The West Riding Territorials in the Great War

by Laurie Magnus

CHAPTER X

I.—THE NORTHERN RIDGES

Between the Battle of Arras in the Spring and the Battle of Cambrai in the Autumn came the Third Battle of Ypres in the Summer. This middle battle in time (with which, in the history of the West Riding, we shall not be much concerned) was the northernmost battle in space, and its success, if it had been fully successful, would have been amphibious in kind. It would have rendered untenable by Germany the sea-bases of her submarine campaign, thus relieving the food-problem for the Allies, and it would have removed the military peril, fought out to a standstill in 1915, which threatened Paris and the Channel ports. On this account, as we saw in the last Chapter, the northernmost battle of the three was originally the chief in significance according to Sir Douglas Haig’s plans. If we may regard the long Allied line, say, from Reims to the sea, throughout, and even beyond, the fighting season of 1917, as the scene of a single battle, we must add that the course of that battle did not follow Sir Douglas Haig’s wishes. We read above of a ‘revised’ scheme, of ‘restricted’ preparations for the attack in Flanders, and we infer (indeed, we are informed) that, if Haig had been in sole Command of the Allied Forces on the Western front, he would have disposed the programme a little differently. Happily, it is not our business to judge the strategy of the war. Our task is to narrate the part which was played by a few thousand Yorkshiremen in bringing the war to a victorious close. Strategy was not in their contract: the Colonel obeyed his Brigadier, the General his Corps Commander; and even in a larger sphere, Sir Douglas Haig was less than supreme. In the triple battle of 1917 many factors entered into account. To burn out the submarine nests, to countervail Italy’s fate of arms, to anticipate Russia’s defection, to release French industry and railways: these were a few of the considerations which affected the movements of the Allied Armies between Verdun and Ypres, the two flagstaffs of French and British ardour. That they were, primarily, political considerations does not mean that they were wrongly brought into account. Always the strategical initiative, as distinct from the tactical, lies partly outside the control of the fighting men. But there was worse than this in the series of conditions which determined the fighting of 1917. The sequence of battle-areas (Arras, Ypres, Cambrai) might be dictated by causes which prevailed over the best-laid plans; the course of the battles themselves, especially of the Summer-battle about Ypres, was dictated by less calculable chances. Among these were the ‘pill-boxes’ and the mud, the solid and the fluid conditions. When to break off that last battle was almost more difficult a problem than when to engage it; and if its commencement was postponed by causes outside Haig’s control, we can read between the lines of his Fourth Dispatch the hesitation with which he carried it on:

‘After weighing these considerations, as well as the general situation and various other factors affecting the problem, among them the desirability of assisting our Allies in the operations to be carried out by them on the 23rd October in the neighbourhood of Malmaison, I decided to continue the offensive further....

‘Though the condition of the ground continued to deteriorate, the weather after this was unsettled rather than persistently wet, and progress had not become impossible. I accordingly decided to press on while circumstances still permitted....

‘By this time the persistent continuation of wet weather had left no further room for hope....[84]’

it would be unnecessary to complete this final sentence, except that it closes with the definite statement, that, ‘in view of other projects which I had in view, it was desirable to maintain pressure on the Flanders front for a few weeks longer.’ Once more, we are not required to judge, but, at least, we may note the implication that, even when there was ‘no further room for hope’ (surely, a grave obstacle to progress) it was still necessary to ‘maintain pressure for a few weeks longer.’

The West Yorkshire troops did not come in till close to the end of this middle battle, and we shall presently be more fully concerned with the ‘other projects’ elsewhere. But we can imagine what it meant to those spent and battle-weary soldiers to ‘maintain pressure’ beyond the hope of progress. ‘Physical exhaustion,’ we read, ‘placed narrow limits on the depth to which each advance could be pushed’; and how far those limits should be forced was a matter of very difficult discretion. ‘Time after time,’ runs the Despatch, ‘the practically beaten enemy was enabled to re-organize and relieve his men, and to bring up reinforcements behind the sea of mud which constituted his main protection’; and at what point a ‘practically beaten’ enemy should be left behind his barrier of mud was, again, very hard to decide. Hard and difficult decisions for the High Command; but the hardship and the difficulty of the fighting fell heavily on the fighting men, and the Summer-battle of 1917, which was prolonged far beyond the Summer, entailed, as Sir Douglas Haig tells us, ‘almost superhuman exertions on the part of the troops of all arms and services.[85]’ The great Commander chose his word well. If the triple battle of 1917 were to be fought out again, with all the conditions constant except those which strategists could vary, there would be, conceivably, a new time-table and a new distribution of effort at Arras, Passchendaele and Cambrai: there would still be the ‘superhuman’ effort to overcome the German advantage of irregular, murderous blockhouses, like Martello-towers sunk in a sea of mud, and of not less irregular rain.

We come to closer quarters with this middle battle. It opened on June 7th with an explosion of nineteen mines, which caused enormous rents in the enemy front-line trenches, and which effectively assisted the Artillery and the Air Force in their preparations for the Infantry advance. Impressive from a spectacular point of view, it was no sudden thing, this explosion. It represented many months of patient labour by highly-skilled miners and engineers, the memory of whose devotion to duty, under conditions of constant horror, should help, in industrial times, to soften acerbities at home. It was, further, the great surprise of the attack. British enterprise had to burrow underground in order to escape the observation of an enemy, who, since 1915, when the Ypres salient was inevitably contracted,[86] had occupied all the commanding ground in a stretch of country where 60 feet was the measure of a mountain. Messines, Wytschaete and Oostaverne were all captured on that first day (June 7th), together with more than 7,000 prisoners and 450 pieces of Artillery. General Sir Herbert Plumer and the Second Army, who had acted as wardens of these marches through so many weary and exacting months, reaped a swift reward in the second week of June.

Unfortunately, it did not end as it began. The obliteration of two Battalions on the Yser between Nieuport and the sea on July 10th belongs to the history of the Northamptons and the King’s Royal Rifles, whose heroic defence of a position cut off from succour or support is Homeric in its quality.[87] Canadian historians will tell the tale of the capture of Hill 70 from the Prussian Guard, and of the long struggles in the outskirts of Lens. The season was still young, however; the initial operations had been successful, and the results achieved in June encouraged Sir Douglas Haig to extend the area of his attack right along the ridges and their spurs from Messines to Houlthulst Forest. These movements started on the last day of July, with the Fifth Army under General Sir Hubert Gough and the Second under General Sir Herbert Plumer.

Slowly, resolutely, painfully, a way was forced up the difficult slopes. After twenty days a big advance could be recorded, but the going had been hard and expensive, and already the pace began to tell. The halt called in mid-August by exhaustion was employed for further preparation, and a month later, when the full attack was re-commenced, the highest points were still in enemy hands. It was now the middle of September: battle had been joined in the first week of June, but Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse and a series of minor positions had still to be won, in order to render Passchendaele untenable and so to complete the capture of the ridges. The programme, we see, was out of gear; the price paid was out of proportion to the gains. The battle-fury surged up and down in gusts and lulls, and ebb and flow, shaped less to a regular advance than to a series of shocks and withdrawals, with the battle-mark always a little higher, but, behind it, in an ascending scale, loss of life, and devastated country, rain and ruin, and desperate endeavour. Was it worth while? was one urgent question. How long could it be kept up? was another.

Every Battalion of the 49th Division was engaged: the West Ridings, the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, the York and Lancasters, and the West Yorkshires, and at last they reached the top of the main ridge. The date was October 9th-10th, and the 49th was moved to the attack with the 66th Division on their right and the 48th on their left. The St. Julien road lay behind them, Passchendaele was a mile or two ahead. Three stout Infantry Brigades, eager to crown the Summer’s struggle, took part in the front of the operation: the 146th in the centre, the 148th on the right, and the 144th (48th Division) on the left. The 147th was the Reserve Brigade. The centre Battalion of the centre Brigade was the 1/7th West Yorkshires; they found the 1/5th of the same Regiment on their right, and the 1/8th on their left: the 1/6th was their Reserve Battalion. The heavy casualties in these two days’ fighting made exact information hard to collect: in three Companies of the middle Battalion all the Officers and senior N.C.O.s had been permanently or temporarily disabled, and as early as 7-30 on the first morning (October 9th) the Reserve (147th) Brigade was ordered to be ready at an hour’s notice. In these circumstances, an hour to hour narrative could not be accurately compiled. The details were too much confused. Touch was lost between Companies and between Battalions, and one Officer’s summary of a part must stand for the record of the whole: ‘The Brigade (the 146th) reached its first objective, but was unable to proceed further.’ Still, an advance was made on these two days, which count among the worst experiences on the Western front, and the Troops very thoroughly merited the congratulations of the Corps Commander, Sir Alexander Godley, on their achievement ‘under the extremely adverse conditions.’

The congratulations were renewed a few days later (October 18th) when Major-General Perceval, C.B., took leave of the 49th Division, which, despite the ‘adverse conditions’ and the ‘almost superhuman exertions,’ which we have read of, he had commanded so gallantly and with so much hope. We are told that, at the Brigade Parade, he appeared to feel the parting very keenly, and we know how warmly his regret was reciprocated by the whole Division. He had succeeded to the Command in 1915, when General Baldock was injured by a shell,[88] and he had led the 49th Division in the Battles of the Ancre and the Somme, culminating in the capture of Thiepval, during 1916.[89] He was succeeded now by Major-General Neville J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G. (1916), of the Cameron Highlanders, who had served on the Nile and in South Africa, and whose proud privilege it became, as an Infantryman, to command a Territorial Infantry Division till the end of the war.

We return from this personal note, arising out of the change of Command, to the intense struggle outside Houlthulst Forest. It was renewed three times in October, a bloody October for the 49th Division, as for the British Army as a whole, and, at last, on the last day of that month, the British line had been carried, foot by foot, till within about 300 yards of the contested village of Passchendaele. One more week of effort was demanded of the Troops exhausted by four months’ bloodshed, and the final assault was delivered on November 6th, when the village fell to the Canadians. In the course of four days’ further fighting the last crests of the ridges were secured, and the long Third Battle of Ypres was definitely terminated.

Who had won it? Counting July 31st as the first day of that phase of the Third Battle, it had cost the Germans over 24,000 prisoners. They had lost positions from Messines to Passchendaele, roughly, on a front of twelve miles, the value of which, small in area, had been recognized as cardinal in three great battles in three years. Because they had lost the positions, we may conclude that they had lost the Third Battle, as they had lost the First (1914) and had been stalemated in the Second (1915). But this conclusion does not contradict another, that Sir Douglas Haig had not won. He had not won the victory which he sought. If we compare the close with the opening of this long and brilliant Despatch (‘the Campaigns of 1917’), we see clearly by how much he had contracted his original bold design, and how grievously his large hopes had been disappointed by extraneous events. ‘The general conditions of the struggle this year,’ he recorded, ‘have been very different from those contemplated at the conference of Allied Commanders held in November, 1916. The great general and simultaneous offensive then agreed on did not materialize.’ We turn back to the plans at that Conference, so far as the British Commander reveals them.[90] They ‘comprised a series of offensives on all fronts, so timed as to assist each other by depriving the enemy of power of weakening any one of his fronts in order to reinforce another.’ The Arras battle was not to be pursued beyond its first objective: ‘it was my intention to transfer my main offensive to another part of my front.... I hoped, after completing my spring offensive further south, to be able to develop this Flanders attack without great delay, and to strike hard in the north before the enemy realized that the attack in the south would not be pressed further.’ But it ‘did not materialize,’ as has been said. The task of the British and French Armies had proved far heavier than was originally anticipated, and, on the other hand, the enemy’s means of resistance had proved ‘far greater than either he or we could have expected.’ We shall see in a later chapter how these disappointments imposed a change from the offensive to the defensive in the renewed campaign of 1918. Here we observe that, to this extent, the Summer battle of 1917, protracted almost too long for the endurance even of British soldiery, could not be counted victorious. Nor was the final outlook better, when the results on a wider front were added to those of the Third Battle of Ypres. On no front had we suffered defeat; on none, as German reports prove, was the enemy free from anxiety or confident of military success. But our great efforts were frustrated by outside causes: military opinion is hardening to the conviction that the Western battles of 1917 worked out, on a balance, to our disadvantage, and the dark shadow of the Russian Empire in solution fell across the concluding pages of the British Field Marshal’s Fourth Despatch.

II.—BETWEEN THE BATTLES.

While the 49th Division was struggling up the northern ridges, the 62nd was spending a brief and busy interval between the Battle of Arras in the Spring and the Battle of Cambrai in the Autumn.

Not an hour of that interval was wasted. The noise of the guns was never ceasing; and it is especially interesting to observe how admirably the Divisional Training, set on foot at once between the battles, fitted the daily calls which were to be made on all units of the Division.

But first, for the sake of its pleasant reading, and as a proof that merit found reward, take Lord Harewood’s statement to the West Riding Association in October, 1917, of the Honours awarded to their Troops. The 62nd had figured in an Honours List as early as the previous April, and there had been a good sprinkling from its units in June. Now, every unit had been fighting, and every unit had won distinction. Thus, we met Lieut.-Colonel Hastings at Bullecourt, and we read here of his well-merited D.S.O., and of as many as sixteen Military Medals awarded to gallant men in his Battalion. In point of fact, the Honours which were awarded were far fewer than the Honours which were deserved; and, confining ourselves to figures only, since it is not seemly to select names[91], we observe that, out of fourteen Military Crosses which fell to the 62nd Division, four went to subaltern Officers in a single Battalion of the West Ridings. In the 49th Division, there were twenty-four awards of the Military Cross; four men received Bars to their Military Medals; and there were over a hundred fresh Military Medals and other decorations. Many mothers and maids in the West Riding had cause to be proud of their sons and lovers.

So much in this place for the past fighting. Meanwhile, let us follow one unit of the 62nd to its interval of rest between the fights. Here, too, we need not particularize. We noted at the end of the last chapter how quickly sport succeeded war, and in all units alike, at Achiet-le-Petit and elsewhere, the typical Battalion Sports Officer would ‘get a move on’ very quickly. We may imagine the kind of man he was; say, a subaltern Officer with a wound-stripe, perhaps recently rejoined, and wearing, no doubt, the ribbons of a Military Cross and a Croix-de-Guerre. We may imagine, too, the shell-pocked field, which, in order to exercise his men, he would set himself to convert into a football ground, with its holes neatly patched and darned, and its goal posts and other appurtenances requisitioned as urgently as ammunition. Or take the signal example of the great crater-coliseum,[92] on which a whole Battalion had been set at work, and which was ingeniously constructed to accommodate about two thousand spectators. It was chiefly used for boxing contests, and the R.E. took a hand in erecting its 18-foot ring. The next step was to find and train the teams, and special mention is due to the middleweight champion of the 62nd Division, Company Sgt.-Major Schofield, D.C.M., of the 2/5th West Ridings, whose fight with Pte. Hayhurst, of the 2/6th Duke of Wellington’s, filled the Coliseum one fine day. They were not too particular about the seasons. When the weather was hot, they played cricket; when it was not, they played football, and an inter-Brigade Summer football match resulted in the victory of a team composed of the R.E. and R.A.M.C.; the 2/4th West Ridings being second, and the 2/5th West Ridings third. Later, a Divisional Cup was competed for at Beaulencourt, and was won by the 2/5th West Ridings, who beat the R.E. and R.A.M.C. by the handsome score of six goals to one.

The old saying about the playing-fields at Eton and the Battle of Waterloo recurs to memory as we write. The preparation for war in sport was illustrated again and again. Three times in the course of this Summer, a certain Company out of a Battalion of the 62nd was stationed in a position known as the Apex, which had formed part of the Hindenburg Line, south-south-west of Riencourt. The first occasion was towards the end of June, and the Company Officers found cause to bless the foresight of the authorities who had organized so many forms of sport. Take their excellent shooting, for example. A party of the enemy, about six in number, had been observed on the sky-line walking in single file on the top of a communication-trench. The range was, approximately, 1,200 yards. Six men were sent out in a good lying position, and the sights were harmonized between 1,000 and 1,400 yards. After the third round, we are told, the enemy rapidly dispersed, and contracted their sphere of activity. Or, take the raid on the Apex on September 13th, which was shown by prisoners’ testimony to have been carefully rehearsed by a considerable enemy force of Storm-Troops, Infantry, and others, under orders to destroy all dug-outs near the Apex and to inflict as much damage as possible on our garrison. The attack fell on the 2/6th West Yorkshires, and was very gallantly repulsed; chiefly by the courage and determination of Captain G. C. Turner, who was killed, and of L.-Sergt. W. Pearson (No. 241038), who lived just long enough for General Braithwaite to recommend him for the award of the D.C.M. It was a typical ‘No surrender’ exploit, and merits special recognition. Or, another incident at the Apex back in August. On this occasion a private soldier distinguished himself, and was awarded the M.M., in a voluntary patrol to clear up an obscure position. In full daylight he went, unaccompanied, up a gulley some 35 to 40 yards, and located an enemy party. He reported the position to his Officer, who dealt with it successfully the same night by the aid of some rifle-grenadiers. It was the same private, by the way, the crack shot in his own crack company, who brought down some partridges in September, within a few yards of the enemy posts. Either for the game or for other causes, the men of this Company became so keen on patrol work at the Apex, that they petitioned for a double tour duty and stayed out eight consecutive nights. Insignificant details, perhaps, but good shooting and keen soldiership won the war; and the Division thoroughly earned the compliments of the Commander-in-Chief and Army Commander on their exploits during this period, which showed ‘skill and enterprise.’

They were as good at salving as at sniping. The tale is told of a Platoon near Bullecourt, which had become liable to a complaint that Salvage orders were being neglected. The complaint was quickly set to rights, and within a very short time a remarkable collection was accumulated outside Company Headquarters. A derelict Tank had been found hidden fast in high undergrowth, and as many as seven Lewis guns and some forty magazines in more or less bad condition were brought to join the Battalion dump. By the side of another Tank the bodies were identified of four men of the Royal Warwicks, and, as the Yorkshiremen themselves had once been engaged in the same sector, they began an organized search, which resulted in at least forty casualties being transferred from ‘missing’ to ‘killed.’

So, the pause between the battles were filled up. With raids and counter-raids, and martial exercises, and military sports, and play imitating work, the exhaustion after Bullecourt was repaired, and the spirit of Bullecourt was renewed. Field-work on the open fighting system completed the training at Beaulencourt where a move was made into hutments in October, and it is noted that the shooting was so much improved that one Platoon, at the end of its intensive practice, scored a total of 405 out of 450 points in a ‘mad minute’ competition. Early in November, a new Brigadier was appointed to the 186th Brigade in succession to Brig.-General Hill, whose gallantry and leadership had won him the affection of all ranks, when the limits of age compelled his retirement. The veteran’s place was taken by a very junior Officer, R. B. Bradford, V.C., who fell in action at the end of the same month, and whose name may stand, on the eve of the Autumn fighting, to typify the personnel of the Division, certain units of which we have visited here and there in the training period between Arras and Cambrai. Roland Boys Bradford was born in 1892; he joined the Durham Light Infantry in 1912, and went out to the war two years afterwards. Thus, his chance came early in life, and he made the fullest use of every phase of it. His promotion was as rapid as his valour was remarkable. He won the M.C. and the V.C. (1916), and was several times mentioned in Despatches, and accounts agree that this youthful Brigadier, when he reached that military rank at the early age of twenty-five, was a soldier of very brilliant promise. He died young, according to civil standards, but he achieved a fine professional record under exacting conditions of active service; and General Braithwaite’s 62nd Division was fortunate, in November, 1917, in possessing, on the Cambrai front, Brigadiers so thoroughly conversant with their duties and so fully qualified to lead their men as General Viscount Hampden, commanding the 185th, General Taylor, commanding the 187th, and General Bradford, commanding the 186th, whose swift death is the just pretext for this brief excursus.

III.—THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI (FIRST PHASE)

We reach now the final stage of the campaign, which had been planned with such hopeful anticipations at the November conference just a year before.

There are several ways of regarding the Battle of Cambrai. We may look at it through big, strategic spectacles, as a means, opportune, but timely, of engaging and distracting German Forces which might otherwise have been sent to Italy. This view is not without authority, and it is stated with his usual lucidity by Mr. Buchan in his popular narrative:

‘Italy, fighting desperately on the Piave, deserved by all the laws of war some relief in the shape of an Allied diversion. Weary as his troops might be, Sir Douglas Haig was not able to grant them the rest which they had earned and most urgently required.’[93]

It is not within our province to strike a balance between this assumption of ‘all the laws of war’ and the degree of weariness of Sir Douglas Haig’s troops.

Again, we may look at this battle through the narrower spectacles of a tactician. It was designed in the nature of a surprise. It was unexpected in time and place, and it brought into operation a new weapon in the form of a mass attack of Tanks in lieu of Artillery preparation. In this aspect the Battle was victorious: it evoked von der Marwitz’s Order to the German Second Army (November 29th):

‘The English, by throwing into the fight countless Tanks on November 20th, gained a victory near Cambrai. Their intention was to break through; but they did not succeed, thanks to the brilliant resistance of our troops. We are now going to turn their embryonic victory into a defeat by an encircling counter-attack. The Fatherland is watching you, and expects every man to do his duty.’

Once more, we shall not attempt to strike a balance. We gained a victory, according to this Order, but it was embryonic and not a success. At the same time, we know that things were serious when the Fatherland was said to be watching.

