FOOTNOTES:
[1] Plutarch, Theseus, initio.
[2] Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft, vol. ii. p. 156.
[3] Expressions from the Russian circular of the 6th July, 1848, addressed by Count Nesselrode to his agents in Germany.
[4] The Germanic Confederation was formed in 1816. Frankfort was chosen as its seat, whither delegates were sent from all the States of Germany retaining sovereign rights. These delegates formed the assembly called the Diet.
The assembly was composed of seventeen envoys, presided over by the representative of Austria. There were however thirty-one States exclusive of the free cities, represented in the last period of the Diet's existence. The Diet was so constituted that each of the following States or combination of States had one representative: Austria; Prussia; Bavaria; Kingdom of Saxony; Hanover; Würtemberg; Grand Duchy of Baden; Electorate of Hesse; Grand Ducal Hesse; Denmark, for the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg; The Netherlands, for Limburg and Luxemburg; The Duchies of Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Saxe-Altenburg; Brunswick and Nassau; The two Mecklenburgs (Schwerin and Strelitz); Oldenburg, Anhalt and two Schwarzburgs (Rudolstadt and Sonderhausen); Lichtenstein, Reuss, Schaumburg Lippe, Lippe Detmold, Waldeck and Hesse Homburg; The free cities, Lubeck, Frankfort, Bremen and Hamburg.
The votes were equal. Sittings were secret.
On important occasions the assembly was resolved into what was called the plenum, in which a greater number of votes were assigned to the chief States, and the total number of voices was then increased to seventy. In these cases a majority of three fourths was necessary for any question to be carried.
The leading idea with the founders of the Diet was the preservation of internal tranquillity, the next, the formation of a league which should inspire other nations with respect.
Ambassadors were accredited to the Diet.—Translator.
[5] Russian circular of the 27th May, 1859, concerning the war in Italy.
[6] This young lieutenant was M. de Bismarck. The Landwehr is divided into two levies. The soldier belongs to the first levy seven years, to the second levy for a like period.—Translator.
[7] A writer in a position to be well informed, a former under secretary of state in the ministry of Prince Schwarzenberg, thus narrates the origin of Russian intervention in Hungary, tracing it back to 1833, to the celebrated interview of Munchengraetz between the Emperor Francis I. of Austria and the Czar Nicholas. In one of the confidential conversations, Francis spoke with sadness and apprehensions of the sickly and nervous state of his son and prospective successor, and begged the czar to maintain towards that son the friendship which he had always had for the father. "Nicholas fell on his knees, and raising his right hand to heaven, swore to give to the successor of Francis all aid and succor he should ever need. The old Emperor of Austria was profoundly touched, and placed his hands on the head of the kneeling czar as a token of benediction." This strange scene had no witness, but each of the two sovereigns narrated it some months later to a superior officer who then commanded the division of the army stationed at Munchengraetz. This superior officer was no other than the Prince of Windischgraetz, who, later, in 1848, nominated and made generalissimo of the Austrian army at the critical moment of the Hungarian insurrection, took upon himself to recall to Nicholas, in a letter, the pledge formerly given at Munchengraetz. The czar replied by placing his whole army at the disposition of his imperial and apostolic majesty.—Cf. Hefter, Geschichte Oesterreichs, Prague, 1869, vol. i. pp. 68-69.
[8] Session of the Prussian chamber of the 6th September, 1849. This speech is not reproduced in the official collection of the speeches of M. de Bismarck published at Berlin.
[9] The battle of Sadowa, or as it is more commonly called in Germany, the battle of Königsgrätz, was fought on the 3d of July, 1866, and decided the result of the conflict between Prussia and Austria.—Translator.
[10] We take the liberty of citing on this subject a piquante scène d'antichambre which has its instructive side. There was then at Vienna, in the ministry of foreign affairs, a very original figure, an usher, the memory of whom is not effaced at the Ballplatz. He bore the uncouth name of Kadernoschka; placed in the large waiting room before the cabinet of the minister, it was his duty to introduce the different visitors to the chief. This M. Kadernoschka was an usher of great style: he had been trained by the old Prince Metternich himself and loved to recall that he had "exercised his functions" from the time of the famous congress of 1815! One day, after a long interview with Prince Gortchakof, Count Buol sees this good Kadernoschka entering with a more than usually solemn air. He had a communication to make to his Excellency "in the interest of the service!" And Count Buol learns that the Russian envoy, after having left his Excellency, had appeared entirely overcome and suffocating with anger,—that he had asked for a glass of water; that for half an hour he had walked up and down in the waiting room, gesticulating with violence, talking to himself, and crying from time to time in French: "Oh! some day they shall pay me well for that, they shall pay me for that!"
