FOOTNOTES:
[103] Report of James Gordon, in Napier, Montrose and the Covenanters i. 153. ‘Some were threatened and beaten who durst refuse, especially in great citys, as likewise in other smaller towns: namely at Edinburgh, St. Andrews, Glasgow, Lanark.’
[104] Burnet: Memoirs of the Dukes of Hamilton 409.
[105] ‘Statuentes ex pio eiga antiquum nostrum regnum affectu, ut omnia gratiose stabiliantur et instaurenter similiter adeo ac si nos in sacrosancta persona nostra ibidem adessemus.’ Letters of Authorisation of May 20.
[106] Articles of Advise offered to His Majesty, August 1638. They were signed by Hamilton himself, Traquair, Roxburgh and Southesk. Rushworth ii. 758.
[107] Narrative of proceedings, in Rothes 220.
[108] Note on the private articles: Baillie i. 469. Guthrie’s assertion goes somewhat further: ‘For the ruling elders, as there was but one from each presbytery, so they enjoined that he should be a well-affected nobleman, and failing there a well-affected gentleman; whereby it came to pass that all the noblemen who were furious in the cause were elected either in one presbytery or in the other.’ (p. 46.)
[109] Documents in Rushworth ii. 342. Aiton, Life of Henderson 358.
[110] Cp. Laud to Strafford. Strafford Letters ii. 265.
BOOK VII.
CONNEXION BETWEEN THE TROUBLES IN SCOTLAND AND THOSE IN ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE.
CHAPTER I.
CAMPAIGN OF CHARLES I AGAINST SCOTLAND.
Some few score of years before these events, the Aragonese had rebelled against Philip II for reasons similar to those for which the Scots rebelled against Charles I. The pressure of the ecclesiastical and temporal rule as exercised by that sovereign had made the Aragonese anxious for their ancient liberties: the Inquisition was as much hated by them as the High Commission by the Scots; and a trivial circumstance had sufficed to cause the nobles, the hidalgos, and the towns to revolt in quick succession. But Philip II had arrayed against the Aragonese the power of his principal state of Castile, to the position of which they feared to be reduced, had recovered their obedience by force, had still more narrowly restricted their ancient liberties, and had established the royal authority more firmly than any of his predecessors had ever succeeded in doing.
The cause of the Scots involved yet more serious issues than that of the Aragonese. If the Aragonese had been victorious, they would only have revived within narrow territorial limits a representative Catholic constitution, according to the ideas of the middle ages. The Scots on the other hand repudiated everything which reminded them of the old hierarchy and its alliance with the crown: they laid claim on religious grounds to a political freedom such as had never yet existed in the world.
So much the more did Charles I believe himself entitled to put an end to this movement by force of arms. Even at the time when Hamilton first went to Scotland, and expressed his anxiety lest he should be met by protestations and A.D. 1639. rebellious assemblies, the King had plainly said that in such a case he might collect troops and scatter the rebels. ‘But,’ rejoined Hamilton, ‘what if there be not troops enough found in the country for this purpose.’ ‘Then,’ answered the King, ‘power shall come from England, and I myself will come in person with them, being resolved to hazard rather my life than to suffer the supreme authority to be contemned.’ Hamilton had offered far more than the King originally intended, but, in spite of all his advances he had only awakened a more violent opposition. The letters in which he announces this result strike a chord of self-reproach, we might almost say of contrition, for he felt deeply that he had brought the King into an almost untenable position. On his return he expressed his conviction that the only course now open to the government was to crush the rebels by force of arms. It was intended that Scotland should be coerced by England, in the same way that Aragon had been coerced by Castile.
In the Privy Council and among the friends of King Charles this design was debated from various sides.
It was pointed out to him that a war between his subjects in the two countries, whatever the issue might be, could only bring loss to him who was King over both. And who, it was asked, could guarantee to him that England would bestow the assistance of which he stood in need? He would be conjuring up a storm which after such long years of peace would burst forth with all the greater violence. How much better under all circumstances was an agreement, more especially as mercy became a king.