A third way of looking at this battle, and the way best suited to our present purpose, is to regard it as a very gallant enterprise, worthy of the finest traditions of the British Army, and not less worthy because a large part of its hardest demands fell on Territorial Troops. They might muffle the joy-bells in England when the full story of the battle was revealed, but at least they had rung them spontaneously in recognition of a brilliant feat of arms, and the bells still peal in celebration of the dash and heroism of British soldiers.

We turn back for a moment to the sketch on [page 116], especially to A B C, the road from Albert through Bapaume to Cambrai. The British line has swallowed up the eleven miles (A B), where the fighting was so intense in 1916, and it struck now (November 20th) across that road at a point just east of Boursies, about half-way between Bapaume and Cambrai. Thence it forged right into the triangle, of which Arras is the apex, leaving Quéant in German occupation on the east, and Bullecourt in British on the west, to the northerly country where we have been adjourning. Turning next to the position before us, we see what advantage would accrue from a deeper bite on the same road. Not primarily to capture Cambrai, though this, too, might enter calculation, but to roll up the British forces from below the road in such a way as to threaten Cambrai and to disturb the German Winter dispositions, was a hazard worth the stake in late November. Roughly, the scheme of the attack was to push out between Boursies and Gonnelieu in a north north-easterly direction, lapping up the strong positions like a flame, and to spread in a converging semi-circle up to the main road (Bapaume-Cambrai) and beyond.

The troops at Sir Julian Byng’s disposal[94] were, first, a fleet of four hundred Tanks, commanded by General Hugh Elles; next, the following six Infantry Divisions: the 36th (Ulster), 62nd (West Riding), 51st (Highland), the 6th, 20th and 12th; next, four Cavalry Divisions; and, finally, three more Infantry Divisions (3rd, 16th and 29th), of which the 29th, of Gallipoli fame, was actively engaged. It will be seen that the 62nd had a place of honour in the attack, and it was allotted the task of capturing Havrincourt, the strong point of the enemy’s line. This task required all the powers the Troops could bring: unfaltering leadership, indomitable mettle, and untiring endurance. The methods and needs of the attack had been the subject of constant discussion since the original scheme of operations had been laid before Divisional Commanders at a conference on October 31st. The 51st and 62nd Divisions had been trained close to one another in order to facilitate co-operation, and the preparation of Artillery positions, begun on November 4th, was carried out night and day till the 19th. No detail was too small to engage the personal attention of the Officers in charge of the operation, various features of which were modified from day to day in accordance with practical experience.

On the night of November 17th-18th, the two leading Brigades of the 62nd Division took up their battle front; the 185th on the right, and the 187th on the left. Detachments of the 36th Division were kept in the outpost line, so as to avoid any chance of the enemy spotting the relief; and, though he rushed one of these posts, and captured two men of the 36th, he was not made aware of the date or time of the attack, or of the fact that Tanks were to be used. These lumbered off from the advanced Tankodrome at the south-west corner of Havrincourt Wood, and reached their lying-up places by midnight on Y Z night, November 19th-20th. The pace of the Tanks was calculated, after practical experience, at a hundred yards in five minutes, and the Artillery barrage and Infantry advance were regulated accordingly. The two leading Infantry Brigades were to attack on a two-Battalion front, preceded by twenty-two Tanks. The remaining two Battalions of each Brigade, preceded by eight Tanks, were to leap-frog through the leading Battalions, picking up all surviving Tanks on their way.

Second only, if second, to the Tanks in novelty and effectiveness was the new, great weapon of surprise, perfected by the lessons of a hundred mistakes. We may quote the evidence of a contemporary Battalion diarist, who ascribed the initial success, first, to the Tanks (‘these dealt extremely effectively with the enemy wire, which was very formidable in places’), and, secondly, to secrecy (‘even in the marches up to the line the destination of the Battalion for that night was not made known to anybody below the rank of an Officer. That this policy paid well may be judged from the fact that the enemy was obviously taken completely by surprise’). This record, taken from the account of the 2/4th York and Lancasters, is repeated in almost every diary. In order to keep the secret, very elaborate precautions had been taken. Aerial photographers were deceived by marches on the off-side of roads. Lorries going northward carried lights, lorries going southward carried none. No fires were allowed. There was no preliminary bombardment, and, as indicated above, no one in the Division knew the destination of the Division. Zero hour on November 20th was 6-20 a.m., and at 6-20, on that foggy morning, the first intimation to the Germans of the 62nd Division’s attack was the sight of a sheet of flame from every gun, and of heavy Tanks looming through the mist. No wonder, that the first bound of the eager Infantry started with conspicuous success, and was attended by comparatively few casualties.

That first bound of the Infantry was to carry them to Havrincourt and Flesquières, and Havrincourt, as we saw, was to be the prize of General Braithwaite’s Troops. We shall come to the fighting in a moment. Here let us straightway say that the Division acquitted itself brilliantly. Sir Douglas Haig, in his Despatch, expressly used this rare epithet. ‘The 62nd (West Riding) Division (T.), (Major-General W. P. Braithwaite),’ he wrote, ‘stormed Havrincourt, where ... parties of the enemy held out for a time,’ and ‘operating northwards from Havrincourt, made important progress. Having carried the Hindenburg Reserve Line north of that village, it rapidly continued its attack, and captured Graincourt, where two anti-Tank guns were destroyed by the Tanks accompanying our Infantry. Before nightfall, Infantry and Cavalry had entered Anneux, though the enemy’s resistance in this village does not appear to have been entirely overcome till the following morning’ (November 21st). ‘This attack of the 62nd Division,’ added the great Field Marshal, ‘constitutes a brilliant achievement in which the troops concerned completed an advance of four and a half miles from their original front, over-running two German systems of defence, and gaining possession of three villages.[95]’ As a fact, their advance on that day, the third Tuesday in November, covered a distance further in actual mileage than any other of Sir Julian Byng’s Divisions; further, indeed, than any Division of the British Army had advanced in one day under like conditions since war was engaged in the Western Front. Starting from a point just below the big bend of the Canal du Nord, they took Havrincourt by assault (which meant, among other factors, (1) secrecy, (2) Tanks and, as we show below, (3) Infantry-rush) pushed straight forward to Graincourt, and reached and occupied Anneux, at the edge of our B C road, and opposite the south side of Bourlon Wood: over 7,000 yards, as a crow flies, and a wholly exceptional day’s march for soldiers fighting every foothold.

We have drawn attention to the secrecy and the Tanks. ‘The measure of further success,’ so ran an order of the day, ‘is entirely dependent on the speed with which the operation is carried out. Every minute is of importance.... Once the enemy is on the run, every man must put forth his utmost efforts to press on and to prevent his rallying.’ Here, again, the 7,000 yards of the 62nd Division bear witness to exemplary team-work in training for this Infantry-rush both in the period of Divisional rest and of intensive preparation. One more detail may be set down in this place. At the Dinner of the 62nd Division, held at Leeds on September 9th, 1919, when Major-General Sir James K. Trotter took the Chair, General Braithwaite, on leave from his Command in Cologne, announced that a site for a Divisional Battle Memorial had been sought and courteously granted in Havrincourt Park—an announcement which, as we shall see, derived additional force and appropriateness from the further record of the Division at Havrincourt in the victorious advance of 1918.

Meanwhile, still on that first day, when the Tanks went crashing through the fog, the Highlanders (51st Division) were repeating against Flesquières on the right, the ‘bound’ of the 62nd against Havrincourt. Its capture was reported about 11 a.m., but two hours later authentic news arrived, that, though the troops were holding the front trench of the Hindenburg Support Line in front of the village, machine-gun and rifle fire had broken the assault; a large number of Tanks had been put out of action; the Support Line and Flesquières itself were still in enemy hands. This retardation of the programme affected immediately the advance of the 186th Infantry Brigade (Graincourt). Its right wing was dangerously exposed; and the two Field Artillery Brigades to the east of Havrincourt, deprived of the hope of Cavalry assistance, were also left hanging. Still, the Infantry pressed on. The results achieved were too good and too promising to be sacrificed to a risk which might eventuate either way, and it would at least be practicable to call a halt on the Graincourt-Cambrai road till the position at Flesquières was clearer. This plan was exactly carried out, and shortly after 5-30 that afternoon the 186th Brigade had captured Graincourt, and was resting (or at any rate not advancing from) a line north of the Cambrai road.

HAVRINCOURT: CANAL DU NORD BRIDGE.

HAVRINCOURT: IN THE PARK.

We shall come back to the epic battle of November 20th. Passing now to November 21st, the objective of the Division on the second day was the high ground west of Bourlon and Bourlon Wood. The gallant 186th Brigade was entrusted with this attack, and all available surviving Tanks were put at their disposal. One Regiment of Cavalry was attached to the Division, and Zero hour was fixed at 10-0 a.m. It had been hoped to push forward the Artillery during the night of 20th-21st, but the rain which had been falling since the afternoon interfered with this programme. However, despite the opposing mud, all four Artillery Brigades were in action between Havrincourt and Graincourt early in the afternoon of the 21st. The night of the 20th had passed quietly. About 8 o’clock the next morning, the 51st (Highland) Division had completed their capture of Flesquières, and were advancing on to the Marcoing-Graincourt Road. Prisoners’ tales reported that Bourlon Wood (the 62nd’s objective) was held by the 32nd and 224th Brandenburghers, indicating that a Reserve Division had been brought up by the enemy. It was time to get on, and punctually at Zero-hour the 186th Infantry Brigade, with the 185th in close support and the 187th in reserve, were started on their way, while the Artillery bombarded Bourlon village and put a smoke barrage on Tadpole Copse. Eighteen Tanks in all was the number of available survivors, but, owing to trouble with petrol-supply, etc., not all of these were ready to time, and some delay ensued in the execution of the operation.

Before estimating the results of the severe fighting in which the Brigade was involved, one or two facts may be stated as to the participation of some of its units.

The 2/4th West Ridings were detailed to capture Anneux and Anneux Chapel. The village, though strongly held by Infantry and Machine-Guns, duly fell to their splendid efforts, but further advance was stopped at the edge of Bourlon Wood. The Company detailed to take the Chapel performed skilful work with heavy casualties, and, after making good their advance to the edge of the wood, and capturing at least 300 prisoners, were withdrawn shortly before dark to the sunken road.

The 2/5th and the 2/7th West Ridings were badly handicapped for lack of Tanks. Instead of the frontal attack which had been intended, the uncut wire compelled them to have recourse to an attack by bombs, with consequent loss of impetus. A single Tank, which arrived in the afternoon, was utilized to the utmost of its capacity. The 2/6th Battalion, which was to have been kept in Brigade reserve, and to have been used for the capture of Bourlon Village as soon as the leading Battalions had reached their objectives, had to be employed to reinforce the assault and to fill up gaps in the line. Similarly, the Cavalry were dismounted in the later hours of the afternoon, and helped to complete the line held in front of Anneux by the 2/4th West Ridings.

Though Moeuvres and Anneux (inclusive) had been captured, and were held, it was evident that Bourlon Village would not be taken that day. Orders were issued, accordingly, to relieve the 186th Infantry Brigade in their present positions, and their relief by the 185th was duly carried out that evening.

The general situation on the night of November 21st was somewhat vague, and next day, though the Division was to have been relieved during the night of the 21st/22nd by the 40th Division, it was decided to make one more effort to capture the ridge west of Bourlon Wood, which overlooked all the ground west and south of Graincourt. They tried, and struggled, and tried again, but, despite much desperate fighting, no capture ensued, and, owing to the enemy’s counter-attack and the consequent disorganization, the attempt had to be abandoned. On the same day, the 51st Division took and lost Fontaine. In the night, the relief of the 62nd was duly effected by the 40th.

We break off here for a moment to set down one or two of the gallant deeds which were done in the three days’ battle. And, first, we should quote in full the special Order of the Day, which General Braithwaite, Commanding the Division, published on November 24th, the first full day of the relief. The Divisional Commander, it stands written,

‘has the honour to announce that the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander have expressed their high appreciation of the achievement of the 62nd Division in the battle.

‘The Divisional Commander had the most implicit confidence that the Division would acquit itself with honour.

‘To have advanced 7,000 yards on the first day, taken all objectives, held them against counter-attacks and handed over all gains intact to the relieving Division is a feat of arms of which any Division may be justly proud.

‘The number of prisoners taken is not far short of 2,000. Thirty-seven guns have been captured, which include two 8-inch Howitzers, one complete Battery of 4·2, one complete Battery of 5·9, and the remainder, guns of various calibres, many of which were brought into action against the enemy.

‘The number of Machine-Guns, Granatenwerfer, etc., etc., which have fallen into our possession is so considerable that it has not been possible yet to make an accurate tally of them.

‘The advance of the Artillery to Graincourt, and the accuracy of the barrage, is worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Regiment. To C Battalion, the Tanks, all ranks of the Division express their admiration of the skill, bravery and the splendid self-sacrifice which made success possible.

‘The discipline, valour and steadiness of all ranks has been beyond praise.

‘It is with great and legitimate pride that I have the honour to sign my name as Commander of the 62nd (West Riding) Division.’

November 24th, 1917—the years that have elapsed and that will elapse since General Braithwaite signed this Order cannot diminish its praise. The glowing words breathe and live; they survive the neiges d’antan which cover his gallant men’s graves between the Bapaume road and the Canal de l’Escaut.

Here, too, is the place to mention the visit on November 22nd of Sir Douglas Haig himself to the Headquarters of the 62nd Division (a visit preceded the day before by the dispatch of an A.D.C. by the Commander-in-Chief), in order personally to congratulate General Braithwaite, and to tell him to let the Division know how splendidly, in his opinion, they had acquitted themselves.

Or take the record here and there (it can be but a casual selection) of the acts which won these praises in the three days’ battle which we are reviewing. It was at the very beginning of the battle, early in the morning of November 20th, that the 2/5th Battalion of the West Riding Regiment, going forward in column of route to try to get through the gaps in the wire in front of Havrincourt, lost Lt.-Col. T. A. D. Best, D.S.O., their Commanding Officer, described by the General at his graveside as ‘one of the finest soldiers and the most perfect gentlemen he had had under his command.’

The same Battalion, if we may follow it a little further, continued its advance on the first day to a point on the further (north) side of the Bapaume-Cambrai road, where it succeeded in establishing touch with the 36th Division on the Canal bank. This attack was a ‘record at the time for depth in one day’s advance, the Battalion going about 7,000 yards from the old British Front Line to the final objective for the day.’ Its captures for the day included more than 350 prisoners, fifteen Machine-Guns and a Trench Mortar, and the total casualties in the Battalion were three Officers and ten other Ranks killed, one Officer and fifty-five other Ranks wounded, and four men missing. Its honours included two appointments to the Distinguished Service Order, in the persons of Captains Goodall and C. S. Moxon; and next day, November 21st, when Major F. Brook was appointed by the G.O.C. to the Command of the Battalion, in consideration of his gallant conduct and brilliant leading after the death of Colonel Best, Captain (Temporary Major) Goodall, Senior Company Commander, became second in command.

Records similar to the above might be lifted out of the Diary of each and every Battalion engaged on those days. Our selection of a single example will have sufficed to typify the spirit which animated all units in all ranks; and when we turn from the exploits of a Battalion to the exploits of individuals, the same tale of courage is repeated.

Take, for instance, the following record of an exploit by two young Officers: it is regarded by the Divisional Commander as one of the most remarkable during the battle. In the 187th Brigade, the G.O.C., Brigadier-General Taylor, in his determination to be prepared for all eventualities, had impressed upon his Officers the necessity of pushing forward at Zero hour, whether or not the Tanks had arrived. This meant that the Infantry must know their way, and, consequently, during Y Z night, two Officers of the 2/5th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry crept out between midnight and dawn to reconnoitre the route. They actually succeeded in creeping up to the enemy’s wire, and marked out the route which they would have to follow, if the Tanks were late the next morning, by placing tapes to guide them. It was well that they did so, for the unexpected happened. The Tanks, which were to lead the Battalion, were delayed; and it was due to the initiative and enterprise of these two gallant Officers,[96] that the Battalion was able to start without the advance-guard of Tanks, and to march straight to their first objective, which they captured at the point of the bayonet.

Take, again, seven exploits in the ranks, each of which won a Military Medal. We select them as typical acts, in the various arms of the Service; and, though the extracts from the records are accurate, we shall not identify them by names, since many pages of this narrative could be filled with similar accounts. In each instance, the date of the exploit is November 20th or 21st, and they all redound to the credit of the 62nd Division.

(1) A Private displayed great courage and devotion to duty during the attack on the Hindenburg Support system near Graincourt. He acted as runner, and was on duty two days and one night with his Company, often taking messages under machine-gun fire to Platoons on the Front Line, thereby keeping his Company Commander in constant touch with what was happening.

(2) A Private displayed great bravery and resolution whilst acting as Company runner during the operations near the Hindenburg Support Line. Throughout the day, under heavy fire, he continued to carry messages to and from Battalion Head Quarters and Companies on the flanks. He set a fine example of devotion to duty and showed a complete disregard for his own safety.

(3) A Private displayed his bravery and coolness during the attack on the Hindenburg Support Line, north of the Cambrai road. When his Company was temporarily held up by machine-gun fire from the Front, and its flank was threatened by a strong enemy bombing party, this man took up a position in the open, in front of the German wire, and continued, under heavy fire, firing off rifle-grenades until incapacitated by wounds. His gallant action frustrated the attempt to turn the flank of his Company.

(4) A total disregard to danger and devotion to duty was shown by a Private, while acting as Stretcher-Bearer during the attack on the Hindenburg Support system near Graincourt. He dressed wounds and got back casualties during the whole day under machine-gun fire, and went out alone next day and brought in a badly wounded man from the front of the forward line, thereby undoubtedly saving a life.

(5) A Non-Commissioned Officer showed great bravery and initiative during the attack on the Hindenburg Support Line. When the Company was temporarily held up by enemy machine-gun fire both flanks, he took out a Lewis-gun to the left flank of the Company, and, though under continuous and heavy fire, engaged the enemy machine-gun with direct fire, and thus enabled the Company to advance.

(6) A Non-Commissioned Officer displayed courage and initiative during the attacks between Anneux and Bourlon Wood. He was in charge of a Lewis-gun team on the right flank of his Company. Heavy casualties were being caused by a party of the enemy firing from the direction of Anneux. Without waiting for orders, the N.C.O. crept forward under rifle and machine-gun fire to a commanding position, and opened fire with his Lewis-gun on the enemy, killing several and dispersing the rest of the party.

(7) A Non-Commissioned Officer displayed conspicuous bravery during the attack on the Hindenburg Support Line and Hughes Switch. A hostile Trench Mortar was in action from a point slightly in advance of Hughes Switch. This N.C.O. rushed forward and bayoneted the men in charge of the Trench Mortar, and took prisoners an officer and eight men who emerged from a dug-out close at hand.

These seven examples, casually selected from the records of fighting in the opening phase of the Battle of Cambrai, illustrate what General Braithwaite meant when he wrote (November 24th) of his ‘implicit confidence’ in the Division. They illustrate, too, what Sir Douglas Haig meant when he wrote that it was ‘reasonable to hope’ that his operations at Cambrai would be successful. For success and confidence in war depend in the ultimate resort on how the soldier obeys orders. The runner who takes messages under fire is an essential link between his Company Commander and Divisional and Army Headquarters. The man who frustrates a turning movement, or who enables his Company to advance, helps directly to bring the issue into accordance with the plan of operation, and, in this regard, these few typical examples are worth more than a chapter of battle stories, as the spirit is worth more than the letter.

IV.—BATTLE OF CAMBRAI (SECOND PHASE).

We turn back at this point to the main narrative.

The 62nd Division, as we saw, was withdrawn during the night of 22nd/23rd November, and was relieved by the 40th. This relief proved of short duration. November 24th, the day of the Special Order, was spent in necessary re-organization, but shortly before midnight on that day, after barely thirty-six hours’ pause, Corps orders were received, that the 62nd were to relieve the 40th during the following evening.

We have the advantage of an impression of that day (November 24th, 1917)—an impression from without, as it were—from the private diary of Major-General the Earl of Scarbrough, at that time, it will be remembered, Director-General of the Territorial and Volunteer Forces, and still Chairman of the West Riding Territorial Force Association. In the company of General Mends and Captain Atkinson-Clark, the Director-General was paying a visit to his County Divisions at the Front. He had lunched on the 23rd at Ypres, with Major-General Cameron, Commanding the 49th Division, in a dug-out just inside the walls. The Division were then in the line, with one Brigade (the West Yorkshires) in reserve, and Lord Scarbrough had visited their camp, and seen their Commanding Officers, who were ‘living in a sea of mud.’ At 8 a.m. on Saturday, the 24th, the visitors left the Second Army, travelled by motor-car through Bapaume, and, passing over a part of the Somme battlefield, where ‘every village had been shelled out of existence,’ reached the operation area of the Third Army. Thus, the Chairman and other Officers of the Association enjoyed the unique experience of taking lunch with Major-General Braithwaite, Commanding the 62nd Division, on the day following their visit to the Headquarters of the 49th. Lord Scarbrough notes that the G.O.C. was ‘immensely pleased’ with the work of his Division, and that Sir Douglas Haig had visited the General and thanked him for their ‘remarkable success.’ Though the Division only came out the day before, after three heavy days’ fighting, and were naturally ‘dog-tired,’ they had just been called upon to be ready to send a Brigade back into the line at half-an-hour’s notice. The enemy had begun a heavy counter-attack on Bourlon Wood, ‘which was the key of his position, and which dominated the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, the main road of supply for his troops in the line further north.’ The 40th Division, the visitors heard, were reported to be having a bad time, as the German Artillery had been reinforced, and a Division brought from the Russian front had been thrown into the line. These notes, written at the time, are exactly confirmed by the records prepared more carefully later on when all the available facts had been ascertained.

