FOOTNOTES:
[1] Aluise Contarini, 20 Agosto 1628: ‘Essendo trattenuto ben quatro hore a disputar, risolver et adomesticar il negotio: sempre coll’ assistenza di Carleton che in questo fatto si è portato egregiamente.’
[2] ‘Tutto è vero, ma il mio honor importa più.’
[3] ‘That they should hazard for the relief of the town all his ships, that he purposed not to have it left re infecta, whatever it might cost.’ Mead to Stuteville, in Ellis iii. 269.
[4] Contarini, Nov. 18. ‘Non può con doppio dishonore et parlare et perdere.’
[5] Contarini to Zorzi: ‘Mi manda a dire in molta confidenza che non vorrebbe disgustar il re interessandosi troppo in questo affare.’
[6] ‘S’il y a quelque chose à ajouter ou à diminuer, se fera de part et d’autre de gré à gré.’ Traité de paix fait à Suze, 24 Avril 1629, Art. iv. Dumont v. ii. 580.
[7] Zorzi to Contarini, Jan. 20, 1629: ‘Che la Francia non vorrebbe servirsene, che da sola apparenza senza sturbar il riposo del re et il gusto degli Inglesi.’
[8] Contarini to Zorzi, Nov. 21: ‘Questo parte (l’Inglese) piu non insiste d’esserne direttrice—punto grande guadagnatosi—ma vederebbe volentieri che Ugonotti non si dolessero da lei che li havesse abbandonati et il re vi ha riflesso.’
[9] A. Contarini designates this view as ‘la massima con la quale credo d’ haver portato questo negocio.’ (8 Giugno 1629).
[10] Cp. Slange ii. 1. 378. Schlegel’s doubts are done away by the news which Anstruther gave to England about the ‘abboccamento seguito tra il re di Danimarca e Suecia, et i buoni concerti stabiliti tra loro per difesa del mar Baltico.’ Dispaccio Veneto 1 Mayo, 1629.
[11] Aitzema: Saken van staet en orloogh i. 243. Contarini avers that the squadron, consisting of five ships, had gone in the direction of the Elbe.
[12] ‘Istis locis nullam esse classem, deesse navigia, quibus bellum mari possit sustineri,—Danis in promtu esse classem quam indies Sueci, Angli, Batavi novis augeant subsidiis.’ Extract from the report of the Generals in Adlzreiter, Ann. Boici iii. 1821.
[13] Contarini, 29 Giugno: ‘Per unir seco con qualche buon concerto tutto questo settentrione.’
[14] Contarini, 2 Giugno 1628: ‘La pace gridata a piena bocca dei popoli o con Francia o con Spagna o con tutti, rispetto al commercio.’
[15] ‘Je ne doute pas, que Rubens n’ait declaré nettement ce que Gerbier lui a proposé.’ Lettre de l’Infante 1628, 31 Mai (Gachet, Lettres de Rubens); so that it seems as if people in Spain had doubts about it.
[16] ‘Che si confermi semplicemente l’ultima pace fatta col re Giacomo, lasciando il negotio del palatinato vergine senza parlarne, admettendosi nel resto in quel trattato l’assistenza a stati et altri amici di questa corona.’ Contarini (here our principal authority), 20 Luglio 1629.
[17] According to Contarini (Aug. 3) we must date the decisive meeting of the Privy Council on July 19/29, 1629.
[18] There is an order to the vice-admirals extant, dated March 8, 1630, in which they are admonished to allow no rudeness or insolence to be shown to the ambassador of the King of Spain, who was expected to arrive shortly. Bruce, Calendar of State Papers 1630, No. 50.
[19] Contarini gives us part of the contents of a note of Coloma to the King of England: ‘Pienissima attestatione che nel cattolico sia vivo e cordiale desiderio de sodisfare al re della Gran Brettagne in tutto quello pin si possj—che per ridurre in stato di riuscita il negotio della restitutione del palatinato sia necessario che prima di tutte le cose segua la pace tra le due corone nella quale debbe esser incluse il principe Palatino.’ (26 Aprile 1630).
