea.” This was a competition between the opposing armies in rapid trench digging. The effort on either side was made to prevent the enemy from executing a flank movement. In an amazingly short time the opposing trenches extended from the Belgian coast to the Swiss border, making further outflanking attempts impossible of achievement.

This was not the first time in history that intrenched armies opposed each other. The Civil War in this country set the fashion in that respect. The contending sides in the Great War, however, improved vastly upon the American example. Communicating trenches were constructed, leading back to the company kitchens, and finally to the open road leading back to the rest billets of the armies.

When night raiding commenced, it was speedily seen that straight trenches exposed whole companies of men to enfilading fire. Thereupon bastions were made and new defenses presented by zig-zagging the front-line trenches and the communicating ditches as well.

To the formidable obstacles presented by the trenches, equipped as they were with sandbag parapets and firing steps, were added barbed-wire entanglements and pitfalls of various sorts. The greatest improvement was made by the Germans, and they added “pill boxes.” These were really miniature fortresses of concrete and armor plate with a dome-shaped roof and loopholes for machine gunners. Only a direct hit by a projectile from a big gun served to demolish a “pill box.” The Allies learned after many costly experiments that the best method to overcome these obstacles was to pass over and beyond them, leaving them isolated in Allied territory, where they were captured at the leisure of the attackers.

Trench warfare brings with it new instruments. There are the flame projectors, which throw fire to a distance of approximately a hundred feet. The Germans were the first to use these, but they were excelled in this respect by the inventive genius of the nations opposing them.

The use of poison gas, the word being used in its broad sense, is now general. It was first used by the Germans, but as in the case of flame-throwers, the Allies soon gained the ascendency.

The first use of asphyxiating gas was by the Germans during the first battle of Ypres. There the deadly compound was mixed in huge reservoirs back of the German lines. From these extended a system of pipes with vents pointed toward the British and Canadian lines. Waiting until air currents were moving steadily westward, the Germans opened the stop-cocks shortly after midnight and the poisonous fumes swept slowly, relentlessly forward in a greenish cloud that moved close to the earth. The result of that fiendish and cowardly act was that thousands of men died in horrible agony without a chance for their lives.

Besides that first asphyxiating gas, there soon developed others even more deadly. The base of most of these was chlorine. Then came the lachrymatory or “tear-compelling” gases, calculated to produce temporary or permanent blindness. Another German “triumph” was mustard gas. This is spread in gas shells, as are all the modern gasses. The Germans abandoned the cumbersome gas-distributing system after the invention of the gas shell. These make a peculiar gobbling sound as they rush overhead. They explode with a very slight noise and scatter their contents broadcast. The liquids carried by them are usually of the sort that decompose rapidly when exposed to the air and give off the acrid gases dreaded by the soldiers. They are directed against the artillery as well as against intrenched troops. Every command, no matter how small, has its warning signal in the shape of a gong or a siren warning of approaching gas.

Gas masks were speedily discovered to offset the dangers of poison gases of all kinds. These were worn not only by troops in the field, but by artillery horses, pack mules, liaison dogs, and by the civilian inhabitants in back of the battle lines. Where used quickly and in accordance with instructions, these masks were a complete protection against attacks by gas.

The perfected gas masks used by both sides contained a chamber filled with a specially prepared charcoal. Peach pits were collected by the millions in all the belligerent countries to make this charcoal, and other vegetable substances of similar density were also used. Anti-gas chemicals were mixed with the charcoal. The wearer of the mask breathed entirely through the mouth, gripping a rubber mouthpiece while his nose was pinched shut by a clamp attached to the mask.

In training, soldiers were required to hold their breath for six seconds while the mask was being adjusted. It was explained to them that four breaths of the deadly chlorine gas was sufficient to kill; the first breath produced a spasm of the glottis; the second brought mental confusion and delirium; the third produced unconsciousness; and the fourth death. The bag containing the gas mask and respirator was carried always by the soldier.

The soldier during the winter season in the front-line trenches was a grotesque figure. His head was crowned with a helmet covered with khaki because the glint of steel would advertise his whereabouts. Beneath the helmet he wore a close fitting woolen cap pulled down tightly around his ears and sometimes tied or buttoned beneath his chin. Suspended upon his chest was the khaki bag containing gas mask and respirator. Over his outer garments were his belt, brace straps, bayonet and ammunition pouches. His rifle was slung upon his shoulder with the foot of a woolen sock covering the muzzle and the leg of the same sock wrapped around the breech. A large jerkin made of leather, without sleeves, was worn over the short coat. Long rubber boots reaching to the hips and strapped at ankle and hip completely covered his legs. When anticipating trench raids, or on a raiding party, a handy trench knife and carefully slung grenades were added to his equipment.