If we look at a map once more, we observe that the wider swing-round on the eastern portion of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road had been held up at Crèvecoeur and Rumilly. The consequence was (the causes were uncontrollable, and concern the historian of other Divisions) to increase the German pressure on Bourlon Wood and on the village beyond. The 40th Division had attacked and captured the greater part of these positions during November 23rd, but by reinforcements and counter-attacks the enemy had succeeded in reversing these successes. Orders were issued, accordingly, for the 62nd Division, less the Artillery and R.E., to relieve the 40th Division, less the Artillery, R.E., and Pioneer Battalion, in the Bourlon Section of the line, with the 186th Infantry Brigade on the right, the 187th on the left and the 185th in Divisional Reserve; the Headquarters of the two leading Brigades being located at Graincourt. The relief was carried out without incident, except for a considerable amount of shelling, which caused some casualties in the 186th Brigade. Next day (November 26th) there was a Corps Conference at Divisional Headquarters, where, after long discussion, it was decided that the Guards and the 62nd should attack the following morning with the assistance of Tanks, in order to capture Fontaine and the remainder of Bourlon Wood and Village. The night of the 26th was very cold, with a blizzard blowing of snow and sleet. Zero-hour next morning was fixed for 6-20 a.m. The Tanks, of which 20 were available (16 being allotted to the 187th Infantry Brigade for the capture of Bourlon Village), reached their rendezvous punctually at 2 a.m., and the Infantry were all in position fifty minutes before Zero-hour. A projected bombardment of the village during the day of the 26th was not proceeded with, since three Companies of the Highland Light Infantry (40th Division) were missing, and it was thought that they might still be holding out in Bourlon. Coming now to Zero-hour on the 27th, and observing that, about 10 a.m., Brigadier-General Taylor, Commanding the 187th Brigade, reported that his attack had been unsuccessful and that his troops, which had entered Bourlon, had been compelled under heavy fire to retire, we may enumerate at least four causes which contributed to this comparative failure. The first was darkness and mud: the men, and their rifles and Lewis guns, were covered with mud from the start, and every man in the Brigade was chilled by his long exposure to the driving snow. Secondly, there were strong points south of Bourlon, which, owing to heavy machine-gun fire, had not been dealt with by the Tanks. Thirdly, the village barricades likewise opposed the Tank advance; and, fourthly, in and beyond Bourlon, the enemy were able to bring to bear very effective machine-gun fire. Or we may quote, in illustration of these obstacles, the experience of a Company Officer, from Zero-hour 6-20 a.m., to the time, a few hours later, when he, like so many others, became a casualty:

‘Immediately on leaving the forming-up line,’ he wrote, ‘we came under very heavy machine-gun and rifle fire. We pressed on. The machine-gun fire became more intense, and the enemy shelling more severe. The casualties here amongst the Company were very heavy indeed. Despite this, the Company, with dauntless courage, still pressed on, but my casualties were appalling, and further progress became impossible.’

It was about this time (say 10 a.m.) that the 185th Infantry Brigade were ordered to place another Battalion at the disposal of the 187th. Meanwhile, frequent reports of hard fighting on the front of the 186th Infantry Brigade had been received, and now they sent a message to say, that, though their troops had all reached Bourlon Wood, the left Battalion of the Guards had been driven back to its original line. At noon it became evident that the advance of this Brigade had left both flanks dangerously exposed. Partly in order to meet this danger, the 185th Brigade (less one Battalion already sent forward), reinforced by a Battalion of the 2nd Cavalry Dismounted Brigade, were ordered to relieve the 187th, and to extend their line round the south edge of Bourlon Village, so as to keep in touch with the 186th; and the 2nd Cavalry Dismounted Brigade (less its one Battalion) was ordered to keep itself in readiness to relieve the front Battalions of the 186th. The advance of this last-named Brigade was continued during the day, and they reached practically all their objectives and were consolidating in depth. By this time, however, they were very tired and were subject to heavy counter-attacks, and the full effect of the new dispositions were not felt in time to achieve their aim.

We need not follow this fighting further. During the night of November 28th/29th, the 62nd Division was relieved by the 47th. It moved back to Havrincourt for the night, and marched next day into the reserve area at Bertincourt and Lebucquière. Thenceforward, until the battle was broken off, except for intermittent shelling, the 62nd Division took no further active part in the operations. They had done extraordinarily well, and the fine fighting of the 187th Infantry Brigade in Bourlon Wood on November 27th stands out in the record of brilliance achieved by the 62nd Division during this week at Cambrai. We know what happened immediately afterwards: how the fighting odds proved too tremendous, and the great offensive ended with a retirement on December 4th to the 7th, back from Bourlon, back from Fontaine, back from Mesnières and the Bonavis Ridge, to points corresponding approximately to the line held on November 20th, with certain gains in the regions of Flesquières and Havrincourt, though a little closer to Gouzeaucourt in the South. It would be idle to minimize the disappointment at this result, especially when it was realized at home. In the larger issues of the war, the Battle of Cambrai takes a smaller place than it occupies in the records of the troops which took part in the fighting. A victory had been gained by those troops which could not be turned to defeat, though the advance was turned to a retirement. As a battle, it had been lost; as an experiment, it had succeeded, though the measure of the success was laid up in the future. But the troops were competent to measure it. Their military sense, developed by a year’s continuous campaigning, seized the broad issues of the experiment, and all ranks of the 62nd Division were filled with a just sense of elation. Their allotted task had been performed with what Field-Marshal Lord Haig, in his foreword to this volume, describes as ‘outstanding brilliance,’ and a consciousness of this performance, however modestly concealed, was present to the minds of all who survived the battle.

The casualties had been severe. In the first phase (November 20th to 23rd), they amounted to 75 Officers and 1,613 other Ranks; in the second phase (November 25th to 28th), to 79 Officers and 1,565 other Ranks.[97] The honours had been not few[98]; but, apart from the measure of achievement which casualty and honours lists supply, we take count of the enhanced spirit of the Division, which, though it had ‘found itself’ before, may be said to have vindicated at Cambrai its title to a place in the front rank. The Divisional Pelican, as we see, was still waiting to put down his foot, but by fine team-work and fine individual work, the Division had proved its merit as a fighting force, and had won the rare praise of the Field-Marshal and the grateful thanks of the Divisional Commander. Viewed, too, in relation to earlier actions, the Cambrai battle, whatever its issue, is to be claimed as a conspicuous success. It first proved the efficacy of Tanks, and their power of timed co-operation with the Artillery and Infantry arms; it first proved the value of secrecy as an essential factor of victory; and the lessons learned at Cambrai incomparably modified the memory of past work at Bullecourt and Thiepval.

BOOK III
WAR’S END

CHAPTER XI
FATEFUL DAYS IN 1918

All accounts agree that the close of 1917 found the Allies very unfavourably situated. The balance seemed to be shifted against them; and the contrast, in retrospect, is striking between the natural elation of the troops who had taken part in the push at Cambrai, and had put to a practical test the three-in-one new factors of success—Tanks, secrecy and speed—and the equally natural depression of public opinion at home, and even at the front, wherever the chances of the campaign were accurately weighed. The mere strategic satisfaction at having relieved the pressure on Italy, or, at least, at having kept it short of full strength, by tactical operations in France, afforded inadequate compensation for the knowledge, growing to certainty, that the issue of 1917 would be a German offensive in 1918. All the credits on the side of the Allies were likely to mature in the remote future. All the debits, the heaviest of which was Russia, could be calculated at once.

Take, for instance, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s fifth volume.[99] It opens on a very piano note. ‘The late winter and the early spring of 1918 saw the balance tilted against the British and their comrades in the West, through causes over which they had no control.... From November [1917] to March [1918] an endless succession of troop trains were bearing the divisions which had extended from the Baltic to the southern frontiers of Russia, in order to thicken the formidable array already marshalled across France.’ Or take the expert evidence of Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice[100]: ‘In Europe 1917 was a year of disappointment for the arms of the Allies.... From the beginning of November onward they [the Germans] were moving troops from the Russian to the French front as fast as their trains could carry them. It was calculated that the Germans would be able to increase their strength on the Western front between the beginning of November and the end of April by not less than a million and a half of men’: a very nasty calculation for the Allied Command, and for the two Governments behind it at home.

Moreover, there was not much time. This was the key to the situation. Troops moving as fast as they could travel would reach their destination earlier than troops which were moving through a longer distance at a slower rate. ‘While it would be possible,’ wrote Sir Douglas Haig,[101] ‘for Germany to complete her new dispositions early in the new year, the forces which America could send to France before the season would permit active operations to be recommenced would not be large’: again, a very simple calculation, but it entailed serious consequences. The first was, that ‘it became necessary to change the policy governing the operations of the British Armies in France’[102]; or, rather, this was less the first consequence than the sum-total of the consequences, which involved in their train all kinds of major and minor changes. The policy governing the operations of the British Armies in France had to be changed. 1918 had to be adjusted to 1917; and, while the process of adjustment unmade, or, at least, disturbed, the whole basis of British dispositions, and robbed the seed-time of the harvest, it was by no means clear that the new course would be either satisfactory or complete. For the change from an offensive to a defensive policy, under the urgent threat of a German advance, was accompanied by (1) a reduction in the British fighting strength, (2) a deficiency in defensive training, and (3) an extension of the British front by over twenty-eight miles. Such, briefly, was the problem at the opening of December, 1917, while General Braithwaite’s gallant troops were still winning laurels in front of Cambrai, and public opinion in England was still uncertain whether the ‘break-through’ had come or not. As a fact, it was coming from the other side. It was coming with a weight of men and guns unequalled in the history of warfare. It was coming before the United States could pour their forces into Europe. It was coming against spent soldiers, unprepared with rear-line systems or with the latest developments in defensive fighting. It was coming, when our man-power was at its lowest, measured by the demand that it had met, and by the demands which it had to meet. It was coming, accordingly, when Army Commanders, from the Field Marshal downwards, were upset, if we may use an expressive term, by the necessity of defending an extended front with numerically reduced forces. The re-organization of Divisions from a 13-battalion to a 10-battalion basis affected, of course, even the smallest unit, and every Commanding Officer had to adapt himself to the new methods. That the fighting efficiency of units was impaired is a conclusion contradicted by events. That it could not be otherwise than impaired, under these novel and cumulative conditions, is an inference in accordance with expectation.

We may select a very simple entry from the Diary of the 1/6th Duke of Wellington’s West Riding Regiment (49th Division). On January 29th, 1918, when the battalion was at Hondegem, a draft of eight Officers and one hundred and ninety-five other ranks from the 1/5th West Riding Regiment was posted to it, ‘the 1/5th W.R.R. having been transferred to the 62nd Division.’ Next morning, this draft was posted to companies, ‘after which all companies reorganized on a 4-platoon basis.’ Take the 2/4th Battalion of the same Regiment, and its entry on January 31st, 1918: ‘The Brigade was reduced to three Battalions, the 2/6th being broken up, ten Officers and two hundred and twenty other ranks being transferred to the 2/4th Duke of Wellington’s Regiment.’ On the same day, seven Officers and one hundred and fifty other ranks were posted to the 2/5th West Yorkshires from the 2/6th West Yorkshires, ‘who were disbanded’; and, briefly, if reference be made to the Order of Battle of the 62nd Division, given at the end of Chapter VI above, the range and complexity of the changes in personnel, consequent on the supreme need of defending a longer line with fewer men, and defending it against imminent assault, may be judged by these random examples. There was not a Company Commander in all the Divisions of the British Armies who did not feel the effects of the new policy in the early days of 1918.

Purposely, we have dwelt on the soldier’s view. To him it mattered not at all that the Versailles (Supreme War) Council had been formed at Rapallo in the previous November, or that Mr. Lloyd George, on his way home through Paris, had delivered a rousing speech on the topic of the barrier in the West. Neither Council nor speeches would break that barrier, the dams of which were about to burst on him. To him, again, it mattered little more that, before the dams burst in fury on his long, thin, tired khaki line, the same doubts, or nearly the same doubts, weighed heavily on the minds of his Commanders as had oppressed them in 1915, when the 49th Division first came out to France. Now, as then, behind the narrow wall of Troops, which still guarded Ypres from the invader, lay Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne. We may call this the horizontal line, leading from Brussels to the sea, and across the sea to hated England. That way lay the end of the war, and Prussia’s satisfied ambition. Now, as then, too, a vertical line pointed southwards from Ostend to Paris, through Arras, Albert and Amiens, and the battlefields of 1916. That way lay a bisection of the Allied Forces, a spectacular occupation of the French capital, and, at best, a prolongation of the war into 1919 and even 1920. Either way lay disaster to British arms; and the stars pointed both ways at once. To the soldier, as we say, it mattered little that a kind of choice had to be made, and a kind of balance had to be struck, between two alternative enemy aims, which were yet not mutually exclusive. His business was to fight, not to think, and, in the fighting days to which we are now coming, he fought tenaciously till he fell, leaving to those whom they concerned the fate of London and Paris. Yet, because their fate was involved in the disposition of the Allied Armies at the beginning of 1918, we are bound to consider the problem by which Sir Douglas Haig was confronted. ‘In the northern portion of the British area,’ he wrote, in the Despatch which we have already quoted in this chapter, ‘lie the northern channel ports, the security of which necessitated the maintenance of sufficient troops in the neighbourhood. Little or no ground could be given up on this front.... In the central portion,’ he continued, ‘lie the northern collieries of France and certain important tactical features which cover our lateral communications. Here, also, little or no ground could be given up.’ What could be given up? A hateful consideration for the High Command, but it had to be faced and answered, in order to save what could not, or to concert, at least, the best measures for its safety. ‘In the southern portion of the British area, south-east of Arras,’ it was held, ‘ground could be given up under great pressure without serious consequences.’ The ‘great pressure’ was certain to be applied, and it afforded some consolation to reflect that, in contrast to the central and northern portions, the forward area of this sector consisted chiefly ‘of a wide expanse of territory devastated by the enemy last spring in his withdrawal.’ He had held it in 1916. Early in 1917, as we saw, he had partly retired from it and had partly been driven back, destroying and ravaging as he went, to his prepared lines in the rear. Let him come again in 1918. We knew the ground as well as he. The ground ‘to be given up under great pressure’ was sacred to the heroes of the Somme, and would not be given up for ever.

The time passed quickly to the appointed day.

We return to the 62nd Division, in rest on January 1st in the Reserve area of the XIIIth Corps in the Maroeuil district, above Arras. ‘It was evident,’ runs the great Despatch, dated July 20th, but going back to the previous November, ‘that the enemy was about to make a great effort south of Arras. An attack on this front would undoubtedly have as its object the separation of the French and British Armies and the capture of the important centre of communications at Amiens. To meet this eventuality more than half our available troops were allocated to the defence of this sector, together with the whole of the cavalry.’ On January 5th, the front from Gavrelle to Oppy, at right angles to the Arras-Douai road, was taken over from the 56th by the 62nd, with the 185th Brigade holding the left section all the time, and the 186th and 187th alternating on the right. On January 9th, Major-General Braithwaite, the 62nd Divisional Commander, assumed command of the sector. On the 18th, a German runner was captured, and valuable information was elicited from him as to the enemy dispositions. The 240th German Division was opposite the 62nd; many troops, mostly from Russia, had been collected in the back areas; the appointed day was plainly drawing nearer. There had been heavy snow and a sudden thaw: ‘Conditions in the line very bad,’ writes a Battalion diarist (January 19th), ‘but men very cheerful and happy’ (the italics are his).

When they were not in the line, they were providing working parties; when they were not at work, they were undergoing training. ‘The construction of new communications and the extension of old, more especially in the area south-east of Arras, involved the building of a number of additional roads and the laying out of railways, both narrow and normal gauge. All available men of the fighting units, with the exception of a very small proportion undergoing training, and all labour units were employed on these tasks.’ So far, the Field Marshal in his Despatch, and we may quote Sir A. Conan Doyle’s comment: ‘There were no enslaved populations who could be turned on to such work. For months before the attack the troops ... were digging incessantly. Indeed, the remark has been made that their military efficiency was impaired by the constant navvy work upon which they were employed.’[103] It may be. But Sir Douglas Haig bore testimony, that ‘the time and labour available were in no way adequate, if, as was suspected, the enemy intended to commence his offensive operations in the early spring....’

On January 31st, as we saw, the re-organization of the Division took place. Under the new scheme of nine battalions plus a Pioneer Battalion to a Division, the nucleus of Battalions to be amalgamated arrived from the 49th Division further north. In the 185th Brigade, the 2/6th West Yorkshires were disbanded, and the 2/8th were amalgamated with the 1/8th to form the 8th West Yorks. In the 186th Brigade, the 2/6th West Ridings were disbanded, and the 5th West Ridings were formed out of an amalgamation of the 1st and 2nd Line Battalions. In the 187th Brigade, when it left the line, the disbanded unit was the 2/5th York and Lancasters; the 2/5th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry were amalgamated with the 1/5th as the 5th K.O.Y.L.I.

February sped, like January, in preparation varied by raids, and by rumours more or less authentic. ‘Training and range-firing till noon. Route march from 2-5 p.m.’ is a characteristic extract from a Battalion diary, dated February 19th. On February 28th, the 62nd Division relieved the 31st in the left sector of the XIIIth Corps. On March 10th, an increase of activity was observed in the enemy aircraft and artillery. On the 12th, information was to hand that an attack in the neighbourhood of Arras might be expected at an early date, and the Division was held in a state of readiness. On the 17th, under cover of darkness, two officers and eighty other ranks of the 2/7th West Ridings made a successful raid on the enemy trenches north of Fresnoy. On the 21st, news arrived that the enemy offensive had started opposite the Third Army, on a front of about twenty-seven miles from the north of Gouzeaucourt to the south of Gavrelle. The Army Commander was General the Hon. Sir Julian Byng, with the Vth, VIth, IVth and XVIIth Corps under the respective commands of Lieut.-Generals Sir E. A. Fanshawe, Sir G. M. Harper, Sir J. A. L. Haldane and Sir C. Fergusson, Bt.

March 21st, 1918: the story has been told a hundred times, and will be re-told in every book of the British Army until the ‘pussyfeet’ of warfare prohibit the writing of military history. A few words must be said about it here, though it happened that on the day itself no troops from the West Riding were engaged. The Fifth Army, commanded at that date by General Sir Hubert de la P. Gough, extended immediately south of the Third, and consisted of the VIIth, XIXth, XVIIIth and IIIrd Corps, under Lieut.-Generals Sir W. N. Congreve, Sir H. E. Watts, Sir F. I. Maxse and Sir R. H. K. Butler respectively. At its southern extremity, it touched the junction of the British and French lines; its total front was about two-and-forty miles, with an average of about 6,750 yards to each Division in the line compared with an average of about 4,700 yards per Division in the line in the Third Army. We should remember, too, that the southernmost portion of the front had only recently been taken over from the French, and the ‘navvy’ work spoken of above was even more incomplete than in other parts. By so much more difficult, accordingly, was Sir Hubert Gough’s task than Sir Julian Byng’s. The German General opposing the Fifth Army was von Hutier, the conqueror of Riga, and the Crown Prince of Prussia was afforded this unique opportunity of winning his coveted laurels in the final battle to be known as the Kaiser-schlacht. Further, at least sixty-four Divisions of super-trained enemy troops took part in the operations on the first day, against eight in the line of the Third Army (with seven in reserve) and eleven in the line of the Fifth Army (with three Infantry and three Cavalry in reserve). Two-thirds of the German Divisions were allotted to the assault on General Gough; and ‘never in the history of the world,’ it has well and soberly been said, ‘had a more formidable force been concentrated on a fixed and limited objective.’[104] We are not directly concerned with the story of the Fifth Army on that day, but since its ‘apparent collapse’ has been (or was) contrasted with the ‘glorious defence’ by General Byng, we may be permitted to cite here the opinion of Major-General Sir F. Maurice, that ‘the burden which Gough’s troops had to bear was incomparably the greater.’ He summarizes with admirable brevity the facts which we have recounted above:

‘In the first stage of the battle very nearly twice as many German Divisions attacked Gough as fell upon Byng. Each of Gough’s Divisions had on the average to hold nearly fifty per cent. more front than had Byng, while the Third Army reserves were nearly twice as strong as those of the Fifth, yet at the end of the first day’s battle Gough’s left, where the gallant 9th Division beat off all attacks, had given less ground than some of Byng’s Divisions further north had been compelled to yield.’[105]

Pending the appearance of an official history of the war, no narrative of March 21st can be otherwise than inadequate, which holds the scales less evenly between the two Armies primarily engaged than this temperate statement by Sir Frederick Maurice.

