CONGRESS-LEAGUE REFORM PROPOSALS
I. The Secretary of State in Council
(1) The Secretary of State to be retained. But his salary to be transferred to British Estimates.
(2) The Council of India be abolished.
(3) There should be two permanent Under-Secretaries, one of whom should be an Indian. The charges of the Indian Office establishment should be transferred to British Estimates.
(4) The proposed Select Committee of the House of Commons is not objected to.
(5) The Secretary of State for India should eventually occupy the same position as the Colonial Secretary. The control of Parliament and Secretary of State be modified only with the transfer of responsibility of the Government of India to the electorate.
II. The Government of India
(1) General.—The Government of India shall have undivided authority in matters concerning Peace, Tranquillity and Defence of the Country; but subject to a Statutory Declaration of the rights of the people of India as British citizens, viz., that all Indians are equal before law, equally entitled to a licence to bear arms and to have the freedom of speech, writing, and meeting, and also the freedom of the Press, and that no one be punished or deprived of his liberty except by a sentence of a Court of Justice.
That the principle of Responsible Government should be applied to the Central Administration by dividing the subjects into (1) reserved (2) transferred. The reserved subjects to be administered by Government without popular control. The reserved subjects shall be Foreign affairs (except relations with Colonies, and Dominions), Army, Navy, and relations with Indian Ruling Princes, as well as matters affecting public peace, tranquillity, defence of the country subject to the Declarations of Rights mentioned above. All other subjects should be transferred subjects—i.e., transferred to the popular control exercised by the enlarged Legislative Assembly.
There should be no Privy Council.
(2) Executive Council.—The Executive Council shall consist partly of Ministers, from the Elected members of tie Legislative Council, and in charge of the transferred subjects; and other members nominated by the Government in charge of the reserved subjects. When there are two or more members in charge of the reserved subjects, half the number shall be Indians.
(3) Legislative Council.—There should be no Council of State, but only one Legislative Assembly composed of 150 members, four-fifths of whom should be elected directly by the people. The Franchise should be as broad as possible without distinction of sex, but with a proportional and communal representation for Mohammedans as settled at Lucknow. The Assembly should have an elected President. (The Moslem League does not object to the Council of State if at least half the members thereof would be elected).
The Legislative Assembly should have the same measure of fiscal autonomy as Self-Governing Dominions, and should control the Budget, excepting the reserved subjects, the allotment for which shall be a first charge on the Revenues. All Bills must be introduced and passed in the Assembly.
Provided that in the case of reserved subjects if the Legislative Assembly does not pass measures desired by Government, the Governor-General in Council may provide for the same by regulations. Such regulations will remain in force for one year, and shall not be renewed unless 40 per cent (two-fifths of the members) of the Legislative Assembly present and voting are in favour of them.
The Governor-General to retain his existing power of making ordinances and the Governor-General in Council the power of passing regulations. The Governor-General and the Crown to have also power of assent, reservation or disallowance.
The Congress-League scheme objects to periodical Commissions for revising the Constitution, and asks for a Statutory declaration that the transfer of responsibility should be completed in a period not exceeding 15 years, when India should be placed on a footing of equality with the other self-governing parts of the Empire.
III. The Provincial Governments
(1) General.—India, including Burma, is divided into 14 provinces, each of which has its own Provincial Government.
By a system of decentralisation, revenues are allotted to all these provinces by the Government of India. The Provincial Governments administer, under the general supervision of the Central Government, without being responsible to the Local Legislatures in any way.
(2) Executive.—Bombay, Bengal, and Madras have each a Governor sent from England and three (one of whom is, in practice, an Indian) Executive Councillors appointed by the Crown, with a Legislative Council.
Bihar and Orissa governed by a Lieutenant-Governor with Legislative and Executive Councils; United Provinces, Punjab and Burma by a Lieutenant-Governor with only a Legislative Council; Central Provinces and Assam by a Chief Commissioner with only a Legislative Council, and the remaining by Chief Commissioners without any Councils.
(3) Legislative.—The Provincial Legislative Councils enjoy limited powers for legislation in the provinces. The Governor is the President of the Council.
The elected members of the Legislative Council are elected by constituencies formed of Municipal and Local Boards, and Landlords with a separate constituency for Mohammedans. They are in a minority except in Bengal, where they have at present only a small majority. The Legislative Councils have no control over the Executive or the Budget.
The Acts of the Provincial Legislature must be assented to first by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or the Commissioner as the case may be, and then by the Governor-General subject always to disallowance by the Crown.
Public Services
Recruitment, examination, and other matters relating to Indian services are at present under the control of the Indian Government and the Secretary of State, with no statutory limit for recruitment in India.
Local Self-Government
Half the members of Municipalities and Local Boards are generally elected, but the bodies are under official control.