Airplane bombing ultimately changed the whole character of the war. It extended the fighting lines miles behind the battle front. It brought the horrors of night attacks upon troops resting in billets. It visited destruction and death upon the civilian population of cities scores of miles back of the actual front.

Germany transgressed repeatedly the laws of humanity by bombing hospitals far behind the battle front. Describing one of these atrocious attacks, which took place May 29, 1918, Colonel G. H. Andrews, Chaplain of a Canadian regiment, said:

“The building bombed was one of three large Red Cross hospitals at Boulenes and was filled with Allied wounded. A hospital in which were a number of wounded German prisoners stood not very far away.

“The Germans could not possibly have mistaken the building they bombed for anything else but a hospital. There were flags with red cross flying, and lights were turned on them so that they would show prominently. And the windows were brilliantly lighted. Those inside heard the buzz of the advancing airplanes, but did not give them a thought.

“The machines came right on, ignoring the hospital with the German wounded, indicating they had full knowledge of their objective, until they were over a wing of the Red Cross hospital that contained the operating room on the ground floor. In the operating room a man was on the table for a most difficult surgical feat. Around him gathered the staff of the hospital and its brilliant surgeons. Lieutenant Sage of New York had just given him the anaesthetic when one of the airplanes let the bomb drop. It was a big fellow. It must have been all of 250 pounds of high explosive.

“It hurtled downward, carrying the two floors before it. Through the gap thus made wounded men, the beds in which they lay, convalescents, and all on the floors came crashing down to the ground. The bomb’s force extended itself to wreck the operating room, where the man on the table, Lieutenant Sage, and all in the room were killed. In all there were thirty-seven lives lost, including three Red Cross nurses.

“The building caught fire. The concussion had blown the stairs down, so that escape from the upper floors seemed impossible. But the convalescents and the soldiers, who had run to the scene of the bombing, let the very ill ones out of the windows, and escape was made in that way.

“And then to cap the climax, the German airplanes returned over the spot of their ghastly triumph and fired on the rescuers with machine guns. God will never forgive the Huns for that act alone. Nor will our comrades ever forget it.”

The statement of Colonel Andrews was corroborated by a number of other officers.

To protect artillery against counter-fire of all kinds, both sides from the beginning used the art of camouflage. This was resorted to particularly against scouting airplanes. At first the branches of trees and similar natural cover were used to deceive the airmen. Later the guns themselves were painted with protective colorations, and screens of burlap were used instead of branches. The camoufleur, as the camouflage artist was called, speedily extended his activities to screens over highways, preventing airmen from seeing troops in motion, to the protective coloration of lookout posts, and of other necessary factors along the fighting front. Camouflage also found great usefulness in the protective coloration of battle-ships and merchant vessels. Scientific study went hand in hand with the art, the object being to confuse the enemy and to offer targets as small as possible to the enemy gunners.

© Underwood and Underwood, N. Y.

THE MADE-TO-ORDER INFERNO OF THE FLAME-THROWER

A “rain-of-fire” attack in the front-line trenches. This weapon was devised by the Germans and was apparently one of those pre-war inventions they had counted on to make their conquest easy. It was never as effective a weapon as gas, even when developed by the Allies, but its terrifying effect can be gauged by the illustration given.

Crater warfare came as a development of intensified artillery attacks upon trench systems. It was at Dunajec on the eastern front that for the first time in modern war the wheels of artillery were placed hub to hub in intensified hurricane fire upon enemy positions. The result there under von Mackensen’s direction was the rout of the Russians. When later the same tactics were employed on the western front, the result was to destroy whole trench systems with the exception of deep dugouts, and to send the occupants of the trenches into the craters, made by shell explosions, for protection.

It was observed that these craters made excellent cover and when linked by vigorous use of the intrenching tools carried by every soldier, they made a fair substitute for the trenches. This observation gave root to an idea which was followed by both armies; this was the deliberate creation of crater systems by the artillery of the attacking force. Into these lines of craters the attacking infantry threw itself in wave after wave as it rushed toward the enemy trenches. The ground is so riddled by this intensive artillery fire that there is created what is known as “moon terrain,” fields resembling the surface of the moon as seen through a powerful telescope. Troops on both sides were trained to utilize these shell holes to the utmost, each little group occupying a crater, keeping in touch with its nearest group and moving steadily in unison toward the enemy.