Even so, we have omitted the fog, which, after five hours’ incessant bombardment (from 5 to 10 o’clock in the morning), had been drawn up from the soil in a white, impenetrable blanket, and which, in Sir Douglas Haig’s words, ‘hid from our artillery and machine gunners the S.O.S. signals sent up by our outpost line,’ and ‘made it impossible to see more than fifty yards in any direction.’ This efficient aid to the attackers, which had often been simulated in battle by artificial means with smaller success, affected the defence all along the line; and the only answer to the fog, we are told, was to strengthen the Infantry in the trenches, involving, if it were to be done, a fresh weakening of our too weak reserves.

But we are not writing the history of the Second Battle of the Somme. On March 21st, as we have said, General Braithwaite’s troops were not engaged in that long line from Oppy to La Fère, on which, as we read above, ‘ground could be given up under great pressure without serious consequences.’ The pressure proved greater than had been anticipated, and the measure of the ground given up increased the seriousness of the consequences.

On the 21st, those fifty-four miles were held from north to south by the following Divisions in order of line: 56th, 4th, 15th, 3rd, 34th, 59th, 6th, 51st, 17th, 63rd, 47th, 9th, 21st, 16th, 66th, 24th, 61st, 30th, 36th, 14th, 18th, 58th. The Guards Division was at Arras, and from various points in the Reserve-area, again working southwards from above the Scarpe, the 31st, 40th, 41st (west of Albert), 25th (at Bapaume), 19th, 2nd, 39th, 50th, 20th, and the 1st, 3rd and 2nd Cavalry Divisions (at Péronne, Athies and Guiscard respectively) were brought up and thrown into the line. The first battle-honours belong to these, and no sketch, however imperfect, of the conditions under which they were won, can miss the splendour of their winning, or the valour of the living and the dead.

We pass over the next few days. Their story is written on the map in four days’ battle positions (March 23rd to 26th), all of which were swiftly obliterated in the further retreat and the last advance. What can never be obliterated, however, so long as gallant deeds are traced on the map of human character, is the memory of those British Divisions, outnumbered, befogged, giving ground, but retaining, with their backs to the wall, the heroic quality of victors. We merely note that, on March 26th, at a conference held at Doullens between the French and British Army Commanders, Lord Milner (representing the British Government), M. Poincaré (President of the French Republic), M. Clemenceau (Prime Minister) and the French Minister of Munitions, it was decided, in view of the imminent danger of the capture of Amiens, ‘to place the supreme control of the operations of the French and British forces in France and Belgium in the hands of General Foch, who accordingly assumed control.’[106]

On March 23rd, the wave of withdrawal reached the 62nd Division. The 187th Brigade was moved to Arras, where it was placed at the disposal of the 15th Division, but this order was cancelled almost at once, under the stress of immediate circumstances, and the whole Division was allotted to the XVIIth Corps. On the night of March 24th/25th new orders were received to join the IVth Corps, and early in the morning of the 25th the three Infantry Brigades of the Division were moved to Ayette.

It proved a long day’s work, and the beginning of an exacting time. We are back again now in the old, shell-ridden quadrilateral: Doullens-Arras (north), Doullens-Albert (west), Albert-Bapaume (south), Arras-Bapaume (east). Bucquoy, to which the Division was to move at once, lies just to the east of the centre of the diagonal Arras-Albert, and the south-west road from Bucquoy to Albert passes through Thiepval and Auchy, where the 49th Division from the West Riding suffered so severely in 1916. We remember how, a little more than a year ago, in January, 1917, when the 62nd had just arrived in France, some Officers of the 2/5th Duke of Wellington’s made ‘a tour of the trenches in an old London General omnibus. The party visited Acheux and Warlencourt, and then drove along the Doullens-Arras road, which was closed to traffic at one point owing to shelling.’[107] The problem then was to push the Germans back, back between Arras and Bapaume, always nearer to Douai and Cambrai. A year’s hard battles had been fought, and now, in March, 1918, Bapaume had fallen, Albert was to fall (March 26th-27th), and the problem was to prevent the enemy’s ‘double hope of separating the French and British Armies and interfering with the detraining arrangements of our Allies by the capture of Montdidier.’[108] In this effort the now veteran 62nd was to bear a conspicuous part.

CHAPTER XII
WITH THE 62nd AT BUCQUOY

General Braithwaite, then Commanding the 62nd, has said to the present writer that he regards the action at Bucquoy as, perhaps, the finest achievement of his Division. They were hurried to Ayette as early as March 25th, and there, as stated, the Staff Officer who had been sent on to IVth Corps Headquarters brought Orders for the Division to proceed at once to Bucquoy. Divisional Headquarters reached it at about 8-30 in the morning, and the General went forward to the Headquarters of the 40th and 42nd Divisions, just West of Bucquoy, in order to learn the tactical situation. (The 40th had been in reserve on March 21st till it was pushed into the line near Bullecourt; the 42nd had arrived since that date). The leading Troops of the 185th Brigade began to reach Bucquoy about 10 o’clock, but the roads were so much blocked with transport of all kinds that concentration was not completed till 11-30. Meanwhile, Corps Orders had been received for the men to have a meal and to get rested, and for the Division, which had been up all night and had already marched twelve miles, to hold itself in readiness for a move at short notice. The General also paid a visit to the Headquarters of the 41st Division (in reserve at Albert on March 21st, and also pushed into the line), now likewise stationed at Bucquoy, and shortly afterwards Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper, Commanding the IVth Corps, arrived.

The situation, as it revealed itself, was simple and serious. Briefly, with or without Albert, which fell on the night of March 26th, the urgent, essential task was to stabilize a line. The Germans had thrust, and thrust again, here, there, wherever they found an opening. They had driven us back in five days (March 21st to 25th), on the front of the Third Army, right up to the line of the old trenches at Achiet-le-Grand, Miraumont, Pozières. More ground might still be yielded ‘under great pressure,’ but the vital danger lay further south, where, still to the north of the River Somme, at the junction of the Third and Fifth Armies, withdrawals on the night of the 26th were to reach a line from Albert to Sailly-le-Sec. What this meant to the French forces nearer Paris, to the important centre at Montdidier, and to the railway from Amiens to the capital, was coming very insistently into view; and the severe strain on the 62nd Division, among other gallant Divisions, on March 25th and following days, was due above all to the necessity of arresting the advance about the Ancre, and of preventing the German hope of breaking through the receding British line. Once broken, it could never have been mended, and our real triumph in defeat was our disappointment of Ludendorff’s design of cutting off one force from another. The line went back, irregularly, unsteadily. Perilous salients were bulged out, to be straightened by retirements on the wings. Troops were pushed from place to place, or assembled by spontaneous conglomeration, to stop a dangerous gap. Different units became hopelessly mixed, and sorted themselves out into novel formations. Platoons, Companies, even Battalions improvised barriers of their own dead. But still Ludendorff was disappointed. Still his weary men, flung in desperation, however magnificently led, spent their last ounce of strength in vain. Still, in retreat after retreat, touch was maintained between Brigades, between Divisions. Still fighting the enemy to a standstill, dog-tired, attenuated, unconquerable—still a line held.

It was to a patch of that line, covering, roughly, the centre region in the Doullens-Albert-Bapaume-Arras quadrangle, to which we have frequently referred, that the attention of Major-General Braithwaite was directed by the IVth Corps Commander at their anxious conference in Bucquoy about noon on March 25th.

The 186th Brigade was now arriving at Bucquoy, and the two Brigadier-Generals (185th and 186th) were ordered, as soon as they would be ready, to move to Achiet-le-Petit, and to cover that village, the 186th on the right and the 185th on the left. The object of this move was to prolong the front of the 62nd Division (at Logeast Wood, due East of Bucquoy, and midway between Ablainzevelle and Achiet-le-Grand), so as to enable other Divisions which had been heavily engaged, to withdraw and re-organize. The Brigades reached their positions between 4 and 5 o’clock in the afternoon, with two Battalions each in line and one in reserve, and with one Company of the Machine-Gun Battalion attached to each Brigade. It is to be observed that these were the first operations, since the Machine-Gun re-organization, in which that Battalion had taken part, and, in ideal country for that weapon, and with the improved moral of the Companies under new conditions, the results fully justified the change. During the early evening of March 25th, the various Divisions affected (19th, 25th, 41st, 51st) gradually withdrew behind the line held now by the 62nd with the 42nd, and at 7 o’clock Major-General Walter Braithwaite, Commanding the 62nd Division, took over Command of the front, with Headquarters at Bucquoy, and the Headquarters of the gallant 41st were removed to Souastre in the rear. At 9-30, General Braithwaite’s Headquarters withdrew to Gommecourt, to which a line had been run during the afternoon, but, owing to the heavy traffic on the roads, the move was not completed till 11 p.m. About that hour, the Corps Commander sent a telephone message to say that it would be necessary to withdraw not later than next morning to the line Puisieux-Bucquoy-Ablainzevelle, and to ask the Divisional Commander if he preferred to make the move sooner, while still under cover of darkness. We should note that a trench East of Bucquoy had been dug during the afternoon by the Pioneer Battalion of the 62nd (9th Durham Light Infantry), in order to cover that place in the event of our Troops being driven in, and that about 8 p.m. the 187th Brigade was ordered to concentrate on Bucquoy in Divisional Reserve, and to move forward a Battalion into the new trench. Meanwhile, the Divisional Artillery had arrived, and went into action, covering the withdrawal, during the night of the 25th.

General Braithwaite decided to take advantage of the darkness, but, though a Staff Officer was sent back at once to communicate his decision to the Brigadiers, the Order did not reach them till after 2 o’clock next morning (March 26th), so heavy was the congestion in the roads; and the actual start was made in early daylight. In the night, the 186th Brigade was subjected to enemy fire, and some changes in the dispositions had to be made, but the successful withdrawal of the Division was completed about 8 a.m., when the 185th Brigade took up a position on the high ground East of Bucquoy. The 186th were in touch with them, and extended to a point about five hundred yards North-east of Puisieux, with two Battalions in the front line, and the third and Pioneer Battalions in support. The 187th were in Divisional Reserve in the neighbourhood of Biez Wood, with two Battalions East of the Wood, and the third in the trenches South and South-west.

This was on March 26th, and another heavy and difficult day ensued. The Germans were advancing all the time in a westerly direction, which developed during the day into a determined north-westerly attack from the neighbourhood of Puisieux and Serre against the right flank of the 186th Brigade. Two Battalions of that Brigade (5th Duke of Wellington’s and Pioneers) were accordingly withdrawn a short distance, so as to face more directly to the South, with their right resting on Rossignol Wood (between Bucquoy and Hébuterne), so as to cover the exits from Puisieux. Three Companies of the 2/4th Duke of Wellington’s (in Reserve) were moved forward to prolong this line, and a Battalion of the 187th Brigade (Reserve) was further used to extend their flank on the high ground West of Rossignol Wood. This occurred in the late afternoon, when five heavy attacks by the Prussian Guard on Bucquoy, and between Bucquoy and Puisieux, had been repulsed; and the causes why the German advance in this area had shifted slightly to the North (roughly, in the direction Serre to Hébuterne) were, briefly, two: (1) To the South of Puisieux and Hébuterne, early on March 26th, there was a gap in the line of three or four miles between the 62nd and 12th Divisions. About a thousand men from various units of the 19th Division were holding the defences round Hébuterne, and it was known that the New Zealand Division was well on its way to fill the gap. Their leading Brigade, however, could not arrive till the late afternoon, and it was actually about 10 p.m. before it filled the southern half of the gap, with its left resting on Colincamps. Meanwhile, about 7 p.m., the 4th Brigade of the Australian Division, which had been put at General Braithwaite’s disposal, relieved the elements of the 19th in the defence of Hébuterne, and got in touch during the night of the 26th and early morning of the 27th with the second Brigade of the New Zealanders, to the South of the village. This gap, then, and the delay in filling it, were one main cause of the concentration on the West of Bucquoy. The second (2) was subsidiary, and arose from the fact that, during the morning of March 26th, constant reports were received of mounted enemy troops seen in Hébuterne and even to the West of it. Possibly, isolated patrols had reached the edge of the village, but, as the result of these rumours, ‘unauthorized orders were issued by persons totally unknown, in a more or less excited state,’ to clear all transport westwards, and some valuable hours were lost in collecting and bringing back those units.

THE CHURCH, BUCQUOY.

This bare account of one day’s fighting leaves much to the imagination. But an hour by hour recital of the deeds of unit by unit in the Division would make too much of a day’s work, which was only the beginning of a hard battle. We must not lose the perspective in a contemplation of detail, and this perspective is admirably rendered in the few lines devoted by Sir A. Conan Doyle to the 62nd Division on March 6th. ‘South of Puisieux,’ he writes, ‘there was a gap of four or five miles [the Divisional Commander says ‘three or four’] before one came to British troops. Into this gap in the very nick of time came first the 4th Brigade of the Second Australian Division, and later the New Zealand Division in driblets, which gradually spanned the vacant space. It was a very close call for a break through without opposition. Being disappointed in this, the Germans on March 26th spent the whole afternoon in fierce attacks on the 62nd Division, but got little but hard knocks from Braithwaite’s Yorkshiremen,’ who, we remember, had been on the move since early morning the day before. ‘The 186th Brigade on the right,’ it is added, ‘threw back a flank to Rossignol Wood to cover the weak side.’[109] We shall not further expand it.

Next day, March 27th, after a comparatively quiet night, the attacks on Bucquoy were resumed on the front held by the 185th and the left of the 186th Brigade. Our Lewis guns took ample toll of the advancing enemy lines, and the assault failed with heavy loss. Shortly after noon another attack was begun to the East of Rossignol Wood, where the 5th Duke of Wellington’s, who had suffered so severely the day before, were primarily engaged on their right. Their Lewis guns and rifles proved effective in the open, but the bombers swarming the old trenches which existed in that part of the line were less easy to repulse: the German was a skilful thrower, and it happened at that time and in that locality that rifle bombs and Stokes Mortars were very difficult to procure. Despite extraordinary courage and untiring effort and resourcefulness, bombing parties continued to work their way up the intricate systems of old trenches; and, though two determined attacks between Rossignol Wood and Hébuterne (between 1 o’clock and 2-30) and two others on Bucquoy (at 4 o’clock and again at 5-30) were severally defeated, the 2/4th Battalion of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry were driven to the high ground East of Hébuterne and a Company of the 2/4th York and Lancasters were driven out of the Wood. The North-westerly move of the enemy, which we noted as his direction the day before, seemed, accordingly, more critical, since a gap had been made between the right of the 186th Brigade and the Australians in Hébuterne. To meet this crisis, the trenches East of Gommecourt, lying further to the North-west, were manned by two Companies of Australians, and the 187th Brigade was ordered immediately to counter-attack. There was some delay in getting this order through to the two left Battalions of the Brigade (the 2/4th York and Lancasters and the 5th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry), but about 7 in the evening, after the 4th Australian Brigade had been ordered urgently to co-operate, using, if necessary, the whole of their Reserve Battalion, the Brigadier-General Commanding the 186th got into personal touch with Lieut.-Colonel O. C. S. Watson, D.S.O., Commanding the 5th K.O.Y.L.I. (187th Brigade), and ordered him to counter-attack Rossignol Wood, with the help of four Tanks, which the Brigadier was able to put at his disposal. This counter-attack succeeded, and at 11 p.m. the Officer Commanding the Battalion reported that he had regained part of the Wood and the high ground to the South-west of it. He had gained great glory at the same time, as is shown by the following extract from the London Gazette, May 8th, 1918:

‘Victoria Cross

‘Major (A/Lt.-Col.) Oliver Cyril Spencer Watson, D.S.O. (R. of O.), late King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

‘For most conspicuous bravery, self-sacrificing devotion to duty, and exceptionally gallant leading during a critical period of operations. His command was at a point where continual attacks were made by the enemy in order to pierce the line, and an intricate system of old trenches in front, coupled with the fact that his position was under constant rifle and machine-gun fire rendered the situation still more dangerous. A counter-attack had been made against the enemy position, which at first achieved its object, but as they were holding out in two improvised strong points, Lieut.-Colonel Watson saw that immediate action was necessary, and he led his remaining small reserve to the attack, organizing bombing parties and leading attacks under intense rifle and machine-gun fire. Outnumbered he finally ordered his men to retire, remaining himself in a communication trench to cover the retirement, though he faced almost certain death by so doing. The assault he led was at a critical moment, and without doubt saved the line. Both in the assault and in covering his men’s retirement he held his life as nothing, and his splendid bravery inspired all troops in the vicinity to rise to the occasion and save a breach being made in a hardly tried and attenuated line.

‘Lt.-Colonel Watson was killed while covering the withdrawal.’

We have only to add to this record of the 27th, that the 185th Brigade should have been relieved on that day, but the operations round Rossignol Wood and the loss of Ayette (by the 31st Division on the left of the 42nd) postponed the relief for twenty-four hours.

The night passed quickly and fairly quietly. On March 28th, there was an early bombardment of the whole Divisional front and of the back area over the Woods (Biez and Rossignol), and an intercepted advance on Bucquoy, which was subjected to heavy shelling all that day. Splendid work was done in that morning battle (10 a.m. till noon) by the 186th Brigade under Brig.-General J. L. G. Burnett, a very worthy successor to Bradford, whose services we commemorated above. One Platoon of the 5th Duke of Wellington’s, which occupied an advanced post, became isolated from the rest. When last heard of at about 1 o’clock, it was known to be still holding out, but no particulars of its experiences are available. The heroic record remains, to the imperishable honour of Yorkshiremen, that, when the position was finally reached, this Platoon had been overwhelmed, and not a man was left alive.

More serious than attacks in the open, which were sometimes stopped, and which, if they developed, were repulsed, were those bombing-parties working their way up the trenches, who had done so much damage the day before. They were very active again on the 28th, and sometime between noon and 2 o’clock they contrived to drive back from the ridge East of Hébuterne and from Rossignol Wood the 5th Battalion of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, who had made so gallant a sacrifice to hold that position overnight. Rossignol Wood was not recovered on that day. Two Tanks were derelict in the Wood, and formed effective cover for the enemy, and there was a partial failure, too, in an attempt by the 124th Brigade (41st Division). At 7 o’clock, fresh orders for the re-capture were given to the 8th West Yorkshires (in reserve to the 185th Brigade), who were placed at the disposal of the 187th, and at the same time the 4th Australian Brigade was to drive the enemy out of the trenches South-east of Gommecourt. This bombing encounter proved successful in releasing five hundred yards of trenches, and by early morning of March 29th the West Yorkshires had reached the Northern end of the contested Wood. There they were held up by heavy machine-gun fire, but the twofold counter-measures had eased the situation, and the gap between the 186th and the Australian Brigades was satisfactorily filled. The postponed relief of the 185th by the 42nd Division was duly completed during that night.

Next morning (March 29th), progress was made with the urgent work of re-organizing the 187th Brigade. It had performed magnificent service in exceptionally difficult circumstances, which included the absence through illness of its Brigadier-General. Lt.-Col. Barton, D.S.O., who had been temporarily in Command, had also fallen ill, and was replaced on March 28th by Lt.-Col. C. K. James, D.S.O., the Officer Commanding the 2/7th West Yorkshires. The Brigade had been almost continuously in action since its hurried departure from Ayette in the early hours of March 25th, and the V.C. awarded posthumously to the Commanding Officer of the 5th K.O.Y.L.I. is an indication of the splendid resistance which it offered time after time to the enemy assaults on its front. The Brigade was now located in the trenches North and West of Rossignol Wood, in touch with the 186th on its right and with the 41st Division on its left. One Battalion of the 185th was moved up in close support during the afternoon. Bombing fights between the Australians and their assailants about Gommecourt and Hébuterne were the chief incidents of the day which proved the growing exhaustion of the enemy. March 30th and 31st were spent, too, in comparative quiet: an important document captured by the Australians showed how heavily the Germans had suffered. But the 62nd had suffered too. We referred above to Colonel Watson. Two other Commanding Officers, who fell at the head of their respective Regiments, may also be mentioned here, as splendid types of fighting Officers, first beloved and then mourned by their men. These were Lieut.-Colonels A. H. and C. K. James, of the 7th and 8th West Yorkshires, known, of course, as James the Seventh and James the Eighth, who, though not related to each other, were firm comrades in life and death. On the night of March 31st-April 1st, a Brigade of the 37th Division relieved the 186th, which withdrew to Souastre and Henu, and next night the remainder of the 62nd Division (less Artillery) was relieved by the 37th, and moved back into the Reserve area.

It will be admitted that they had earned their relief. The Field Marshal’s summary runs, under date March 27th: ‘A series of strong attacks commenced all along our front from about Bucquoy to the neighbourhood of Hamelincourt, in the course of which the enemy gained possession of Ablainzevelle and Ayette’ (which was re-taken by the 32nd Division on April 3rd). ‘Elsewhere,’ it continues, ‘all his assaults were heavily repulsed by troops of the 62nd Division, under Command of Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and of the 42nd and Guards Divisions.’[110] And, under date March 28th: ‘The 42nd Division drove off two attacks from the direction of Ablainzevelle and the 62nd Division with an attached Brigade of the 4th Australian Division also beat off a succession of heavy attacks about Bucquoy with great loss to the enemy.’[111] We have filled in some details in this outline, which is sufficiently effective in its statement of duty done and of local successes achieved. If we go behind it at all, it is rather to point to some lessons that were learned than to gild the laurels of renown which the Division earned during those fiery days.

