Chapter XII.
§ 1. Study of the military profession at Sparta. Period of service. § 2. Arrangement of the army. Numbers of the military divisions. § 3. Arrangement of the enomoty and military evolutions. § 4. Arrangement of the Mora. § 5. Organization of the Spartan army. Its officers. § 6. Cavalry in the other Doric states. The Sciritæ in the Lacedæmonian army. Light-armed soldiers. § 7. Arms of the heavy infantry of Sparta. § 8. Spartan tactics. § 9. Steady courage of the Spartans. § 10. War considered as an art by the Spartans. Life of the Spartans in camp.
1. The military system of the Dorians, which we are now about to consider, was evidently brought to the greatest perfection in Sparta. In this state the military profession, as was hardly the case in any other part of Greece, was followed as an art, as the study of a life;[1090] so that when Agesilaus (as is related) separated the shoemakers, carpenters, potters, &c., from the assembled allied army, the Spartans alone remained, as being the warriors by profession (as τεχνῖται τῶν πολεμικῶν[1091]). But the principles of their military tactics were evidently common to the whole race; and, according to a conjecture advanced in a former part of this work,[1092] it was chiefly the method of attack, in closed lines, with extended lances, by which the Dorians conquered the Achæans of Peloponnesus, and which was adopted from them by many other states of Greece.
Every Spartan was, if he had sufficient strength, [pg 243] bound to defend his country in expeditions without the boundaries during the years that were designated by the name ἡλικία.[1093] This period lasted to the fortieth year from manhood (ἀφ᾽ ἥβης), that is to say, to the sixtieth year from birth:[1094] until that time a man was called ἔμφρουρος (from φρουρὰ), and could not go out of the country without permission from the authorities.[1095] Of these, the younger men were sometimes sent abroad; but those of fifty-five and upwards, not till the state was in difficulty.[1096] The ephors stated in the name of the public assembly the years, until which the obligation to service in an individual case extended.[1097] Upon the whole, the armies of Sparta must have contained many aged triarii: while in Athens the liability to foreign service generally terminated with the twenty-third year of manhood; which was computed from the eighteenth year.[1098] But Sparta reckoned upon a healthy and strong old age; the time for deliberative sagacity does not begin till the age for fighting has ended. The allied army of the Argives, Arcadians, and Athenians was, in 418 B.C., met by an army composed of all the Spartans[1099] (that is, all the ἔμφρουροι[1100]); but they dismissed from the boundaries a sixth part of the [pg 244] army, consisting of the younger and the older, in order to protect the capital.[1101]
2. In marching and in battle the Spartans endeavoured to conceal their strength from the enemy; for this reason the levies were hastily made by the ephors, and the army sometimes marched during the night;[1102] the depth of the ranks in the army was also very various, and the enemy could not be certain of its strength. In the battle of Mantinea there were seven lochi, each containing four pentecostyes, the pentecostys four enomoties, and the front row of the enomoty containing four men: the pentecostys had therefore 16 in front, the lochus 64, the whole army 448. According to Thucydides the Spartans generally stood eight men deep; therefore the whole number of the hoplitæ was 3584. To these however were added the 300 picked men about the king, about 400 cavalry in both wings,[1103] and also the old men, posted as a body of reserve with the baggage, together with the Lacedæmonians, appointed to cover the right wing of the allies, in number perhaps about 500.[1104] The whole number of men was 4784. A sixth part of the army had been sent back; which gives for the entire army 5740 men. This was at that time the number of heavy-armed soldiers, which, after severe losses in the field, the city of Sparta was able of itself to furnish:[1105] nor indeed is it so considerable as the report of its strength would lead one to suppose; but it increased, in the manner of [pg 245] an avalanche, into a numerous and powerful army,[1106] when there was time to collect troops from the allies.
