FOOTNOTES:
[300] Mr. Godolphin. Cp. Verney, Notes 3 Dec.
[301] Journals of the House of Commons, 4th November, 1641.
[302] Copy of the articles, in Forster’s Arrest of the Five Members 114.
[303] Bates, Elenchus motuum 31: ‘Suasu quorundam qui a sacris erant, etiam ipsius parlamenti senatorum.’
[304] Journals of the Commons ii. 317.
[305] D’Ewes in Sanford 465, ‘(These five gentlemen) were sent to this day by the Earl of Essex—that the King intended to come to the House of Commons to seize upon them there.’ According to Verney they had at the opening of the morning sitting ‘information that they should be taken away by force.’
[306] Giustiniani 7/17 Genn. ‘La camera bassa dichiarò le accuse—per libello infamatorio—a disegno di portare all’ altra il decreto per approbatione: di questi atti disobedienti fatto consapevole nello stesso punto, il re sorti improvisamente della propria stanza e portatosi a quelle della guardia disse ad alta voce: Vasalli e soldati miei piu fedeli seguitate mi.’
[307] La Ferté: ‘Comme le parti de ce jour n’étoit pas bien fait pour le parlement j’en avertis mes amis qui y pouveurent, un quart heure devant.’ Probably La Ferté is ‘the noble person who wishes well to this nation,’ by whom, according to D’Ewes, Langres, a Frenchman by origin, was sent: the ambassador’s friend would then be Fiennes, for the tidings came to him, and he informed the Speaker. There is scarcely any room for the treachery often imputed to Lady Carlisle.
[308] I take this account from the detailed letter of Robert Slingsby, 6th January, who adds ‘another bold fellow in the lowest rank stood up against upon a forme and cryed the priviledges of Parliament: another cryed out the observe man.’
[309] Instruction to Nicholas, in Forster’s Arrest of the five members 269. Giustiniano: ‘Il re mostra gran cuore—ma sproveduto di danaro e forse di savio e fedele consiglio lascio dubbioso il fine.’
[310] From D’Ewes, in Forster 276, it seems to follow that the resolution was devised in Coleman Street, whither the five members had fled, and only accepted by the House.
[311] ‘The violating the privileges of parliament is the overthrow of parliament.’ Heads of the conference with the Lords.
[312] Aerssen: ‘LL Majestés me disants, qu’elles étoient assurées, que mardy ou mercredy ils viendroyent pour separer la royne du roi.’ Guistiniano: ‘Dubitando per avventura di quei mostruosi successi, che senza riguardo tengono di presenti in esercitio le lingue delli piu appassationati.’
BOOK IX.
THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR. 1642-1646.
In the states of Western Europe constitutional rights from a very early date had contended for the mastery against the supreme executive authority: but this strife assumed a new character, as to the principles involved and the system on which it was waged, from the date when the spiritual questions raised by religious controversy came to be mixed up with those purely political. In this respect creed made no difference. Starting from the demand for ecclesiastical uniformity, the French earliest of all sought, under the impulse of Catholic fanaticism, to confine their government within the narrowest limits in the sphere of politics also. In the year 1576 the Estates at Blois asked the assent of the crown to the resolutions passed by them: they wanted to exclude from the Privy Council all members hostile to them. In 1585 the Guises at the head of the Catholic League proposed assemblies of the Estates, recurring regularly every three years, which should keep a reckoning between prince and people. The chief among several grievances which roused the population of Paris to insurrection against Henry III was the tolerance accorded to the Huguenots in contravention of the old laws of the land. In the assembly of 1588 the Estates formulated the demand that the King not only should administer the finances with their co-operation, but also should in future neither declare war nor conclude peace without them. In the assembly of 1593 they proceeded to dispose of the crown itself: the doctrine was, that if the King disregarded the fundamental laws of his kingdom, namely the spiritual laws, his authority reverted to those by whom it had been conferred, that is to say, the Estates. It was only the departure of Henry III from the capital, and the military exploits of Henry IV, that preserved the personal authority of the French kings.
We may perceive at a glance the manifold analogies between the English events of which we are now treating, and those which had taken place in France half a century earlier. Both began through a desire to make the recognition of the exclusive dominance of one religion effectively binding on a government not decidedly inclined to that party: in both the one-sided tolerance displayed by the princes formed one of the chief grounds of complaint against them: the demand was not only for the full execution of the ecclesiastical laws, but also for the unconditional validity of the resolutions passed by the assembly of the Estates wherein these opinions prevailed, for periodic meetings of the Estates, and the dependence on them of the highest officials and of the entire administration—with this difference, that what in the one kingdom was desired for the benefit of Catholicism, in the other was meant to aid the Protestant cause. The religious principles were opposed to one another, the political were to a large extent identical.
In England however all was more deeply rooted and more firmly established than in France. The preponderance of Parliament was far more a matter of historical usage than the power of the Three Estates in France: it had grown up in far more intimate union with the feelings and habits of men. Further, while in France the motives derived from foreign connexions occupied the whole foreground, and were as clear as daylight, in England such motives were weaker and more obscure: the movement assumed a prevailing national colour. When at last after long disputes every chance of a peaceful result had vanished, it was obvious that in England the war must involve far greater danger to the crown. From the different development of the contending principles in the two countries arose the divergence in their later history. At that time the English crown was not yet without military resources, and the example of France might serve as an encouragement to challenge the fortunes of war on the King’s behalf. The English capital had taken as active a part in favour of the Puritan Parliament as the French capital for the exclusively Catholic Estates. Charles I had been obliged to quit Westminster and London as Henry III had quitted Paris: since the successor of the latter had within a few years made himself master of Paris, and had brought about a reaction at least in politics, might not the same future be possible for Charles I also?