BUCQUOY: STREET.

BUCQUOY: MARKET PLACE.

We have already mentioned the work of the newly-organized Machine-Gun Battalion, and the comparative lack of Rifle bombs and Stokes Mortars. Another fact worth noting is the renewed confidence reposed in the Rifle and the Lewis Gun. In the face of effective fire from these weapons the enemy never succeeded in pushing home an attack across the open. Communication between the Division and Brigades was maintained with very little interruption, and the two Brigade Headquarters being kept together enabled the admirable Signal Service to devote all their attention to one main route. Under these novel conditions of open warfare, it was found that special training was required for the Power Buzzer operations of Brigade Sections, and in other technical details the experience at Bucquoy was to prove valuable.

Most valuable of all was the knowledge that, with nearly all the chances against them, they had fought the enemy to a standstill. Despite a perilous gap in the thinned line of British troops, and despite the delays in filling it, the enemy had not broken through. The line was threatened on March 25th. It was constantly, almost continuously, assailed from the East, and, where disclosed, from the South. It still held on March 31st. Mistakes unavoidable in the medley were heroically repaired. Odd pockets of men, as we have seen—a thousand from the 19th Division behind Hébuterne, another thousand from the 41st about Gommecourt—showed incomparable resourcefulness. Sudden orders were given in emergency, and were carried out unerringly under darkness. Troops confidently expected in the afternoon arrived short of their destination after nightfall, and the intervals of time and place were filled up. The whole story of these days is a lesson in how not to yield, and the whole moral of it is contained in the fact that the end of the first phase of the Second Battle of the Somme was, at best, an incomplete German victory. They had not achieved what they had hoped, and, losing hope, they would lose all.

So, Bucquoy is a name that shines in the war record of the 62nd Division. We leave them now, at the beginning of April, in Divisional Reserve, with their Headquarters at Pas, enjoying a well-earned respite from active operations, though under two hours’ notice to move: and we turn next to another part of the wide field, where the 49th Division, the First Line of the West Riding Territorials, bore its separate part in the grand defensive.

CHAPTER XIII
WITH THE 49th IN THE VALLEY OF THE LYS

I.—FIRST PHASE

We reach a confused tract of warfare, punctuated, as ever, by noble deeds, through which we must strike a careful trail.

In an Order, issued by Major-General Cameron, Commanding the 49th Division, and reviewing the period from April 10th to May 5th, 1918, upon which we are now to enter, the General drew attention to the fact that his Division had not been fighting as a whole. ‘In some ways it is sad,’ he wrote; ‘but the fact that we have been separated for a great part of the time has in no way diminished the credit of your achievements. Every part of the Division in its own sphere of action has done exceptionally well, and every part has earned high praise from Commanders outside the Division.’

Partly, then, the confusion arises from the distribution of the Troops to outside Commands. But the mere fact of this distribution is itself evidence to the difficulty of responsible leadership in those days; and, before we attempt to draw a table of the activities of the Division in place and time during the period covered by that Order, a brief survey may be made from a more general point of view. ‘Every part earned high praise from Commanders outside the Division’: we are concerned, then, with outside Commands and with a wider outlook than the 49th Division’s.

We are concerned with Ludendorff’s point of view, so far as we are at liberty to re-construct it. On a previous page we tried to show how the German mind in March was divided between two strategic plans, one of which pointed to Paris and the other to the Channel ports. Both were pursued in turn, and even to some extent simultaneously, and either, if successful, would have inflicted an almost irreparable blow on the Allied forces of France and Britain. The point is, that neither quite succeeded: the union of those Forces under Foch and the response of the British Armies to Haig’s summons on April 13th, ‘With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each of us must fight to the end,’ were to prove incalculably more effective than all the odds combined against them. But the initiative in April was with the Germans. So soon as one plan miscarried, or was left standing, or was conveniently broken off, they were able to call the other plan, and to make a new push with fresh Troops. The initiative was theirs, and the superiority was theirs, in numbers and (by the offensive) in surprise. ‘The possibility of a German attack North of the La Bassée Canal had been brought to my notice,’ wrote Sir Douglas Haig, ‘prior to the 21st March. Indications that preparations for a hostile attack in this sector were nearing completion had been observed in the first days of April.’[112] But no observations, however accurate, and no prevision, however acute, could organize fifty-eight Divisions to fight battles in two sectors at one time. Forty of the fifty-eight Divisions had been engaged in the Second Battle of the Somme, and ‘the steps which I could take,’ he continued, ‘to meet a danger which I could foresee were limited by the fact that, though the enemy’s progress on the Somme had for the time being been stayed, ... [he] was in a position to take immediate advantage of any weakening of my forces in that area.’[113] And to initiative, numbers and surprise was added the fortune of the weather. The early spring had been ‘unseasonably fine,’ and the low-lying ground in the Lys Valley dried up in time for the Germans to anticipate a relief of the Portuguese, who were holding the front to the South of Armentières, and who had been in the line for several months. A shattering German assault fell suddenly (April 9th) on this thin-spread Portuguese Division, already overdue for relief; and ‘no blame,’ we instinctively know, ‘can be attached to inexperienced troops who gave way to so terrific a blow, which would have been formidable to any soldiers in the world.’[114]

Such, then, in the broadest outline, was the strategic situation, when Ludendorff, leading the Kaiser-schlacht, which had opened on March 21st, left the fate of Amiens hanging in the precarious balance to which it had been fought in ten days, and sought to add terror to exhaustion by renewing his thrust at the Channel ports.

When this underlying principle is seized, and Sir Douglas Haig’s problem is imagined, what ensued may briefly be recounted to the date of the engagement of units of the 49th. We are not now to consider the biggest aspect: the point of view of the War Council at Versailles. The facts that Americans were coming, and that British reinforcements would be poured in, did not illumine the darkness in Flanders in the middle of the second week of April. Nor is it immediately to the point, that, when Sir Frederick Maurice saw Marshal Foch on April 16th, and the Germans seemed ‘well on the road to Calais and Boulogne, ... Foch had himself measured accurately both the German strength and the endurance of the British Army.... “The battle in Flanders is practically over,” he said; “Haig will not need any more troops from me.” Not even the loss of Kemmel a few days later ruffled him. He was right, and the battle in Flanders ended in a complete repulse of the second German effort to break through.’[115] No. We should thank heaven, fasting, for the Marshal’s masterly imperturbability. It won the war, among many claimants for that boon. But the great leader himself would admit, that his estimate of ‘the endurance of the British Army’ had been calculated to the last ounce of its worn strength, and that ‘the loss of Kemmel a few days later’ (on April 25th, to be precise) imposed a well-nigh intolerable strain.

We are to contract our horizon on those days: to forget, what were then invisible, the dots and spots on the Atlantic, which marked the precious troopships bringing help from the New World to the Old; to forget the set will of Paris, raided from the air by night and day, and nearly within gunshot as well; to forget the last effort of England, and how, in a room at the War Office, all was ready to call out the Volunteers, the final arm of Home Defence; and we are to try to piece together events in Flanders from early morning on April 9th, when the brave Portuguese were overrun, till the confidence of the French Marshal was justified at the end of the battle on May 8th. Throughout that month, we are to remember the superb generalship of Sir Douglas Haig, splendidly backed as he was by Generals Sir H. Horne, Commanding the First, and Sir Herbert Plumer, Commanding the Second Army. Through all ranks of the heroic forces which they commanded, whether tired veterans from the hills and valleys of the Somme, or new drafts of young soldiery from home, and in all arms of the Service, one spirit prevailed: to obey, at whatever personal cost, the supreme call of their Commander-in-Chief, which was issued on the fourth day of the Flanders battle, and the pith of which we quoted above. The enemy’s objects, they were told, ‘are to separate us from the French, to take the Channel ports, and destroy the British Army.’ He had, as yet, ‘made little progress towards his goals.’ Time, they were reminded, was on their side, not necessarily as individuals but as Englishmen: ‘Victory will belong to the side which holds out the longest.’ And then followed the stern command: ‘There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment.’

So we come to the 49th Division, which has been in the Ypres area all that year, performing necessary and at times exacting duties on a front which was never immune from Artillery attacks and sudden raids, and to its response, through its various units, to the call to stand fast and die.

Ypres 49th. Divisional Headqrs. in the Ramparts:—Winter, 1917-18.

The German advance on April 9th between Armentières and the La Bassée Canal had bulged in the line by that evening to a distance of three to five miles. Next day, the attack was extended North of Armentières to Wytschaete and Hollebeke, and the enemy gains were extended. The 34th Division in Armentières, though not yet attacked on their own front, had their two flanks dangerously exposed, and were withdrawn in a North-westerly direction, reaching a stopping-place at Nieppe. If we follow this action a little further, we shall be able to fit in more intelligibly the narrative of the 49th Division. On April 11th the advance was pressed in the direction of Nieppe and Neuve Église, and in the afternoon there was fierce fighting about Messines, now in enemy occupation. These losses pinched the 34th out of their temporary foothold at Nieppe. The withdrawal on this day did not cease in that particular area till about a thousand yards East of Neuve Église and Wulverghem, involving the abandonment of Hill 63. Next day, an assault in great strength was launched due westwards between Merville and Steenwerk, and affected our line below Bailleul, which looks down through Nieppe to Armentières. On the same day and the following (the 13th) Neuve Église was hotly involved, and fell before midnight on the 14th. Another twenty-four hours and Bailleul had suffered the same fate. There was now a very perilous salient in this stricken northerly region, and on the night of April 15th/16th the decision was taken to withdraw from the Passchendaele Ridge, the scene of so much bloodshed in the previous summer; and, consequently, to close in nearer to Ypres. These retirements, as may be seen on a map, brought the Kemmel sector into prominence, and the German capture on April 16th of Meteren and Wytschaete, at the two extremes of that front, was developed next morning (17th) into a determined attack on Kemmel Hill.

Recalling now from [page 46] above, and from an earlier April 17th, the geographical significance of Ypres, noting that this significance was not diminished by the improvement in German heavy Artillery, as shown by the guns trained on Paris, and observing that a sentimental value had accrued to Ypres in those middle years almost bigger than its geographical significance, we are now better qualified to measure the anxiety of the British Command during the crucial week, April 9th to 16th, 1918. Would Ypres fall? Would the Channel ports follow, with all their accumulated stores, and G.H.Q. be driven to the sea? Could the hard-pressed Troops of the Second Army hold out to perform their allotted task, since ‘the constant and severe fighting in the Lys battle front, following so closely on the tremendous struggle South of Arras, had placed a very serious strain upon the British forces’? ‘Many British divisions,’ continued their Commander, ‘had taken part in the northern and southern battles, while others had been engaged almost continuously from the outset of the German offensive.’[116] We know the answer to these questions. It is time now to see in one area how those answers were dictated.

Take, first, in the 49th Division, the 147th Infantry Brigade, which moved on the night of April 9th/10th to join the 34th near Armentières with the following Group Details: ‘A’ Company of the Machine Gun Corps, a Light Trench Mortar Battery, a Field Company (57) Royal Engineers, a Field Ambulance (1/2nd West Riding), and No. 3 Company, 49th Divisional Train. On April 10th, the 1/4th Duke of Wellington’s were engaged at Erquinghem, covering a crossing of the Lys. That night, the Brigade was defending Nieppe, in support of the 34th Division in its withdrawal from Armentières. On the night of the 11th/12th, they carried out a skilful rearguard action, covering a further withdrawal. From the 12th to 14th, they maintained their position, despite repeated attacks, in the southern outskirts of Bailleul. A few hours’ rest, and on the evening of the 15th the Brigade was again in the front line, in consequence of Bailleul’s fall. On April 16th and 17th, they were successfully holding their own on the slopes to the North-west of Bailleul, and taking heavy toll of the enemy. ‘In this action,’ we read, ‘all units of the Brigade Group greatly distinguished themselves.’ On the 19th, they moved into the 34th Divisional Reserve, and two days later they rejoined their own Division in and around Poperinghe. Thus, this Group is inserted into the fighting which we summarized just now; and, before taking the other Groups in order, or expanding the narrative of this, we may fitly interpolate the praises which it won from Major-General C. L. Nicholson, Commanding the 34th Division:

‘The G.O.C. 34th Division wishes to place on record his great appreciation of the services rendered by the 147th Infantry Brigade during the period it has been attached to the Division under his Command. The action of the 4th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s, South of the Lys on 10th April, the skilful rearguard fighting under cover of which the Division withdrew from the Nieppe position, the stubborn defence of the right of the Division at Steam Hill (South of Bailleul), and the complete defeat of a whole German Regiment on the 16th April, are exploits of which the Brigade may well be proud.

‘Throughout the period, the steadiness, gallantry and endurance of all ranks has been worthy of the highest traditions of British Infantry, and the G.O.C. 34th Division is proud to have had such Troops under his Command.’

Or these praises bestowed on a gallant Regiment may be tested by the record of one man: No. 24066, Pte. Arthur Poulter, of the 1/4th Battalion, Duke of Wellington’s (West Riding), who was awarded the Victoria Cross for his action on April 10th, commemorated in the following terms in the London Gazette of June 28th:

‘For most conspicuous bravery when acting as a stretcher-bearer. On ten occasions Pte. Poulter carried badly wounded men on his back to a safer locality, through a particularly heavy artillery and machine-gun barrage. Two of these were hit a second time whilst on his back. Again, after a withdrawal over the river had been ordered, Pte. Poulter returned in full view of the enemy who were advancing, and carried back another man who had been left behind wounded. He bandaged up over forty men under fire, and his conduct throughout the whole day was a magnificent example to all ranks. This very gallant soldier was subsequently seriously wounded when attempting another rescue in the face of the enemy.’

A Group, similarly constituted, of the 148th Infantry Brigade was sent on April 10th to Neuve Église, which was plainly threatened on that day, under orders to move at half an hour’s notice. The same night, its 1/5th York and Lancasters became attached to the 74th Brigade (25th Division) where it was drawn into the fighting near Steenwerk, to the South of Nieppe, and rendered valuable service, remaining in attachment until April 16th. Next day (11th), in the morning, the 1/4th Battalion of the same Regiment was detailed to counter-attack on a line West of Ploegsteert Wood, where the rest of the 25th Division was engaged. Hill 63 is situated immediately North of the North-west corner of that Wood, and Neuve Église lies about two miles to its North-west. We shall have to come back to the gallant record of this unit, and of the 1/4th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and of others in the Group, during the struggle for Neuve Église, which lasted till the night of April 14th/15th. It is a record of desperate valour against overwhelming odds; and, when, weary but undaunted, the Brigade was withdrawn to Poperinghe on April 19th, it had thoroughly earned the encomium of Major-General Sir E. G. T. Bainbridge, Commanding the 25th Division:

‘Will you thank the 148th Infantry Brigade for all they did in holding on to Neuve Église? It is, of course, greatly due to them that the place was held as long as it was.’

Similar praises were bestowed by the Brigadier-General Commanding the 74th Brigade (25th Division) on the Battalion of the 148th Brigade, which had been under his orders. He placed on record,

‘his great appreciation of the services rendered by the 5th Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment during the time it was attached to the Brigade under his Command. The gallantry and endurance of all ranks throughout the operations are worthy of the highest traditions of the British Army, and it was a pleasure to the B.G.C. to have such Troops under his Command. He was much impressed by the dashing manner in which the Battalion carried out the attack on Cabaret du Saule on 11th April, and by its stubborn resistance on 14th April on Mont de Lille.’

We come, last in this summary, to the 146th Infantry Brigade (49th Division).

On April 10th, it was in line in the Ypres salient, under the orders of the 21st Division.

Next day, very early in the morning, its 1/7th Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, became attached to the 62nd Infantry Brigade, which had been detached from the 21st Division and placed under the orders of the 9th (Scottish) Division, commanded by Major-General G. H. Tudor. That Division (the 9th), we may note, in anticipatory compensation for its terrible losses in this area in April, was to have the honour on July 19th of capturing Meteren with great éclat. This reversal of misfortune lay in the future. To-day the situation was very grave, and the part played by the 1/7th West Yorkshires, in attachment to the attached Brigade, may best be told, in advance of the more detailed narrative, in the Report of the Brigadier-General Commanding the 62nd Brigade, which was transmitted by General Tudor to General Cameron (49th Division). It was dated April 20th and ran as follows:—

‘I should like also to draw attention to the very gallant behaviour of the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment, of the 146th Infantry Brigade.

‘On the critical afternoon of the 11th April, when the Brigade holding the Messines Sector was driven back, leaving my right flank perilously exposed, the 1/7th West Yorkshire Regiment was moved up at very short notice from Parret Camp to form a defensive flank on the Bogaert Farm-Pick Wood Spor, and to fill the gap on our right.

‘Under very heavy shelling the Battalion moved forward splendidly, and their steadiness undoubtedly saved the situation. From that evening until the morning of the 16th the Battalion held the right sub-sector of the Brigade front from Bogaert Farm to Pick Wood; on the night of the 15/16th they handed over from Bogaert Farm to Scott Farm to the 1st Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment, and took over to Spanrock-Molen inclusive. On an extended front they encountered the full force of the enemy attack on the morning of the 16th, and fought most gallantly until overwhelmed by superior numbers. As in the case of other Battalions the mist placed them at an enormous disadvantage, and deprived them of the full use of their fire power.’

Major-General Cameron, in communicating this message to the Brigadier of the 146th, added the expression of his ‘great hope, that you will find that you have sufficient old hands remaining to carry on the spirit which has animated the 146th Brigade, and infuse it into the new drafts which I hope to see joining you soon, in order that the name of the 146th Brigade may live for ever. Please let your Battalions know that I feel deeply proud of them.’

The Battalion had rejoined its own unit on April 18th. Its casualties between the 11th and 16th had been eleven Officers and four hundred and forty-two other ranks.

Noting that Parret Camp, referred to in the above message, lay a mile and a quarter to the North-west of Kemmel, and that the 1/7th West Yorkshires were supposed to be already tired out when they marched there in high fettle in the early hours of April 11th, we return on that date to the rest of the 146th Brigade. The Group units were established in the defences of Kemmel Hill, which, though not immediately in the front line, formed a position, as we are aware, of supreme prospective importance. The Command was entrusted to Lt.-Col. H. D. Bousfield, of the West Yorkshire Regiment, a supernumerary Lieutenant-Colonel at the time, who came under the orders of the 49th Division up to April 13th, of the 19th Division on that date, and, on April 19th, of the 28th French Infantry Division. To the final assault on the Hill under its French Commander we shall presently come back.

This outline-sketch of the activities of units of the 49th Division in their places in the Valley of the Lys may be supplemented with one or two details, before we pass to the second and worse phase of the battle in that area of fire.

Take, for instance, the struggle about Neuve Église, in which the 148th Brigade bore itself so gallantly, in the grim days, April 12th to 14th. A glance at the map will show that Neuve Église lies almost midway between Messines and Steenwerk, but (in a narrow area, of course) some way to the West of either. Thus, its capture, besides re-acting on the hard-pressed 34th Division below, would enable the Germans to round back on the 19th above, where Major-General G. D. Jeffreys would be caught in the rear. Accordingly, here, as much as anywhere (we should say ‘worse than elsewhere,’ but no comparison could be sustained), the command to hold out to the last man was imperative and binding. And right well this Brigade of the 49th supported the valorous efforts of various bodies of brave troops, including a mixed lot of a thousand, whom Brigadier-General Wyatt, formerly Commanding the 1/4th York and Lancs., had collected from anywhere to do everything. General Wyatt’s old Battalion and a sister-Battalion in the Brigade, the 1/4th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, had already done stiff service in the defence of Neuve Église, where, on April 13th, the assault broke out again with added fierceness. At 7 a.m. on that day, the enemy entered the village. At 8-30, counter-attacks were launched of their own initiative by all available units of the Brigade, and were pushed with courage and determination. In this action, Major Jackson, M.C. (of the 458th Field Company, Royal Engineers), Captain J. F. Wortley, M.C., and Lieut. Gifford, M.C., (both of the 1/4th York and Lancs.), were specially mentioned in the Brigadier’s message to the Battalion. A big bag of prisoners was made, and the village was cleared of Germans. We are told that, about this time (the afternoon of April 13th), the Troops were still cheerful and in good heart, but that the continuous strain and want of sleep were beginning to tell. Unfortunately, they told in vain. On the night of 13th/14th, the enemy came on again, and forced a way into the village. Captain Wortley was killed in an attempt to establish a line about the Church, though that line was subsequently held by small parties of the 4th York and Lancs. and of the 9th Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Highlanders). We read that ‘these plucky men refused to obey the order to withdraw, and were eventually cut off completely by the enemy, and there is little doubt that they died fighting to the last.’ To lose Neuve Église under such conditions was to win imperishable renown.

Or take a difficult little operation by two Companies of the 1/5th West Yorkshires (146th Brigade), which was not less difficult because it proved successful. On the night of April 15th/16th, a partial withdrawal, as we saw above, was made perforce in the Ypres salient. These two Companies, under the Command of Major Foxton, were left to hold posts in the Corps line across the Menin Road about three miles East of Ypres. They did their job very thoroughly. By moving dummy carrying parties about the tracks, and keeping six men in the front line, right away till broad noon on that day, and by other manœuvres, they deceived the enemy so completely that no approach to our old front line was attempted till 3-30 p.m.

