INTRODUCTORY
Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.
The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.
War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.
MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY
We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.
Primary objects are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.
Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds—Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.
Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.
Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior
object; (2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versâ. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versâ. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.
Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with—
(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.
(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.
Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—
(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.
(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.
(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.
It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.
Example.—For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible good.
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
Nature of Object
Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between offensive and defensive, upon which all strategical calculation must be based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.
All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.
A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for ourselves.
A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something.
Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.
Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.
This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular operation is offensive or defensive.
Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; e.g., ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be defensive, and vice versâ. For example, in the Russo-Japanese
War the ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).
Relation of Offensive to Defensive
The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war, since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.
The advantages of the Offensive are well known.
Its disadvantages are:—
That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications, and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.
The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:—
Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground, facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of organising in advance.
The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They become, however, real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.
Functions and Characteristics of the Defensive
True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.
To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our way by using the defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to hit harder.
A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. Unless it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. Thus, in 1756, the French, by assuming the defensive in the Channel, threatened an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca.
This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare, since the mobility of fleets enables them to pass instantaneously from the defensive to the offensive without any warning. When we assume the defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay aside attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke.
The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. But in that case we were not acting on the defensive at all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were doing nothing. We were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is really an instance of the successful use of defensive by the Dutch. Being no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they assumed the defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a counter-stroke. It was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get better terms of peace.
So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. Clausewitz calls it "a shield of blows." It is often called offensive-defensive, or active defence. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive which excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea. The old Elizabethan term Preventive most closely expresses the idea.
The most important function of the defensive is that of covering, buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No plan of campaign, however strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the use of the defensive. Without some use of the defensive the cardinal principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective, the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. Because it is only by using the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre.
In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: If not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become so—
(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;
(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or securing allies.
It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that is no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the defensive ourselves we have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. The bulk of our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by our enemies assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with success, and it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so.
Offensive Operations used with a Defensive Intention
(A) Counter attacks.
(B) Diversions.
Counter attacks are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of defence."
Diversions are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.
Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their own. They
should, therefore, be small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.
Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that justifies their use.
This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities are most highly developed in combined expeditions.
Diversions must be carefully distinguished from eccentric attacks. Eccentric attacks are true offensive movements. They have a positive object, i.e., they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, i.e., they aim at preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions.
Examples.—Diversion.—Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army employed in the defence of Canada"; i.e., the intention was negative—preventive—defensive. Eccentric Attack.—Operations against New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; i.e., the intention was positive—to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years' War.
This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions. These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric attacks, and true direct offensive.
LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS
From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification of wars, according to whether such object is limited or unlimited.
(1) War with limited object ("limited war") is where the object is merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions or interests; e.g., Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation of Cuba.
(2) War with an unlimited object is where the object is to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must agree to do our will (become subservient); e.g., Franco-German War.
PLANS OF WAR
System of Operations
Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object (i.e., whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of the war."
Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon—
(1) The theatre of the war.
(2) The various theatres of operation available within it.
1. Theatre of the War.—Usually defined as "All the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the subordinate objects that lead up to them."
A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."
2. Theatre of Operations.—Is generally used of the operations of one belligerent only.
An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.
A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory we seek to take possession of or to defend.
A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the particular operation."
Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.
Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or movements may be offensive.
As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the lines of operation and the objectives.
Objective
An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is directed." Thus, where the object in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually be the objective.
"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." For purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply distinguished. Objective is the end of some particular movement or operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. Object is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the general staff or director of the war. An objective is some definite point which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part of his strength which we wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term of anything we already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have been Rojesvensky's objective. It was, strictly speaking, only his destination. To reach it and concentrate with the units already there was the primary object of the operations entrusted to him. He had no true objective before him except Togo's fleet.
An objective is always subordinate to some object. It is a step to the attainment of that object.
Lines of Operation
A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."
Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Positions" are the converse of these.
Lines of Communication
This expression is used of three different things:—
(1) Lines of supply, running from the base of operations to the point which the operating force has reached.
(2) Lines of lateral communication by which several forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to each other's support.
(3) Lines of retreat, which are usually lines of supply reversed, i.e., leading back to the base.
For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and communication," which were in use at the end of the 18th century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be supplied.
Maritime Communications
The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet may have to operate are:—
(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond to the communications of armies operating ashore). These have greatly increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c.
(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base.
(3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of belligerents' possessions.
In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a consideration of Maritime Communications, and the extent to which they are the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and this is probably the best method of solving them.