CHAPTER I.
ORIGIN OF THE CIVIL WAR.
There is an important point of connexion between English and French history in the fact that the Queen of England was a daughter of Henry IV, and had her father ever in view as the ideal man and prince. She had grown up under the influence of those prevailing Catholic sentiments which her Florentine mother favoured, and in ideas of the unconditional supremacy of royalty and of the claims of birth, such as had come into favour under her brother: almost more than he she showed that the blood of Henry IV flowed in her veins.
We know how long it was before she could obtain any certain influence over her husband. He put an end, with a decision which no one would have expected in him, to the religious demonstrations of her household, of which she approved: he allowed no scope to her personal sympathies, which were directed across the Channel; he supported his ministers against her. For Charles I was fully conscious of his royal calling: he would not let his position be interfered with by foreign influences: only in cases of mercy was the Queen’s intercession ever attended to. Hostility to Cardinal Richelieu, who had deeply offended both the Queen through her mother and the King by his connexion with the Scots gave the first occasion for an understanding between Charles and his consort which was of importance in public affairs; it formed as it were a common interest between them.
The Queen reconciled herself to the dominion of Anglicanism, while it supported the prerogative, on which again toleration of the Catholics was based. Hence also attacks on the A.D. 1642. prerogative, the unconditional validity of which had been assumed in her marriage treaty, appeared to her like an assault on her personal rights. She had that fiery conviction of the truth of her creed which is frequently characteristic of clever women: they see in every deviation from it either error, or a wicked design, or actual crime: the feeling of being in the true faith fills them with pride and utter contempt for its enemies. How much more must this have been the case where religious hostility was in league with political attacks on the rights of royalty. In the efforts of the Puritan party in Parliament Henrietta Maria saw so many blows aimed at all human and divine rights. She had not yet fully converted her husband to these views, but she impressed him by her quick, spirited, and lively intelligence: events aroused in her a far more active spirit of resistance than in him: she divined the purport of the intentions of her opponents, and the inevitable results of the steps taken by the King. The fact that her views and predictions were justified by the event, gave her a double influence over him, so that he formed a very high opinion of her talents. Long as they had been married, she had never lost the traces of passionate affection: once, though half jestingly, she showed signs of a nascent jealousy: but the King wished to please her and go hand in hand with her; as her penetration convinced him, so too he loved to win her approval. Her judgment was especially decisive in personal matters: she boasted once that as soon as she had gained credit with the King, she had restored to his favour persons whom before he had hated[313]. Now however the bitterest hatred of Parliament was directed against all whom she favoured or listened to. Persons, at least as much as principles, were the great exciting cause of the movement[314]. The Queen herself was directly attacked and threatened by this hostility. To arm against the Parliament was for her a matter at once of self-defence and of ambition; she aroused for this end all the energy which the King possessed. A.D. 1642. Charles I desired to defend not merely himself but also his wife and family. In this community of interests, of opinions, and of dangers, the Queen obtained, if not absolute dominion, at any rate the greatest influence over the King.
Her fear lest they should be separated had contributed mainly, as we have seen, to their joint resolve to quit London. There was however in this no despondency: the court merely wished to save itself from being coerced by the immediate pressure of the mob: the plan of taking up arms and threatening the city itself was connected with this removal.
Parliament was greatly disturbed by the news that the officers and armed men who had been dispersed from Westminster had reassembled at Windsor. Digby told them that the King had retired from the city in order to avoid being trampled on. He himself appeared in the field at the head of a small body of men with his friend Lunsford, and was suspected of intending to seize Kingston-on-Thames. It may safely be assumed that this suspicion was well founded. Some months later the Queen frankly told a French agent that the purpose of herself and the King had been to seize, from Windsor, a strong place in the neighbourhood, but that this had become impossible when the Parliament placed troops between that point and the castle[315]. These were the militia of Surrey and Bucks, who were immediately despatched, and dispersed the royal troops before they had fairly assembled. Lunsford was brought back a prisoner: the subtle Digby escaped.
From Kingston, where there was a considerable magazine, the King would have been able to communicate with Portsmouth and Hull, as well as with the Tower. The attention of the Queen was especially directed towards Hull, where there was a great store of arms, enough, as was supposed, for an army of sixteen thousand men: but the project of making an immediate attempt upon that town was frustrated, as far as we can see, by the opposition of members of the Privy Council, A.D. 1642. who feared by such a step to provoke the Parliament to arms, with which they still wished to maintain a tolerable understanding[316].
The Queen was of an entirely different opinion: she held that the only way to arrive at an accommodation was first to come to a distinct breach; that only when the King had definitely opposed himself to Parliament would he find the means for resistance.