[20] ‘A writing under the King of Spain’s own hand and seal, promising never to take off his hand from that negotiation, until the King our master should have entire satisfaction touching the restitution.’ Windebank to Aston, in the Clarendon State Papers i. 780.
[21] Letter from the King to the Queen. Rushworth ii. 61.
[22] ‘Though I am not much rejoiced at it, yet I am so confident on my dear brother’s love and the promise he hath made me not to forsake our cause, that it troubles me the less.’ (Elizabeth to Carlisle, June 1630, in Green’s Princesses of England v. 482).
CHAPTER II.
SHARE OF ENGLAND IN THE EVENTS OF THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, 1630-1636.
Charles I had told his sister that the conclusion of peace with Spain did not hinder him from forming an alliance with Sweden. And in fact, in the summer of 1630, as soon as Gustavus Adolphus appeared in Germany, we find one of the principal nobles of Scotland, James Marquess of Hamilton, collecting English and Scottish levies with the support of the King, who handed over to him the proceeds of a Scottish tax for that purpose. One part of this force embarked at Leith, the other at Yarmouth; and towards the end of July 1631 they landed at Usedom, as Gustavus Adolphus had done a year before. The English have always affirmed that the arrival of Hamilton with a considerable body of troops contributed materially to the decided successes of this year of the war. And with good reason; for they gave the Protestant princes greater confidence in their cause and made the Emperor anxious for his territory of Bohemia. Hamilton was one of those personages of high rank who gave themselves up to the cause of the Queen of Bohemia with chivalrous devotion. While the King of Sweden was pressing forward into Saxony to try his strength against the arms of the League, Hamilton guarded the passage of the Oder to provide for the possible contingency of a retreat: but after the decisive battle at Breitenfeld, not far from Leipsic, he turned his steps to Lusatia and Silesia. How advantageous would King Charles have found it for his purpose, which he thought to promote by combining Spanish influence and warlike demonstrations in support of it, if he A.D. 1631. had been able to offer places in Silesia in exchange for those in the Palatinate! Hamilton had taken Guben, and was on the way to Glogau, when Gustavus Adolphus, chiefly out of regard to Saxony, gave him orders to turn aside towards the Elbe to besiege Magdeburg. Hamilton looked upon this as an intentional injury done to Queen Elizabeth and her consort. As the King of Sweden was advancing into West Germany without a check, Hamilton hurried after him, hoping to be put at the head of a separate division, and charged with the reconquest of the Palatinate. But the number of the Scots and English had already melted away to a great extent, owing to the unhealthiness of the climate and to their marches through a devastated country: they were besides at variance among themselves, so that he now threw no weight into the scale. It was intimated to him that every one knew quite well that he was not prosecuting his own cause, but that of the King of England: but that no one would help him to attain his party-end by these means.
Gustavus Adolphus was convinced that the enemy would not be able to drive him out of Germany. He was more afraid of the coldness and jealousy of his allies, who could easily undermine his authority[23]: and he looked upon Charles I as one of them.
At Frankfort on the Main Henry Vane presented himself before Gustavus Adolphus as ambassador of the King of England, in order to invite him to restore the Elector Palatine to his country. The King of Sweden made various objections, founded on his relations with France, which was again showing much regard for the Catholic princes; but he principally urged the request that King Charles should break with Spain[24]. People feared that whenever the King of England saw his brother-in-law restored, he would throw himself entirely on the side of the Spaniards. If, as Charles I said, his relations were such that an agreement with Spain did not prevent him from forming a connexion with Sweden, they yet involved the consequence that this was never very A.D. 1632. close; for Sweden was allied with France, whose interests ran exactly counter to those of Spain.