Meteren: Ap: 1918:

Bailleul (Meteren Road) Ap. 1918.

We need not expand the account of the exploits of the 1/7th West Yorkshires during their hard days of service with the 62nd Brigade. We know by now that a situation could be ‘saved,’ in the expressive word endorsed by General Tudor, only by endurance of a kind corresponding to the call of the British Commander-in-Chief on the 13th. We prefer to conclude on a quieter note. These few, casual illustrations of a week’s fighting, as desperate as it was heroic, for the ultimate safety of the Channel ports, would convey a false impression if they painted no scene but ‘death or glory.’ It was hard going all the time, and the conditions told, as we have seen. But the grit of the Yorkshiremen was not unequal to the incessant demands. We read nearly always of a cheerful spirit, of a line which seemed ‘good’ by comparison with other lines which they had known worse, of refreshing snatches of rest, of the welcome arrival of the limbered wagons with rations, and similar incidents of the kind, which helped to ease what had to be endured. We read, too, in an Officer’s diary, such a characteristic entry as the following: ‘Next morning, there was light shelling, but about 1-30 p.m. the Boche started a heavy bombardment, and attacked at 3 o’clock from the South-west. This was his usual time-table all through these operations.’ (The italics are ours). And, again, a page or two later on: ‘The Boche programme continued: a heavy bombardment 1 p.m.—3 p.m.’ They had taken the measure of their Boche. It was all very frightful and terrible, and good men were falling every hour; but frightfulness ‘according to plan,’ as Macbeth discovered in his day, contains an antiseptic element, which is related to the sense of humour in the British soldier. If it is too much to say that this sense would always enhearten him, at least it stood him in good stead, and even inspired him with good hope, when Hollbeke, Messines, Ploegsteert, Neuve Église and Bailleul had been left behind the German front, and the salient round Ypres had been retracted, and the storm was about to burst on Kemmel Hill.

II.—SECOND PHASE

There were four or five more or less calm days in the sector North of the Lys. The battle-fury surged a little South on a front from Merville to Givenchy, extending along the La Bassée Canal, and it broke out afresh in the Somme Valley, on the slopes just East of Amiens, where the village of Villers Bretonneux changed hands twice in two days (April 24th, 25th), remaining the second time in British possession. The interval in the Northern area, though used for rest and re-organization, so far as circumstances allowed, was less an interval than a breathing-space, in which both sides were awaiting the call of ‘Time!’ A renewed attack was obviously impending. The enemy would want to exploit his gains, and to make that push for Ypres and Dunkirk, which had haunted his day-dreams for four years. The blow fell on April 25th, at about 5 o’clock in the morning, when a very violent bombardment along the whole line from Hollbeke to Bailleul announced the commencement of the second phase of the sanguinary Battle of the Lys.

If we look once more at the familiar map, we shall see the Allied line stretching from North-east to South-west. British troops were holding the line from a point on the Ypres-Commines Canal just above St. Eloi to a point about a mile below Wytschaete. The 21st Division was on the Canal, with a composite Brigade of the 39th; the 9th Division held the Wytschaete Ridge, with three units of the 21st and 49th (chiefly the 146th Infantry Brigade). The rest of the line was French. Immediately below our 9th Division was the 28th French Division, in Command of the Kemmel Defences; next below, at Dranoutre, came the 154th, in face of an enemy assault from Neuve Église. Then came the French 34th, and their 138th at St.-Jans-Cappel. Behind the line, two Brigades of our 49th (the 147th and 148th) were in Corps Reserve in and around Poperinghe, and one Brigade each of the 30th and 31st were located between Poperinghe and the front line. Our 25th Division was in Reserve, a little behind the two Brigades of the 49th.

Against these worn and weary Troops, so lately withdrawn from the positions from which they were now to be assailed, and so hardly re-organized or recruited, the enemy launched nine Divisions, ‘of which five were fresh Divisions and one other had been but lightly engaged.’[117] Their direct objective was Kemmel Hill, an important point of observation in that country of low-lying flats, and important, too, as a jumping-off place for Ypres; their subsidiary purpose was to separate the British from the French forces by a flanking movement below Wytschaete. Accordingly, the weight of the attack fell first on the French 28th and the British 9th Divisions, with the two Brigades attached to the latter. Dealing first, with the British sector, we are not surprised to learn, in Sir A. Conan Doyle’s temperate narrative, that ‘the 9th Division in the north was forced to fall back upon the line of La Clytte [behind Kemmel], after enduring heavy losses in a combat lasting nine hours, during which they fought with their usual tenacity, as did the 64th and 146th Brigades, who fought beside them.’[118] It is rather the details which surprise us, and help to make this ‘tenacity’ real. At 2-30 a.m. on April 25th, this Brigade of our 49th Division had to endure a two hours’ bombardment with heavy gas-shells and smoke. It was followed by half an hour of the greatest intensity with High Explosives. At 5 o’clock, in the inevitable mist, which enhanced the difficulty of the defence, the Infantry attack was launched, but was held on the Brigade front. At 6-45, a Company of the 1/6th West Yorkshires was reported to be fighting a rearguard action under Captain Sanders, V.C. This gallant Officer was seen rallying his men from the top of a pill-box, and, though wounded, he continued firing with his revolver at point blank range until he fell. No news came from the front line Companies, but all the evidence goes to show that they fought and died at their posts. We need not follow the retirement of what was left of these Battalions, first, to Vierstraat Cross Roads and then to Ouderdom. The evidence of casualties is more pertinent. In the West Yorkshire Regiment, on these two days (April 25th, 26th),[119] the 1/5th’s casualties amounted to eighteen Officers and five hundred and fifty-seven other ranks; the 1/6th’s to twenty-two and four hundred and sixty-one, and the 1/7th’s to five and one hundred and thirty-nine respectively. The Trench Mortar Battery of the Brigade was engaged on Kemmel Hill during this battle, and none of those in action returned. We may add here, that, at Ouderdom on April 27th, some Brigade remnants were formed into a composite Battalion, under Major R. Clough, of the 1/6th West Yorkshires, and were placed in Divisional Reserve at the call of the 147th Brigade, the rest being withdrawn into a back area.

Turning now to the action on the French front, and to the German assault on Kemmel Hill,[120] and observing that St. Eloi and Dranoutre, to the East and West of the position, fell at an early hour into the enemy’s hands, we have to record that by 10 a.m. on April 25th Kemmel Village and Hill had both been lost. It will be recalled from our summary of this fighting that Lt.-Col. Bousfield, Commanding some units of the 49th Division (146th Brigade) had been left in Command on Kemmel Hill on April 11th, and handed over to the French Divisional Commander on the 19th. He and his fellow Yorkshiremen continued the defence till the last moment with conspicuous courage and devotion. On April 26th, at 3 a.m., counter-attacks were made by the French and British in combination, in which Troops from the 49th Division, attached to the 25th, again bore themselves gallantly. But the position then was irretrievable, at least in its main aspects, and the line in the salient was further re-adjusted during the night of April 26th/27th.

This brief account of a big event (the darkest hour of the Flemish battle, it has been called) might be extended into the local fighting which marked the course of the next few days. But an extract from one Officer’s diary may suffice as a sample of what was happening: we have trusted his judgment before, and his first and last sentences are decisive. He writes on April 28th:

‘The Germans were not ready to profit by their success at Kemmel. During the next three days there was a good deal of shelling by long-range guns, but no attacks, and the Battalion [it was in the 148th Brigade] was able to improve the line greatly, with Lewis gun posts pushed well forward to command the valley in front. A French cart stranded in No Man’s Land was found to be full of excellent signalling equipment, which improved our communications.

‘29th April.—On April 29th the Germans made what proved to be their last attempt on the Ypres front. Their plan was to attack on the whole front from Dranoutre to Voormezeele, and so pierce the line to the South of the city. A heavy bombardment with shells of the heaviest calibre opened and continued unceasingly from 3 a.m. to 4 p.m. It was probably the heaviest bombardment the Battalion has had to face, and casualties were many, including some of the finest fighters of the Battalion. At 4, the Germans attacked. On the 7th Battalion front, where there was dead ground, the Germans got into the line, and were only driven out by successive bayonet charges. On the 6th Battalion front, the forward posts could see the Germans descending Kemmel, and with Lewis gun and Rifle fire stopped them dead with great loss. Before dark, the attack had definitely failed along the line: the Germans had played their last card.’

This conclusion agrees with Sir F. Maurice’s: ‘The gain of Kemmel proved to be the enemy’s undoing’; and with that of all competent authorities, reviewing the battles of March and April, 1918, with the knowledge acquired since the war was ended. Ludendorff could not exploit his successes, for in no sector was any of them complete. The failure to break through in the north ‘was hardly less important in its effect on the campaign than that which the Germans had suffered on March 28th, and these two triumphs of our defence over the enemy’s attack went far in preparation for the victories which came later in the year.’[121]

So, the darkest hour gave place to the dawn.

Congratulatory messages, couched in the highest terms, reached the 49th Division in its time of merited relief.

General Sir Herbert Plumer, Commanding the Second Army, conveyed, on April 29th, the following message from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies:

‘I desire to express my appreciation of the very valuable and gallant service performed by Troops of the 49th (West Riding) Division since the entry of the 146th Infantry Brigade into the Battle of Armentières. The courage and determination shown by this Division have played no small part in checking the enemy’s advance, and I wish to convey to General Cameron and to all Officers and Men under his Command my thanks for all that they have done.’

On May 2nd, the IXth Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir A. Hamilton Gordon, sent the following message:

‘Heartiest congratulations on the splendid fight you put up on 29th April.’

Throughout this period (April 10th to May 2nd), the 49th Divisional Artillery had been serving with the 21st Division, and they received from Major-General Campbell the following letter of thanks:

‘Before handing over Command of the 49th Divisional Artillery, I wish to express to all ranks my thanks and appreciation of the excellent work done since it has been under my Command. No Commander could have been better served in every possible way. The splendid fighting spirit shown by all ranks has been beyond all praise.’

We may add here that the 49th Division were no whit less appreciative of the gallant and efficient help which they had received from C.R.A., 9th Division, in Command of the following Artillery Brigades: 50th, 51st, 148th, 156th and 162nd R.F.A. Brigades and 30th Heavy Artillery Brigade.

D.D.M.S., XXIInd Corps, wrote to A.D.M.S., 49th Division, to congratulate him on ‘the extraordinarily efficient manner in which casualties have been evacuated from your area under the recent trying conditions. I have never seen the work more speedily and successfully carried out’; and truly Major-General Cameron might say to his ‘Comrades of the 49th Division’:

‘The reputation which you have won for courage, determination and efficiency, during recent operations, has its very joyous aspect, and it is deeply precious to us all.’

The name of Ypres is inscribed in English history: like Khartoum, Kandahar, Trafalgar, and other names in older times, it has been adopted in the title of a British Commander. It belongs, by the same token, to the 49th Division, whom, twice in the course of the War, in the Spring of 1915 and of 1918, we have seen defending its trenches or fighting in the open for its safety, and to whom a Memorial is dedicated on its site. They had well earned the praises bestowed upon them. To them, with very gallant comrades, including our Belgian Allies, fell the part of guarding the approaches to the vital line of the Channel ports. On April 9th, 1918, when the course of the Kaiser-schlacht was diverted from the Southern to the Northern front, Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army formed our last line of defence in Flanders. That line held at the end of April, after three weeks’ shattering blows, unsurpassed in impetus and severity; and, throughout those weeks, the 49th were in the line.

CHAPTER XIV
THE YEOMANRY

The pace was too fast to be kept up. The Germans could not be doing it all the time, and pauses, lengthening in duration as the fury of the attacks increased, were bound to be interposed between one onslaught and the next. Here, again, as on previous occasions, the official German historians of the war will be able to correct the impression which their daily bulletins sought to create, and will tell an attentive world how the desperate courage of the invader broke on the final factor which no resources of science can permanently disguise—fighting men’s physical exhaustion.

Such a pause, partly filled, as we shall see, by a transfusion of bloodshed to another area, occurred at the height of that darkest hour, which we followed in the last chapter; and, before pursuing our account of the West Riding Infantry Divisions through the last hundred days of the war, we may fitly utilize this interval to narrate, necessarily a little summarily, the fortunes and the disappointments of some of the West Riding Mounted Troops. For they, too, as Earl Haig has testified, ‘came forward at the beginning of the war to serve their country in the hour of need,’ and ‘performed their duty under all circumstances with thoroughness and efficiency.’

These words occur in an Order, dated September 9th, 1917, and addressed by the Field-Marshal to the 1/1st Yorkshire Hussars Yeomanry. ‘The Army Council,’ the Order starts, ‘has found it necessary to dismount certain Special Reserve and Yeomanry Regiments, and to utilize the services of Officers and other Ranks in other branches of the Service.’ Here we see the meaning of ‘under all circumstances,’ and the cause of the disappointments to which we have referred.

That the war was not a Cavalry war, and that its ‘circumstances’ did not often call for the special faculties furnished by Mounted Troops, are facts that enhance, rather than diminish, the praise of the ‘thoroughness’ and ‘efficiency’ with which the duties falling on the Yeomanry were discharged. Officers, N.C.O.’s and men adapted themselves with conspicuous cheerfulness to the shifting needs of the day’s work, and became fitted to the uses which were made of them. But no keenness, military or moral, could turn the war into their war. The war in South Africa was their war, the next war may be their war again; ‘but the circumstances of the late war gave them few chances of doing the work for which they were intended, and their chief claim to credit lies in the fact, that, whatever work they were given to do, they carried out to the best of their ability, and to the complete satisfaction of the authorities under whom they worked.’[122]

How complete that satisfaction was, may be judged by one or two letters, which we are privileged to quote, and which it is appropriate to produce in advance of such narrative as may prove available of the miscellaneous duties which the Yeomanry actually performed. Thus, when ‘B’ Squadron of the Yorkshire Hussars left the 46th Division in May, 1916 (the particulars of this move will be found below), Major-General E. J. Montague Stuart-Wortley wrote to their Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Eley:

‘Many thanks for your letter. It was a great blow to me to find on my return from leave, that your Squadron had left the Division, and that our very pleasant connection had come to an end.

‘I can assure you that it has been the greatest pleasure to me to have had your Squadron under my command; and I should be very much obliged if you would tell all your Officers, N.C.O.’s and men how deeply I appreciate all the good work they have done whilst with this Division. They have frequently been called upon to do work which was quite outside of what Cavalry are trained to perform; and on every occasion, they have carried it out with zeal and efficiency which has been deserving of all praise.

‘You will be glad to have the whole Regiment together again; I shall watch all you do with the greatest interest; I know that all you are called upon to do, will be done well.’

Again, in 1917, when the same Yeomanry Regiment left the XVIIth Corps, in consequence of the decision of the Army Council, notified in the Field-Marshal’s Order as above, to dismount them and utilize them ‘in other branches of the Service,’ Lieut.-General Sir Charles Fergusson, Bt., Commanding the Corps, wrote to Lieut.-Col. Eley:

‘On the departure of the Regiment from the XVIIth Corps I wish to express to you and to the Officers and men under your command my thanks for the loyalty and assistance which has invariably been given by the Regiment during the period of its connection with the Corps.

‘Its smartness, discipline, and soldierly spirit have been conspicuous; and no matter what the work has been, it has always been carried out in accordance with the best traditions of the Regiment and of the Service.

‘I know that Officers and men will continue to live up to these traditions, and that no matter where duty and the service of the country call them, they will never forget that the reputation and good name of the Regiment remain in their hands. Whether as a unit or as individuals the spirit of the Regiment will remain; and when the time comes for it to be re-united, the knowledge that they have done their duty under all circumstances will add to the pride and satisfaction with which Officers and men will look back to their record in the war.

‘I wish goodbye and good luck to all ranks.’

Again, in 1919, when the Yorkshire Dragoons left the Rhine (these particulars, too, will be found below), Lieut.-General Sir C. W. Jacob, K.C.B., Commanding the IInd Corps of the Second Army, addresses the following letter to Major-General the Earl of Scarbrough, in his capacity as Hon. Colonel of the Regiment:

‘The Yorkshire Dragoons are leaving very shortly for England on reduction to cadre, and as you are the Hon. Colonel of the Regiment, I thought you would like to hear how well the Regiment has done all the time that it has been with the IInd Corps.

‘You know that at first the Regiment was split up and its squadrons distributed among various Divisions. In the early part of 1916 it was decided to take away from Divisions their Cavalry Squadrons, and to have a Cavalry Regiment at the headquarters of every Army Corps. The three squadrons of the Yorkshire Dragoons were thus brought together and formed into a Regiment again, and in May, 1916, became the Cavalry Regiment of the IInd Corps. It was in that month, too, that I took over command of the IInd Corps.

‘From the time the Yorkshire Dragoons came to the IInd Corps till hostilities ceased on the 11th November, 1918, their work has been excellent all through. They have had strenuous times, but have always shown themselves equal to the occasion.

‘Yorkshire has given many thousands of splendid soldiers to the British Army, and I place the Yeoman of the Yorkshire Dragoons high up in the list. They have responded to every call made on them, and have fought magnificently.

‘In October, 1917, the regiment was taken away from the IInd Corps for work with the Cavalry Corps. Later on, owing to the shortage of horses in the army, it was decided to dismount the Yeomanry Regiments and to turn them into machine-gun or cyclist units. The Yorkshire Dragoons were formed into a Cyclist Regiment, and came back to the IInd Corps as such. It was naturally a disappointment to them to be dismounted, but they accepted the situation in the right spirit and very soon became the best cyclist unit in the British Army.

‘I cannot speak too highly of their work in the final phase of the war, when they took part in the attack from Ypres in September, 1918, and when the Germans were driven clean out of Belgium.

‘The Regiment has been fortunate in its Officers. They were first of all commanded by Lieut.-Col. Mackenzie Smith, D.S.O., up to the time they were dismounted. Since then they have been commanded by Lieut.-Colonel R. Thompson, D.S.O. Both these officers have been first-class, and I cannot speak too highly of the latter. Lieut.-Colonel Thompson is a first-rate leader, and he has been backed up by an excellent lot of junior officers.

‘I regret very much to have to part with the Regiment, but their turn for demobilisation has come round. They have earned the gratitude of their country and county in the way they have worked and fought all through the war, and have made a name for themselves which will never be forgotten.’

General Jacob’s letter (May 27th, 1919) epitomizes clearly, six months after the Armistice, the successive stages of organization through which the Mounted Troops had passed. Between the lines of the various decisions therein recorded (‘to take away from the Divisions their Cavalry Squadrons,’ to take away the Cavalry Regiments from the Corps, ‘to dismount the Yeomanry Regiments and to turn them into machine-gun or cyclist units’), we may read the meaning of some remarks occurring in earlier letters: ‘They have frequently been called upon to do work which was quite outside of what Cavalry are trained to perform’ (General Stuart-Wortley); ‘No matter what the work has been, it has always been carried out in accordance with the best traditions of the Regiment and the Service’ (General Fergusson), and ‘their chief claim to credit lies in the fact, that, whatever work they were given to do, they carried out to the best of their ability’ (Col. Mackenzie Smith). The time never quite came to employ the Cavalry. They never really came into their own. But it was not till a late period in the war, when the shortage of horses in the Army and the shrinkage of man-power and shipping at home compelled the authorities to drastic action, that the repeatedly disappointed hope of employing them at last in their right capacity was finally abandoned. Accordingly, their history in the Great War is a history of partially fulfilled renown, in relation to their pre-war training and to their anticipations on mobilization. ‘It must be admitted,’ we read, ‘that the Yorkshire Dragoons never felt either pride or affection for their bicycles. The one thing to be said for them was that they were more easily cleaned than horses, and never had to be exercised or fed.’ In this sense, ‘their chief claim to credit,’ in the words of Lieut.-Col. Mackenzie Smith,[123] may be stated in the highest terms as a claim to the credit of subordinating their own desires, and the ambition appropriate to their Arm of Service, to the needs of the Army and the Empire as a whole.

We may follow these changes more precisely.

Originally, both Yeomanry Regiments, after coast defence and other work at home, went out to France as Divisional Cavalry. The Hussars arrived at Havre in April, 1915, and were posted as follows:

• ‘A’ Squadron to the 50th (Northumbrian) Division,
• ‘B’ Squadron to the 46th Division, and
• ‘C’ Squadron to the 49th (West Riding) Division.

The Dragoons arrived in August, and were posted:

• ‘A’ Squadron to the 17th Division,
• ‘B’ Squadron to the 37th Division, and
• ‘C’ Squadron to the 19th Division,

all in General Plumer’s Second Army, to which, under General Jacob’s Command, they were to return later on as a Cyclist Corps.

Their time as Divisional Cavalry lasted till May, 1916, but was not as full as they had hoped. ‘Our work,’ writes an Hussar Officer in a personal letter, ‘was very miscellaneous. We fetched up remounts, dug trenches, buried wires, supplied M.M.P. and orderlies to the Divisional Staff, and observation posts to the Infantry in the front line;’ and Col. Smith, of the Dragoons, writes in much the same vein: ‘They did many dull, but arduous and necessary fatigues. But they took an especial interest in the Divisional observation posts, the management of which was entrusted to them by the Division,’ and which proved, as he says in another place, ‘a definite speciality of the Regiment, and earned them considerable credit.’