If however the court had no strong places at its command, the Queen could not stay in the country. She did not feel safe in any of the country houses and badly fortified castles which were at her disposal: she was afraid of falling some day into the hands of Parliament, a prospect which seemed to her both disgraceful and dangerous. The idea of her leaving the country for some time, which had often been thought of before, was now again mooted: there was a further reason, as she said, in the fact that her presence irritated Parliament against the King. Still a regard for her own safety and for the King’s negotiations was by no means the only reason for her departure: when the Queen fled, as undoubtedly she did, before enemies who were too strong to be faced, she hoped at the same time to be able to provide the means requisite for their overthrow. She resolved to conduct her daughter to the house of her future father-in-law, who would be greatly obliged thereby, for he had already through his ambassadors expressed a wish that this should be done, and would afford her support. She had jewels with her, including some left by Queen Elizabeth, and intended to sell them, or pawn them as security for the loan she hoped to raise: and she thought that with the arms to be purchased with the proceeds, or with the money in cash, her husband would be in a position to declare war if necessary. He promised her not to depart without her knowledge from the resolutions which they had adopted together, and especially to make no further concessions to Parliament. Prince Rupert of the Palatinate had already come to Dover with the purpose of taking arms in his uncle’s cause. He was told A.D. 1642. that the time was not yet come, and accompanied the Queen to Holland: but at Dover men spoke without any reserve of the probabilities of war within a short time[317].
All hope of an accommodation was not yet given up: the negotiations had not been altogether broken off by the King’s departure from the capital: on both sides they still thought it possible to avoid extremities.
On one of the most important questions there had been some approximation. The King had at last agreed to what the Lords, after the violent transformation of their house, had by a majority accepted: he prevailed upon himself to sanction the exclusion of the bishops from their temporal offices, and especially from Parliament. He had two motives for this; first, that otherwise the departure of his Queen would not have been permitted; secondly, that he saw no other means of saving the existence of the bishops in their spiritual character, the episcopal church government, which the opposition intended to destroy. He regarded Episcopacy as a divine institution which he durst not overthrow: but he held it to be allowable to surrender under the pressure of circumstances, he hoped not for ever, the temporal authority which had been committed to the bishops.
Even on the other great dispute, which was now prominent, concerning the chief control of the military power, the King had shown some signs of giving way. When towards the end of January he was urged to entrust the fortresses, as well as the command of the militia, only to persons whom the two Houses of Parliament should have recommended to him, he answered with much emphasis that the appointment of military commanders was one of the jewels of the crown that could not be parted with: but he added that he wished to know the names of the men in whom Parliament had confidence, as well as the extent of the power which they thought to confer, and the length of time for which it should be held. Such concessions were scarcely expected, and awakened in A.D. 1642. the country a lively hope that all might even yet be amicably settled[318]. What was the point at which this hope broke down?
Immediately after the King’s return from Dover to Greenwich the list of persons recommended, as well as details of the power intended for them, and its duration, were laid before him. In the names he found not much to object to: about the extent of power he raised some legal difficulties, which however might very well have been removed: but he was only the more resolute in his resistance to the terms suggested as to its duration. Parliament claimed exclusively for itself the right of revoking the appointments, as well as authority to punish any disobedience to its ordinance[319]. The King however had never intended to go so far. He might very likely have been persuaded to temporary compliance: as the scheme stood, it implied his renunciation for ever of all military authority. To this Charles I would not assent, declaring in the most emphatic language that he could not entrust to others the power placed in his hands by God, through the laws, for the defence of his people, at all events without being able at any moment to resume it. All now depended on whether Parliament would be content with this limitation.
There were not wanting some in the assembly who would have been satisfied with this, as the control of the army had always been a right of the crown. But what security would there have been in appointing military commanders whose powers might be taken from them by the King at any moment. The debate filled many with gloom and fear of misfortune[320]. Whatever they might do, whether they remained quiet, or regulated the militia under the authority of the two Houses, matters had come to a crisis, ‘to a desperate pass.’ In the Lower House the determination to adhere to A.D. 1642. their purpose, and consideration of their own danger prevailed. They first resolved that the King’s answer must be regarded as a positive refusal, and then agreed upon a new memorial, in which he was told plainly, that unless he declared himself ready to satisfy Parliament on this point, and that at once, through the members who presented the memorial, they had determined to take control of the militia under the authority of the two Houses, and the words were added, ‘for the rescue of the King himself and of his kingdom.’
Charles I replied that he was astonished at this message: his answer had contained all that he could grant in reason, justice, and honour. After a few days Lord Pembroke once more put the question, whether he would not, at least for a short time, surrender to Parliament the right of control over the army. The King answered, not for an hour: things had been demanded of him which had never before been asked of a King. He was now against any temporary concession.
Parliament however paid no further attention to him. They adhered to the fiction that the agreement of the two Houses implied the royal will, even when the King in person had in the most decided manner expressed an opposite view. After receiving his answer the Lower House passed a resolution that the kingdom should immediately be put into a state of defence under the authority of Parliament, in the manner already fixed (March 2). Some few lords of ancient name, such as Lindsay, Grey, Seymour, Capel, offered some resistance: but the majority agreed to the conclusions of the Lower House, and action was taken immediately according to their tenour.
