A short history of Belgium

by Léon van der Essen

CHAPTER XII

THE DUTCH RULE AND THE BELGIAN REVOLT OF 1830

After the fall of Napoleon, the powers were called upon to decide the political status of Belgium. The Belgians were not consulted in the matter, vitally important as it was, and their country was considered merely as the spoil of the Allies. The main idea that actuated the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) in rearranging the map of Europe was to prevent a new menace from the side of France. This country was not allowed to hold more territory than it possessed in 1789, before the outbreak of the Revolution; at the same time the Allies who had defeated Napoleon sought to erect a bulwark against any new extension of France in the North. They could have granted independence to Belgium, but as the country was weak it seemed that independence would mean reabsorption by France. The final settlement of this important question resulted, therefore, in the formation of the new Kingdom of the Netherlands, whereby both Belgium and Holland, united under the same sovereign, would, it was expected, present a sufficiently strong barrier against France. The new kingdom was declared also to be neutral territory. This is the first time that the conception of neutrality was realized with regard to a buffer-state in Western Europe, located between England, France, and Germany. But the conception of neutrality, as applied to the Netherlands, is much older than the Congress of Vienna; and it seems worth while to trace the different schemes dealing with Belgian neutrality before the years 1814-15.[19]

The idea of establishing the neutrality of the Netherlands goes back in history as far as the government of Maria of Hungary, at the time of Emperor Charles V. The former proposed the neutrality of the Belgian provinces on February 8, 1536, in order that they might escape being made the battlefield of Europe during the impending international conflicts. Charles V refused to consider the scheme, as he himself was planning to raise the Netherlands into an independent kingdom, to be governed by the son of Francis I, King of France. This plan, of course, was never carried out.

In 1634 France and Holland concluded a special treaty against Spain, by which the Netherlands should either become an independent kingdom or be divided between the contracting powers. Cardinal Richelieu, the French minister, preferred the idea of an independent Belgium, and went so far as to propose that this kingdom should be permanently neutral. In that way the cornerstone of Spanish power in Europe would have been destroyed. Although neutral, Belgium would have had the right to conclude offensive alliances, but would not enjoy the benefit of having the integrity of its territory guaranteed. If that scheme had been carried out, the Belgians would have had to revolt against Spanish rule. But the Belgians, owing to the presence of strong Spanish armies within their borders, did not revolt. The plan of Richelieu failed. His scheme was, however, taken over by Cardinal Mazarin, minister of Louis XIV. Mazarin had first suggested the annexation of Belgium by France, but he met with strong opposition on the part of Holland and England, both interested in keeping the French menace from extending right to their own doors. Changing his mind, Mazarin, in 1658, reverted to Richelieu’s plan concerning the creation of an independent and neutral Belgium. This proposal met with the strong opposition of the Dutch “Staatspensionnaris” De Witt, who expressed the fear that such a state would ruin Dutch trade—an independent Belgium would necessarily be given a free Scheldt. He also made it clear that Holland could not forego her right to meddle in the affairs of the Catholic Netherlands, and that the idea of a common protectorate over them would be welcome. Mazarin seems not to have been sincere when proposing his plan. It may be inferred that his main object was to quiet the fear of Holland that the French and the English would use Belgium as a base during their operations against Spain.

When the Treaty of the Barriers (1715) threatened to impose upon Belgium the Dutch garrisons which were maintained for protection against France, the latter presented (February 17) a memoir to Holland, again proposing the status of permanent neutrality for Belgium. The egotism and ill-will of the Dutch defeated this proposal. They would never have consented to the opening of the Scheldt, which was a necessary condition for an independent Belgium. Their policy on this point is made clear by the declaration of the States-General of the United Provinces, when Emperor Joseph II, in 1756, endeavored to obtain the opening of the Scheldt and free shipping on the river. The States-General declared that “the salvation or the loss of the Republic and its inhabitants depended upon this point.”

When the Revolution of the Belgians against Austrian rule broke out in 1789, the Elector Frederick-William of Prussia tried in vain to obtain from the other powers, England and Holland, the recognition of the Belgian Republic. He proposed that they should recognize the independence of Belgium and compel the Belgians “to establish a firm, strong constitution, in conformity with the interests of the Allies...; to create, subject to the advice of the Allies, a respectable military state that would inspire confidence; to avoid alliances with powers, enemies of the Allies, and also trade with them.”

As Prussia was ready to make war on Austria, her hereditary enemy, Emperor Leopold II declared that he would, in case of war, cede the “Austrian Netherlands” to France. This England could not have permitted, and therefore that country withdrew support from Prussia, causing the Elector Frederick-William to abandon his plan concerning Belgium.