The first organic change is explained in a letter from G.H.Q., dated May 2nd, 1916, and addressed to the Third Army Commander. We cite here the salient extracts:

‘In consequence of the growth of the Army and the development of the Corps Organisation, much of the independence of action and movement formerly belonging to the Division has passed to the Corps. It has been found necessary, therefore, to reconsider the organization and distribution of the Mounted Troops hitherto allotted to Divisions.

‘The allotment of these troops was originally made with a view to providing the Divisional Commander with a small mobile force under his immediate control for reconnaissance, protective and escort duties; and on the assumption (originally correct) that the Division would be moving either independently, or with one or more roads allotted to its exclusive use.

‘These conditions are unlikely to recur; any future movement will be by Corps, marching and fighting in depth on a comparatively narrow front. The mounted troops belonging to the Corps must, therefore, be assembled under the direct control of the Corps Commander, and organized as Corps units.

‘The Commander-in-Chief has accordingly decided—

‘(a) to convert the Squadrons of Divisional Cavalry into Corps Cavalry Regiments, composed of a Headquarters and Three Squadrons each; one Regiment being allotted to each Corps.

‘(b) to withdraw the Cyclist Companies from Divisions, to reconstitute them into Battalions of Three Companies each, and to allot one Battalion to each Corps.

‘(c) to allot one Motor Machine-Gun Battery to each Corps. This battery will normally be attached to the Cyclist Battalion.’

The following Table shows how the foregoing provisions were applied to the Squadrons of Yorkshire Dragoons and Yorkshire Hussars:

Transferred	From			To
Squadron	Div.	Corps	Army	Corps		Army
‘A’ Squadron 1/1st Yorkshire Dragoons	17	II	Second	⎫	II	Second
H.Q. & ‘B’ Squadron 1/1st Yorkshire Dragoons	37	VII	Third	⎬
‘C’ Squadron 1/1st Yorkshire Dragoons	19	XI	First	⎭
‘A’ Squadron 1/1st Yorkshire Hussars	50	V	Second	⎫	XVII	Third
‘B’ Squadron 1/1st Yorkshire Hussars	46	XVII	Third	⎬
‘C’ Squadron 1/1st Yorkshire Hussars	49	X	Fourth	⎭

Thus, the Divisional Cavalry were transferred, and each Corps now received a Squadron of Cavalry, a Battalion of Cyclists, and a Battery of Motor Machine-Guns. At this time the training of the Cavalry in France was inspired mainly by General Gough, who subsequently commanded the Fifth Army; and the rôle devised for Corps Cavalry Regiments was summed up, as he said, in the one word ‘“Security”: that is, the protection of the Infantry with which it is working.’ These were the days, it will be remembered from earlier chapters of the present volume, in which a break-through was still hoped for, when the Corps Mounted Troops would have followed the five Divisions of Regular Cavalry through the ‘gap’ to be made in the German line, and would become immediately responsible for the protection of the Infantry Reserve and for general Advance Guard duties.

But events did not fall out as had been expected. ‘During the summer and autumn of 1916 there were several occasions,’ we are told, ‘on which the Higher Command had hopes of a Cavalry situation, ... but these hopes never materialized.’ The main work of the Regiment in these months—and very important work it proved—was to maintain observation posts in forward areas, and it was true that opportunities occurred, and were seized with gallant alacrity, to win the Military Cross and the Military Medal for special acts of reconnaissance and daring. In less forward areas the duties were more laborious, but were not less cheerfully performed. Traffic control, unloading ammunition trains, helping at hospitals and burying the dead; the maintenance of communications in winter mud, when the Infantry were roped together in order to go into the front line, and casualties by drowning were almost as numerous as those caused by the enemy: these, with training, and the care of horses, and the usual Regimental sports, were among the functions substituted in reality for the purpose cherished by the Corps Cavalry. In March, 1917, at the time of the German retreat, the IInd Corps Cavalry had the chance, of which they fully availed themselves, of proving their mettle in mounted action, and the D.S.O. awarded to Lieut.-Col. Mackenzie Smith was a recognition of his wise insistence on a constant high level of training efficiency. The disappointment of his Mounted Troops at Cambrai in November, 1917, was their final grief before the Order for dismounting.’

We shall not follow in detail the dismounted history either of the Dragoons or the Hussars in the miscellaneous duties to which they were called. We may note, however, that, in the battles of 1918, good fighting work was done by both Regiments, and that, early as October 20th in that year, Lieut.-Col. Thompson received his D.S.O. as an immediate award, in recognition of his gallantry at the crossing of the River Lys. General Jacob’s letter to Lord Scarbrough, quoted on an earlier page, refers particularly to this Officer, and to the part taken by his cyclists ‘when the Germans were driven clean out of Belgium.’

So the Yeomanry, too, before war’s end, had their fill of fighting in the front line, and, alike in honours and casualties, through all the phases of their experience, as Divisional Cavalry, as Corps Cavalry, and as Dismounted Troops, they bore themselves with conspicuous bravery and with not less conspicuous self-sacrifice. They were content to do the task set before them, when, owing to causes beyond control, they could not do the task for which they had been trained, and neither in the West Riding nor beyond it will their splendid record be allowed to fade. Not inappropriately it happened that the IInd Corps of the Second Army[124] was chosen to form part of the Army of the Rhine. The Yorkshire Dragoons were detailed to act as Advance Guard to the Infantry of the 9th, 29th and 41st Divisions; and ‘consequently,’ we read, ‘in most of the towns and villages through which they passed, they were the first British troops which the inhabitants saw. The march through Belgium was a triumphal progress.’

But we must not anticipate the day of triumph, amply as the Yeomen had contributed to it. The battles of 1918 have still to be won, and we return at this point to the interval called by exhaustion after the First Battle of the Lys.

CHAPTER XV
THE LAST HUNDRED DAYS

I.—THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The force of the German onslaughts of March 21st and April 9th, 1918, had been spent beyond hope of renewal on the fronts in which they occurred. On the Lys, as, a month earlier, on the Somme, and more necessarily because of the further month’s exhaustion, time had to be taken to reorganize, to recuperate, and to recommence; and the time taken by the enemy was time given to the Allies.

How admirably they employed it in May, June and the first part of July does not fall within the province of the present chronicler. It happened that it was not till July 20th that the Territorial Infantry from the West Riding entered into action since May on any considerable scale. Accordingly, we may pass over the interval. We may pass over the dispatch of the IXth Corps, commanded by Sir A. Hamilton Gordon, and consisting of the 8th, 21st, 25th and 50th Divisions, all of which had had their full share of fighting, to join the Sixth French Army on the Aisne. The intention was, to give them a chance of rest in a section unlikely to be busy; the effect was to give them a worse experience in the sudden battles about Reims than they had endured on the Somme or on the Lys. How they acquitted themselves is best told in the noble language of the French Army Commander, General Maistre, in his farewell letter (July 3rd) to General Hamilton Gordon:

‘Avec une ténacité, permettez-moi de dire, toute anglaise, avec les débris de vos divisions décimées, submergées par le flot ennemi, vous avez reformé, sans vous lasser, des unités nouvelles que vous avez engagées dans la lutte, et qui nous ont en fin permis de former la digue où ce flot est venu se briser. Cela aucun des témoins français ne l’oubliera.’

Immediately after this disaster, which had brought the Germans within forty miles of Paris, and Paris within range of their ‘freak’ gun, Marshal Foch withdrew from Flanders his force of about eight Divisions, and transferred them southwards to the French front. Next, he asked that four British Divisions might be moved down to the Somme, so as to ensure the connection between the French and British forces about Amiens; and, ‘after carefully weighing the situation,’ wrote Sir Douglas Haig, ‘I agreed to this proposal.’ But the Generalissimo’s resources still fell short of the plans he was maturing. ‘On the 13th July a further request was received from Marshal Foch that these four British Divisions might be placed unreservedly at his disposal, and that four other British Divisions might be dispatched to take their places behind the junction of the Allied Armies. This request,’ wrote the British Commander-in-Chief, ‘was also agreed to, and the 15th, 34th, 51st and 62nd British Divisions, constituting the XXIInd Corps, under Command of Lieut.-General Sir H. Godley, were accordingly sent down to the French front.’[125]

We resume our chronicle, therefore, with the record of the 62nd Division in the counter-offensive by Marshal Foch, which he launched on July 18th, and which, by repeated hammer-strokes, increasing in strength and velocity, was to bring the war to its appointed end. Exactly a hundred days elapsed between July 18th and October 26th, when Ludendorff’s resignation was accepted, and he left German Army Great Headquarters. Before resuming it, however, for the space of those hundred days, a word, though not strictly within our province, may be said about Haig’s decision on July 15th. We are to recall that the Allies had been defeated three times in less than four months, and had given up far more ground than was ever contemplated in the previous winter Councils. A German gun had found the range of Paris, and might find the range of the Channel ports. The secrets of the autumn of victory were locked up in the harvester’s brain; yet he asked for four plus four Divisions to be moved from the British to the French front. We should leave the matter there: all the papers have not yet been published; but perhaps we may quote at this point the reasoned opinion of Major-General Sir F. Maurice:

‘Haig, being responsible to his Government for the safety of his army and the ports, felt that he must obtain their concurrence in this last step, though he was quite ready to take the responsibility upon himself of advising them to concur. It does honour to Foch, to Mr. Lloyd George and to Sir Douglas Haig that in this critical time they all agreed. Both the British Government and the British Commander-in-Chief supported Foch, decided to back his judgment, and to accept the danger of weakening the British forces in the north, and he was thus enabled to mature his plans for the defeat of Ludendorff.... It required great courage and determination to make that attack as it was made. The Germans had still a superiority of more than 250,000 Infantry on the Western front, and Foch, as well as Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Douglas Haig, had to take risks.’[126]

So, we march with General Braithwaite’s Yorkshire lads to the Valley of the Ardre, where for the next ten days (July 20th to 30th) they played a glorious part in the Second Battle of the Marne, after which there was no turning back.

The River Ardre rises due south of Reims, in the forest called after that city. It flows in a north-westerly direction through richly-timbered and hilly country, which afforded every facility for the cunning nests of machine-guns in which the enemy excelled. We have two or three descriptions of the lie of the land from a military point of view. The valley, we read, ‘is bounded on each side by high ridges and spurs, the crests of which are heavily wooded: those on the north by the Bois de Reims, on the south by the Bois de Coutron and the Bois d’Eclisse. The villages of Marfaux and Chaumuzy in the bottom of the valley, also the dominating height of the Montagne de Bligny (some seven thousand yards from the line of departure) afforded the enemy three successive points d’appui of great strength. These centres of defence were further strengthened by natural buttresses formed by the hamlets of Cuitron (North), Espilly, Les Haies and Nappes (South), all perched high up on the abrupt slopes and spurs running down into the valley below. So steep are some of these slopes that the light French Tanks (Chars d’Assaut) were unable to operate upon them in places, and the Tanks’ activities were further restricted by stretches of soft and marshy ground on either bank of the Ardre. Standing crops in the undulating valley, the vineyards on the slopes, and the dense woods on the ridges, concealed the hostile positions from view, whilst sunken roads and banks running at right angles to the direction of attack provided ready-made positions for a stubborn defence.’

In this large, dense wood of summer foliage, on slopes running down to marshy ground, we are to remember that the ‘stubborn defence’ was now the business of the Germans. The conditions of the war in the West had changed in several important aspects. Not merely was the enemy on the defensive, to the huge enheartenment of the Allied Forces, but this account of the natural features is necessary because the fighting was now in the open, and no longer in a too familiar entrenched area. To these changes in tactics and terrain, at once so novel and so inspiriting, was added the fresh experience of fighting side by side with new friends. General Godley’s Corps, we remember, was sent at Marshal Foch’s request right away from the British northern sector into the area of the French Command. There it found the 1st Italian Division, the 14th and the 120th French Divisions, and the 1st Colonial French Corps; and we are told that, in this War of Positions, ‘the transference to a sector with its natural obstacles, the novel situation of passing through Italian Troops to attack side by side with our French Allies in the attempt to oust enemy forces (enjoying all the advantages that the possession of the initiative and positions of great natural strength would give them) presented problems to all Arms which had hitherto been met with only in theory.’ The practical problem of language was the least. Education authorities will learn with pleasure, though some of their critics may be surprised, that ‘there were far fewer French Officers with any working knowledge of English than British Officers with a working knowledge of French, and French was the language generally used.’ Whether it was the French of Stratford-atte-Bow, or the French of the British private, ‘Tout-de-suite, and the tooter the sweeter,’ our information does not reveal; but it is satisfactory to know that the ‘working knowledge’ aimed at in our schools answered a test which experts might not have satisfied. Of other details, such as entraining and ‘embussing,’ this is not the place to speak: certain differences in practice were found, and were solved with good will on both sides. We may add here, in this list of new conditions, that the 62nd Division now included the 2/4th Hampshire Regiment, recently arrived in France, and the 1/5th Devons, lately from Egypt. On August 2nd, Major-General Braithwaite wrote to the County Territorial Associations at Southampton and Exeter respectively, to express his high sense of their several distinguished services; and he wrote at the same time to the Durham Association, in connection with the 9th Durham Light Infantry, the Pioneer Battalion of the Division, to say that it has been necessary to employ them in this Second Battle of the Marne as a fighting Battalion, and that ‘they fought magnificently, as Durham men always do.’

The assembly of the Troops for the battle was not an easy matter. Long marches were entailed; the roads were strange and crowded; exact positions on the night of 19th/20th were difficult to ascertain, and it was not till after daybreak on July 20th that the Brigades were in position upon the base of departure. Briefly, the River Ardre formed the dividing-line between Divisions, with the 62nd (West Riding) on the right and the 51st (Highland) on the left.[127] The two Divisional Headquarters remained together throughout the operations, an arrangement which they found of incalculable value. On July 31st, we may note, Generals Braithwaite and Carter-Campbell exchanged letters, expressing in the most cordial terms the pleasure each Division had derived from serving side by side with the other.

A start was made on the right at 8 a.m. on July 20th, under an artillery barrage, the leading Brigades being the 187th (right) and 185th (left), with the 186th in Divisional Reserve, to leap-frog and capture the second objective. As may be judged from the nature of the country and the advantages offered to its defenders, progress was slow and casualties were heavy, and the deadly nests of German machine-gunners proved very stubborn to rout out. Now in one part and now in another, the combined advance was temporarily held up; small groups went too far forward; detachments tried to work a way round; till, through the standing grain or wooded undergrowth, little streams of prisoners trickled out, vocal witnesses to the prowess of the attackers. It was obvious at the end of the first day that a part of the Bois de Reims between Courmas and Cuitron, especially a strong point located on a timbered spur south-west of the Bois du Petit Champ, would have to be thoroughly cleared before the operations could be successful, and at 10-30 on July 21st, the 187th Brigade was detailed for this work. As one result of this day’s heavy fighting, in which the 9th Durham Light Infantry and the 2/4th York and Lancs. may particularly be mentioned, the 103rd and 123rd German Divisions had to be completely withdrawn, and replaced by Regiments of the 50th German Division. Thus, the 62nd had fought two enemy Divisions out of the field.

On July 22nd, the capture and clearance of the obstructive Bois du Petit Champ was entrusted to the 186th Brigade (Brig.-General Burnett), and was successfully carried out with great dash and initiative by the 5th Duke of Wellington’s. Initiative, indeed, was the key to a very trying and tricky situation. The undergrowth in places was found to be as thick as in a tropical jungle, and machine-gun crews hidden in the thickets had evidently been trained to fire in the direction of sound. It was necessary to attack at close range, with casualties increasing as the range shortened. Two companies of the 5th Devons arrived to reinforce their Yorkshire comrades, and to assist in capturing a strong point of eight machine-guns and their garrison. It was a very gallant little enterprise, in which the front company of the Left Column was surrounded after hard hand-to-hand fighting, and its position rendered untenable by the superior numbers of the enemy. Captain Cockhill, M.C., cleverly withdrew his few remaining men, and two Officers and six other ranks fought their way out to the posts of the rear company. By nightfall, the whole of the area was cleared, with the exception of a strong pocket of the enemy situated in the centre of the wood, and very difficult to locate, who were captured next day; and this example of a single, small action in a tight corner of a wood, down south of the long front line, serves to show with what gallantry and courage the invader was driven out of France.

The prisoners’ bag of July 22nd was two Officers and two hundred and six other ranks of the 53rd Infantry Regiment, 50th German Division, together with forty-one machine-guns. On the 23rd, the clearance of the Bois enabled progress to be made all along the northern front of the Ardre, and eight French 75 m.m. guns, recaptured from the enemy, were included in an excellent day’s haul.

Passing over the intervening period, with its daily tale of prisoners and gains, though accompanied by very heavy losses, we come to July 28th, when the 8th West Yorkshire Regiment, supported by the 5th Devons, made a particularly brilliant assault on the Montagne de Bligny, north-west of the Bois de Reims. They started at 4 o’clock in the morning, and, aided by the half-light of a late July dawn, succeeded in reaching the foot of the steep slopes of the mountain before they attracted hostile fire. This surprise, combined with the dash displayed by the assaulting Troops, who, in spite of serious casualties, succeeded in rushing the hill, resulted in the capture of a position of great tactical importance.

How important, in the opinion of the best judges, may be gathered from the following extract from the Minutes of the West Riding Territorial Force Association, held at York on October 28th, 1918:

‘Major Chadwick asked if any information could be given as to whether the French Government had awarded the Croix de Guerre to the 8th Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment (Leeds Rifles).

‘Lord Harewood replied: The Croix de Guerre has been offered to the Battalion of the Leeds Rifles referred to, but whether or not the War Office will allow the Battalion to accept it I do not know.’

The Fifth French Army Commander’s Order on the subject, dated October 16th, was worded as follows:

‘Le 8th Bataillon du West Yorkshire Rgt.

‘Bataillon d’élite; sous le commandement énergique du Lieutenant-Colonel Norman Ayrton, England, a participé brillamment aux durs combats du 20 au 30 Juillet, qui ont valu la conquête de la Vallée de l’Ardre. Le 23 Juillet, 1918, après s’être frayé un chemin dans les fourres épais du Bois du Petit Champ, s’est emparé d’une position importante malgré un feu nourri des mitrailleuses ennemies. Le 28 Juillet, 1918, dans un brio magnifique, a enlevé la Montagne de Bligny, fortement défendue des forces ennemies supérieures en nombre, s’y est maintenu malgré les pertes subies, et les efforts désespérés de l’adversaire pour reprendre la position.’

It was a great and almost a unique compliment; and, as we shall presently see, the 8th West Yorkshires enjoyed at a later date another striking opportunity of proving their gallantry in action.

July 29th, to return to our recital, was a comparatively quiet day. On the 30th, the 2/5th West Yorks. successfully carried out a small attack to complete the capture of the Mount Bligny, and, meanwhile, the remaining Troops of both Divisions had reached their final objectives.

We subjoin the official account of these ten days’ ‘continuous fighting of a most difficult and trying nature. Throughout this period,’ runs the statement, ‘steady progress was made, in the face of vigorous and determined resistance. Marfaux was taken on the 23rd July, and on the 28th July British Troops retook the Montagne de Bligny, which other British Troops had defended with so much gallantry and success two months previously. In these operations, throughout which French Artillery and Tanks rendered invaluable assistance, the 51st and 62nd Divisions took one thousand two hundred prisoners from seven different German Divisions, and successfully completed an advance of over four miles.’[128] The total casualties for the period in the 62nd Division alone amounted to 4,126:

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Officers	28	108	10
Other Ranks	521	3,063	406

Apart from the victory which was gained, the whole operation, as shown above, afforded very useful lessons in the new conditions of warfare, and it was utilized to the full in this sense. Particular attention may, perhaps, be drawn to the experiment of Machine-Gun Battalions, which was found to have more than justified the change of system. The M.G. Battalion of the 62nd Division had now fought in two battles: in a defensive battle in the previous March, and now in an offensive battle on the Marne, and the improvement in the Machine-Gun service was estimated at sixty per cent. at least. Partly, its success might be ascribed to the fact that the Commanding Officer of the Battalion was not selected for expert gunnery, but was a good Infantry Officer, with an eye for country, a knowledge of tactics, and a power of command.

But where all units and Commanders did so well, it is invidious to select one Arm. We may more fitly close this section of the Second Battle of the Marne with some extracts from the congratulatory messages earned by General Braithwaite’s Division. There was, of course, the new fact of a close liaison between British and French Troops, which caused more than common punctiliousness in the preparation and dispatch of these epistles; but the tone is exceptionally cordial, the sentiments are extraordinarily sincere, and the praises were very thoroughly deserved. General Bertholot, Commanding the Fifth French Army, published an Order of the Day, dated July 30th, of which the following is a translation:

‘Now that the XXIInd British Corps has received orders to leave the Fifth Army, the Army Commander expresses to all the thanks and admiration which its great deeds, just accomplished, deserve.

‘On the very day of its arrival, the XXIInd Corps, feeling in honour bound to take part in the victorious counter-attack, which had just stopped the enemy’s furious onslaught on the Marne, and which had begun to hurl him back in disorder towards the north, by forced marches and with minimum opportunity for reconnaissance, threw itself with ardour into the battle.

‘By constant efforts, by harrying and driving back the enemy for ten successive days, it has made itself master of the Valley of the Ardre, which it has so freely watered with its blood.