The King was on his way to the North, when he received a declaration stating the reasons for these resolutions: he did not delay a moment the issue of a counter declaration (Huntingdon, 15 March) in which he repeated the contents of his last message; at the same time he called attention to the fundamental laws of the realm, one of which was that no subject was bound to pay obedience to any act or command to which the King had not given his consent. He stated that he required obedience to the existing laws, and simply forbade any compliance with orders not ratified by A.D. 1642. himself; both generally, and in special relation to the army, no ordinance was to be carried out in which he had no part[321]. He did not stop, it will be seen, at the immediate circumstances of the case, but raised conspicuously the great constitutional question which Parliament had decided for itself, or treated as if already decided.
The Parliament was not misled on either point: this time the majority of the Upper House took the initiative. On the evening of the 16th arrived the message from Huntingdon: on the evening of the 17th first the Lords and then the Commons adopted the resolutions, first, to adhere to their earlier declarations in relation to the army[322], secondly, that the Lords and Commons in Parliament possessed the full right of declaring what the law of the land was, and that to dispute or deny this, or to issue an order that any such declaration was not to be attended to, was a breach of the privileges of Parliament. Whoever advised the King, added the Lower House, to send this message, is an enemy to the peace of the kingdom.
This is the moment, if we would fix it exactly, at which reconciliation between the King and the Parliament became impossible. Hitherto the opposing manifestoes had always assumed the possibility of a reconciliation, although they obviously risked a different result: but the gulf between the King’s declaration on the 15th, and the answer of Parliament on the 17th, could not be bridged over: the two powers now stood most distinctly opposed to each other, both in their general claims and in their specific demands. The latter in fact implied the former: they formed a kind of summary of the whole dispute.
From this point the dissension, which hitherto had been confined to the constitutional authorities, spread over a wider field. King and Parliament together had formed the authority which every one was bound to obey: what was to happen when these issued contrary orders? The question A.D. 1642. to which of the two they would render obedience was set first before the commandants of certain fortresses.
In the first days after the King’s departure, when Digby and Lunsford were stirring, it was remarked in the city that arms and ammunition were being brought out of the Tower, and an unusual quantity of provisions carried in. Not only was this immediately forbidden, but also, in order to make it impossible, a levy of militia, under the command of Skippon, was stationed in the approaches to the Tower, and information immediately conveyed to the Common Council. The Lieutenant Constable, John Byron, was greatly astonished when the Sheriffs of London and Middlesex informed him of this arrangement. He declared to them that it ran counter to the privileges of the Tower, which he had received orders from the King to maintain. They referred to the commands of the two Houses, in which the royal will was contained, and threatened him, if he did not obey, with open force and a formal blockade on the side of the river. John Byron was the first to give utterance to those feelings of chivalrous loyalty, without any stain of factious ambition, which still survived in a large part of the nobility and gentry. He wrote to the King’s secretary that he would take care that, in conformity with his Majesty’s commands, he gave no valid cause for dispute: but he said that they were seeking occasion against him[323]. If they cut off his supplies, and attacked him with open force, he certainly could not promise, in the condition he was in, to hold out long: but they should purchase both the place and his life as dearly as he could make them[324]. It was not however to come to such extremities. The Commons preferred at once to request the removal of Byron: the King begged to know their complaint against him: they answered that in times of imminent danger the advice of Parliament was a sufficient reason. Charles I did not in fact dare to resist: for these were the A.D. 1642. days before the departure of the Queen, when he sought to avoid a formal breach. Byron was present at the sitting at which the King’s answer in the affirmative was announced. He said that only one charge could be made against him, of having been appointed by the King and being faithful to him and only begged to be allowed to resign the place into the King’s own hands. With the King’s consent the Tower was now finally handed over to a governor of the Parliamentary party, named Conyers.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Colonel Goring, commandant of Portsmouth, who this time did not flinch. He was summoned by Parliament to Westminster to give advice about arming the country: he delayed to appear for some time, and when no other pretext was available, declared plainly that he saw that Parliament was entering on an illegal course, and refused his obedience. He made his garrison take an oath of this tenour, and admitted within the walls of his sea-fortress none but undoubted adherents of the King.
A direct and typical conflict between the views of Parliament and of the King in relation to military authority took place at Hull.
Kingston-upon-Hull, which had grown from a fishing village to a considerable town, through its favourable situation for the northern trade, had been carefully fortified by Henry VIII, who devoted to this purpose some of the spoils of the monasteries. Strafford had placed a military magazine there to serve for the war against Scotland: since the disbanding of his army, the block-houses, castle, and magazine had remained under the charge of the magistrates and inhabitants of Hull. The attention of Parliament had long ago been directed to this place: the mayor had been requested to disarm all recusants in the city and its neighbourhood, as danger was apprehended from them. Now however that an open breach had taken place, the danger was grown most serious, particularly as the court at once turned its eyes on Hull. Parliament resolved to secure the place by a governor who could be fully trusted, Sir John Hotham. Hotham had taken part in the German war in the service of the Elector Palatine, and had been promised by the King the reversion A.D. 1642. of Hull, but afterwards had attached himself decidedly to the dominant party in Parliament, of which he was a member. He was a rude soldier, violent and ambitious, and had a very good idea of how to combine his opinions with his interests: he immediately sent his son to take possession of the post to which Parliament had appointed him. Meanwhile Lord Newcastle had also entered the town, though under another name, in order to win it for the King, and introduce a Royalist garrison. The mayor and aldermen of Hull were in the utmost perplexity; for the moment they admitted neither force, and prayed Parliament, through the representatives of the city, to come to an understanding with the King about the introduction of a garrison: but under the influence of the elder Hotham, Parliament spurned any such evasion of the difficulty[325]. In the city itself the magistrates were mostly for the King, but the greater part of the citizens inclined to the Parliament. Under these circumstances Hotham gained his point, and entered Hull with orders to admit none but Parliamentary troops.
