The Historical or Comparative Method: Montesquieu and Buffon.

About the middle of the eighteenth century we remark the introduction of a new, or almost new, method of investigation, which was destined to achieve great results. Hitherto many men had been sanguine enough to believe that they could think out or decide by argument hard questions respecting the origin of what they saw about them. It was easier, but not really more promising, to resort to ancient books which contained the speculations of past generations of thinkers. Now at last men set themselves to study what is, and by the help of historical facts to discover how it came to be. The new method was first applied to the institutions of human society, but was in the end extended to the earth, life on the earth, and a multitude of other important subjects.

Most writers call this method historical, because history is the chief means by which it seeks to trace causes. Others call it genetic, because it goes back, whenever it can, to origins. It might also be called comparative, because it compares, not only things which are widely separated in time, but also things which are separated in space, things which differ in form or tendency because they have a common origin, and things which differ in origin because they have a common form or tendency. Whether the institutions, arts, and usages of mankind, or the species of plants and animals, are in question, the study of history, together with the comparative study of what now exists, results in increased attention to development, and this again brings to light the continuity of all natural agents and processes—continuity in time and continuity among co-existences. Since the new method has succeeded in tracing the causes of many phenomena which once seemed to obey no law, it has done much to strengthen the belief in universal causation.

Down to the middle of the eighteenth century the book of Genesis had been almost unanimously accepted in Europe as the only source of information concerning the origin of the world, of man, of languages, of arts and sciences. The whole duration of the world was restricted to so brief a space that slow development was impossible, and it was assumed that early history of every kind must be miraculous.[17]

Montesquieu (Esprit des Lois, 1748) was the first to exhibit on an impressive scale the power of the historical method. Natural development, determined by unalterable conditions, was with him the key to the right understanding of the past. It is well known that here and there a great thinker had before Montesquieu framed something like the same conception. The Politics of Aristotle[18] and Vico's study of the historical evolution of the Roman law (1725) are memorable anticipations. By 1748, the date of the Esprit des Lois, or 1749, the date of Buffon's first volumes, which come next before us, Newton's Principia had made students of physics and astronomy practically familiar with the notion of universal causation.

Buffon's place in the history of science is that of one who accomplished great things in spite of weaknesses peculiarly alien to the scientific spirit. It was mainly he who, by strenuous exertions and largely at his own cost, transformed the gardens from which the king's physicians used to procure their drugs into what we now know as the Jardin des Plantes. By the untiring labours of fifty years he produced a Natural History in thirty-six volumes crowded with plates. Having won for himself a place side by side with Montesquieu and Gibbon, he employed it to direct attention to the larger questions of biology and geology. He was a pronounced freethinker, who promulgated bold views with a dexterity which saved him from condemnation by the theological tribunals. When his opinions were declared to be contrary to the teaching of the Church, he printed a conciliatory explanation, but never cancelled the passages objected to, which continued to appear in a succession of editions. His deficiencies, we must admit, were serious. He was a poor observer (partly because of short sight), and had no memory for small details. His enemies were able to taunt him with absurd mistakes, such as that cows shed their horns. He alienated the two foremost naturalists of the eighteenth century, Linnæus and Réaumur, by ignorant and scornful criticisms. His strong propensity to speculation, insufficiently checked by care to verify, might have brought him under the sarcastic remark of Fontenelle, that ignorance is less apparent when it fails to explain what is, than when it undertakes to explain what is not.

Buffon's fame is not seriously impaired by the fact that his great work is no longer read except by those who study the course of scientific thought. Few productions of the human intellect retain their value after a hundred years, and scientific treatises become obsolete sooner than others. It is consoling to recollect that, if their energy is quickly dissipated, it is at least converted into light.

In a history of biology Buffon is naturally a more important figure than Montesquieu. Buffon had imbibed evolutionary views from the Protogæa of Leibnitz, which in turn made use of certain hypotheses of Descartes.[19] The Histoire Naturelle inclines to some theory of evolution, especially in the later volumes. At first Buffon teaches that species are fixed and wholly independent of one another; some years later he is ready to believe that all quadrupeds may be derived from some forty original forms, while in a third and subsequent passage he puts the question whether all vertebrates may not have had a common ancestor. He does not shrink from saying that one general plan of structure pervades the whole animal kingdom—a belief that he could never have adequately supported by facts; Baer long afterwards (1828) searched in vain for evidence on this very point, while Darwin in 1859 admitted that his arguments and facts only proved common descent for each separate phylum of the animal kingdom;[20] he inferred from analogy that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form.[21] Elsewhere Buffon makes bold to declare that Nature in her youthful vigour threw off a number of experimental forms of life, some of which were approved and adopted, while others were allowed to survive in order to give mankind a wider conception of her projects. There is generally some gleam of truth in Buffon's most fantastic speculations, but we often wish that he could have attended to the warning of Bossuet: "Le plus grand dérèglement de l'esprit est de croire les choses parce qu'on veut qu'elles soient."

[Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon.]

Against all his shortcomings we must set the fact that Buffon strove to interpret the present by the past, the past by the present, geology by astronomy, geographical distribution by the physical history of the continents. One of his maxims expresses the fundamental thought of Lyell's Principles of Geology: "Pour juger de ce qui est arrivé, et même de ce qui arrivera, nous n'avons qu'à examiner ce qui arrive."

Hard-and-fast distinctions are the marks of imperfect theory. Early philosophers distinguished hot and cold, wet and dry, light and dark, male and female, as things different in kind. In later times organic and inorganic, animal and vegetable, the activities of matter and the activities of mind, have been sharply separated. But as knowledge increases these distinctions melt away; it is perceived that the extreme cases are either now connected by insensible gradations, or else spring historically from a common root. Hutton, Lyell, and their successors have made it clear that the history of the earth calls for no agents and no assumptions beyond those that are involved in changes now going on; the present is heir by unbroken descent to the past. Continuity has been established between all forms of energy. Even the chemical elements, once the emblems of independence, give indications that they too had a common origin. The nebular hypothesis, which has been steadily rendered more probable by the scientific discoveries of two centuries, traces all that can be perceived by the senses to a homogeneous vapour, and lays the burden of proof on those who believe that continuity has its limits. Every history, whether of planetary systems, or of the earth's crust, or of human civilisations, religions, and arts, is recognised as a continuous development with progressive differentiation.