[11] Protocol of the conference of the 17th April, 1855.
[12] A religious ceremony which, in the Protestant Church, corresponds in a certain degree to the first communion in the Catholic Church.
[13] Referring to Henry IV., Emperor of Germany from 1056 to 1106, who humbled himself before Pope Gregory VII. at Canossa in 1077.—Translator.
[14] Referring to the closing words of Cato's speeches: Cæterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam.—Translator.
[15] Treaty of Gastein, 14th August, 1865, between Austria and Prussia on the one side and Denmark on the other.—Translator.
[16] Sturm and Drang-Periode, first period of Goethe and Schiller.
[17] Varzin, the Tusculum of the German chancellor, is situated in Pomerania, to the right of the Stettin-Danzig road, and about ten miles from Schlawe. The comfortable dwelling-house is almost surrounded by a magnificent park of beech and oak trees. Varzin has been in M. de Bismarck's possession since 1867.—Translator.
[18] In the popular edition of the book of M. Hesekiel, this scene is illustrated by a vignette.
[19] Berlin is situated on the river Spree.—Translator.
[20] Session of the chamber of the 15th November, 1849. One knows that the chancellor of Germany has lately enacted a law which institutes civil marriage in Prussia. However, none of the speeches which have been cited is found in the official collection of the speeches of M. de Bismarck published at Berlin.
[21] Session of the chamber of the 21st April, 1849. See also the interpellation of M. Temme in the session of the 17th April, 1863.
[22] A circular of Prince Schwarzenberg, made public by a calculated indiscretion, after having related the incident of the telegraph, and the desperate course of M. de Manteuffel as regards the Austrian minister, added: "His majesty the Emperor thinks it his duty to comply with the desire of the King of Prussia, so modestly expressed."
[23] Shakspere, Henry IV. part I. act iii. scene I.
[24] It does not, however, fail to be interesting, and to even have a very piquant side. Still full of the conviction that they had made on Denmark a war "eminently iniquitous, frivolous, and revolutionary," the Prussian plenipotentiary to the Bund labored, in 1852, very actively in dissipating for the future a possible cause of perturbation, and negotiated an Esau bargain with the Duke Christian-August Augustenburg, the former upholder of Schleswig-Holsteinism, and eventual pretender to the Duchies. Thanks to the intervention of M. de Bismarck, the old duke signed for the sum of one million and a half rixdalers given by the government of Copenhagen, a solemn act, by which he bound "himself and his family, on his princely word and honor, to undertake nothing which could disturb the tranquillity of the Danish monarchy." That did not prevent the son of Christian from impudently insisting on his pretended rights in 1863, nor even M. de Bismarck from supporting them for a certain time, up to the moment when the famous syndics of the crown cast the doubt in the soul of the first minister at Berlin and proved to him that the Duchies, belonging by right to no one, belonged to King William by the fact of conquest.
[25] The minister of Nassau, Baron Max de Gagern was at the head of this deputation.
[26] "Austria is not a state, it is only a government."
[27] As well as the Germans born or naturalized in Russia who encumbered the different branches of the state service, and occupied in general a very large and important position in the administration of the empire. On his accession to the ministry, Alexander Mikhaïlovitch loudly signified his intention of "purging" his department of all these "intruders." Routine, however, and above all Sclavic idleness (which willingly leaves to foreigners and to "intruders" all work demanding perseverance and application) were not slow in triumphing over the principle of nationality; the palingenesis of the minister, announced with so much fuss, ended in a very insignificant change in the personnel of the lower order, and the chancellor found among these Germans his two most devoted and capable aids: M. de Westmann, deceased last May at Wiesbaden, and M. de Hamburger, quite recently made secretary of state.
[28] Letter of M. de Cavour to M. Castelli-Bianchi, Storia documentata, vol. viii. p. 622.
[29] See, for this and all that follows concerning the relations of France and Russia in the years 1856-63, Two Negotiations of Contemporaneous Diplomacy; the Alliances since the Congress of Paris, in the Revue des deux Mondes, of the 15th September, 1864.
[30] It is true that, in a circular of the 27th May, 1859, the Russian vice-chancellor took care to give a commentary to his proposition, and to prove that the congress which he had planned looked to nothing chimerical. "This congress," said he, "did not place any power in presence of the unknown: its programme had been traced in advance. The fundamental idea which had presided at this combination, prejudiced no essential interest. On one side, the state of territorial possession was maintained, and on the other there could come from the congress a result which had nothing excessive or unusual in the international relations." It would be well to re-read this remarkable circular, and to weigh every word of it. One will find in it the most curious and substantial criticism, made, so to speak, by anticipation, of the different projects of the congress, those which later the Emperor Napoleon III. was to present to Europe, especially the eccentric project which surprised the world in the imperial speech of the 5th November, 1863.