‘Thanks to the heroic courage and proverbial tenacity of the British, the continued efforts of this brave Army Corps have not been in vain.

‘Twenty-one Officers and more than one thousand three hundred other ranks taken prisoners, one hundred and forty machine-guns and forty guns captured from an enemy, four of whose Divisions were successively broken and repulsed; the upper Valley of the Ardre, with its surrounding heights to the north and south reconquered; such is the record of the British share in the operations of the Fifth Army.

‘Highlanders, under the Command of General Carter-Campbell, Commanding the 51st Division; Yorkshire lads, under the Command of General Braithwaite, Commanding the 62nd Division; Australian and New Zealand Mounted Troops; all Officers and men of the XXIInd Army Corps, so brilliantly commanded by General Sir A. Godley—you have added a glorious page to your history.

‘Marfaux, Chaumuzy, Montagne de Bligny—these famous names may be inscribed in letters of gold in the annals of your Regiments.

‘Your French comrades will always remember with emotion your splendid valour and perfect fellowship as fighters.’

It was well and generously said.

The XXIInd Corps Commander specially conveyed through Major-General Braithwaite his high appreciation of the Divisional Artillery: ‘The way in which Batteries worked with Battalions, and Brigades with Brigades of Infantry, in open warfare, must have been a source of enormous satisfaction to all Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men, and the way in which it was done is worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Regiment.’ Other letters and orders were published, and the memory of the Marne was added to that of Bucquoy, Cambrai and Havrincourt in the tradition of the 62nd Division.

II.—THE FINAL OFFENSIVE.

Events moved quickly from this date, more quickly, indeed, than they were divined except in the swift mind of the great Marshal, and more quickly than they can be conveniently followed in a day-to-day narrative of two Divisions. The greatest battle in all history was planned, and fought, and won, between August 8th and September 9th, 1918, the period described by Sir Douglas Haig as ‘the opening of the final British offensive.’ It is the word ‘final’ which signifies. So definite, in fact, was the issue, that Ludendorff described August 8th as ‘the black day of the German Army in the history of this war,’ and proffered his resignation a few days later. This was not accepted at the time, but at a Council held on August 14th he expounded the situation to the Kaiser and to the ruling German statesmen, with the result that Prince Max of Baden was subsequently appointed Imperial Chancellor with a view to paving the road to peace. These developments, not quite obscurely hinted at in a Note issued by Sir Douglas Haig on the eve of the Battle of Bapaume (August 21st to September 1st), must inevitably dominate our review of the ‘great series of battles, in which, throughout three months of continuous fighting, the British Armies advanced without a check from one victory to another.’[129] The autumn fighting of 1918 differed from that of previous years, in that there was no fifth winter to the war. We have not to follow our Divisions over the top of their trenches, and back again, when the weather failed, into the monotony of trench life. They did not fully know that they were fighting the last battles: it would be difficult to fix the exact date when this was revealed even to Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig. They did not welcome the Armistice with the joy with which it was acclaimed in London: ‘the news of the cessation of hostilities was received by the fighting Troops,’ writes an Officer of the 62nd Division who was ‘in at the kill,’ ‘without any of the manifestations of excitement that marked the occasion at home’; it was just an incident of the day’s work, and a sign that the work had been done well. But an effect of increasing speed, of the accelerated progress of Titanic forces, directed irresistibly to one end, cannot but be felt during this period. Amiens was disengaged after August 8th, partly by a brilliant feint in Flanders, which deceived even the King of the Belgians. Thiepval Ridge, with its graves of 1916, Pozières, Martinpuich, Mory (by the 62nd Division) were re-taken in the fourth week of August, and on August 29th Bapaume fell. On September 1st, the Australians took Péronne, and Bullecourt and Hendecourt fell the same day. Meanwhile, the Channel ports were safe at last, for the enemy had no Troops with which to threaten them, and he partly withdrew and was partly driven from the Lys salient. Merville, Bailleul, Neuve Église, Kemmel Hill, Hill 63: all the tragic places of the previous spring were once more in rightful hands in September. There followed the Battle of the Scarpe, and the storming of the Drocourt-Quéant Line, by the results of which, on the British front, in the centre, we were brought right in face of the main German defences known as the Hindenburg Line. The question was, whether to attack it now or later. On September 9th, Sir Douglas Haig had been in London, and had indicated that the end might be near. He wrote, after weighing all the chances: ‘I was convinced that the British attack was the essential part of the general scheme, and that the moment was favourable. Accordingly, I decided to proceed with the attack, and all preparatory measures were carried out as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible.’[130] A great month, and a grand decision.

So, we return at this point to the services of the Troops from the West Riding, and shall fit them in to the concluding battles, where they occurred.

At the end of August (25th to 27th), the 62nd Division drove the Germans out of Mory, situated in country which they knew, about four miles north of Bapaume. Excellent work there was achieved, among other units, by the 2/4th and 5th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and by the 2/4th York and Lancs. ‘D’ Company Commander in that Battalion led a charge against a nasty position in an awkward little hold-up, and personally accounted for the machine-gun team with his revolver. Many prisoners, including a Battalion Commander, were captured by the Division in these three days.

There was still hard fighting for the Division before it was withdrawn for a few days’ rest, and the height of efficiency it had reached may fitly be judged by a single instance, extracted from the London Gazette, December 26th, 1918. Therein is recorded the award of the coveted Victoria Cross to Sec.-Lieut. James Palmer Huffam, of the 5th (attached, 2nd) West Riding Regiment (T.F.), in the following circumstances:

‘For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty on August 31st, 1918.

‘With three men he rushed an enemy machine-gun post, and put it out of action. His post was then heavily attacked, and he withdrew fighting, carrying back a wounded comrade. Again, on the night of August 31st, 1918, at St. Servin’s Farm, accompanied by two men only, he rushed an enemy machine-gun, capturing eight prisoners and enabling the advance to continue. Throughout the whole of the fighting from August 29th to September 1st, 1918, he showed the utmost gallantry.’

Meanwhile, on August 27th, Major-General Walter Braithwaite was appointed to the Command of the IXth Corps, with the rank of Lieutenant-General, when a Knight Commandership of the Bath was conferred upon him in recognition of his services with the 62nd. It will be recalled that he succeeded Sir James Trotter in Command of the 62nd Division in December, 1915.[131] He took the Division over to France, and led it with conspicuous gallantry till the very eve of its final bout of victory. His affection for his brave ‘Yorkshire lads’ was fully reciprocated by his subordinate Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men, who were all sensible of the constant care and fine, soldierly qualities of their Commander. Sir Walter Braithwaite has taken every opportunity, in subsequent meetings with, or references to, the Division, to testify to his pride and pleasure in that office: ‘I look back,’ he wrote to the Secretary of the West Riding Association (November 3rd, 1918), ‘on the time spent in Command of that heroic Division as one of the proudest terms of years in my life.... I don’t think I can be accused of partiality in saying that there is no Division in the B.E.F. with a prouder record of continued success than the 62nd.’ He was succeeded now by Major-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., D.S.O., who took over at a most responsible time and who saw the war out and the peace in.

The grand decision referred to above, and concerted early in September between Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig, found the Division in the Gomiecourt area, where they had been withdrawn on September 3rd, in order to rest and train. On the 8th, Lieut.-General Sir J. A. L. Haldane, Commanding the VIth Corps in the Third Army (General Sir Julian Byng), called on Major-General Whigham to explain the part to be taken by the 62nd in the impending operations. It was to attack and capture the village of Havrincourt, and ‘Z’ day was subsequently appointed for September 12th. We may recall from [page 150] above, the first capture of Havrincourt by this Division on November, 1917. We may recall, too, how on September 9th, 1919, almost on the anniversary of its second capture, it was announced at a Divisional Dinner that a Memorial to the Division was to be erected in Havrincourt Park. We are now to see how it was won on the second occasion.

There was this difference between the second and the first. In the battle of 1917, the break-through on the Cambrai front did not close with a permanent advance. Owing partly, as we now know, to the diversion of some Divisions to Italy, the brilliant design, so courageously supported, could not be completely carried out. This time, there was no going back. It was the Hindenburg Line which was to be captured, on the road from the River Marne to the River Meuse.

The Hindenburg Line, so called by our Troops, was neither Hindenburg nor a Line. As described and pictured by great generals,[132] it consisted of a series of defences, including many defended villages, and forming a belt, or fortified area, varying in depth from seven to ten thousand yards. It stretched from Lille to Metz, and among its extensions, or switches, was the famous ‘Drocourt-Quéant Switch,’ which had held up our advance more than once. Within this system of barriers, running through a stratum of deep cuttings, the enemy had prepared elaborate dug-outs, shelters, and gun-emplacements, all heavily fortified and wired. The luxurious appointments of some of them, which so much astonished beholders, need not detain us here. The importance of these extraordinary entrenchments to their assailants in the autumn of 1918 lay, first, in their genuine strength, to which German engineers had devoted all the ingenuity of their craft, and, next, in the almost legendary awe with which time and sentiment had invested them. This effect was carried out in their native names. Working from north-west to south-east, they were known in the German Army and behind it as Wotan, Siegfried (supported by Herrmann), Hundung (Hagen), Brunehilde (Freya), Kriemhilde and Michel; and we may well believe that, at the back of the front, until such time as the front broke, German opinion was obstinately convinced that their tutelary heroes must protect the Fatherland from invasion.

It was the task of the 62nd Division to break into this line through Havrincourt, and, by breaking it, to shatter the illusion. For, at last, on the Western front, we were fighting not only positions but ideas.

The operation (September 12th to 15th) proved a complete success. It was carried out on the left by the 187th, and on the right by the 186th Infantry Brigade, with the 9th Durham Light Infantry (Pioneers) attached to the latter as an assault Battalion. One company of the 62nd Machine-Gun Battalion was allotted to each attacking Brigade, and eight Brigades of Field Artillery and three Groups Heavy Artillery were in position to support. The plan of attack entailed a change of direction from north to east, in order to obviate the difficulties of the terrain, and the consequent complication of the Artillery barrage had to be very carefully worked out. In contrast to the attacks in November, no Tanks were employed in this action, but it bore in another respect a superficial resemblance to the First Battle of Havrincourt, insomuch as the first day’s work ‘could not have been bettered, but again there was to be a second chapter, a chapter of hard fighting, in very difficult circumstances, fought to the end, and crowned with success.’ We shall not follow it in detail, save to note that, an hour after Zero (5-30 a.m.) on September 12th, ‘large batches of prisoners were coming back,’ and that four Officers and eighty men of these had been captured at a strong point which ‘offered little resistance, owing to the great gallantry of Sergt. Laurence Calvert,[133] of the 5th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.’ His great gallantry won the Victoria Cross, in circumstances officially described as follows:

‘For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty in attack, when the success of the operation was rendered doubtful owing to severe enfilade machine-gun fire. Alone and single-handed, Sergt. Calvert, rushing forward against the machine-gun team, bayoneted three and shot four. His valour and determination in capturing single-handed two machine-guns and killing the crews therefore enabled the ultimate object to be won. His personal gallantry inspired all ranks.’

All ranks were inspired to good purpose; or, more precisely, the inspiration of all ranks found its typical expression in the brave act of this gallant N.C.O. The Division’s team-work, now as always, was exemplary; and, whether judged by casualties or captures,[134] the result of the Second Battle of Havrincourt was a great triumph for General Whigham in his new Command.

For Havrincourt looked to the east. It looked through the intricate defences, in which the German people still believed, to Cambrai and St. Quentin, and beyond. Thus it formed one of those ‘formidable positions,’ which, as Sir Douglas Haig wrote, ‘had to be taken before a final attack on the Hindenburg Line could be undertaken.’ By its capture, and that of others, ‘our line advanced to within assaulting distance of the enemy’s main line of resistance.’[135] And General Whigham, in a letter of October 9th, addressed to the Secretary of the Association at York, said, in almost identic terms: ‘On September 12th, the Division was called upon to repeat its former feat of capturing the village of Havrincourt. This village stands on very commanding ground, and formed a most formidable position in the Hindenburg front line. Its capture was essential to the development of the great offensive south of Cambrai, in which we have latterly been engaged.... Without the possession of Havrincourt, the grand attack of September 27th could not have been successfully launched.’

So, we come to that ‘grand attack,’ in which, as the General went on to say, ‘the Division has once more added fresh lustre to its fame.’ On this occasion they were engaged to the south of the scenes of their exploit in November. Graincourt now fell to the 63rd Division, Anneux to the 57th, Bourlon and Bourlon Wood to the 4th and 3rd Canadian Divisions. The 3rd Division moved forward with the Guards, forcing the crossings of the Canal, by capturing Ribécourt and Flesquières (the objective of the 51st in the previous November). To the 62nd was allotted the task of following up the attack, and of securing the crossings of the Canal at Marcoing. Once more, we have the high privilege of illustrating the nature of the operations by a single typical example of the spirit which animated all ranks. The London Gazette of December 14th, 1918, announced the award of the Victoria Cross to Private Henry Tandey, D.C.M., M.M., of the 5th Duke of Wellington’s, in the following circumstances:

‘For most conspicuous bravery and initiative during the capture of the village and the crossings at Marcoing, and the subsequent counter-attack on September 28th, 1918.

‘When, during the advance on Marcoing, his platoon was held up by machine-gun fire, he at once crawled forward, located the machine-gun, and, with a Lewis gun team, knocked it out.

‘On arrival at the crossings he restored the plank bridge under a hail of bullets, thus enabling the first crossing to be made at this vital spot.

‘Later in the evening, during an attack, he, with eight comrades, was surrounded by an overwhelming number of Germans, and, though the position was apparently hopeless, he led a bayonet charge through them, fighting so fiercely that thirty-seven of the enemy were driven into the hands of the remainder of his company.

‘Although twice wounded, he refused to leave till the fight was won.’

No defences made by man, certainly none made by German, could withstand courage of this kind.

In a Special Order of the Day, issued on October 1st, by Major-General Sir R. Whigham, Commanding the 62nd Division, he addressed his gallant Troops as follows:

‘The capture of Havrincourt on 12th September was essential to the success of the operations south of Cambrai, in which the 62nd Division has been engaged during the last four days.

‘As a sequel to that brilliant achievement, the Division has now captured Marcoing, Masnières, and the high ground north of Crèvecoeur, thus establishing a bridgehead over the Canal de St. Quentin, which is vital to the further successful prosecution of the campaign.

‘The Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief visited Divisional Headquarters to-day, and desired me to convey to all ranks of the Division his congratulations and high appreciation of their splendid courage and endurance.

‘For myself, I give you all my warmest thanks for the unfailing cheerfulness with which you have carried out the most arduous tasks, often in conditions of great hardship and discomfort.

‘It will ever be to me a pride to have commanded so magnificent a Division.’

Yet one more word about Marcoing. On an earlier page we remarked that we should have occasion to come back to the 8th Battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment, the Bataillon d’élite of a French Army Order. This occasion occurred on September 27th, when two companies of that Battalion earned from the VIth Corps Commander (Lieut.-General Sir A. Haldane) the following striking encomium, dispatched through the 62nd Divisional Commander:

‘Please convey to the survivors of the two companies 8th West Yorkshire Regiment my high appreciation and admiration of their initiative, dash and gallantry in pushing up to the outskirts of Marcoing yesterday [September 27th], in spite of all obstacles. It is by resolution and bravery such as they displayed that great victories have been won in the past history of the British Army.

‘I heartily congratulate the whole Battalion, yourself, and your splendid Division on the inspiring incident in front of Marcoing.’

Major-General Whigham, in publishing this letter, for the information of all ranks of the Division, showed how well the action of the two Companies illustrated the principle of pressing an advantage, whenever gained.

‘The great and critical assaults, in which, during these nine days of battle [September 27th to October 5th], the First, Third and Fourth Armies stormed the line of the Canal du Nord and broke through the Hindenburg Line, mark the close of the first phase of the British offensive. The enemy’s defence in the last and strongest of his prepared positions had been shattered. The whole of the main Hindenburg defences has passed into our possession, and a wide gap had been driven through such rear trench systems as had existed behind them. The effect of the victory upon the subsequent course of the campaign was decisive.’[136]

So far, Sir Douglas Haig, with his usual modesty and brevity. In Flanders now, King Albert of the Belgians, leading his nation at last in victory, as he had led it so gallantly in defeat, entered Ostend on October 16th. The Second Battle of Le Cateau in the previous week had driven the last German out of Cambrai; and about this date, as Sir Frederick Maurice writes, ‘The revulsion of feeling and the collapse of confidence were such that no enthusiasm could be aroused for a war of endurance in defence of the Fatherland. Even in an autocratic country it is not possible to deceive all the people all the time, and the German people knew in October, 1918, that the victory which had been promised to them could never be obtained.’[137]

RHONELLE RIVER CROSSING (Nov. 1st. 1918).

In these circumstances, the battles still ahead, in which the Divisions from the West Riding were to take part, need not detain us long. The 49th were engaged in October (11th to 17th) at Villers-en-Cauchie and Saulzoir, on the road running eastward out of Cambrai between Douai and Le Cateau. They fought with all their accustomed gallantry, especially in the capture of Saulzoir, which was defended by Machine-Guns and Tanks. When the obstinate resistance had been overcome, an Officer of the 1/6th Duke of Wellington’s found the houses full of civilians, who had taken refuge in their cellars, and who welcomed the arrival of the British Troops with offerings of cognac and coffee. The Division fought again below Valenciennes on November 1st and 2nd, and, with the 5th and 61st Divisions, crossed the Rhonelle River and captured the villages of Préseau and Maresches. Lieut.-General Sir A. Godley, Commanding the XXIInd Corps, conveyed to Major-General Cameron the expression of his appreciation of these exploits in the following complimentary terms:

‘I wish to heartily congratulate you and your Division on the successful capture of all your objectives and the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy as the result of your two days’ hard and gallant fighting.

‘All three Infantry Brigades, your Artillery, and Engineers, have added another page to the distinguished record of the Division.’

The 62nd Division, on October 19th and 20th, had the task of capturing Solesmes, and of driving the enemy from the line east of the River Selle, to which he had retired a few days before, partly as a result of the operations in which the 49th had borne themselves so gallantly. This further assault on the German positions, directed ultimately at Le Quesnoy, was to be a surprise, without preliminary bombardment. It was carried out ‘according to plan,’ with very conspicuous success. Twelve Officers and six hundred and eighty-seven other ranks, seventy-one machine-guns, thirteen trench mortars and five guns were captured at the cost of a casualty list of fifty-seven other ranks killed, ten Officers and three hundred and seventy other ranks wounded. The River Selle was crossed by wading, the water being in many places waist-high. The ground to be traversed proved difficult, with dense hedges and barbed-wire fencing, and in Solesmes itself the street-fighting was serious and severe. But the fine leadership of Platoon Commanders and the excellent spirit of the men carried all obstacles before them; and, once more, and now for the last time, we have the advantage of illustrating these qualities by an extract from the London Gazette (January 6th, 1919), announcing the award of the supreme decoration of the Victoria Cross to Corpl. (A/Sergt.) John Brunton Daykins, of the 2/4th York and Lancaster Regiment, 187th Infantry Brigade, 62nd Division, in the following circumstances:

‘For conspicuous bravery and initiative at Solesmes on October 20th, 1918, when, with twelve remaining men of his Platoon, he worked his way most skilfully, in face of heavy opposition, towards the Church. By prompt action, he enabled his party to rush a machine-gun, and during subsequent severe hand-to-hand fighting he himself disposed of many of the enemy,[138] and secured his objective; his party, in addition to heavy casualties inflicted, taking thirty prisoners.

‘He then located another machine-gun, which was holding up a portion of his Company. Under heavy fire he worked his way alone to the post, and shortly afterwards returned with twenty-five prisoners, and an enemy machine-gun, which he mounted at his post.

‘His magnificent fighting spirit and example inspired his men, saved many casualties, and contributed very largely to the success of the attack.’

Douai. The Belfry

The war’s end on November 11th at 11 o’clock in the morning found the bulk of the 49th Division resting on its well-earned laurels in the neighbourhood of Douai. The Gunners, the Royal Engineers and the Pioneer Battalion went forward in the final stages of the advance, and the Artillery had the distinction of finishing at a point further east than any other Divisional Artillery engaged. The 62nd Division ended in the Valley of the Sambre. If we draw an irregular quadrilateral, dipping a bit on the southern side, with its north-west angle at Valenciennes, its south-west at Le Quesnoy, and its north-east and south-east angles at Mons and Maubeuge respectively, we shall be able to prick in the places of the Division’s stout advance between November 4th and 11th (Orsinval, Frasnoy, Obies, Hautmont, Louvroil: it is at this end that the line dips towards Avesnes), by the help of which, as Sir Douglas Haig wrote: ‘On the 9th November the enemy was in general retreat on the whole front of the British Armies. The fortress of Maubeuge was entered by the Guards Division, and the 62nd Division (Major-General Sir R. D. Whigham), while the Canadians were approaching Mons.’[139]

And Mons, as we know, is the last word of the war on the Western front.

On November 18th, 1918, the 62nd Division started to march to Germany, where it formed part of the British Army of Occupation in the Rhine Province of the Kingdom of Prussia. As a Division of the IXth Corps of the Second Army, it had the luck to come under the command of its former Divisional Commander, Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Braithwaite, K.C.B., then commanding that Corps, who, accordingly, saw the Pelican at last put down his foot on German soil.