The King had by this time (March 19) come to York: he had been inclined to return to Scotland, but the country gentry, as well as the inhabitants of the city, displayed so much devotion to him that he determined to remain. Both the interests of the county and his own required the occupation of Hull. There was no doubt that Hotham would reject every other measure: but would he have the face to oppose the King himself? Charles I, who in spite of so much contrary experience, was always persuaded of the vast influence of royalty, deemed this impossible, and resolved to go in person to Hull, and obtain entrance into its fortifications.
Towards the end of April the Elector Palatine, and the King’s younger son, James, arrived one day in Hull for the purpose, as they said, of inspecting the fortifications of the place in company with the governor. They were still busy with this, when the King sent word that he also meant to A.D. 1642. and that accommodation must be provided for him and his suite: he might have some three hundred men with him. But Hotham knew that if he admitted only twenty, he should no longer be master of the place, where there was still considerable number of Royalists. His resolution was instantly taken: he raised the drawbridge and informed the King who was already at the gates, in the humblest language, but still in direct terms, that he could not admit him without violating the confidence reposed in him by the Parliament.
The speech is extant in which Hotham justified his conduct to the inhabitants of Hull[326]. He declared that it was his duty to die for King and Parliament, but when there was hostility between them, he must obey the latter; that Parliament was entrusted by the King and nation with power to order everything that concerned the common weal: if it noticed dangers anywhere, it was bound by its duty to obviate them, and no one could then refuse obedience to it, without breaking his troth to the sovereign. He took credit to himself for what he had done, and said that he did not think to renounce his loyalty to the King in proving his obedience to Parliament for an example to others.
Thus was accomplished in a striking manner what had long been pending: the authority of Parliament as representing the nation, in military matters as well as all others, confronted the personal power of the crown, and that with a claim to superiority. The King was refused admission into one of his fortresses, in the name of the authority represented by the two Houses of Parliament, in which his own title was comprised. Charles I had to retire from Hull without achieving his object. He declared John Hotham guilty of treason: but Parliament replied by resolving that such a sentence on a member of the Lower House, especially without any A.D. 1642. judicial proceedings, was a new breach of the privileges of Parliament, and an illegal act on the King’s part.
Thus was one legality opposed to the other, one obedience to the other, one conception of the supreme power to the other: and the great question now was, which of the two would gain the upper hand in England.
There were still numberless persons who would not listen to the argument propounded by Hotham at Hull, but professed a doctrine totally opposite. The Lower House, they said, is elected by subjects, and represents only subjects: no sort of authority over princes can be conferred on it by them. Parliament appealed to the fundamental laws of the realm; but we must first know what is their true meaning: it seeks to give effect to the protest passed and sworn to three years ago, but in that the honour of his Majesty was reserved. The King has conceded all that can fairly be asked, perhaps too much: Parliament is openly usurping the whole executive power, and desiring to wield it at its pleasure: but there cannot be two swords in the kingdom. Certainly in obeying the King we have no idea of neglecting the duty we owe to the kingdom.
These opinions prevailed at York[327], whither the King returned from Hull: and once they were manifested there unmistakeably. In an assembly of the county gentry Charles I explained what had happened, adding that he would rather lose his three crowns than leave such an insult unpunished[328], and asked them to form a guard for his protection. What the King said of his own position was greeted with joyful assent, but what he let fall about the intentions of Parliament roused expressions of disapproval. In a second assembly, at Heworth Moor, near York, the freeholders and tenants also took part. The King appeared at the head of his newly-formed guard, both horse and foot: the nobles and gentry constituted the first, the militia A.D. 1642. the second. A proclamation was issued in which the King professed his adherence to the Protestant religion and the laws of the land, and claimed the support of the assembly in maintaining them. The Cavaliers waved their hats: the people cried ‘God bless the King’: yet even here there was not complete unanimity. There were still some Puritans and adherents of the Lower House in York who were encouraged to express their sentiments by the presence of some commissioners of Parliament. At the meeting Thomas Fairfax placed a petition of this nature on the pommel of the King’s saddle, who refused to receive it, as coming from a single man: it seemed to him sufficiently rejected by the joyful acclamations of his partisans. A devoted mob, of perhaps 20,000 men, attended him back to the city as if in triumph. The Cavaliers had the upper hand in York as decidedly as the Roundheads in London. The ancient nobility, such as the Savilles, who were now again firmly attached to the King, set the fashion which was followed by most of the city and county. The York people would scarcely endure the Londoners who were settled there in business: they regarded them as accomplices of those who had transgressed against the King. Three knights brought to the King as a present a charger splendidly caparisoned in the ancient style: the velvet which covered it reached to the ground[329].
Similar exhibitions of chivalrous and popular adherence were made in Derby, Lancaster, and other northern counties.