Gustavus Adolphus saw with pleasure that the Elector Frederick, with the support of the States-General, of the Prince of Orange and the King of England, joined his camp and followed it for a time. Frederick was present when Gustavus Adolphus conquered Kreuznach, formerly one of his towns; and it appears possible that the reviving affection of his subjects contributed to the result. A couple of English regiments were also engaged here[25], and Frederick welcomed them with satisfaction. He attended the King on his victorious march to the Lech and into Bavaria; every word the King uttered strengthened his hopes of returning in a short time to his country as sovereign. But when he now desired to come forward on his own account and to arm, Gustavus Adolphus would not accede to his wish. He gave him to understand that this would interfere with the success of his own enlistments. The King even hesitated to replace in his hands the government of those circles of the Palatinate which had been reconquered; at all events he annexed to his consent the condition that the Lutherans should be allowed free profession of their faith. Everything led men to expect that if he wrested from the Spaniards the two strongholds which they still retained, he would keep them for a time in his own hands. Even in this moment of apparent success Frederick endured hours of sadness and heavy sorrow of heart. He once with tears in his eyes told Hamilton and Vere that he had rather be out of the world than obliged to submit to the conditions imposed by Sweden.
In October 1632 Frederick returned to his country. But in what a plight did he find it on his return! Oppenheim, where he wished to take up his residence, was half burnt down; the houses that were left standing had no bolts or bars, no doors or windows. To avoid being carried off by the first active bands of marauders, he set out for Mainz; but a pestilent sickness was raging there; he was attacked by it and perished, far from his wife and children. He had paid for A.D. 1633. the short possession of a throne, which his own unassisted strength was too weak to maintain, by a fugitive’s life, in which many yielded him their sympathies, but none the help of which he stood in need.
At that time his death was hardly remarked, in presence of the great loss which the whole Protestant cause and the world in general experienced when the King of Sweden fell on the battle-field of Lützen.
The two events exercised a concurrent influence upon England. King Charles, after his brother-in-law’s death, regarded it as his duty to identify his nephew’s cause still more closely with his own. The death of the King of Sweden made his task easier, inasmuch as the strong will, which had hitherto controlled every design, had now ceased to act. Charles I now immediately invited the Protestant sovereigns of Germany to carry on the war, by which the Palatinate was to be restored; and in return he offered to continue to them the subsidies which he had contributed to the King of Sweden. And Chancellor Oxenstiern, who guided the Swedish policy, had weighty reasons himself for respecting the interests of the Palatinate, as they were linked not only with so many others in the Empire, but with those of the Netherlands besides, and just now with those of Great Britain[26]. In May 1633, at the convention of Heilbronn, where the English ambassador Anstruther appeared among others, the cause of the Palatinate received more consideration than it ever had before. Electoral rank was conceded for the first time to the plenipotentiary of the Palsgrave Louis Philip, who came forward as administrator of the Palatinate in the name of the Elector Charles Louis, who was still a minor. The Chancellor of Sweden promised them the restoration of the whole country, so far as it was in Swedish hands: and in the Consilium formatum, which it was determined at Heilbronn to set up, to act in conjunction with him, the Palatinate occupied the first place. In return the administrator granted the restoration of the Lutheran faith: he left Mannheim, as well as other important A.D. 1633. places, in the hands of Sweden for the time, and made himself answerable for the payment of 60,000 reichs thalers. These however the English ambassador undertook to furnish; and in fact we find that immediately after this time £15,000, which at that time was about equal to the sum stipulated, was despatched to Germany. The King and Weston were well pleased that England was not named in the treaty, nor pledged to further advances[27]. They now thought it preferable to leave the matter alone.
But the help of England could not but be often claimed hereafter in aid of this cause.
In the summer of 1633 there was much talk of invoking the sympathies of the English nation in behalf of the widowed Queen Elizabeth and her children. Her friends flattered themselves that half a million thalers might be raised by voluntary contributions; and Nethersole, one of the Queen’s most trusty friends, was in the country to conduct the transaction, which was to be carried out in the name of the Princess and of the King. But it was soon perceived that the nation was not so forward as had been expected; for it saw in this scheme an attempt to evade the necessity of a Parliamentary grant. In order to meet this suspicion the sketch of a proclamation was laid before the King, in which the remark was made that he would measure the loyalty of his people by the amount of their voluntary contributions, and would be the more ready to seek their help in another way when the time for this should have arrived[28]. But this clause displeased the King, because it contained a promise which he was reluctant to give, that Parliament should be summoned; and he struck it out with his own hand[29]. On this the whole project fell to the ground, for without an assurance of this sort the Queen’s friends had no hope of effecting anything.