In answer to this by the other side, it was said that the agreement must above all be such that the King should appear in it as master, and should assert his importance. Of all misfortunes which a sovereign could undergo, loss of authority was the worst; and the loss moreover was most severe, when he had intended to make an alteration, and had been compelled to withdraw it: the subject then became insolent, and the sovereign fell into the plight of being no longer master, but servant. What an unendurable position it would be to sit still and to go on making concessions to men actually engaged in rebellion. Even a serious war would be better A.D. 1639. than such a peace: and if the King would surround himself with trusty counsellors, would place the nobles under an obligation to his cause, be gracious to the people, and then courageously take horse, everybody would follow his example[111].
Still further considerations, of a less general but of all the more urgent character, are stated in the letters exchanged between the two men to whom Charles I was accustomed to give most heed, Wentworth and Laud. They found the reason of the embarrassment which had arisen in Scotland, not in the King’s design itself, but in the want of proper means for its execution. Wentworth said moreover, that if these rough spirits were able to carry out their disorderly designs against the honour of the King, the danger would be as great in England as in Scotland: that the peace of the three kingdoms depended on the course taken by this movement. Laud answers in similar terms. He adds, that if the King did not defeat the Scots, a second confusion would arise greater than the first, and that no one could see what this would bring with it in its train[112].
These two men were the principal supporters of the unparliamentary and hierarchical system which the King had undertaken to enforce. From the first moment they had felt the recoil of the Scottish movement upon both the other kingdoms: they saw that the whole system as well as themselves personally would be endangered by its progress: and they were of opinion that their whole strength must be exerted to put an end to it, cost what it may.
The assertion was advanced at this very time that an alliance between the Scottish and English nobles had preceded the disobedience of the former: that they had made an agreement in regular form to abolish the episcopal constitution, and to curtail the prerogative of the King[113].
A.D. 1637.
But this is without doubt too strong a statement. The Scottish nobles were aware of the discontent of a powerful party in England which was excluded from the government. They may have reckoned upon it, but at this time no proof is found of a formal agreement.
What is recorded of the alliance between the religious parties in the two kingdoms with a view to common action has greater credibility. A Scottish clergyman, who had long resided in London and returned to Edinburgh in the year 1637, brought with him from the English Nonconformists the assurance that as soon as anything was done in Scotland something would be attempted in behalf of Presbyterianism in England also. And, in fact, after the outbreak of the disturbances in Edinburgh, Puritanism bestirred itself in London as well. In Cheapside, Lambeth, and on the doors of St. Paul’s, placards were put up, in which complaint was made against the Archbishop of Canterbury for shedding the blood of the saints, and allowing Popish and Romanising tendencies to have free play. It is remarkable what a reaction at first arose in consequence. Archbishop Laud showed some courage in seizing that moment for establishing the supremacy of Anglican orthodoxy over Catholicism as well as over Puritanism. He had already long felt displeased at being sometimes hindered by the influence of the court, or of certain nobles, from enforcing the laws of the Church against Catholics as well as against Protestants. He made a bold effort to show the world that he was no Papist, and secured a decision in the Council that the old edicts against recusants should be revived and put in force. Catholic writings were again forbidden. Popish writers were treated with a severity similar to that which had hitherto been shown towards the Puritans. Laud himself had his old controversial writings against the A.D. 1637. Jesuits reprinted. Proclamations appeared which, although more moderate in language than before, yet indicated afresh that spirit of hostility to the Papacy which had originally characterised the Anglican Church as well as other Protestant bodies. Charles himself fully concurred in these proceedings. Cuneo had once complained to him of the Archbishop, on the supposition that every order proceeded from his individual determination. The King answered that the other members of the Privy Council as well held the same opinion. Cuneo took the liberty of reminding him of the conditions of his marriage contract, by which he had assured the Catholics of protection and care. ‘I shall never break these conditions,’ replied the King, ‘but with your permission I will show that I really belong to the religion which I profess. I know that the Pope wishes me to be other than I am[114].’
There is as little truth in the assumption, which has been often made, that the influence of Cuneo, and a tendency to Catholicism on his own part, had kept back the King from doing justice to the demands of the Scots. The King thought only of the supremacy of the Anglican Church: the regard paid to Scotland operated at first even to the prejudice of the Catholics, for the Archbishop wished above all to convince every one that he had no leanings towards them. But if the King and the Archbishop had hoped to calm men’s feelings by this means, they were mistaken. The English Puritans, no less than the Scottish, considered the demonstrations of the rulers of the Church against Catholicism a mask which they would soon let fall again. They thought that if the King wished to keep the Puritans in England in subjection, he must first put down their fellow-believers in Scotland.