The thirteen counties of Wales unanimously rejected the requests made to them by Parliament, and assured the King of their entire devotion. The sheriff and gentry of Nottingham entreated Parliament not to expect them to make war on the King, to whom they were bound by the oath of allegiance and supremacy. This address is also remarkable, because it touches on all the questions which at that moment the men who had not yet committed themselves to a party were most anxiously deliberating. The theory of what might be considered lawful in England was discussed A.D. 1642. at length: the view taken is, that as the King and Lords can make no law without the assent of the Commons of England, so this threefold cord may not in any way be separated: the Commons with the Lords are equally incompetent to make laws, so that what the Parliament called laws were merely declarations of opinion, to which no one was bound to pay obedience.
From this point of view others sought to define more closely the relations of the three powers. The union of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms in the English constitution, contrived by the wisdom of antiquity, was, they thought, endangered by the demands of Parliament. The object of the monarchical form was that the country under one head might be able to repel foreign attacks and quell internal tumult, and for this it was indispensable that the head of the state should possess the right of making peace and war, as well as the nomination to the military and great civil offices: he must have the power to enforce the laws. The House of Commons was not intended to take part in the government, or to nominate those who were to conduct it, though it possessed the initiative in the imposition of taxes, and the right of impeaching those who might misuse the power entrusted to them by the King. The function of the Upper House was to hold the balance between these two powers. The absolute power which ruled the country was composed of the union of the royal prerogative, the judicial power of the Lords, and the legal privileges of the Commons[330].
The assumption in this argument is that the laws, by which the limits of each power within the constitution were defined, were old and well-known: as in earlier times the King, so now the Lower House was reproached with misunderstanding the laws and exceeding its powers.
This accusation could certainly not be controverted from A.D. 1642. the point of view of the existing constitution. The chief efforts of the dominant party had been hitherto directed to forcing the King to assent to the bills submitted to him: he had quitted the capital in order to escape further pressure: their proceeding, in spite of his refusal, to give effect to their own views, and this in matters of the highest importance, was an open violation of the existing constitution and of the recognised mutual rights of the parties. They acted as though the King’s consent was no longer necessary: Henry Martin once propounded the theory that as the opinion of all the Commons of the realm was implied in the vote of the Lower House, so the King’s consent was included in the vote of the Lords[331]; that the Parliament of the realm was his great council, whose opinion he must follow; and that the old Norman formula of refusal ought to be abolished.
The zealous adherents of Parliament did not repel the charge of transgressing the laws: they accepted it. Their doctrine was—starting from Oliver St. John’s language on the Bill of Attainder—that Parliament could not be bound by written laws, for that the legislative power in the fullest extent belonged to it, which meant merely equity applied by common consent to politics: that inferior tribunals were bound by written laws, but not the highest, which would cease to be such if bound[332]. This theory distinguished between fundamental laws and principles, recognising only the latter as conclusive.
The view which some years later John Milton sought to uphold, namely, that Parliament was not co-ordinate with the King, but superior, rested on the same basis. For, he argued, the King governs through the laws; the Parliament, even in the absence (as then) of any King’s assent, makes and repeals them, so that Parliament is above all positive law. Thus a power, if not literally absolute, yet exalted above the law, such as the King claimed, was ascribed to Parliament.
A.D. 1642.
The Parliament still avoided expressing or sanctioning on its own part these ideas, which had been generated in theorising minds by its position and growing strength: it adhered above all to its practical demands.
These were once more laid before the King in definite form in the first half of June. They are the so-called nineteen propositions, a sort of programme of the condition into which it was sought to bring the nation. Three demands were therein specially put forward: one religious, for the change of the existing state of things in relation to church government and the liturgy, in conformity with a consultation to be held with learned theologians, and with the resolutions of Parliament: one political, that all nominations to high offices should require the approval of the two Houses, and that even the Privy Council should consist of only a fixed number of persons, all of whom must be approved by both Houses: finally one military, that the proposals in reference to the militia should be accepted, at least temporarily[333]. The King answered that were he to assent to these propositions, he should not be able to fulfil the duty incumbent upon him: they were the sort of conditions that are made with a prisoner.
While thus definitely refusing, he was already aware that he had by no means the unanimous opinion of Parliament opposed to him. We have already more than once mentioned the discussions within the House on the most important questions; the first on Strafford’s attainder, the second about the attack on Episcopacy, and the preparation of the Remonstrance: but the majority had always persevered in the course once adopted. Now came the third and greatest division. In spite of the protests, to which several lords had resorted, the resolutions about the militia were passed, and the nineteen propositions laid before the King as the terms of Parliament. Seeing that thus the ancient constitution of the country was threatened at once in spiritual and in political matters, a number of Lords deemed it their duty, and had the courage, to separate from Parliament. At the sitting of A.D. 1642. May 30 the Upper House was informed that twelve Lords at once had been seen on the road to York, and then actually in that city. They were Monmouth, Northampton, Salisbury, Devonshire, Dover, Dunsmore, Andover, Capel, Rich, Grey, Lovelace, and Coventry. Soon followed men like Lord Hertford, who had taken a great part in the beginning of the movement. A certain vacillation was exhibited by some before they took the step, by others after it; but the majority were fully determined, and held to their purpose. The number was soon so great that it seemed less wonderful that they should be gone, than that the rest should stay behind at Westminster[334]. It was regarded as an event of great importance when Lord Littleton carried off to the King the Great Seal, in conformity with a promise made at the time of receiving it, a feat not accomplished without some stratagem and danger. A number of the Commons also repaired to the King, around whom was formed a company that professed to represent the State, and treated the acts of the Parliament at Westminster as lawless usurpations.