A.D. 1634.
Towards the end of the year 1633 there was a moment when the Emperor again obtained advantages on the Upper Rhine; and the attention of King Charles was called to the inability of the territory of the Palatinate to resist even a feeble attack from the side of Alsace. The administrator asked for only a small force of 6000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, which after it was once raised might be kept in pay for £6000 a month. The Queen of Bohemia, the States-General, and the French ambassador united their requests with his; the Chancellor of Sweden sent his son over to recommend the King most strongly to accede to them: but the King and his treasurer shrank from a new and regular outlay, which in the present instance was sure to entail much other expenditure. At last they raised 100,000 thalers for Germany, and sent the administrator a gold chain in order to keep him in a good humour: but they could not be moved to undertake an obligation which could lead to the assembling of Parliament.
We should remark however that they were withheld from decisive action, not only by want of money and by fees of Parliament, but also by general political considerations as well.
In the last few years, since the leading of the King of Sweden in Germany, the importance and power of the French had immeasurably increased. They had the Protestant interest in Germany on their side, and they already exercised a decisive influence on the Catholics also. In all their proceedings it was seen that, notwithstanding the advantages which they won, their allies derived no benefit, but that on the contrary they only endeavoured to make their own position so strong in order to be raised above all need of considering the interests of other powers. Only one other state, Holland, raised itself side by side with them to daily-increasing importance. Just at that time the Dutch had thrown their English rivals into the shade: they had founded their East Indian empire, they had established a footing in Brazil, they had captured in the West Indian waters the Spanish register-ships which went from Mexico to Havanna with all their rich cargo—an achievement which the English had so often attempted in vain; and in their A.D. 1635. domestic waters, in the narrow channel of the Slaak, they had annihilated the fleet of the Infanta Isabella which was sailing to attack them. In consequence of this they also became masters of the neighbouring seas. They did not hesitate to seek out ships under the Spanish flag, especially those of Dunkirk, in English ports, or in English waters, and to take them across to Holland as their lawful prize. And even on land at that time they achieved important results. By the successful surprise of Wesel they not only again secured their own frontier, but once more infused some portion of vital power into that principality on the Rhine, which had been formerly founded there by Brandenburg in conjunction with England, but which certainly required a longer time for its development. The sieges of Bois-le-duc and Maastricht, notwithstanding so many other great events, riveted at that time the attention of Europe. The success of the Dutch in these two enterprises appeared a proof of their general superiority; the provinces of the Spanish Netherlands were much straitened by it. And as it revived in those provinces the hereditary feeling of dislike to a foreign rule, Holland and France on their part might well think of availing themselves of this dissatisfaction, and of putting an end for ever by a sudden attack to the rule of Spain.
It is quite plain how great a blow the English would have sustained if the whole coasts of this part of the continent had fallen into the hands of these two neighbours, whose close alliance was in itself very offensive to them[30]. Against the danger of being entangled in continental affairs, and of feeling their reflex action in Great Britain, Charles I had to set off the other danger, if he held aloof from them, of seeing new powers develop during their progress, which might make his position most critical. In order to acquire the means of resisting the ascendancy of France and Holland, he was obliged to make fresh advances to Spain.