[31] Massari, Il Conte Cavour, p. 268.
[32] Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft, vol. ii. p. 90.
[33] In 1862, at the moment of definitely leaving his post at St. Petersburg, M. de Bismarck received the visit of a colleague, a foreign diplomat. They were speaking of Russia, and the future chancellor of Germany said, among other things, "I am in the habit, when leaving a country where I have lived long, to consecrate to it one of my watch charms, on which I have engraved the final impression which it has left me; do you wish to know the impression which I carry from St. Petersburg?" And he showed to the puzzled diplomat a little charm on which these words were engraved: "Russia is nothingness!"
[34] M. de Bismarck has since presented these quadrupeds to the zoölogical garden of the former free city of Frankfort.
[35] Constantin Roessler, Graf Bismarck und die deutsche Nation, Berlin, 1871.
[36] Frederick William IV. having died the 2d January, 1861, the prince regent took from that day the name William I.
[37] See the remarkable pamphlet entitled Europa's Cabinete und Allianzen, Leipzig, 1862. It is the work of a Russian diplomat, celebrated in political literature, the same whose book on the Pentarchie had such a loud echo under the monarchy of July.
[38] See in the Revue des deux Mondes of the 1st October, 1868, Les Préliminaires de Sadowa.
[39] See the celebrated circular dispatch of M. de Bismarck of the 24th January, 1863, in which he gives an account of the curious interviews which he had with the ambassador of Austria, Count Karolyi, in the last months of the year 1862, soon after his accession to power.
[40] "Why, then, should not representative institutions be accorded at the same time to the kingdom of Poland and to the empire of Russia?"—Dispatch of Lord John Russell to Lord Napier, 10th April, 1863.
[41] "This connivance of Austria was not the least remarkable event in the history of this insurrection."—Confidential dispatch of M. de Tengoborski to M. d'Oubril, 4th February, 1863.
[42] "The Polish insurrection, on which its duration impressed a national character," the Emperor Napoleon III. said in his speech of the 5th November, 1863.
[43] "On former occasions, M. de Bismarck always spoke to me of the probability that the Russian army would be too weak to suppress the insurrection."—Dispatch of Sir A. Buchanan, 21st February, 1863. He uses the same language to the Austrian minister, Count Kavolyi. On his part, the director of the diplomatic chancellor's office of the Grand Duke Constantine wrote on the 4th of February, at the first news of the envoy of the Prussian generals for the conclusion of a military convention: "While recognizing the courtesy of the mission of these gentlemen, we cannot give an exact account of what has influenced it. There is no pericolo (sic!) in mora, and we have no need of it for the coöperation of foreign troops.... The Prussian government paints the Devil much blacker than he really is."—Confidential dispatch of M. de Tengoborski to M. d'Oubril, Russian minister at Berlin.
[44] The German papers at this time published this interview after the narration of M. Behrend, who did not deny it. See, among others, the Cologne Gazette of the 22d February, 1863.
[45] Dispatch of M. Buchanan of the 17th October, 1863. Inclosure. Minute of conversation between M. de Bismarck and Sir A. Buchanan.
[46] Seeking an issue, however dishonorable to the campaign so foolishly undertaken, the chief of the foreign office had decided towards the end of September (after the speech of Blairgowrie) to declare the Emperor Alexander deprived of his rights over Poland, "for not having fulfilled the conditions in virtue of which Russia obtained this kingdom in 1815." France was to make an analogous declaration, but M. Drouyn de Lhuys, become prudent, and with reason would not send his note until after that of England had reached Prince Gortchakof. Lord Russell then wrote his dispatch; it was read at the council, approved by Lord Palmerston, and a copy of it was given to the minister of foreign affairs of France. Lord Napier had already been advised to inform Prince Gortchakof of an "important communication" which he would soon have the honor to transmit to him, and the Duke of Montebello was also instructed by the French government to support his colleague of Great Britain in his solemn declaration; already the debated document had left for its destination, and was on its way to St. Petersburg, ... when suddenly, and to the unspeakable astonishment of the persons initiated, a telegram brusquely stopped in Germany the bearer of the note; another telegram informed Lord Napier that no further attention should be given to the "important communication." For during the interval Count Bernstorff had read at the foreign office a Prussian dispatch in which M. de Bismarck advised the principal secretary of state to take care how he proceeded,—for, if the czar were declared deprived of his rights over Poland for his violation of the treaty of Vienna, the German governments could also declare on their part the King of Denmark deprived of his sovereignty over the Duchies of the Elbe for not having fulfilled all the engagements of the treaty of London. Lord John Russell recalled the courier and tore up the note.—Vide in the Revue des deux Mondes of the 1st January, 1865, "Two Negotiations of Contemporaneous Diplomacy; M. de Bismarck and the Northern Alliance."