The Lords however did not join the King unconditionally. A mutual engagement was entered into, on the basis of maintaining the English constitution. The King promised the Lords to require from them no other obedience than was grounded on the laws, and to take under his protection every one who refused to obey the declarations and orders of the two Houses at Westminster. The Lords undertook to defend the King, his crown, dignity, and rightful privileges against every man, and to obey no orders not warranted by the laws: especially they pledged themselves to this in respect of military ordinances lacking the King’s assent. Both parties bound themselves to support the true Protestant religion, as by law established,—thus excluding Presbyterianism,—the lawful liberties of the subjects, and the privileges both of the King and of Parliament. The King says ‘the just privileges of the three estates of Parliament[335],’ which included the restoration of the bishops to A.D. 1642. their parliamentary rights: the Lords say ‘the just privileges of your Majesty and your two Houses of Parliament.’ Twenty-five Lords signed the agreement on June 13, 1642.
These promises were given and these declarations exchanged by way of opposition to the demands contained in the nineteen propositions[336]. For a moment they flattered themselves that the weight added to the King’s cause would incline the Parliament to more peaceful views: but the contrary happened, the feeling of hostility grew with the number of enemies.
The Parliament complained of the evil-minded persons about the King, called Cavaliers, who had no respect for the laws, and no fear of God or man: that in York nothing less was intended than the dissolution and overthrow of the government of the kingdom. In language of earnest apprehension it warned one and all to aid in averting this pressing danger according to the promise contained in the protest. The Lords at Westminster also, under the influence of a document that reached them, declared it necessary to provide for the safety of the King and the kingdom[337]. Thereupon, in complete contravention of the royal decrees, the militia in the city and neighbouring counties were put under arms, voluntary contributions were collected, and a loan made.
The associated Lords at York declared in reply that it appeared from the parliamentary papers which had reached them, that the sacred person of the King, religion, the liberty of the subject, Parliament and its rights, were all in danger[338]: in order to assist the King in their defence, they proclaimed a levy of cavalry, which all of them promised to raise, and to maintain in the field for a fixed time.
On June 17 the assembly at Westminster, on June 22 that at York, declared the country in danger, each through the other; and they proceeded to arm against each other.
A.D. 1642.
We see now how it came to such an extremity. It is obvious that this idea was eventually entertained through the Queen’s influence, before her departure: but all still depended on whether an accommodation was possible in respect of the military power. The King was willing for the time to admit the participation of Parliament: but the latter claimed not only the recommendation of commanders for that occasion, but also that their removal should be made to depend exclusively on the vote of the House, and required the unconditional obedience of the country to its ordinances. This would have deprived the King for ever of the sword, and made the Parliament master in his stead[339]: the King would not go so far, nor would the majority of the nobility or of the gentry allow it. For they thought that the sword did not belong to Parliament, and that absolute executive authority was not its function: moreover resistance was contrary to the old doctrines of the established Church. The contest was not between absolute power and a democratic republic, though these ideas at times appeared in the background. The one party in fact desired Parliament not without the King, the other the King not without Parliament: but the one sought to maintain the autonomy of the throne and of the Church, and the estates of the realm as hitherto constituted, the other would shake the foundation of the Church, and subject the crown unconditionally to Parliament. On this question a dispute broke out within the legislative body itself: part broke loose from the rest, and joined the King.
As now both sides had formally decided to make preparations for war, the whole country immediately became involved in the hostility between them. In all the counties the Parliamentary ordinance and the full powers conferred by the King on his adherents (commission of array[340]) encountered one another, both couched in the same terms, both directed to the same end, yet diametrically opposed to each other in intention.
A.D. 1642.
In the eastern counties the influence of the capital gained obedience for the ordinance; in the northern, through the influence of York, the commission gained the upper hand; but neither unopposed. In the midland counties the chiefs who had declared for the opposite sides contended together: in Lincoln, Willoughby of Parham and Lord Lindsay; in Leicester, the Earl of Stamford, who had been deputed by the Parliament, and the sheriff appointed by the King, Henry Hastings, son of the Earl of Huntingdon; in Northampton, the Brookes and the Comptons; in Berkshire, the Earl of Holland and Lord Lovelace; and others elsewhere. In Oxfordshire the Earl of Berkshire encountered Hampden, and was arrested by him. As in Derby the Royalists, so in Wiltshire the adherents of the Parliament under Lord Pembroke, preponderated. In Lancashire and Cheshire Lord Stanley mustered in three separate places bodies of 20,000 men, all armed with muskets and pikes, and ready for the King’s service: but this powerful levy, besides awakening jealousy at court, aroused the opposition of the lesser magnates, led by some members of Parliament[341]. William Earl of Hertford, to whom the King had entrusted seven Welsh counties, and ten others bordering on them, made a great figure; but he was not undisputed master of them: in Gloucestershire Parliamentary opinions prevailed, and in Pembroke they were gaining ground.