With the religious agitation in England moreover there was now connected another of a civil character, which had reference principally to the interpretation of the laws. Just during those months in which the revolt in Scotland was gaining consistency, the question about the legality of ship-money A.D. 1638. which, as has been mentioned, the King allowed to be raised, came on for discussion before the Judges of the Realm during the term of their regular session, from the autumn of 1637 to the summer of 1638. Who does not know the passionate interest which is wont to attend proceedings of the higher courts of justice when they bear on unsettled political questions? This was strengthened by the compulsory exaction of the tax which went on simultaneously with the discussion of the point at issue. The Judges, who declared themselves in favour of the legality of the tax, incurred hatred and obloquy. But there were two of them. Crooke and Hutton, who pronounced against it. Their arguments agreed with the assumptions made by public opinion. They affirmed that the right to which the crown laid claim belonged to it only in very exceptional cases, and then only with the reserve of the subsequent consent of Parliament; but that in the present case such an extraordinary necessity had not arisen, and Parliament had now for some years not been summoned. The two judges contested the precedents adduced by the other party in favour of its own view: they looked upon the question as a simple controversy between legal justice and authority; and they threw themselves without reserve on the side of the former.
This however was no reason why the sentence of the majority of the judges may not have been consistent with former ordinances. The refusals of payment were condemned as illegal; but nevertheless the proofs alleged by the two dissentients had made an indescribable impression[115].
The government did not allow itself to be driven from its course in either of the affairs in which it was engaged. It both kept down the English Puritans, and continued to collect the tax to which exception was taken. But opposition and agitation increased daily in the country. The Scots stirred up this feeling with various pamphlets. They sought to make the English conscious that the cause of both countries was A.D. 1638. the same. And their example itself produced a still greater effect. From time to time anxiety was felt lest the Scottish uprising should spread over England[116].
While already, apart from other considerations, there was much to be said for the necessity of contending against the rising in Scotland in open war, it was also seen that the same course was necessary for the preservation of order in England. Hamilton, the mediator of peace, who had returned from Scotland after failing in his attempt, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, and the Primate of the English Church united their voices in favour of war. Without doubt their counsels were what determined the King.
But it is also clear that no one could think of claiming the help of the English Parliament in the conduct of this war, however important it might have been under other circumstances. The King indignantly rejected the advice to summon a Parliament; for what could he have found in that body but a combination of Puritans and men who had refused to pay ship-money, with those who supported on principle the rights and claims of Parliament? His intention was to carry on the war upon the strength of the prerogative of the crown with those forces which his income, that had just now been increased, as well as the voluntary offerings of the friends of his system should supply.
And his position in general depended upon his success in this undertaking. If the enterprise against Scotland prospered, the validity of the prerogative in England also was for ever established. The King’s hierarchical and monarchical system of government would have acquired double force through a victory won by his own strength. Thus in former times Philip II had first become completely master of his own kingdom by his victory over the Aragonese.
Charles I was not without a prospect of a like success.
Large sums were brought in by those contributions which the most eminent members of the English clergy, especially A.D. 1638. the bishops, agreed to make: for not only was the cause of the King in substance their own, but they wished besides to distinguish themselves by giving proof of loyalty. At the special request of the Queen the Catholics, who were again relieved from the burden of those oppressive measures lately mentioned, gave something, though not indeed very much, nor very willingly; for though they wished to acquire the favour of the King, on whom their very existence depended, they yet feared the vengeance of the enemy in case of a reaction. Among the high nobility also the King and his cause had some ardent adherents of both sexes who made large contributions.
Those feelings of personal dependence on the hereditary sovereign, which were the cement that bound together states of Germanic and Latin origin, were on the whole not yet extinguished in England. On the King’s declaration that he would display his standard in the spring at York, many gave in their names as volunteers. The gentry in the northern counties especially showed zeal and devotion. The militia was everywhere put under arms. In April we find an army of about 20,000 men, horse and foot, assembled around the King.
The army was not intended strictly speaking to invade Scotland. The plan, in the formation of which as in other matters the Marquess of Hamilton had great influence, contemplated only measures of coercion against the Covenanters. And as their principal strength was thought to lie in the town-populations, and the towns lived principally by trade, especially by trade with Holland, he had taken up the opinion that they would be compelled to submit, if they were cut off from this commerce. He went himself with an English squadron to the Frith of Forth in order to carry out this measure. The land-army was intended only to make a demonstration in his support, and above all to secure the Border against an incursion which the Scots might otherwise feel tempted to make.