The French conquest of Belgium entirely changed the policy of the European powers with regard to the Belgian problem. England now saw the French menace facing her own shores, and, according to her traditional policy, began to take measures to avoid the danger. On November 13, 1813, Lord Castlereagh wrote to the English ambassador in Vienna: “I must particularly recommend you to pay attention to Antwerp.... Leaving Antwerp in the hands of France means, or almost means, imposing on us the necessity of a continuous state of war.” It was now England that was specially interested in the future status of Belgium, and it is from that country that emanated the idea, forcibly expressed, of establishing a strong bulwark against France by the creation of the neutral kingdom of the Netherlands. The idea, supported by Prussia, which, as we have seen, had advocated it some years before, was, however, this time expressed by Lord Castlereagh; and the aggrandizement of Holland by its union with Belgium was strongly supported by the Duke of Wellington. Accordingly, on July 31, 1814, the Belgian provinces were formally handed over to the Prince of Orange, whom the Dutch had made their sovereign the year before. The arrangement was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna, and made to include Liège and Luxemburg.

The union of Belgium and Holland was the work of diplomacy: the Belgians had not even been consulted. It was an essentially bad combination. Had the “complete and intimate fusion,” of which the diplomats spoke, been possible between both countries, the projectors would have accomplished an admirable work, offering the surest guaranties for the maintenance of European peace and the durability of their own fabric. But unfortunately the conception was utopian.

Independently of the fact that the Allies disdained to consult the feelings of the Belgian people, they appeared to have lost sight of the moral history of the Netherlands, and to have forgotten those deep-rooted hatreds, jealousies, and dissensions, both religious and political, that had divided the two peoples since the time of their separation in the sixteenth century. Count Charles Van Hoogendorp, a prominent member of the Dutch chamber, in a pamphlet entitled Séparation de la Hollande et de la Belgique, October, 1830 (Amsterdam), himself acknowledged the lack of sympathy between these peoples: “The difference of national character had engendered grievances, and these grievances had excited universal discontent, and national animosity. The division between the two countries existed de facto. Instead of a fusion, all the means employed to amalgamate the two people had only served to disunite them still further. This discontent was not the birth of a day; it dates from the first union of the two states.”

After peace had been restored in 1815, when Napoleon had suffered defeat at Waterloo, difficulties began at once. In March, 1814, Holland had adopted a constitution. Inspired by the old laws of the United Provinces, it was in the main strongly Protestant. Eleven Dutch, eleven Belgians, and two delegates representing Luxemburg were appointed to transform this constitution into one that could be applied to the new kingdom of the Netherlands. The commission proposed the introduction of equality and toleration for all creeds throughout the kingdom, and the creation of a two-chambered Parliament in which Holland and Belgium were to have an equal number of representatives, although the Belgians had 50 per cent more population. No national capital was specified, but the King was to be invested both at Amsterdam and at some city in Belgium. On these principles a fundamental constitution was drafted and submitted contemporaneously to the Dutch States-General and to the notables of the different Belgian provinces. The Dutch passed it unanimously; the Belgians rejected it by a vote of 1,603 to 527. This rejection was partly due to the unwillingness of the Belgian notables to legalize religious equality. The Dutch King, William I, decided to meet the difficulty in a simple manner. He announced that all who had abstained from voting should be counted as voting for the act, and that the 126 hostile votes still remaining as a majority against the act after counting in its favor those refraining from voting should not count, as the principle of religious liberty had been imposed by the Congress of Vienna and had to be observed. This method, which the Belgians called “Dutch arithmetic,” gave to the act 933 votes in its favor as against 670 hostile votes, and it was declared passed.

It became more and more clear that William I was not “the right man in the right place”: he was too Protestant, too Dutch, too autocratic for the Belgians. The latter soon complained of new grievances, among which the following were the most important: the imposition of the Dutch language upon all functionaries, whether civil or military, without granting time to learn it to those who could not speak it; the extreme partiality shown in the distribution of all offices and emoluments; and a financial system that bore heavily and unjustly on Belgium. The Belgians were made to contribute to the payment of debts incurred by Holland long prior to the union, and to pay for the defense of the Dutch colonies, which yielded them no returns at all. The Haute Cour, or supreme court of justice, and all other great public institutions were established in Holland. The religious grievances were also numerous: the government was ill disposed toward the Catholics, and it was supposed that it desired to “Protestantize” the people. Since 1815, the Belgian bishops, under the leadership of Monsignor de Broglie, bishop of Ghent, had dissuaded their flocks from taking the oath to a constitution that introduced liberty of worship. Moreover, in 1825, William I, imitating the plan formerly developed by Joseph II, had established a Philosophic College at Louvain where all priests would receive their education; and, claiming the monopoly for the state in educational matters, had suppressed the episcopal and other national colleges and free schools. Sundry oppressive taxes, repugnant to the habits and usages of the people, were imposed. The freedom of the press was destroyed, and journalists were continually prosecuted before the tribunals. The King even pressed into service ignominious French pamphleteers, expelled from their own country, who daily insulted the Belgians.