III. The Provincial Governments
(1) General.—All Provinces having Legislative Councils at present (except Burma) should have a Governor with Executive and Legislative Councils. A complete separation will be made between Indian and Provincial Revenues. Provincial Governments are to have certain powers of taxation and borrowing.
Responsible Government is to be introduced in the Provinces by a division of departments into reserved (for Government) and transferred (to popular control) subject to a revision after five years. (A Committee is appointed to settle which subjects should be transferred. The report is not yet out.)
(2) The Executive would be a kind of Diarchy, consisting of the Governor and two members (one of whom is to be an Indian) who will be in charge of the reserved subjects, and responsible only to Government; and a Minister or Ministers, nominated by the Governor from the elected members of the Council, who will be in charge of the transferred subjects and responsible not to the Legislature, but to the electors who may not elect him next time. There may also be additional members without Portfolios for the purpose of consultation.
Ministers to have no voice in decisions concerning reserved subjects or about the supply for them in the Budget.
There will be Under-Secretaries and Standing Committees from the members of the Legislative Councils to assist the Executive.
(3) Legislative Councils.—These would be practically two Provincial Legislative Bodies: (1) Legislative Council. (2) Grand Committee.
The Legislative Council will have a substantial elected majority, elected on a broad franchise with Governor as President. (A Commission is appointed to inquire into the question of franchise and the composition of the Council, but the report is not yet out.)
The Grand Committee will comprise only from 40 to 50 per cent of Legislative Council, and its members will be partly elected by a ballot and partly appointed by nomination.
All Legislation and the Budget for transferred subjects only must be passed in the Legislative Councils.
But when the Governor certifies that a bill dealing with reserved subjects is essential he may refer the Bill to the Grand Committee and have it finally passed there.
The members of the Legislative Council can ask questions and pass resolutions, but the latter are not binding on the Executive, except resolutions on the Budget for the transferred subjects.
All Provincial Legislation requires the assent of the Governor and the Governor-General, and is also subject to disallowance by His Majesty.
Public Service
Racial bars should not exist. In addition to recruitment in England a system of appointment to all public services be established in India with an increasing percentage of recruitment. In the case of Indian Civil Service the percentage should be 33 of the superior posts, with annual increment of 1½ per cent.
Local Self-Government
Complete popular control in Local Bodies to be established as far as possible.
III. The Provincial Governments
(1) General.—There should be a complete separation of the Provincial from the Imperial Revenues. All Provincial Governments should have certain powers of taxation and borrowing.
(2) Executive.—Full responsible Government should be introduced into the Provinces. The Executive will thus consist of the Governor and Ministers responsible to the Legislature. There should be no distinction of transferred or reserved subjects.
(3) Legislative.—There should be only one Legislative Council, having four-fifths of its members elected on a broad franchise without distinction of sex, but with a proportional and communal representation for the Mohammedans. The Legislative Council should elect its own President, and must have control over the Budget. All Bills must be introduced and passed in this Legislative Council.
The Governor to retain his power of assent, and the Governor-General and the Crown the power of assent or disallowance.
Public Services
Services should be recruited in India in a fixed and progressive proportion. The annual recruitment in India for the Indian Civil Service should be 50 per cent to start with, and that Indians be granted at least 25 per cent of the Commissions in Army and the proportion be gradually increased. There should be no racial distinctions.
Local Self-Government
Municipal and Local Bodies should be completely under popular control.
APPENDIX C
REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON FRANCHISES AND DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS
(London Times May 13, 1919)
The reports of the two Committees which sat in India from early in November to the end of February last to fill out the framework of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report published last July were issued last night.
The Franchise Committee, of which Lord Southborough was chairman, recommend a scheme of territorial constituencies, urban and rural, the latter based on the existing land revenue districts, together with communal representation for Mohammedans and Sikhs (as contemplated in the original scheme) and for Indian Christians, Europeans, and Anglo-Indians: and the representation of special interests, including commerce and industry.
The other Committee, of which Mr. R. Feetham was chairman, make detailed recommendations as to the division of functions between the Government of India and the provincial Governments, and also between “reserved” and “transferred” subjects in the provinces. Proposals are made for the modification in some important respects (notably in the powers conferred on the Governor) of the “diarchial” system in the provinces set forth in what is conveniently called the “Joint Report.”
As was indicated in The Times on April 5, Lord Southborough’s Committee have not accepted the appeals addressed to them in the interest of woman suffrage. They found it advocated “rather on general grounds than on considerations of practicability.” They are satisfied that the social conditions of India would make such a step now premature. They are of opinion, however, that at the revision of the constitutions of the councils proposed in the Joint Report 10 years after their reconstitution the matter should be reconsidered in the light of the experience gained and of social conditions as they then exist.