PREPARATION FOR WAR
Meanwhile German preparations for war went on apace in every direction. Following up the war teachings of Nietzsche and Treitschke and others, General Von Bernhardi issued book after book defining in clear language the alleged national beneficence, biological desirability and inevitability of war, which, when it came, would be “fought to conquer for Germany the rank of a world-power;” the universities and schools and press teemed with militarist ideals and practices; the army charges rose to $250,000,000 and the trained soldiers available at the beginning of 1910 were alleged to have 6,000 field-guns; Colonel Gaedke, the German naval expert, stated on February 24th of that year that the German government was building a fleet of 58 battleships and that “the time is gradually approaching when the German fleet will be superior to all the fleets of the world, with the single exception of the English fleet,” and that in the past twelve years Germany had spent on new ships alone 63,200,000 pounds, or $316,000,000, while between then and 1914 she would spend 57,500,000 pounds more, or $287,500,000.
The annual report of the German Navy League in 1910 showed a total of 1,031,339 members as against an estimated membership in Britain’s League of 20,000. Professor T. Schieman of the University of Berlin, in the New York MCCLURE’S MAGAZINE for May of that year, clearly stated that Germany would not submit in future to British naval supremacy or to any limitation of armaments. During this period, also, Heligoland, the island handed over by Britain in 1890 in exchange for certain East African rights, became the key and center of the whole German coast defense system against England. Cuxhaven, Borkum, Emden, Wilhelmshaven—with twice as many Dreadnought docks as Portsmouth—Wangeroog, Bremerhaven, Geestemunde, etc., were magnificently fortified and guarded. Whether dictated by diplomatic considerations and affected latterly by the British-French alliance or influenced by Colonial and naval and commercial ambitions, there could be no doubt as to the danger of the situation at the beginning of 1914. In a book entitled “England and Germany,” published during 1912, Mr. A. J. Balfour, the British conservative leader, replied to various German contributors and gave the British view of the situation:
It must be remembered in the first place that we are a commercial nation, and war, whatever its issue, is ruinous to commerce and to the credit on which commerce depends. It must be remembered in the second place that we are a political nation, and unprovoked war (by us) would shatter in a day the most powerful Government and the most united party. It must be remembered in the third place that we are an insular nation, wholly dependent upon sea-borne supplies, possessing no considerable army, either for home defense or foreign service, and compelled therefore to play for very unequal stakes should Germany be our opponent in the hazardous game of war. It is this last consideration which I should earnestly ask enlightened Germans to weigh well if they would understand the British point of view. It can be made clear in a very few sentences. There are two ways in which a hostile country can be crushed. It can be conquered or it can be starved. If Germany were supreme in our home waters she could apply both methods to Britain. Were Britain ten times Mistress in the North Sea she could apply neither method to Germany. Without a superior fleet Britain would no longer count as a Power. Without any fleet at all Germany would remain the greatest power in Europe.
The Balkan wars proved and strengthened the power of Germany in diplomacy and in the Eastern Question, while it showed that a deadly struggle between nations might spring to an issue in a few days and a million armed men leap into war at a word. The enormous German special taxation of $250,000,000 authorized in the first part of 1913 for an additional military establishment of 4,000 officers, 15,000 non-commissioned officers and 117,000 men indicated the basic strength of the people’s military feeling, and ensured the still greater predominance of its army.