One detail in which this war surpassed all others was in the use of machine guns and grenades. The Germans were first to make extensive use of the machine gun as a weapon with which to produce an effective barrage. They established machine-gun nests at frequent intervals commanding the zone over which infantry was to advance and by skillful crossfire kept that terrain free from every living thing. The Germans preferred a machine gun, water cooled and of the barrel-recoil type. The English used a Vickers-Maxim and a Lewis gun, the latter the invention of an officer in the American army. The French preferred the Hotchkiss and the Saint-Etienne. The Americans standardized the Browning light and heavy machine guns, and these did effective service. It was asserted by American gunnery experts that the Browning excels all other weapons of its type.

Two general types of grenades were used on both sides. One a defensive bomb about the size of an orange, containing a bursting charge weighing twenty-two ounces. Then there was a grenade used for offensive work carrying about thirty-two ounces of high explosives. The defensive grenades were of cast iron and so made that they burst into more than a hundred jagged pieces when they exploded. These wounded or killed within a radius of one hundred and fifty yards. In exceptional instances, the range was higher.

The function of artillery in a modern battle is constantly extending. Both the big guns and the howitzers were the deciding factors in most of the military decisions reached during the war. Artillery is divided first between the big guns having a comparatively flat trajectory and the howitzers whose trajectory is curved. Then there is a further division into these four classes:

Field artillery,

Heavy artillery,

Railroad artillery,

Trench artillery.

The type of field artillery is the famous 75 millimeter gun used interchangeably by the French and Americans. It is a quick-firing weapon and is used against attacking masses and for the various kind of barrages, including an anti-aircraft barrage.

British light Tank, of 1918, with turret action and high speed.

British Tank of the earliest type, as used at Cambrai.

German land battleship captured in 1918 on the western front.

Improved French Tank first used in Champagne in 1918.

TYPES OF LAND BATTLESHIPS DEVELOPED BY ALLIES AND GERMANS

Included in the heavy artillery are guns and howitzers of larger caliber than the 75 millimeter. Three distinct and terrifying noises accompany explosions of these guns. First, there is the explosion when the shell leaves the gun; then there is the peculiar rattling noise like the passing of a railway train when the shells pass overhead; then there is the explosion at point of contact, a terrific concussion which produces the human condition called “shell shock,” a derangement of body and brain, paralyzing nerve and muscle centers and frequently producing insanity.

The railroad artillery comprises huge guns pulled on railways by locomotives, each gun having a number of cars as part of its equipment. These are slow-firing guns of great power and hurling the largest projectiles known to warfare. The largest guns of this class were produced by American inventive genius as a reply to the German gun of St. Gobain Forest. This was a weapon which hurled a nine-inch shell from a distance of 62 miles into the heart of Paris. The damage done by it was comparatively slight and it had no appreciable effect upon the morale of the Parisians.

Its greatest damage was when it struck the Roman Catholic Church of St. Gervais on Good Friday, March 29, 1918, killing seventy-five persons and wounding ninety. Fifty-four of those killed were women, five being Americans. The total effect of the bombardment by this big gun was to arouse France, England and America to a fiercer fighting pitch. The late Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York, expressed this sentiment, when he sent the following message to the Archbishop of Paris:

Shocked by the brutal killing of innocent victims gathered at religious services to commemorate the passing of our blessed Saviour on Good Friday, the Catholics of New York join your noble protest against this outrage of the sanctuary on such a day and at such an hour and, expressing their sympathy to the bereaved relatives of the dead and injured, pledge their unfaltering allegiance in support of the common cause that unites our two great republics. May God bless the brave officers and men of the allied armies in their splendid defense of liberty and justice!

Trench artillery are Stokes guns and other mortars hurling aerial torpedoes containing great quantities of high explosives. These have curved trajectories and are effective not only against trenches but also against deep dugouts, wire entanglements and listening posts.

One of the most important details of modern warfare is that of communication or liaison on the battlefield. This is accomplished by runners recruited from the trenches, by dogs, pigeons, telephone, radio, signalling lamps, rockets, but above all by airplanes using radio. These communications between air and earth are of course not as exact nor as general by night as they are by day, but even at night the airplane plays its important part in liaison.

As has been heretofore stated, the airplane considered in all its developments, is the newest and most important of factors in modern warfare. It photographs the enemy positions, it detects concentrations and other movements of the enemy, it makes surprise impossible, it is a deadly engine of destruction when used in spraying machine-gun fire upon troops in the open. As a bombing device, it surpasses the best and most accurate artillery.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:

Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.

Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been standardized.

Archaic or variant spelling has been retained.

New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the public domain.