[47] "In 1848 Denmark had demanded the protection of France; M. Bastide, then minister of foreign affairs under the republic, took its part warmly, and there was even an idea of sending 10,000 men to assist the Danes in the defense of their country."—Dispatch of Lord Cowley of the 13th February, 1864. See also the curious dispatches of M. Petetin, then envoy of the republic at Hanover.
[48] The official journals of Berlin have renewed this reasoning in their recent discussions on the laws of guarantee accorded to the Holy See. The Pope, they argue, cannot be treated as a sovereign, as reprisals cannot be exercised against him by seizing his states.
[49] See the Revue des deux Mondes of the 1st October, 1868, Les Préliminaires de Sadowa, as well as the instructive work of General La Marmora, Un pó più di luce, Firenze, 1873.
[50] It is not useless to mention, en passant, the circumstances in the midst of which these new candidatures were produced. Summoned by the conference of London to present his pretensions, M. de Bismarck (28th May, 1864) could not do otherwise than to follow Austria, and to pronounce himself for the Duke of Augustenburg. The 2d June, at the reunion succeeding the conference (the telegraph had had time to work), the Russian plenipotentiary declared unexpectedly that the emperor, his august master, "desiring to facilitate as far as he could the arrangements to be concluded," had ceded his eventual rights, as chief of the House Holstein-Gottorp, to his relative, ... the Grand Duke of Oldenburg! The 18th June, another relative of the Emperor Alexander II., Prince Frederick William of Hesse, also asserted his rights to the succession at the conference of London. This is an example of the numerous and discreet services which Prince Gortchakof knew how to render to his friend of Berlin in the sad campaign of the Duchies.
[51] Verse of a German song.
[52] We have taken care to preserve in the translation the character of edifying obscurity which distinguishes the original.
[53] "What can one say now, if France had shown itself opposed to these proceedings (the treaty of Italy with Prussia), we could not run the risk of finding ourselves face to face with an Austro-Franco alliance. Prussia was as solicitous as we, perhaps even more, with the attitude which France would take in case of a war of Prussia and Italy against Austria."—La Marmora, Un pó più di luce, p. 80. Three days before the signing of the secret treaty with Italy, M. de Bismarck said to General Govone: "All this, let it be well understood, if France wishes it, for, if she shows ill will, then nothing can be done."—Dispatch of General Govone to General de la Marmora of the 5th April, 1866. Ibid. p. 139.
[54] Letter of the emperor to M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 11th June, 1866. It is from this letter, solemnly presented to the legislative body, that the quotations which follow are taken.
[55] He used this expression more than once, and in a very convincing tone, in the council of ministers before 1866. It was not till later, after Sadowa and the affair at Luxemburg, that he at times seemed to yield to the "party of action" in his views concerning Belgium, without, however, ever giving his full acquiescence.
[56] Dispatch of M. Nigra of the 8th August, 1865. La Marmora, p. 45.
[57] Dispatch of General Govone of the 17th March, 1866. La Marmora, p. 90.
[58] It was on his return from Biarritz that M. de Bismarck said to the Chevalier Nigra, these significant words: "If Italy did not exist, it would have to be invented." La Marmora, p. 59.
[59] Dispatch of General Govone, of the 6th April, 1866. La Marmora, p. 139.
[60] Est aliquid delirii in omni magno ingenio.—Boerhaave.
[61] At the moment when hostilities commenced; dispatch of M. de Barral of the 15th June, 1866. La Marmora, p. 332.
[62] Dispatch of General Govone of the 2d April, 1866. La Marmora, p. 131.
[63] Dispatches of General Govone of the 2d April and 22d May 1866. La Marmora, pp. 131 and 245.
[64] George Hesekiel, iii. p. 271.
[65] E la vipera avrà morsicato il ciarlatano. Dispatch of General Govone of the 15th March, 1866. La Marmora, p. 88.
[66] It was the Queen Augusta who affirmed it in a letter to the Emperor of Austria, saying that on this matter she had received the word of honor of her royal spouse. See the curious dispatch of M. Nigra of the 12th June, 1866, as well as the telegram of General La Marmora of the same day. La Marmora, pp. 305 and 310.
[67] After the death of the great Italian agitator, the journals of Florence published his letters to M. de Bismarck during the years 1868-1869. In case of a war between France and Germany, Mazzini suggests the plan of overthrowing Victor Emmanuel, if this latter allied himself with the Emperor Napoleon III.