Although we have given the account of this battle in the first instance, we cannot derive from it any information with regard to the original regulation of the army, since Agis had increased the lochi to four times their usual strength, as we shall presently see, in order to deceive the enemy by false accounts. For, if we compare the statements of the well informed Xenophon,[1107] we obtain the following explanation of the names: two enomoties compose a pentecostys, two pentecostyes a lochus,[1108] four lochi a mora; now if an enomoty, as must have been originally the case, contained twenty-four,[1109] or, with the enomotarch, twenty-five men,[1110] the mora would have contained 400; and, including the superior officers, pentecosters, and lochagi, 412. In the time of Xenophon, however, the enomoty consisted of thirty-six men[1111]; and accordingly, the mora of 600, as was the case on an occasion mentioned by the same historian[1112]; the other numbers, which vary between 500[1113] and 900,[1114] must also have resulted from the greater or less increase in the strength of the enomoty.
3. Now the enomoty, the most simple body of this military arrangement, was, as the word shows, a file of [pg 246] men closely united, and bound by a common oath,[1115] which stood in the deep phalanx each one behind the other,[1116] the enomotarch being in front (πρωτοστάτης) of the whole file. Thus also the Thebans stood in files twenty-five men deep,[1117] which they sometimes strengthened to double that number[1118]; in the Lacedæmonian army, however, the file was generally broken, and the enomoty, according to the order given before the battle, stood three and sometimes six men broad[1119]; in the former case, if its number was not increased, eight; in the latter, four deep: the Lacedæmonians are also reported to have once beaten the Arcadians with a line only one shield deep.[1120] If, however, the whole enomoty stood in one file, it was called λόχος ὄρθιος; and in this disposition they attacked high places, when the files were placed at some distance from each other.[1121] The deployments (παραγωγαὶ), by which the phalanx was made more or less deep, were ordered by the enomotarch. This person was [pg 247] the strongest man or the best soldier of the whole enomoty; hence it was his continual care that on whatever point the attack was made he should always stand at the head of his file: the uragi, however, the last men of the file, were experienced soldiers, especially when the army was expected to be threatened in the rear. If then the lochi moved one behind the other (ἐπὶ κέρως), the enomotarchs advanced before the long files. If the enemy approached in front, the files, either whole or broken, moved forward, each placing itself on the left side of the preceding file (παρ᾽ ἀσπίδα[1122]). If the enomoty was broken, the enomotarch then occupied in the square formed by his enomoty the front angle to the right hand, and the first enomotarch of the army was always the last man of the right wing; this movement was called παραγωγὴ εἰς μέτωπον, or ἐπὶ φάλαγγος.[1123] But if the enemy came on in the rear, each file wheeled round, so that the leaders again came in front.[1124] If the enemy appeared on the right, the whole number of lochi, moving one behind the other, turned, like triremes, towards the enemy, and the man who was last upon the march was last in the line of battle to the right (παρὰ δόρυ). And, lastly, if they advanced from the left, the same movement took place, only the last lochus then occupied the left wing (παρ᾽ ἀσπίδα[1125]).
4. Lochi also occur among the Argives and Thebans, and in the Asiatic armies; under the command of Sparta there were lochi of mercenaries and bowmen,[1126] &c.; whereas the mora was a division peculiar to the Spartans. The formation of this body was as [pg 248] follows. The whole number of citizens (τὸ πολιτικὸν) was divided into six moras[1127]; so that every person of military age (ἔμφρουρος), even while he lived at Sparta, belonged to one of them. The strength of the mora in the field depended on the maximum fixed by the ephors for the age of those employed; thus, for example, they were able to send out a mora composed of persons less than thirty-five years from manhood (ἀφ᾽ ἥβης) and keep back those of greater age,[1128] &c. So that in this sense the numbers of the division depended upon circumstances. To each mora of heavy-armed infantry there belonged, without being in close connexion with it, a body of cavalry bearing the same name,[1129] consisting at the most of 100 men, and commanded by the hipparmost.[1130] In the mora of the infantry, however, the men of different ages must have been in some manner separated, so that, for example, those between thirty and thirty-five years of age could be easily detached for pursuit.[1131] In this division no respect was had to kindred; soldiers of one mora had brothers, sons, fathers, in another,[1132] although in early times it appears to have been an object of the greatest care to bring relations and friends together. According to Herodotus[1133] Lycurgus instituted the enomoties, triacades, and syssitia for war; evidently as military [pg 249] divisions; and the Lacedæmonians ate and fought in the same company; from which we may explain why the polemarchs had also a superintendence over the public tables.[1134] By these the larger divisions, and not the single banqueting companies, are intended; when Sparta, in the reign of king Agis, again contained 4500 families, there were fifteen of these divisions[1135]; and in earlier times, when the number of families was 9000, there were probably thirty; it is therefore doubtless another name for oba, which rarely occurs; and the army was arranged according to tribes, phratrias, and houses. In early times also the single hamlets of Sparta furnished lochi of their own; as were the Pitanatæ[1136] in the Persian war, and the Mesoatæ.[1137]