Another design was entertained, which is worth mentioning, although it was not carried into effect. A couple of thousand experienced troops, made up of cavalry and infantry, especially arquebusiers, were to be transferred from the Spanish to the A.D. 1638. English service; and the Spaniards were to be allowed in return to enlist a corresponding number in the British dominions. These were to be conveyed to Scotland in Flemish ships, but at the cost of the English, and to be stationed in Edinburgh Castle either by amicable means or by force. From this point they were to be put into communication with the royalists in the northern counties, especially with Huntly, and with the town of Aberdeen. The power of the King would have become so strong in Scotland itself, that, under the influence of coercive measures adopted simultaneously by sea and land, the Covenanters in the capital and in the southern counties might well have been expected to consent to such an agreement as the King desired[117].
The prospect of a very widely extended alliance between various elements of strength had thus been opened: but to secure their co-operation, which was naturally difficult to bring about, diplomatic negotiations of the most prolix character with the courts of Brussels and Madrid were also necessary. While the King was still engaged upon them the Scots on their side were already making preparations for resistance.
But if success depended upon bringing over experienced troops from the Continent to Great Britain, this was far easier for the Scots than for the English. We have already mentioned in what numbers the Scots served under the Swedish flag in Germany[118]. If the Protestant cause which they defended in Germany were now to be fought for and carried through in their own native country, how could they hesitate to return thither? The heads of their families, for whom they still cherished an inborn attachment, now themselves summoned them home.
Among the Scots in the Swedish service Alexander Lesley had acquired a very distinguished position. He commanded the first troops which Gustavus Adolphus threw into Germany: he it was who, by crossing to occupy Rügen from Stralsund, A.D. 1638. had opened the Swedish war in Germany[119]. In the school of Gustavus Adolphus he learned to exercise the command-in-chief of an army in troublous circumstances. Chancellor Oxenstierna, who made him a field-marshal, afterwards employed him in the most difficult political and military enterprises. His exertions in the years 1635 and 1636 had almost the greatest share in establishing the Swedish supremacy in Western Pomerania. Even in Germany however he had been deeply affected by the disagreements between Scotland and England. The views of King Charles, which were at that time represented by Hamilton, when he appeared with the King of Sweden in order to bring about the restoration of the Palatinate, were distasteful to the Scottish troops: they wished to see their King a decided enemy of Spain and Austria. The Field-Marshal might consider that he was merely executing a flank movement in the great war if he went to Scotland and assumed the chief command of his countrymen, who now opposed the doubtful policy of their King, and undertook to maintain their religious and political independence against him. He had moreover a special inducement for going, because Lord Rothes, the head of the Lesleys, was the foremost leader of the movement. People had at first thought that the plain-looking man of mean origin and small stature, with a lame foot and already advanced in years, would secure little consideration among the proud and magnificent nobles. But what is more irresistible in the world than military experience, and more captivating than fame for generalship? Everything was swayed by his counsels. Following his example others also gave up far more lucrative and important positions in the German War in order to serve their country, so that a staff of captains and under-officers was soon formed who rendered the greatest service in training troops[120]. From their fellow-believers in A.D. 1638. Holland the Scots obtained munitions, and even some pieces of ordnance.
It was important for the Scots in the first place to guard against, or to render impossible, any hostile attempt on the part of England. Under Lesley’s guidance they turned their arms against the Castle of Edinburgh: the gate was blown open with a petard. Dalkeith and Dumbarton were taken possession of in like manner: the intended enlistment of Spanish troops was still far from being effected, when the royalists in the north of Scotland were compelled to submit, Huntly was taken prisoner in violation of a promise made to him, and was brought to Edinburgh.
Meanwhile, at the beginning of May, Hamilton appeared with his squadron in the Frith. Beacons upon the neighbouring heights proclaimed his approach to the country, and the whole people hastened in arms to both shores in order to prevent his landing. It is not clear whether he seriously intended to land. He contented himself at present with occupying the small islands of Inch-Keith and Inch-Colm, and of there stopping the Scottish vessels that were passing by. He did not let them go until the crews swore to him that they would stand by the King.