[68] It is necessary to observe that the strategical part of the note of d'Usedom was an almost literal copy of an article of Mazzini published in the Dovere of Genoa, the 26th May, 1866.
[69] See the notes of M. d'Usedom of the 12th and 17th June, as well as the dispatch of Count de Barral of the 15th June. La Marmora, pp. 316, 331, 345-348.
[70] In a dispatch of the 1st March, 1866, M. Nigra informs General La Marmora that, conformably with his authorization, he endeavored to broach the question of the exchange of the Danubian Principalities for Venetia. He showed the advantages which this solution would have for France and England, who would thus see the two programmes of the wars of the Crimea and Italy peacefully accomplished. The minister adds that the Emperor Napoleon III. was struck with this idea. La Marmora, p. 119.
[71] Dispatch of General Govone of the 3d June, 1866. La Marmora, p. 275.
[72] Telegrams of Count de Barral of the 7th April and the 1st June, 1866. La Marmora, pp. 141 and 266.
[73] Telegram of M. de Launay, from St. Petersburg, of the 1st June, 1866. La Marmora, p. 266. One can see in the same work with what empressement M. de Bismarck used this opinion of the Russian chancellor, and transmitted it by telegraph to the different cabinets.
[74] Telegrams of M. de Barral. La Marmora, pp. 248 and 294.
[75] Benedetti, Ma Mission en Prusse, pp. 99 and 254.
[76] This detail, as well as those which follow, are taken from the narration made by M. Thiers himself, some days later, to the diocese of Orleans, and gathered together by M. A. Boucher in his interesting Story of the Invasion (Orleans, 1871), pp. 318-325.
[77] "He (M. de Bismarck) only goes out accompanied, and agents of French police will come as far as the frontier to follow him during the whole journey," announced M. de Barral from Berlin, the 1st June, 1866, three days after the assault by Blind. M. Jules Favre (History of the Government of the National Defense, vol. i. p. 163-164) speaks of the uneasiness manifested by the minister of William I. at the interview at the castle of Haute-Maison, at Montry: "We are very badly off here; your Franc-tireurs can take aim at me through the windows." One can also recall the language of the German chancellor in the Prussian chambers concerning the assault by Kulmann.
[78] According to the analysis of Lord Lyons, to whom M. de Chaudordy communicated this telegram.—Dispatch of Lord Lyons, of the 6th October, 1870. It is curious to compare with this singular telegram of M. Thiers the opinion expressed by Prince Gortchakof before the English ambassador, "that the conditions indicated in the circular of M. de Bismarck of the 16th September could only be modified by military events, and that nothing authorized such a conjecture."—Dispatch of Sir A. Buchanan of the 17th October. Now the conditions indicated in the Prussian circular of the 16th September were already Alsace and Metz.
[79] Confidential note of M. Magne for the emperor.—Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i. p. 240.
[80] The letter addressed to the minister of France at the Hague and placed under the eyes of the emperor, was re-found at the Tuileries after the 4th September.—Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i. p. 14.
[81] This, however, was only a short desire on the part of Prince Gortchakof, a design without consequence, and of which we find the only authentic trace in an obscure phrase of a dispatch of the French ambassador at Berlin. Vide Benedetti, My Mission in Prussia, p. 226.
[82] Dispatch in cipher intercepted by the Austrians and published in connection with the war of 1866 by the Austrian staff.
[83] Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. ii. pp. 225, 228. The editors pretend that this letter was addressed to M. de Moustier, which is entirely erroneous, M. de Moustier being then at Constantinople. We are inclined to believe that the receiver was M. Conti, who had accompanied the emperor to Vichy. It will be remembered that Napoleon III., very unwell and suffering during this whole epoch, had gone the 27th July to Vichy, where M. Drouyn de Lhuys went to see him for a short time; the chief of the state could not, however, prolong his sojourn in the watering-place, and returned to Paris on the 8th August.
[84] "For some time it has been too often said that France is not ready."—Confidential note of M. Magne of the 20th July (Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i. p. 241). M. de Goltz had early discovered this secret, and had not ceased to recommend to M. de Bismarck a firm attitude as regarded France.
[85] My Mission in Prussia, pp. 171-172. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had already obtained from Austria the cession, in any case, of Venetia, insisted at this moment more strongly than ever that they should also take pledges in advance from Prussia, "the most formidable, the most active of the parties." M. Benedetti did not cease to oppose such a proceeding, fearing that Prussia would renounce in this case all idea of war against Austria, and this dispatch of the 8th July was in reality only a new plea in favor of the laisser-aller without conditions which should be granted to M. de Bismarck.