5. Of the two principles upon which the regulation of the Lacedæmonian army was founded, one (as has been already pointed out) belonged more peculiarly to early times, and at a late period nearly disappeared: I mean the complete union and amalgamation of the army in all its parts. This is expressed by the name enomoty; and we are led to the same [pg 250] result by many other remarkable vestiges, such as the proximity of the lovers to the loved (which in certain situations must have produced a strong effect upon the feelings), and the sacrifices to Love, which, according both to the Spartan and Cretan usage, the most beautiful men performed before the battle. The second principle was of longer duration; the duty of implicit obedience to every person in authority (πειθαρχία). Now in the artificial organization of the army almost all Spartans were in a certain respect commanders[1138]; for not only the front men of the files, even when the enomoties were broken (πρωτοστάται), but the first men of every line (ζευγῖται) were officers[1139]; nay, every two persons throughout the whole enomoty were connected with each other as fore-man and rear-man (πρωτοστάτης and ἐπιστάτης.[1140]) The commands (παραγγέλσεις) passed rapidly through the polemarchs, lochagi, &c, to the enomotarchs, who gave them out, like heralds, in a loud voice[1141]; but that the command alone of the immediate superior held good, is proved by the circumstance that the disobedience of a polemarch or lochagus entailed the disobedience of the whole lochus.[1142] The polemarchs, lochagi, pentecosters, and also the xenagi (leaders of mercenaries[1143]), took part in the council of war, which was preceded by solemn sacrifices[1144]; the first mentioned officers commanded independently [pg 251] single moras and whole armies,[1145] or composed the immediate council of the kings; they were supported or represented, as it appears, by the συμφορεῖς.[1146] The king, in an instance mentioned by Herodotus, himself appointed an inferior general,[1147] which seems to be a consequence of his extensive power in military affairs. The escort of the king was called by the name of damosia,[1148] and consisted of his tent comrades, to which the polemarchs,[1149] the Pythians,[1150] and three Equals also belonged[1151]; of the diviners, surgeons, flute-players, and volunteers in the army,[1152] to which must be added the two ephors, who attended the kings on expeditions[1153]; the laphyropolæ, who together with the ephors, took possession of the booty; the hellanodicæ, who decided disputes in the army (in this case, as well as at Olympia, the Peloponnesians were called Hellenes by pre-eminence[1154]); the symbuli, sent out, after the time of Agis, as assistants to the king[1155]; the pyrphorus, a priest of Ares, who took fire from the sacrifice, which the king performed at home to Zeus Agetor,[1156] and on the boundary to Zeus and Athene, [pg 252] and preserved it during the whole campaign (in battle the unarmed were protected by a religious awe[1157]); and, lastly, those who had conquered in crowned contests were in the king's train[1158]; a train indeed of sufficient importance, and fit in so simple a state of society to surround the descendant of Hercules with an appearance of dignity. The Thirty about the king's person are not identical with the damosia; for these were always Spartans, which we cannot say of flute-players, &c.; they were assigned to the king, even when the rest of the army (as was frequently the case in expeditions in Asia) consisted exclusively of neodamodes,[1159] and were probably at the same time the body-guard and council of the king. They may therefore be considered as the 300 contracted into a small body, which accompanied the king only on expeditions to a small distance from home. These 300 were the picked regiment of Sparta, the flower of the youth, as the gerontes were of the old men, and also chosen on aristocratic principles. For the ephors appointed three hippagretæ, each of whom chose one hundred young men, with a statement of the grounds of his selection; from the number of those discharged from this body the five agathoergi were taken, who for the space of a year served the state in missions.[1160]
6. A similar body in the Cretan states really consisted of horsemen; the Spartans were called horsemen, and were in fact heavy-armed infantry[1161]; the cause of which was, the low estimation of the cavalry-service among the Lacedæmonians. The country was fitted rather for the production of men than of horses; and although the citizens furnished both the horse and accoutrements, they were ridden only by weak and inferior persons.[1162] Thus the horsemen of Sparta, the number of whom in the Peloponnesian war was at first 400, and afterwards rose to 600,[1163] effected nothing against the better mounted and practised cavalry of Bœotia, which as the light-armed riders sometimes mounted behind, sometimes vaulted off rapidly, was doubly formidable to the enemy.[1164] Among the other Doric states, Tarentum in particular had a numerous[1165] and very excellent light cavalry.[1166] The preference for a force of this description is a proof, according to the principles of antiquity, of an unstable and effeminate character, exactly the reverse of that exhibited by the heavy-armed soldiery of the Lacedæmonians.