We can hardly form an idea for ourselves how much the relations between England and Spain changed and shifted in A.D. 1634. the great conflict which was going on. In the year 1631 a scheme was drawn up for a great attack of the English and Spaniards upon the United Netherlands, as a result of which Zealand should fall to the lot of the former. As yet indeed there was no treaty, but only a plan sketched out for further consideration, which Charles I avoided accepting, although Cottington seems to have approved of it[31]. But we see at all events to what the aim of the Spaniards was directed. After a short time, when they found themselves deceived, they entertained designs of an entirely opposite character. A detailed plan of Count Olivarez is extant, according to which Spain and France were to undertake a general attack upon England[32]. England, Scotland, and Ireland, were each to be attacked separately, and internal animosities of every kind were to be invoked in aid of the invaders. An idea was entertained of placing the young Elector Palatine on the throne of England, under the condition that he guaranteed full religious liberty and restored the expelled Irish to their lost inheritance. On the other hand, in the summer of 1634 an alliance between Spain and England was again in progress. Weston, Cottington, and Windebank, took counsel with the Spanish resident, Don Juan Nicolalde, for this object, in such entire secrecy that even Coke, the Secretary of State, had no information about it. The King besought the court of Brussels, which on this occasion as on others he was obliged to take into his confidence, to apply to no one about this matter except himself and Windebank. The overtures which he made to Spain at that time are accounted for by the ascendancy of the Dutch marine and the rise of that of the French. The claim of England to exercise a sort of supremacy over the neighbouring seas, was once more called in question. The English contended for this right in learned treatises[33]; the King of France on the other A.D. 1635. hand showed a determination no longer to acknowledge it. For, as his ambassador said, everything must have its foundation in reason; the usage of the sea only required that the less powerful should show honour to the more powerful; even England could have no other claim: and what would happen if the relative power of different states varied? The English would not entertain this supposition, for they clung to the principle that their navy must have the superiority over that of all their neighbours[34], for this reason, if for no other, that, if it had not, their neighbours could throw a far superior army on the shores of England. And another principle was asserted at that time, which did not find full acceptance until a quarter of a century later, viz. that there must be an equilibrium between the European powers; for fears were already felt lest France should become supreme by sea as well as on land[35]. Moreover King Charles was implored by English merchants to protect them against the insults to which they were exposed, while he was not even in a condition to give effect to his ordinances, e.g. those which concerned the fisheries: he therefore cherished the ardent wish to be able again to show himself strong by sea; it was to a Spanish loan that he looked for the requisite means. For even in reference to this object he was cramped by his misunderstanding with Parliament. We shall see hereafter how fatal to the development of domestic affairs were the measures which Charles I was induced to adopt in order to attain this end. Certainly Spain, fully occupied by the war in Germany, and threatened just now by a French war in the Netherlands, could not give him the assistance he desired. But even though no subsidy was forthcoming, yet at all events a common tie of interest between England and Spain again grew out of the situation of affairs.
A.D. 1636.
And this necessarily produced its effect on the treatment of the controversy about the Palatinate. For, if in the general conduct of affairs the King was inclined to favour Spain, how was it to be expected that in the affairs of Germany he would with all his heart support the allies of the French, whose ascendancy he was already beginning to fear? The relation in which England thus stood had already at times been advantageous to the Palatine dominions. After the battle of Nordlingen, which restored to the Imperial arms their superiority in Upper Germany, those districts had had some mercy shown them, at least for a while, owing to this consideration; though on other occasions it was completely lost sight of. In England an intention was cherished of supporting the young Elector with the whole weight of the British name, when in January 1636, on entering his eighteenth year, the time should come for him to claim his hereditary rank and position; for whatever guilt the father had incurred, they thought that it could not be imputed to his children. In this matter the King had reckoned on the good offices of Spain, and on the favour of the Emperor. Then came the news of the treaty of Prague, the fulfilment of which was based upon a new dynastic connexion between the whole house of Austria and Bavaria, and upon the concurrence of the Elector of Saxony. The former stipulations made in favour of Bavaria with regard to the Elector’s dignity, and the dominions of the Palatinate were therein expressly confirmed: the sister of Charles was promised her personal property, and his nephews a maintenance proportioned to their rank so long as they submitted; but these concessions were granted as a favour and not as a right[36]. These tidings produced on Charles I an impression of the most painful surprise; he would hardly believe them: but he thought that, if they were true, every effort must be made to cancel the agreement. Now too, very much as in the year 1623, the Stuart policy depended on the conclusion of an agreement with Austria and Spain. Instructions of this import were given to Lord Aston, who went as envoy to A.D. 1636. Madrid: and John Taylor, an agent who was not without experience in these transactions, was sent by Charles to Vienna to protest against the provisions of the treaty, and to bring the Emperor to another determination.