This was too much for the descendants of those who had fought the tyrannies of Spain, Austria, and France. Public opinion became excited, and in 1828 a union was concluded between the Catholics, partisans of tradition, and the Liberals, who had adopted the ideas of the French Revolution. Threatened in their common interests and privileges, Catholics and Liberals worked together to obtain redress of their grievances and to defend their liberties.

Like Joseph II, the Dutch King refused to hear their complaints, and continued to offend the Belgian people. In 1830 an event of great importance fanned the revolt into flame.[20] In July the people of Paris overthrew the French legitimist monarchy and the government of Charles X. Just as the Brabant Revolution of 1789 was inspired in the first instance by events in Paris and by the fall of the Bastile, so the “July days” gave the final impulse to the Belgians in August. On the evening of August 25, the Brussels Opera House gave a performance of Auber’s La Muette de Portici. When the hero of the piece sang the famous air appealing for revolt and liberty, the effect on the emotions of his hearers was such as to cause them to rush into the streets and then and there inaugurate a revolt against the Dutch. They sacked the house of Van Maenen, the unpopular minister of William I, and that of Libri, the editor of the official governmental newspaper, and attacked the homes of many against whom hatred had long been growing. A guard of citizens was raised to maintain order and a Committee of Regency was established in the Hôtel de Ville. The French tricolor, which had first been hoisted—and this proves the interference of French clubs at the beginning of the Revolution—was replaced by the old Brabant tricolor (black, yellow, red), which is now the Belgian flag. The other chief towns followed and confined their Dutch garrisons within the citadels and forts. Meanwhile a deputation was sent to the King, to petition for the administrative separation of Belgium and Holland, retaining, however, their personal union. William I, unaware of the gravity of the situation, paid scarcely any attention to the delegates. He sent a Dutch army nearly 10,000 strong, with many guns, under Prince Frederick, his younger son, to attack Brussels, where the revolutionists held the lower town. The troops fought their way to the very heart of the upper town, but were stopped at the Place Royale by the stubborn resistance of the Belgian volunteers. These were merely Brussels citizens, reinforced by 300 volunteers from Liège under Charles Rogier, 200 from Louvain, with Jenneval, author of the “Brabançonne,”[21] and others from various Walloon towns. For three days there was terrible street fighting, and on the night of September 26-27 Prince Frederick, with at least 1,500 killed and many wounded, admitted his defeat and left Brussels. Meanwhile a provisional government had been established, composed of Baron d’Hoogvorst, the commander of the volunteers; Charles Rogier, who afterward became the Belgian prime minister; Count Felix de Merode; Van de Weyer, afterward Belgian minister in London; Gendebien, the leader of the French party among the revolutionists, Joly, and De Potter. On October 4, 1830, this provisional government declared Belgium an independent state, and announced its intention of preparing a constitution which was to be approved and adopted by a national congress. A special commission decided, on October 12, in favor of a constitutional monarchy. The final decree of the congress establishing this constitution as law was voted on February 7, 1831.

The basis of the new Belgian constitution consisted of the charters and privileges of the different Belgian provinces and cities, which dated from the Middle Ages, and especially the “Joyeuse Entrée” of Brabant, of which mention has already been made. Other liberties, required by the spirit of modern times, were added: equality of all the Belgians before the law; freedom of worship, of the press, of association, of educational teaching, and the right to vote was accorded to all Belgians who paid a certain amount in taxes.

Some time after the provisional government had declared Belgium an independent state a conference of the powers was held, on November 4, 1830, in London, to consider the new situation created by the Belgian revolt: Van der Weyer was sent to represent the Belgian interests. On December 20, a motion made by the British delegate, Lord Palmerston, was adopted, which declared Belgium an “independent power.” The victory of the revolutionists was thus confirmed. At the same time, the plan of a small but active party among them, who had attempted the reannexation of the country to France, was defeated.