In the Lacedæmonian army the Sciritæ formed a separate body,[1167] of whom there were 600 in the Peloponnesian [pg 254] war.[1168] In marches they went in front, in the camp they occupied the extreme place,[1169] and in the battle they formed the left wing.[1170] Although we have no express statement of their mode of arms, we can hardly suppose that they were heavy-armed troops, since they were particularly employed when a rapid change of position, or a vigorous attack, such as storming of heights, &c., was required[1171]; they were often at the post of greatest danger.[1172] Originally, doubtless, they were, as they were called, inhabitants of the district Sciritis, on the confines of Laconia, towards Parrhasia[1173]; their rights and duties appear to have been defined by agreement; their mode of fighting was also perhaps Arcadian. The other Periœci appear only to have taken part in large expeditions, and such as were prepared for a considerable time beforehand; and they probably served for the most part as hoplitæ[1174]; the ratio of their number, as well as that of the neodamodes and others, to the citizens of Sparta, was not governed by any fixed rule.[1175]
It is not by any means clear in what manner the [pg 255] Peloponnesian armies were accompanied by such numerous bodies of light-armed soldiers, more particularly of Helots.[1176] It must at the same time be borne in mind that the Persian war was the only time, that is, on a general summons of the nation, when so many as seven attended upon every Spartan[1177]; on this occasion, when the numbers of the enemy were so excessive, they might have served to protect the rear of the long line of battle, and to resist the pressure; in addition to which they also annoyed the enemy from behind with slings, javelins, and stones. A large part of them, in the capacity of attendants (θεράποντες, ἐρυκτῆρες, ὑπασπισταὶ), were also destined exclusively for the service of the hoplitæ, and to rescue them in danger[1178]; another portion was probably detached to convoy and cover the baggage (στρατὸς σκευοφορικός). The Peloponnesians in early times never attempted to form separate divisions of light-armed soldiers, such as the peltasts were, who, in addition to the javelin, bore the small shield of the Thracians and Illyrians.[1179] The perfection of this species of troops, especially after the improvement of Chabrias and Iphicrates, was the cause of severe injury to the heavy-armed tactics of the Spartans; and the Peloponnesians dreaded them for a long time, [pg 256] according to the Laconian expression, as children fear a bugbear.[1180]
7. The attention of Sparta was almost exclusively directed to the heavy infantry; and it can scarcely be denied that this was carried by them to the highest pitch of perfection. The arms[1181] consisted of a long spear,[1182] a short sword only used in the closest single combat,[1183] a brazen shield,[1184] which covered the body from the shoulders to the knees,[1185] and was in other respects also more similar to the shield of the heroic age than that of the other Greeks. For while the Greeks in general had adopted the Carian handle (ὀχάνη) in order to direct the motion of the shield, of which the size had been considerably reduced, the Spartan buckler was probably suspended upon a thong (τελαμὼν) laid round the neck, and was only managed by a ring (πόρπαξ) fastened to the concave side, which in time of peace could be taken out.[1186] Cleomenes the Third first introduced the handles of [pg 257] shields in Lacedæmon, and in general a less heavy armour.[1187]
8. The principles of the Lacedæmonian tactics may be deduced from what has been already said on the subject of the enomoty, and of its movements; the deployment of the enomoty (the ἐξελιγμὸς) was the chief means of opposing the best soldiers to the enemy,[1188] and it was from this movement in particular that victory was expected. A particular kind of this manœuvre was called the Laconian; it began from the enomotarchs, who faced about to the right, and passed in an oblique direction between their own and the next file; the whole file, following its leader, placed itself in front of the uragus, who merely faced to the right about. So that the whole phalanx, by this means, turning their faces towards the enemy who appeared in the rear, advanced at the same time in that direction by the depth of the order of battle. The Macedonian mode was different from this; for in that the movement began from the uragus, and therefore the phalanx lost, instead of gained, the same space of ground as it covered; and the Cretan (called also Choreus) differed from both, as the enomotarch and uragus both moved, until they changed places, and consequently, according to this method, the phalanx remained on the same ground.