The leaders of the Parliamentary majority however derived their main strength from their alliance with the capital. Here the Common Council, with the aid of Parliament, had completely thrown off the authority of the chief magistrate. He lost the right which he had hitherto enjoyed, of summoning and dismissing the council, as well as the initiative in its deliberations. His votes were swamped by the great number of the rest; the King’s adherents were ejected: one of the Puritan leaders succeeded to the Royalist lord mayor. A committee was appointed to find means of defence, which controlled the city militia, and in which the Puritans had a A.D. 1642. majority. In the city there were now no preachers except of this persuasion; all others had been removed or silenced. From the pulpits not merely religious but also political opinions were taught: those were counted as the most faithful who were most eager for war with the King, and contributed towards it[342]. Under these circumstances the proposal of the Lords to form a sufficient fund for the maintenance of the army, obtained full approval[343]: and their reasoning was also calculated to make an impression. They observed that the whole kingdom might serve as their security: if Parliament prevailed, every man’s loan would certainly be returned with interest: otherwise not that only, but everything else they possessed would be endangered. The citizens vied with one another in bringing in their gold and silver. The preparations of the city were far in advance of those in the country.
Following the example of the Common Council, Parliament now appointed a committee of safety, as it was called, for the defence of Parliament and of the realm, and to repel all armed opposition. We find among its members Pym, Hampden, Martin, and Fiennes, as well as some more moderate men, such as Hollis and Stapleton: of the Lords there were Essex, Northumberland, Holland, and Say. From this committee proceeded the proposal, which was adopted by a resolution of July 12, that an army of 10,000 men should be raised, and the Earl of Essex placed at the head of it.
Essex and Holland had refused compliance with the King’s orders to follow him and discharge the duties of their offices, and committed themselves fully to the Parliament, which in return took them up very warmly. When now Essex made up his mind to take command of the armed force that was being raised against the King, every one saw that he was thus offending beyond forgiveness, and staking his whole future on the issue: the Parliament in return pledged itself to live and die with him. His support was of indescribable importance to the progress of the cause. He was esteemed steadfast in his A.D. 1642. opposition, and enjoyed the full confidence of the Presbyterians[344]. The memory of his father made him popular in the country: he himself had been at first courted, afterwards neglected by the government of the Stuarts, and seemed to have some claim against them. The ease with which the Parliamentary army was levied was ascribed to his name and zeal: he chose as his subordinates men conspicuous in the dominant party. Balfour served as lieutenant-general; among the colonels of foot we find Brooke, Mandeville, Hollis, Hampden: among the captains of horse Cromwell, Fiennes, and Haslerig. On the same principle on which the general chose the colonels and captains, they made up their regiments and companies, and clothed them in their colours[345]. The army thoroughly represented the ruling party, which held general control of the war, as yet without marked separation between the Presbyterians and the Independents.
Parliament took charge of the revenues, collected the customs, contracted loans, controlled the exchequer: it had already succeeded in getting into its hands the national fleet.
Algernon Percy, Earl of Northumberland, had at an earlier time been raised by the special favour of the King to the dignity of high admiral: he had however long detached himself from the policy of the court, both on principle and from dislike to the persons highest in influence there: in the military question he took the side of the Parliament. His vice-admiral, Pennington, had drawn on himself the ill-will of Parliament by aiding the flight of some of the accused ministers: it desired to displace him, and designated the Earl of Warwick as his successor. Northumberland, against the well-known feeling of the King, lent his aid to this. The King fell into a violent passion and pronounced the dismissal of Northumberland, who without a word laid down his office, saying that it would ill become him to seek to hold, against the King’s will, a post which he owed to his extraordinary A.D. 1642. confidence. The effect of this obedience was however very disastrous for the King: the Parliament at once made Warwick admiral, with all the powers that Northumberland had enjoyed. The King might say what he pleased: with very slight difficulty the fleet passed under the supreme command of Warwick. It had cost the King immense pains to raise this fleet: he had quarrelled with his people about the means of maintaining it: and now without resistance it became subservient to the Presbyterian and Parliamentary interests.
We must not omit to notice that the leading men in this matter were connected by close ties of relationship. The great favourite of Queen Elizabeth was the father of the Earl of Essex: he had two sisters, of whom one was the mother of Northumberland, the other of Warwick. Among these the Earl of Warwick had undoubtedly the most resolution and the most active spirit: he was the man who had sustained Presbyterianism in England in the times of greatest oppression, and had chiefly promoted the religious emigration to America. In him the temper which broke down the ecclesiastical and royalist system of the Stuarts found its most lively expression: without being altogether correct in his morals, he stood at the head of the strict Presbyterians: he was enterprising, determined, irresistible. As Mandeville had been led by him to join the party, we may assume that he exercised decisive influence over his nearer kinsmen, who besides were so inclined already.
Their position is not without analogy to the political circumstances of the first Essex. He too desired to overthrow by popular assistance an administration of Spanish and anti-Protestant tendencies. Now it had come to pass that his son and nephew were at the head of the land and sea forces of England, in direct opposition to the King and his advisers.
If we consider the extent and the concentration of the Parliamentary strength, we shall almost wonder that the Royalists, ill organised, and deprived of the ordinary resources of the supreme power, should have ventured to take the field against it.