But the royal army also, under the command of the Earl of Arundel, had already arrived at the border. With a force the strength of which is rated at 20,000 men, and which was superior, at least in infantry, to that of the King Lesley advanced to meet him: he set up his camp at Dunse Hill immediately under the eyes of the King.
After the example of Gustavus Adolphus and Bernard of Weimar, Alexander Lesley also took pains that the aspect of the camp should correspond to the religious motives of the expedition, and nowhere could men’s feelings have been better prepared beforehand for such a proceeding than in Scotland. The soldiers were heard singing psalms or reading the Scriptures in their tents: the ministers were girded with swords or carried carbines: the more fiery their discourse, the more devoutly they were listened to. But whilst the Scots were opposing their King under arms, they did not wish to wear the appearance of being at war with him. A.D. 1638. They sometimes gave him a cheer: on the flags were to be read the words ‘For God, the King, and the Covenant.’ They did not wish to fight against the King, but against the bishops, by whom he was thought to be misled: they would not let their influence, so ruinous to Church and State, rise again, at least in Scotland.
How entirely different was the appearance which the English camp presented!
It was not merely that but few of the leaders had ever seen war: the soldiers were unaccustomed to strict discipline, and did not render to their officers that punctual obedience which military service requires. The Scottish soldier had few wants[121]; sufficient supplies had been provided from the capital: the English soldier had many wants; but the delivery of supplies was irregular. When the King showed himself they even cried out for bread. No trace was to be found among them of the military spirit of the time; and how should the episcopal system have been capable of calling out a religious zeal corresponding to the Puritan enthusiasm?
Charles I moreover had not been able to assemble, even for a military expedition, so many men of importance without bringing to light the political opposition with which he had to struggle. The Lords of the Opposition had not appeared with the arms and followers which they had been expected to bring. The King sought to assure himself of their obedience by means of an oath, in which they were to vow to serve obediently against all seditious combinations, even if they were formed under pretence of religion. Lords Brooke and Say and Sele refused to take this oath. The King, who when in the field demanded the absolute submission of his vassals, had them arrested; but on this a general disturbance arose in the camp. Their friends took the ground that the King had no right at all to demand a new oath, which had not been approved beforehand by Parliament. The rest of the lords went to the Earl of Arundel with a request that he A.D. 1638. would put himself at their head in order to represent this to the King[122]. Arundel called their attention to the danger which would thus arise to the King’s service, and promised them redress for their grievances. Legal authorities in London gave it as their opinion that the prosecution against the two lords could not be proceeded with. They were accordingly, after some days, set at liberty again.
Thus much at least was by this means made plain to every one,—that there could be no thought of an unanimous and decisive prosecution of the war in favour of the King’s prerogative, as connected with the authority of the bishops. The state of religious opinion shook the loyalty of obedience. The views of the Scots had penetrated even among those who were to have fought against them.
The Scots also on their part had reasons for not driving matters to extremities. An open conflict with the King would have fanned into bright flame the opposition in the North, which had hardly been quelled, and which was already stirring again, so that it would have been necessary to detach a military force to that quarter; and, as has been mentioned, such a conflict was no part of their original intention.
Hamilton had not long been stationed in the Frith when some of the leading Covenanters presented themselves for a conference with him, in which they offered to pay every kind of civil obedience to their sovereign, provided that they could obtain satisfaction as to their ecclesiastical institutions[123]. Hamilton applied to the King in reference to these proposals, and as from the beginning Charles had not intended to subdue the Scots by force, but only by taking arms to compel them to show greater compliance in negotiation, he now acceded to their proposals. On a further application, and on the appearance of symptoms of returning A.D. 1638. obedience in the army encamped over against him, he issued a safe conduct to his own camp for the four deputies whom the Scots appointed, that they might lay their demands before a commission nominated by himself.
The two armies had advanced into the field to meet one another, and lay encamped against one another in open hostility; but in temper they were not altogether opposed. In the one, obedience to the King had not yet been entirely thrown off: in the other it still reigned, but no longer in full strength. How then could men on both sides not hesitate before they caused fresh bloodshed between two nations of common descent, who had been closely connected together for the last century? Instead of fighting they began to negotiate. We must now turn our attention, not to deeds of war, but to arguments and counter-arguments advanced before an assembled council.