[1189] In a charge it was [pg 258] the duty of the general to take care that the army constantly inclined somewhat further to the right than the exact line of its intended direction, since each man naturally endeavoured to bring his unprotected side under the shield of his neighbour, and the last man on the right wing to turn away that side from the danger, and therefore to outflank the left of the enemy:[1190] this was also the cause of the weakness of the right wing, which they endeavoured to remedy by putting in it the best troops, and by protecting it with cavalry. Before Epaminondas discovered the art of concentrating the battle in the spot in which he was strongest, and of keeping the rest of the enemy's troops unengaged, the general had to attend to two points. In the first place, that the chief charge of his own men should be made upon that part where it appeared most easy and advantageous to break the line; and that at the same time his own line should withstand the charge of the enemy: and, secondly, he might endeavour to obtain the victory by extending his front so as to outflank the enemy; a manœuvre which the Spartans seldom indeed attempted, being content to hinder the enemy from effecting it. The chief point was to keep the whole body of men in compact order, both in rapid advance and in pretended flight:[1191] no bravery could excuse a man for quitting his post.
9. The chief characteristic of the warriors of Sparta was great composure and a subdued strength; the violence (λύσσα) of Aristodemus[1192] and Isadas[1193] being considered as deserving rather of blame than praise; [pg 259] and these qualities in general distinguished the Greeks from the northern Barbarians, whose boldness always consisted in noise and tumult.[1194] The conduct of the Spartans in battle denotes a high and noble disposition, which rejected all the extremes of brutal rage; the pursuit of the enemy ceased when the victory was completed;[1195] and, after the signal for retreat had been given, all hostilities ceased.[1196] The spoiling of arms, at least during the battle, was also interdicted;[1197] and the consecration of the spoils of slain enemies to the gods,[1198] as in general all rejoicings for victory were considered as ill-omened;[1199] ancient principles of Greek humanity which we cannot but admire. War was as much as possible confined to a measure of strength; and battle, as Mardonius in Herodotus describes that of the Greeks in general,[1200] was a kind of duel upon the principles of honour. In Peloponnesus, as well as in Eubœa,[1201] the use of the different species of arms had perhaps been regulated by the appointment of general councils; Sparta also retained with a religious veneration the ancient institutions of sacred truces; as, for instance, the Olympic armistice: it wished not only to celebrate its native festivals in quiet,[1202] but even respected [pg 260] foreign solemnities; thus, at so late a period as 391 B.C., that state allowed itself to be delayed and deceived by an appeal of the Argives to “the sacred months.”[1203] If then the state, so long as it remained true to these principles, did not slaughter its enemies without aim or object, so much the more sparing was it of its own soldiers, every moderate loss being severely felt; but even in the engagements of the hoplitæ few of the victorious party were lost. Every one knows of the tearless battle between the Spartans and Arcadians, in which the state had no dead to mourn.[1204] Nothing therefore can be less laid to the charge of Sparta than a violent passion for war, a foolhardy and reckless desire of conquest. The latter was also guarded against by the maxim of Lycurgus,[1205] “not to go often against the same enemy,” the non-observance of which was a charge brought against Agesilaus. With what unwillingness the Lacedæmonians engaged in great wars is generally known. And yet in every action in the open field, up to the battle of Leuctra, Sparta had nearly a certainty of success,[1206] since the consciousness of skill in the use of arms was added to the national feeling of the Doric race, that victory over the Ionians was not a matter of doubt.[1207] With what timidity did the Athenians attack [pg 261] the hard-pressed and exhausted Spartans in Sphacteria! Their feeling towards the captives was nearly the same as that of the Achæans in Homer to the corpse of Hector.