Another important question was now to be settled—the choice of a monarch for the new kingdom. The Belgian congress excluded the candidacy of the Prince of Orange, who was favored by England and Prussia, since the accession of this prince would mean practically reannexation by Holland. Under the influence of the French sympathizers, led by Gendebien, of the provisional government, and by its president, Surlet de Chokier, the Belgian congress decided to offer the crown to the Duke of Nemours, younger son of the French King, Louis-Philippe. This scheme could not be acceded to by England, since Belgium would then have been under the direct influence of France. The English ministry, on February 4, unanimously resolved to declare war on France if Louis-Philippe accepted the offer. So the French King was compelled to decline it on behalf of his son. Finally, on June 4, 1831, the Belgian congress elected Prince Leopold of Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha, widower of the Princess Charlotte of England. Leopold had fought gallantly in the army of the Allies against Napoleon in 1813 and 1814, and had just refused the crown of Greece. He was solemnly inaugurated at Brussels on June 21 as King of the Belgians. He was considered an English prince, and for the moment France resented his election; but Leopold quieted the jealousy of Louis-Philippe by marrying the daughter of the French King, Louise of Orléans.

Another question to be settled was the delimitation of the boundaries of the new kingdom. On January 20 and 27, the Conference of London had issued two protocols, proposing that Belgium be made a perpetually neutral state; that Holland take all the territory that belonged to the Dutch republic in 1790, and that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg become an appanage of the house of Orange; that Belgium should be charged with 16/31 of the national debt of the former United Kingdom of the Netherlands.

These protocols, favorable to Holland, were immediately accepted by the Dutch King, but unequivocally rejected by the Belgians. The second article of the London protocols robbed them of Dutch Flanders—the north of the ancient county—of the towns of Maestricht and Venloo and the strip of Limburg surrounding them, and also of the Grand Duchy, a part of the old Belgian province of Luxemburg. The loss of this territory seemed the more unjust as the inhabitants of those regions had participated in the Belgian revolt and did not desire annexation by Holland.

The negotiations between the powers and the Belgians would never have reached a settlement but for King Leopold. The Belgian King persuaded the Conference of London to supersede its protocols by a declaration in eighteen articles, leaving the matter in dispute to be directly negotiated between Leopold and William of Holland, with the good offices of the great powers. The Dutch King refused to recognize the eighteen articles and, on August 2, twelve days after the accession to the throne of Leopold, invaded Belgium. King Leopold displayed military skill and courage, but the Belgians had no strong army and their ill-trained troops were badly defeated at Louvain and at Hasselt. Impending disaster was prevented by the sudden arrival of a French army, sent by Louis-Philippe, to whom the Belgian King had appealed for help. The French repulsed the Dutch. This intervention of France seriously alarmed the other powers, and especially England. Fearing that French influence might regain a foothold in the new kingdom, they precipitately drafted another protocol, called the Twenty-four Articles, in place of the former eighteen, and took from Belgium the whole of the area in dispute, except the district of Arlon, in Luxemburg. Again the Belgians refused to be stripped; but the threat of invasion by a German army finally compelled them to accede. On November 15, 1831, Belgium, France, and England signed the Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles, to which Russia, Prussia, and Austria soon afterward assented.

This time Holland was unwilling to yield, and the Dutch refused to evacuate the territory they occupied, especially the citadel of Antwerp. A French army, under Gérard, marched for the second time into Belgium, besieged the Antwerp stronghold, and forced the Dutch to capitulate (1832). King William continued to refuse to subscribe to any agreement until 1838. Then, suddenly, he gave his adherence to the Twenty-four Articles. The Conference of London met again and, on April 18, 1839, the final Treaty of London was signed. The Belgians were given a large reduction in what was agreed should be their contribution to the debt of the Netherlands, but were forced to surrender the territories agreed upon by the treaty of 1831. They did it very reluctantly, but had no other choice.

This Treaty of London is the famous “scrap of paper” of which the German chancellor spoke so disdainfully on August 14, 1914. It settled the external relations of Belgium in Europe. By that treaty, Belgium was declared to be an independent kingdom and was to remain “a perpetually neutral state,” under the guaranty of the five great powers. The neutrality of Belgium had been imposed upon the new kingdom at the instance chiefly of England, who desired above all to maintain it as a bulwark against France. As King Leopold I himself writes to Queen Victoria on February 15, 1852, “this neutrality was in the real interest of this country, but our good congress here did not wish it: it was imposé upon them.”

Owing to the fact that so much has been said about the neutrality of Belgium since the beginning of the European war, it seems worth while to explain briefly what ought to be understood by the words “permanent neutrality,” used by the Conference of London.[22]

Article VII of the Treaty of London declares: “Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward all other states.” A distinction must be made between the neutrality imposed by this article on Belgium and the occasional neutrality of a state, which during a war between other powers wishes to avoid the conflict and, in a perfectly voluntary manner, proclaims that decision to the world. In the recent European war, the United States of America observed such an “occasional” neutrality.