Taylor was one of those diplomatists who find their whole happiness in the success of the mission committed to them: who accept as perfectly genuine all the overtures made to them in regard to this object by foreign courts; and therefore try to induce their own government to accept them. In Vienna he fell in with John Leslie, one of the agents in the murder of Wallenstein, who at that time was in high favour with the court, and who introduced Taylor at the different princely houses and procured him a good reception there. They both thought the alliance of Charles I with the house of Austria the only hope for the world. How glorious, they thought, would be the position of this monarch: he would then be the most powerful of European sovereigns. The Jesuits had already on one occasion, in a play performed at their seminary at Prague, celebrated King Charles as the restorer of universal peace. And how could the Imperial court itself fail to be sensible of the advantageous prospect held out to them by a connexion with England? On the 24th of February, 1636, the Emperor declared that he would free the Count Palatine, Charles Louis, if he made proper submission, from the ban under which he had been laid owing to his father’s guilt; that he would again receive him among the Princes of the Empire, and enfcoff him with no mean portion of his father’s possessions: that if negotiations about the electoral dignity were then opened, he would give proof of his favourable disposition to the King, as well as to the young Prince, conceding everything which could be granted to them under fair conditions[37]. These were well-considered words, which made no promise but held out all the greater hopes. Taylor interpreted them to mean A.D. 1636. that the Lower Palatinate on both sides of the Rhine would be restored at once; that negotiations about the Upper Palatinate would be set on foot, and that the dignity of Elector would be transferred to the young Palsgrave after the death of the Elector of Bavaria. He reported that Charles I would receive an assurance on the subject in writing from the Emperor, and his son the King of Hungary, and also from the King of Spain; and that the young Prince would be married to an archduchess, and become greater that any Elector Palatine had ever been. He said that the Queen of Hungary, to whom Charles had once paid court in Spain, had not yet forgotten him, and that the old Elector of Bavaria was derided by her court; that it was intended to restore the old Burgundian alliance between the two houses; that even the Spanish ambassador Oñate, who was at first less favourable to the plan, had said that Spain wished for the friendship of the King of England, not in part but altogether, and only hoped that he would renew his ancestors’ claims on France[38].
In England, Taylor’s ardour had never been approved; but the affair seemed to have reached a point at which further negotiations might be committed to one of the magnates of the kingdom, Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel and Surrey, Earl Marshal of England, whom the King had once rightly styled the most distinguished of his subjects[39]. From the statements of the Secretary employed in these affairs, it is clear that Charles would have been quite contented with such terms as might be hoped from the tenor of Taylor’s despatches. In June 1636 we find Arundel at Linz, where at that time the Emperor had arrived on his way to the meeting of the Electors, which was to be held at Ratisbon, for the choice of his successor.
But a very unexpected difficulty showed itself at once. The full powers entrusted to the Imperial commissioners A.D. 1636. appointed to negotiate with Arundel, rested on the assumption that an offensive and defensive alliance would be concluded between England and the house of Austria. Arundel was one of those statesmen who were generally considered to favour Spain; but he was haughty and measured, and had neither inclination nor authority to form so close an alliance. England wished to conclude a treaty with both lines of the house of Austria as secretly as possible, in order to be able on the one hand to offer resistance to the French by sea, and on the other to promote the interest of the Elector Palatine: but she did not desire to plunge into open war with Holland and France. The Imperial ministers referred to Taylor’s overtures; but the latter proved that he had spoken, officially at least, only of an intimate understanding, and not of an offensive and defensive alliance[40]. Arundel remarked, that the understanding could only be of such a character that all other sovereigns also might be admitted into it. He was out of humour that the other side should have intended to lead him unperceived further than his King thought of going.
Although this beginning certainly argued no good, the negotiations were still by no means rendered hopeless, so long as the prospect of a close connexion was maintained. On the contrary, though Arundel had at first pressed for the restoration of the Elector Palatine to his full rights, he now only asked whether such a restoration might be expected, at least at some future time. The Imperial ministers repeated the declaration given on the 24th of February, with the additional statement that the King of England might promise himself the more affection from the Emperor as the ambassador gave assurance of the sincere good intentions of the King towards him: but they proceeded to indicate the conclusion of an alliance as a necessary condition. Further progress was deferred until the time of the negotiations, which were to be conducted at Ratisbon[41].
A.D. 1636.