The royal commission was composed of men of very different views. With Arundel, in whose tent the meetings were held, sat Essex and Holland: among the Scots were seen some of the former champions of the movement, Rothes and Loudon. The negotiations began on June 11. Hardly had Arundel formally opened the conference when the King appeared in order to conduct his cause in person, for he could not let it be said of him that he was unwilling to listen to his subjects.
The Scots affirmed that their proceedings were in accordance with the acknowledged and written laws of the country. The King denied this: for how indeed could it be said that the last Assembly at Glasgow had been elected or held according to legal forms? In consequence of this he was also unable to regard their decisions as legal or to ratify them. He assured them that he had no intention of altering anything in the matter of religion or law which had been laid down by sovereign authority: but if he said one thing and they another, who, he asked, was to judge between them: who was to fix the sense of the laws?
This in fact was the question at issue. He had intended to decide it in his own favour by superiority of arms, and to break down the political and military opposition in which A.D. 1638. the Scots had engaged. As he had not succeeded in doing this, while at the same time matters had not gone so far as to compel him to an absolute surrender—for at all events he had achieved one object, and had in the first place secured England against an invasion of the Scots, which had been feared—no final accommodation could be expected.
The Scots declared in writing that their wishes were only directed to the maintenance of religion and liberty in accordance with the ecclesiastical and political laws of the country: that they would never desire anything which was not laid down in these; and that they were ready as loyal subjects to obey the King. Charles I replied, that if such were their wishes, they were also his own.
A movement towards an approximation now took place, in which however each side reserved to itself its own views as to what the laws really contained.
The agreement which was arrived at after some days (June 17), the so-called Pacification of Berwick, arranged that the Scottish army should be disbanded, the English fleet withdrawn from the Frith, the King’s castles with their ammunition restored to him, and that any vessels that had been detained should be returned to the Scots[124]. The King consented that in the following August first a free General Assembly, and immediately afterwards a Parliament also, should be held; that they should henceforward be regularly summoned, and that the one should have the decision of ecclesiastical, the other that of temporal affairs. He did not however consent to acknowledge the last Assembly at Glasgow as legal, from considerations, as was said in the proclamation, which were imposed upon him by the sovereign power which had descended to him from his ancestors. What were these considerations? Even if Charles I allowed everything which he or his father had lately introduced to be swept away, yet he would not permit that any part of it should be declared illegal or papistical. He would not allow the reproach of having ordained anything illegal to fall either on himself or on his father. He assented to A.D. 1638. the most important enactments of the Assembly at Glasgow; he assented provisionally even to the abolition of episcopacy; but he held to the view that the Assembly had been illegally summoned, and was illegal: that which might be reaffirmed in a new assembly approved by him, and that only, would he then ratify. In other matters also he clung with similar inflexibility to his conception of the supreme power which must remain in his hands. He was ready to allow periodical ecclesiastical and temporal assemblies to meet. His commissary was to be instructed to proclaim the meeting of such an assembly again within a year; but it appeared to him insufferable that he should be pledged to do this for all future time. If he allowed that his veto should not be exercised with regard to their next proceedings, he was yet resolved not to allow himself to be robbed of this veto for ever. But these are just the most important questions which arise as to parliamentary or representative forms of government. How could it be expected that the strong opposition between royal authority and the independence of parliamentary and ecclesiastical assemblies which was implied in these questions, and which had deep root in Scotland especially, should so easily be brought to a settlement without a real and strenuous conflict.
The news of the Pacification of Berwick was received with great satisfaction, especially in the Protestant world. That the Scots had not been overpowered appeared of itself to be an advantage; but it was thought moreover that King Charles would desire to give employment to the Scots in order to keep them obedient; and where else could that employment be found but in the German war? It is affirmed that Lesley offered him to lead his troops immediately to the Continent for the reconquest of the Palatinate; that he did not require the King to bear any other cost but that of their transport; for Lesley intended to maintain his Scots in Germany as Mansfeld and Wallenstein had maintained their troops[125]. King Charles is said to have entered for a moment into this plan. The rejection of his last overtures A.D. 1638. by Austria appeared to justify it, and no doubt all his affairs might, had he accepted the proposal, have assumed a different aspect. But so bold and reckless an enterprise was repugnant to his character. After some reflection he put it aside. Apart from his fears of strengthening his opponents at home, his relations with France and Spain were not in such a condition that he could throw his weight decisively into the scale.