These opinions necessarily experienced innumerable modifications when Sparta engaged in foreign warfare, and moved out of her own orbit into an unknown region; this was particularly the case in maritime war, which, although followed in early times by Corinth, Ægina, and Corcyra, never agreed with the nature of the Doric tribe. For this reason Sparta, although after many unsuccessful attempts she gave birth to men who had considerable talents for this service, as Callicratidas and Lysander, and for a time her fleet was very numerous, and the commander of it a second king,[1208] never showed any particular inclination for it. A disinclination equally strong, and formed upon the same grounds, was shown by the Spartans to the storming of walled places (πυργομαχεῖν[1209]) for which reason they never in early times constructed any defences of this kind; and despised the use of machines, by which Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, thought that “man's strength was annihilated.”
10. We conclude with the assertion with which we prefaced this chapter, though in a different point of view, that no nation ever considered war as an art in the same sense and to the same degree as the Doric Spartans. Indeed every nation, of a military disposition, and addicted to warlike pursuits, considers war not merely as a means of repelling the attacks of [pg 262] enemies, or of gaining plunder or territory by being itself the invader. The mere act of fighting, the common and disciplined movement of thousands directed to the same end, the “pomp, pride, and circumstance of glorious war,” arouse the feelings, and inspire the mind with the noblest and most elevated thoughts; and there is a certain affinity between the art of war and the more regular and peaceful arts; thus a military body resembled, in its movements and array, a large choral dance. These feelings and views were among all nations most natural to the Greeks, and, of the Greek races, familiar to the Dorians in particular.
The agreement which some moderns[1210] have found between the Greek chorus and the lochus is not a mere creation of the fancy; the large chorus was a pentecostys in number, which was divided into enomoties (hemichoria); it advanced in certain divisions, like an army, and had corresponding evolutions.[1211] Both the dance and the battle were the object of the Pyrrhic, which was particularly practised in Sparta and Crete.[1212] In early times it was a preparation for battle, an use of it which was neglected in a later age; in the soldier heavy-armed for the battle was also seen the practised dancer of the Pyrrhic. The same connexion is alluded to by Homer, where Æneas hopes to overthrow Meriones of Crete, however good a dancer he may be:[1213] thus also the Thessalians called the soldiers [pg 263] of the front ranks “principal dancers;” and said of a good fighter, that “he had danced well.”[1214] For the same reason Homer calls hoplitæ by the name πρυλέες[1215] the war-dance having been called πρύλις by the Cretans.[1216] Now this latter expression is used by Homer in the passages in which both Greeks and Trojans give up the usual method of fighting, and the heroes descend from their chariots and form themselves into a body on foot; and therefore of that very mode of battle which became prevalent in Greece through the influence of the Dorians. For the same reason the Spartans sacrificed to the Muses before an action,[1217] these goddesses being expected to produce regularity and order in battle; as they sacrificed on the same occasion in Crete to the god of love, as the confirmer of mutual esteem and shame.[1218]
The whole existence of the Spartans in the camp appears to have been easy and tranquil; and therefore resembled the mode of living in Sparta, as that city was to a certain degree always a camp.[1219] The bodily [pg 264] exercises were regularly continued, and repeated twice in each day;[1220] but with less severity than at home;[1221] and the discipline in general was less strict. The Persian spy found the Spartans in the evening before the battle of Thermopylæ employed, some in gymnastic exercises, and some in arranging their hair,[1222] which they always wore long after their entrance into manhood. Every man put on a crown[1223] when the band of flute-players gave the signal for attack; all the shields of the line glittered with their high polish,[1224] and mingled their splendour with the dark red of the purple mantles,[1225] which were meant both to adorn the combatant, and to conceal the blood of the wounded; to fall well and decorously being an incentive the more to the most heroic valour.