For these negotiations nothing was more needful than that the Imperial ministers should first of all be agreed among themselves how far they were willing to go. But how could they have taken any steps at all without conferring with Bavaria? In the face of the impending Diet of the Electors, they could least of all have ventured to affront the powerful sovereign, with whom so many others took part. They sent a special mission to invite him to express his views to them categorically: at the same time they called his attention to the importance of the English fleet at that juncture.
The Elector Maximilian attached little weight to this. He answered, that Germany certainly had nothing to fear from this fleet, and that France, which was just as well equipped by sea, would not be deterred even by the enmity of England from extending its power in Germany: that Charles I moreover could not long keep his fleet at sea, for that he was on bad terms with his Estates of the realm, without whose assent he certainly could not reckon upon any permanent contribution. It is remarkable that this consideration which exercised so much influence on the decisions of the King himself, also affected the attitude of other powers towards him, and influenced a negotiation carried on between Austria and Bavaria.
But even apart from this, what would come of it, Maximilian asked, if concessions were made to the presumptuous demands of England? He said that for his part he was not disinclined to surrender under certain conditions the district of the Lower Palatinate, which he had in his hands, but not the Upper Palatinate, which he held in pledge: that the Emperor by virtue of his authority had made over the electoral dignity to him and his house for ever: that this settlement had been made in concert with the other Electors, and that his father and cousin, the Emperor, would not wish to reverse it: that he could not, if he would.
On the resumption of negotiations with England, Count Olivarez remarked that they had been broken off for other reasons, no doubt those very reasons which arose out of the stipulations of Saxony and Bavaria with regard to the Palatinate. He thought however that even now Charles I would A.D. 1636. take no decided action in behalf of Spain, and would always look to his own interests alone. The great successes of the Spanish army in the year 1636 perhaps enhanced his self-confidence: and when negotiations were renewed, the Spaniards were rather on the side of Bavaria than on that of England.
The Imperial court was then confronted by the same question which had formerly been discussed in Spain in the year 1623. Was it to show compliance towards England, and for the sake of this break off its connexion with Bavaria, and quarrel with Spain? The question was submitted to the Emperor’s successor, who decided that in this case England must be disregarded[42].
A formal answer to this effect was communicated to Arundel at Ratisbon on September 12. The restoration of the Count Palatine to the Electorship was deferred until events should have happened, which seemed to Arundel about as near as the end of the world. He remarked that, if his sovereign had been told this before, he would never have sent him to Germany. He returned to England deeply incensed, for he thought that, personally as well as officially, he had not met with the consideration which he had a right to claim.
This was the second time that the Austro-Spanish house refused to draw closer to England from regard to its relations with Germany. There is no doubt that, for the German branch in the present state of affairs, the maintenance of Catholicism and of an alliance with Bavaria outweighed all other considerations. But was this the case also with the Spanish branch? For it, both for the sake of the monarchy and its general position in European politics, a closer agreement with England even under the Stuarts would have been of inestimable advantage. Olivarez differed from Lerma, in that the latter studied most carefully the general and maritime interests of Spain, the former her interests in Germany and on the continent. The mistake of the first A.D. 1636. Stuarts lay in this, that they thought to find in Spain the centre of gravity of the joint relations of the two houses, even after it had been transferred to Austria. In that long and bloody conflict between all the continental powers, which we term the Thirty Years’ War, England also had her interest. James I and Charles I never wholly lost sight of the principal aim of their continental policy, the restoration of the Elector Palatine. But they never staked their whole power on the issue. They once stirred up Denmark to conduct the cause; they then allied themselves with Sweden in order directly to attain their object. But for all that they would never adopt as their own the common political point of view of the Protestant powers. They would far rather, from first to last, have procured from the Emperor the recovery of the Palatinate by means of Spanish influence. But even for securing this the means which they set in motion were not sufficient. Their misunderstandings with Parliament rendered strong measures on their part impossible, just where it was most necessary. In the great continental struggle which must be decisive as to the future condition of Europe, the Stuarts could not interfere to influence the result. Meanwhile they were pursuing their own special end.
Whilst the agitation of the world was at high tide, Charles I in his insular domain, which was affected by it without feeling its full force, was scheming to establish for ever the kingly power.