[86] Benedetti, My Mission in Prussia, pp. 177 and 178. Moniteur prussien (Reichsanzeiger) of the 21st October, 1871.
[87] My Mission in Prussia, p. 181. This assertion of M. Benedetti is fully confirmed by the note found among the papers of the Tuileries, of which we will speak farther on.
[88] "Prussia will disregard what justice and foresight demand, and will give us at the same time the measure of its ingratitude, if it refuses us the guarantees which the extension of its frontiers obliges us to claim."—Dispatch of M. Benedetti, the 5th August, 1866, found at the castle of Cerçay among the papers of M. Rouher, and published in the Moniteur prussien of the 21st October, 1871. Towards the same epoch, they spoke also of the ingratitude of Italy. "The unjustifiable ingratitude of Italy irritates the calmest minds," wrote M. Magne in his confidential note by order of the emperor, dated the 20th July. The cabinet of Florence in truth created in France at this moment unheard of embarrassments by susceptibilities and demands which, to say the least, were very ill-timed. After having been beaten on land and sea, at Custozza and at Lissa, and having received as a recompense the magnificent gift of Venetia, the Italians made pretensions to Tyrol! There was even an instant when the emperor thought "of renouncing the fatal gift made him, and of declaring, by an official act, that he gave back to Austria its parole." See the curious note of M. Rouher written by order of the emperor, Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. ii. pp. 229 and 23.
[89] La Marmora, Un pó più di luce, p. 117. Report of General Govone, 3d June, 1866. Ibid. p. 275.
[90] "All the efforts which he (M. de Bismarck) has without cessation made to bring about an agreement with us prove sufficiently that, in his opinion, it was essential to indemnify France."—My Mission in Prussia, p. 192. Thus thought the ex-ambassador of France, even in 1871!
[91] Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i. pp. 16, 17. The editors thought that they recognized in this note the handwriting of M. Conti, chief of the emperor's cabinet.
[92] "On my departure from Paris, towards the middle of August," says M. Benedetti, in his book, My Mission in Prussia, p. 194, "M. Drouyn de Lhuys had offered his resignation, and I supposed that his successor would be M. Moustier, who was then ambassador at Constantinople. At this moment there was no minister of foreign affairs. In this state of things, I thought it proper to address to the minister of state, M. Rouher, the letter in which I announced my interview with M. de Bismarck, and which accompanied the plan of treaty relative to Belgium." M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not tendered his resignation towards the middle of August; right or wrong, he believed at this epoch that he was "doing an act of honesty and disinterestedness in remaining," and his portfolio was not taken from him till 1st September, 1866. Up to that date M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not ceased to direct the department; the ambassador himself quotes in his book several dispatches exchanged with him, on grave questions, dated 21st and 25th August (pp. 204, 223), and M. Benedetti has singular ideas on the hierarchical duties, believing that it is proper for an agent to evade the control of his immediate chief in view of his near retirement. The conclusion of the passage quoted in the book of M. Benedetti is not less curious: "M. Rouher," says he, "has not laid before the ministry, having never taken the direction of it, the correspondence which I, during several days, exchanged with him. If I gave it here, I should not know how to refer the reader, that he might verify the text of it, to the depot of the archives, as I am authorized to do with all the documents which I put before his eyes." What of that? Once decided to make revelations, M. Benedetti could have well produced this correspondence with M. Rouher on such a disputed subject, while conscientiously warning the reader that he could not find the originals at the depot of the archives. (It is known that the originals were seized by the Prussians, with a great number of other important documents, in the castle of M. Rouher, at Cerçay.) While throwing "a little more light" on all the unnatural obscurities, let us also observe that it is wrongfully, but with a design easy to divine, that the celebrated circular of M. de Bismarck, of the 29th July, 1870 (at the beginning of the war), had assigned to this plan of the secret treaty concerning Belgium a much later date, the year 1867, the epoch after the arrangement of the affair of Luxemburg. This allegation does not withstand a first examination and a simple comparison of the parts delivered to the public. The shadowy negotiation on the subject of Belgium was held in the second half of the month of August, 1866, as M. Benedetti says.
[93] The Moniteur prussien of the 21st October, 1871, gives (from the documents seized at Cerçay) extracts from the instructions sent from Paris the 16th August to M. Benedetti concerning the secret treaty. A passage from these instructions contains "the designation of the persons to whom this negotiation was to be confined."
[94] Quoted from the circular of M. de La Valette of the 16th September, 1862.
[95] These details, as well as those which follow, are taken from the papers seized at Cerçay and published in the Moniteur prussien of the 21st October, 1871.