Permanent neutrality is quite another thing. History shows that there are certain countries, certain geographical zones, which, by virtue of their situation, are in some way predestined to become periodically the theater of struggles between nations. The subjection of such a country to the exclusive influence of one great power has always marked a breakdown of the European balance of power. The idea of placing these zones by means of a treaty in the position of countries outside the possible zone of international conflicts corresponds to a general plan of establishing a régime of peace on the basis of reciprocal and voluntary restriction of action. From this point of view, neutralization is essentially a factor for peace. It follows that the state which is perpetually neutral has not only its own individual meaning and independent mission, but is an important “wheel” in the general policy. This is the case with Belgium, as it was established by the great powers after the revolt of 1830, and that is the true meaning of the statement that it was to be “perpetually neutral.”

Between the neutralized state and the creators of its neutrality there thus exist reciprocal obligations. The contracting powers between them undertake engagements whereby they guarantee to the neutralized state the privileged condition of enjoying permanent peace; while on the other side, the neutralized state accepts the obligations which protect the European balance of power. In that way, each of the contracting powers is bound not to attack the neutral state; not to invite it to abandon its peaceful attitude; to defend it against any power, co-contracting or not, which would compel it to abandon its neutrality. The inviolability of the neutralized territory is agreed upon by this means, for violation would mean for such a state a breach of its own neutrality. On the other hand, the neutralized state must itself defend its neutrality, and adopt all the measures needed for such defense. For this reason, international law holds that a neutralized state which commits an act of defense is not to be considered as being in state of war with the power which violates its neutrality.[23] Moreover, the neutral state must prevent troops or convoys of a belligerent power from passing through its territory.[24] Finally, such a state ought to remain a truly independent state, for if it places or allows itself to be placed in a position of dependence upon another power it destroys the European balance of power, the origin of its international status.

Some authorities on international law[25] maintain that in case of violation of the neutral territory by a belligerent, the contracting powers have not only the right, but the duty, to interfere ex officio, and to protect the neutral state by military power, even without the consent of the latter. On this point, however, opinion is divided.

Does the neutral possess the right to conclude alliances with a foreign power? This question is a little more difficult to determine exactly, but it may be settled in the following manner. Every alliance has in view the possibility of an armed conflict. It follows logically from this that the right of the neutral state to contract alliances corresponds very closely to its right of making war. If it is necessary to forbid such a state every alliance which would tend to draw it into an armed conflict with third parties, it ought to be granted without hesitation the right of concluding any understanding which should have for its sole object the protection of the nation against foreign aggression. And a defensive agreement tending to facilitate for the neutral state the carrying out of the part it is compelled to play in the maintenance of the European balance of power—the very basis of its neutrality—is certainly permissible, and, under certain circumstances, may even seem necessary; for example, when the neutral state seems too weak to resist by its own force a possibly powerful invasion. But it is obvious that the neutral state may never conclude either an offensive or a defensive alliance which would impose upon it the obligation of possible co-operation in the defense of a foreign territory. That is the true meaning of the permanent neutrality imposed on Belgium by the Treaty of London, and it will become clearer when we look at the subsequent facts of history.

In 1870, on the eve of the Franco-German War, Bismarck, with the object of alienating from France the sympathy of the neutral nations, and especially that of England, published a draft treaty, three or four years old, and in the handwriting of Napoleon III’s ambassador, whereby France was to annex Belgium. This publication aroused public opinion in England, and, giving expression to English feeling, Disraeli told Parliament that “the treaties on which are based the independence and neutrality of Belgium” had been concluded in the general interest of Europe and also with a very clear idea of their importance for England. He added: “It is a fundamental principle of the policy of this country, that the country situated along the coasts of Dunkirk to the North Sea islands should be possessed by free and prosperous states practising the arts of peace, in order that these countries should not belong to a great military power.” In conformity with these declarations the English government proposed to France and to Prussia to observe the guaranty by way of co-operation between the English forces and the forces of one of the belligerents against the other in case of the violation by the latter of the neutrality of Belgium. This arrangement was accepted on both sides, and laid down in the formal treaties dated August 9 and 11, 1870. Those special treaties were to be in force “during the war and for one year thereafter,” and the final paragraph expressly stated that, after this period, the regulations of the Treaty of London (1839) should be regarded as in force.[26] This treaty it was that was thought to protect Belgium when the country’s neutrality was violated by Germany on August 3, 1914.