FOOTNOTES:
[8] See Additional Notes, [a].
[9] The universe could not be generated together with all things, for the principle of it must be unbegotten; since everything that is generated, is generated from a cause; and if this cause was also generated, there must be a progression of causes ad infinitum, unless the unbegotten is admitted to be the principle of the universe. Neither, therefore, can the universe be corrupted together with all things; for the principle of it being unbegotten is also incorruptible; that only being corruptible, which was once generated.
[10] Critolaus, the Peripatetic, employs nearly the same arguments as those contained in this paragraph, in proof of the perpetuity of the world, as is evident from the following passage, preserved by Philo, in his Treatise Περι Αφθαρσιας Κοσμου, “On the Incorruptibility of the World”: το αιτιον αυτῳ του υγιαινειν, ανοσον εστι· αλλα και το αιτιον αυτῳ του αγρυπνειν, αγρυπνον εστιν. ει δε τουτο, και το αιτιον αυτῳ του υπαρχειν, αϊδιον εστιν. αιτιος δε ο κοσμος αυτῳ του υπαρχειν, ειγε και τοις αλλοις απασιν. αϊδιος ο κοσμος εστιν. i. e. “That which is the cause to itself of good health, is without disease. But, also, that which is the cause to itself of a vigilant energy, is sleepless. But if this be the case, that also which is the cause to itself of existence, is perpetual. The world, however, is the cause to itself of existence, since it is the cause of existence to all other things. The world, therefore, is perpetual.” Everything divine, according to the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato, being a self-perfect essence, begins its own energy from itself, and is therefore primarily the cause to itself of that which it imparts to others. Hence, since the world, being a divine and self-subsistent essence, imparts to itself existence, it must be without non-existence, and therefore must be perpetual.
[11] i. e. It is not true that the universe can contain anything greater and more powerful than itself.
[12] Philo Judæus, in his before-mentioned Treatise Περι Αφθαρσιας Κοσμου, has adopted the arguments of Ocellus in this paragraph, but not with the conciseness of his original.
[13] This four-fold mutation of ages in the human race, consists of the infant, the lad, the man, and the old man, as is well observed by Theo of Smyrna. See my Theoretic Arithmetic, p. 189.
[14] In the original, το τε απαθες μερος του κοσμου και το ακινητον, which is obviously erroneous. Nogarola, in his note on this passage, says, “Melius arbitror si legatur το τε αειπαθες μερος, και αεικινητον, ut sit sensus, semper patibilem, et semper mobilem partem distinguunt ac separant.” But though he is right in reading αεικινητον for ακινητον, he is wrong in substituting αειπαθες for απαθες; for Ocellus is here speaking of the distinction between the celestial and sublunary region, the former of which is impassive, because not subject to generation and corruption, but the latter being subject to both these is perpetually mutable.
[15] Aristotle, in his treatise on Generation and Corruption, has borrowed what Ocellus here says about the three things necessary to generation. See my translation of that work.
[16] In the original, και ψοφος προς σιγην, instead of which it is necessary to read και σιγη προς ψοφον, conformably to the above translation. See the Notes to my translation of the First Book of Aristotle’s Physics, p. 73, &c., in which the reader will find a treasury of information from Simplicius concerning matter. But as matter is devoid of all quality, and is a privation of all form, the necessity of the above emendation is immediately obvious.
[17] Thus also Aristotle, in his Treatise on Generation and Corruption, θερμον δε και ψυχρον, και ὑγρον, τα μεν τῳ ποιητικα ειναι, τα δε τῳ παθητικα λερεται, i. e. “With respect to heat and cold, dryness and moisture, the two former of these are said to be effective, but the two latter passive powers.”
[18] The substance of nearly the whole of what Ocellus here says, and also of the two following paragraphs, is given by Aristotle, in his Treatise on Generation and Corruption.
[19] In the original, επειτα δε και την αυτην τῳ ανθρωπῳ συνταξιν προς το ὁλον, ὁτι μερος ὑπαρχων οικου τε και πολεως, και το μεγιστον κοσμου, συμπληρουν οφειλει το απογενομενον τουτων ἑκαστον, κ. τ. λ. Here, for και το μεγιστον κοσμου, συμπληρουν, κ. τ. λ., it is requisite to read, conformably to the above translation, και το μεγιστον, κοσμου συμπληρουν, κ. τ. λ. Nogarola, in his version, from not perceiving the necessity of this emendation, has made Ocellus say that man is the greatest part of the universe; for his translation is as follows: “Mox eandem hominis constitutionem ad universam referendam, quippe qui non solum domûs et civitatis, verum etiam mundi maxima habetur pars,” &c.
[20] This observation applies only to well regulated cities, but in London and other large cities, where the population is not restricted to a definite number, this abundant propagation of the species is, to the greater part of the community, attended with extreme misery and want. Plato and Aristotle, who rank among the wisest men that ever lived, were decidedly of opinion, that the population of a city should be limited. Hence, the former of these philosophers says, “that in a city where the inhabitants do not know each other, there is no light, but profound darkness;” and the latter, “that as 10,000 inhabitants are too few for a city, so 100,000 are too many.”
[21] For whole, according to the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato, has a triple subsistence; since it is either prior to parts, or consists of parts, or exists in each of the parts of a thing. But a whole, prior to parts, contains in itself parts causally. The universe is a whole of wholes, the wholes which it comprehends in itself (viz. the inerratic sphere, and the spheres of the planets and elements) being its parts. And in the whole which is in each part of a thing, every part according to participation becomes a whole, i. e. a partial whole.
[22] In the original, ὡς δει, και εξ ὡν δει, και ὁτε δει, a mode of diction which frequently occurs in Aristotle, and from him in Platonic writers.
OCELLUS LUCANUS ON LAWS.
A FRAGMENT PRESERVED BY STOBÆUS, ECLOG. PHYS. LIB. I. CAP. 16.
Life, connectedly—contains in itself bodies; but of this, soul is the cause. Harmony comprehends, connectedly, the world; but of this, God is the cause. Concord binds together families and cities; and of this, law is the cause. Hence, there is a certain cause and nature which perpetually adapts the parts of the world to each other, and never suffers them to be disorderly and without connection. Cities, however, and families, continue only for a short time; the progeny of which, and the mortal nature of the matter of which they consist, contain in themselves the cause of dissolution; for they derive their subsistence from a mutable and perpetually passive nature. For the destruction[23] of things which are generated, is the salvation of the matter from which they are generated. That nature, however, which is perpetually moved[24] governs, but that which is always passive[25] is governed; and the one is in capacity prior, but the other posterior. The one also is divine, and possesses reason and intellect, but the other is generated, and is irrational and mutable.