[96] The two plans of the treaties have since been published by the Prussian journals of the 29th July and 8th August, 1870. The Prussian government is now in possession of two French autographs of the plan concerning Belgium; the one which M. Benedetti left with M. de Bismarck in the month of August, 1866, the other likewise from the hand of M. Benedetti, with marginal notes by Napoleon III. and M. Rouher; this latter document was seized at Cerçay. For the description and other details, see the Moniteur prussien of the 21st October, 1871, and the article from the North German Gazette on the subject of the affair La Marmora.
[97] Private letter from M. Benedetti to the Duke of Gramont, dated 22d August, 1866. My Mission in Prussia, p. 192.
[98] Albert Sorel, Diplomatic History of the Franco-German War, vol. i. pp. 29, 30.
[99] Papers seized at Cerçay, Moniteur prussien of the 21st October, 1871.
[100] Dispatch of Count de Mülinen to Baron de Beust, 30th December, 1866.
[101] Dispatch of M. de Beust to Baron de Prokesch at Constantinople, January 22, 1867.
[102] "What alarms me the most, is the considerable change which the pacification of the provinces of the Caucasus has given to the situation of Russia. I have no doubt that in future possibilities the most serious attacks of the Russians will be directed against our provinces of Asia Minor." Thus Fuad-Pacha expresses himself at the beginning of 1869 in his political testament addressed to the sultan.
[103] Remarks of the Emperor Nicholas to Sir Hamilton Seymour. For the rumors concerning Thessaly and Epirus, see especially the dispatch of Fuad-Pacha to the ambassadors at Paris and London, 27th February, 1867.
[104] Benedetti, My Mission in Prussia, p. 249.
[105] "I wish very much that you would send your carriage before my door, but on the condition that you get in at my house," one of the predecessors of M. de Moustier said wittily to M. de Budberg, at the Hotel of the Quay d'Orsay, some years before, but in the same way in which Russia encouraged the advances of the cabinet of the Tuileries, at the same time that it carefully avoided any positive engagement with it.
[106] The preliminaries of Nikolsburg as well as the treaty of Prague had stipulated the retrocession to Denmark of the northern districts of Schleswig after a popular vote. One knows that Prussia up to the present has evaded the execution of this engagement.
[107] M. de Beust wrote concerning these military conventions with a resigned finesse: "An alliance established between two states, one of which is weak, the other strong; an alliance which has no particular text, but which should be permanently maintained for all the eventualities of war, is not of a nature to create a belief in an international, independent existence of the weak state."—Dispatch to Count Wimpffen, at Berlin, 28th March, 1867.
[108] See [Appendix.]
[109] Speech of the assistant secretary of state, Mr. Fox, at the banquet given by the English Club of St. Petersburg to the mission extraordinary from the United States in 1866.
[110] Circular of M. de La Valette, 16th September, 1866.
[111] See the Revue des deux Mondes of the 1st September, 1867: "The Congress of Moscow and the Pan-Sclavic Propaganda."
[112] It emanated directly from the ministry of the interior, was written in French, and destined to "enlighten" foreign opinion on the facts and deeds of the Russian government.
[113] See, on this subject, the English, French, and Austrian parliamentary documents of the year 1868, and especially the reports of the agents of Austria at Iassy and Bucharest.
[114] Appendix to the dispatch of the Consul de Knappitsch to Baron de Prokesch at Constantinople, Ibraïla, 14th August, 1868.
[115] Dispatch of Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon, 19th December, 1868.
[116] Official journal of the Russian empire, 12th December, 1869.
[117] One can read this remarkable document, which bears the date of the 3d January, 1869, in the interesting pamphlet of M. J. Lewis Farley, The Decline of Turkey, London, 1875, pp. 27-36.
[118] Private letter to the Count Daru, 27th January, 1870.
[119] See, on this subject, the curious dispatch of the 10th November, 1867. The correspondence of Mazzini with M. de Bismarck during the years 1868 and 1869, suggesting the plan of overthrowing Victor Emmanuel if this latter became the ally of the Emperor Napoleon III., has been brought to light only very recently, after the death of the celebrated Italian agitator.
[120] Confidential letter of M. de Verdière, St. Petersburg, 3d February, 1870. Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i. p. 129.
[121] "The Emperor of Russia has taken the general in great favor; he takes him continually on bear hunts, and makes him travel with him on a f... in his one-seated sleigh. That is the height of favor, and I think that politics are in a good condition."—Confidential letter of M. de Verdière, 25th January, 1870. Papers and Correspondence, vol. i. p. 127.
[122] Expressions of the North German Gazette (principal organ of M. de Bismarck) of the 20th July, 1867, on the occasion of the congress of Moscow.
[123] Drang nach Osten.
[124] Dispatch of Sir A. Buchanan, St. Petersburg, 9th July, 1870. For the details of these years, 1870-71, we can only refer the reader to the very instructive work of M. A. Sorel, Diplomatic History of the Franco-German War, Paris, Plon, 1875, 2 vols. We have only two reservations to make in regard to a book written with as much sincerity of investigation as loftiness of mind. The author shows a pronounced weakness for "the diplomacy of Tours," and limits in much too great a degree the original views of Prince Gortchakof in his connivance with Prussia since 1867.
[125] Dispatches of Sir A. Buchanan of the 20th and 23d July. Valfrey, History of the Diplomacy of the Government of National Defense, vol. i. p. 18.
[126] France and Prussia, p. 348.
[127] Dispatch of Mr. Schuyler to Mr. Fish, St. Petersburg, 26th August. General Trochu, Pour la vérité, p. 90.
[128] Prince Gortchakof was far from having at the beginning absolute confidence in the victory of Prussia; he told M. Thiers more than one piquant detail on this subject. Deposition of M. Thiers before the commission of inquiry, p. 12. In an interview, towards the end of July, with a political personage whom he knew to be in relation with Napoleon III., he even let these words fall: "Tell the Emperor of the French to be moderate." Valfrey, vol. i. 79.
[129] The Golos, quoted in the dispatch of Mr. Schuyler, 27th August.
[130] A. Sorel, Diplomatic History, vol. i. p. 254. Let us quote the passage from another dispatch of M. de Beust, dated the 29th September, and destined for London: "Let us not fear to say it: what to-day serves powerfully to prolong the conflict to the extreme horrors of a war of extermination, is, on one side illusions and false hopes, on the other indifference and contempt for Europe, spectator of the combat."
[131] A. Sorel, Diplomatic History, vol. i. p. 402.
[132] Report of Sir A. Buchanan of the 17th October.
[133] It was only the simple recommendation of an armistice, with no other design of influencing what might be the conditions of peace, that Prince Gortchakof declined to make common cause. M. d'Oubril, his minister at Berlin, found himself at the last moment without instructions on this subject. "It is singular enough," wrote Lord Loftus, on the 26th October, "that Russia, after having in many circumstances, proved its desire for peace, thus stands aside and prefers isolated to common action."
[134] Dispatch of Prince Gortchakof to Baron Brunnow at London, November 20, 1870.
[135] Dispatch of Mr. Joy Morris of the 2d September, quoted above.
[136] See the Revue des deux Mondes of the 1st February, 1868 ("The Diplomacy and the Principles of the French Revolution," by M. le Prince Albert de Broglie).
[137] Note to Prince Gagarine at Turin, 10th October, 1860.
[138] Speech on the 1st August, in the House of Commons.
[139] Provincial Correspondence of the 1st May, 1873.
[140] Telegram from the czar to King William I. of the 9th December, 1869. Quite recently, at the last banquet of St. George, the Emperor Alexander II. said: "I am happy to be able to state that the close alliance between our three empires and our three armies, founded by our august predecessors for the defense of the same cause, exists intact at the present moment." Official journal of the Russian empire of the 12th December, 1875.
[141] Count Tarnowski, "A Visit to Moscow," Revue de Cracovie, November, 1785.
[142] Ausder Petersburger Gesellschaft. The other descriptions are taken from the Journal de St. Petersburg, and L'Invalide Russe of that time.
[143] Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft, vol. ii. p. 89.
[144] Confidential note of M. Magne, 20th July, 1866. Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family, vol. i. p. 241.
[145] The Golos, several years ago, advanced these curious statistics, the effect of which was profound at the time. The name of Kozlof had a moment of celebrity in Russia: hearing it pronounced at the end of a long list of purely Teutonic names, at the presentation of the officers of a grand army corps, the czarovich cried out, "At last! thank God." Fr. J. Celestin, Russland seit Aufheburg der Leibeigenschaft, Laibach, 1875, p. 334.
[146] We have said: "How could he undertake to present to M. de Bismarck the demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries?" and M. Benedetti sees in the word undertake the insinuation of an initiative. We have, however, very explicitly said, The demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries, and we immediately added M. Benedetti's own expressions: "I have provoked nothing, still less have I guaranteed the success; I have only allowed myself to hope for it." None of our readers could mistake the meaning of our words, nor, above all, see therein the insinuation which M. Benedetti gratuitously credits us with.
[147] "Del Conte Bismarck dice (M. de Benedetti) che è un diplomatico per così dire MANIACO; che da quindici anni che to conosce e lo SEGUE."—Report of General Govone, 6th April, 1866. La Marmora, p. 139.
[148] La Marmora, p. 110.
[149] See the Revue of the 15th September, and the 1st October, 1868.