FOOTNOTES:
[7] Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur John Watson was forty-six years of age. He entered the army as a sub-lieutenant of the 12th Foot (now the Berkshires) on August 9, 1873, and received his lieutenancy from the same date. He was instructor of musketry to the regiment from February 12, 1880, to January 24, 1883, received his company on the 14th of April following, and, passing the Staff College in 1884, served with the Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir Charles Warren later in the year, and from February 17 to October 28, 1885, was brigade-major in Bechuanaland, being honourably mentioned in dispatches. He was employed on staff service with the Egyptian army from February 12 to September 7, 1886, obtaining his major’s commission on October 21 following; and in 1888 served in the Hazara Expedition as brigade-major to the first column under Brigadier-General Channer, when he was again mentioned in dispatches, and received the medal with clasp. From July 20, 1889, to February 20, 1896, he was garrison instructor in Bengal, and deputy assistant-adjutant-general for instruction in the Punjaub, taking part in 1895 in the operations in the Chitral, accompanying the relief force under Sir Robert Low, acting as road commandant on the lines of communication. For his services in this campaign he received his second medal with clasp. He was gazetted lieutenant-colonel of the Suffolk Regiment on September 19, 1898.
APPENDIX
THE STORY OF SPION KOP.
A great deal of consternation and not a little surprise was caused by the publication of the official account (London Gazette, April 16, 1900) of the evacuation of Spion Kop. In order to make intelligible the causes of the terrible fiasco it is necessary to quote for the benefit of those interested not only Lord Roberts’s comments on the subject, but the statements of the officers concerned. Sir Redvers Buller, writing from Spearman’s Hill, January 30, 1900, gave his version of the proceedings:—
“I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren’s Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions 10th Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it moved to Frere on the 9th.
“The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the 9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650 ox waggons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there were three places at which all the waggons had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the difficulties; but these were all successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops.
“The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th in support of the mounted troops, who had surprised and seized the important position of Spearman’s Hill, commanding Potgieter’s Drift, on the 11th.
“By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman’s Hill, and supply was well forward.
“On the 16th a reserve of seventeen days’ supply having been collected, General Sir Charles Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichardt’s Drift, which is about six miles west of Potgieter’s.
“I attach Sir Charles Warren’s report of his operations.
“On the night of the 23rd General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren’s force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing considerable hardships; there had been very heavy losses on Spion Kop. I consequently assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule transports on the 25th: this was completed by midday the 26th; by double spanning, the loaded ox waggons got over the drift at the rate of about eight per hour. The mule waggons went over the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon went on day and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field Artillery and four howitzers, the following vehicles were passed: ox waggons, 232; 10-span mule waggons, 98; 6-span, 107; 4 span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these the ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.
“By 2 P.M. the 26th all the ox waggons were over, and by 11.30 P.M. all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the troops. By 4 A.M. the 27th all the troops were over, and by 8 A.M. the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached their new camps by 10 A.M. The marches averaged for the mounted troops about seven miles, and for the infantry and artillery an average of five miles.
“Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic that I do not think they would have lasted another half-hour.”
He concluded by saying:—
“Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have succeeded. We have suffered very heavy losses, and lost many whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand, we have inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly disheartened; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say, in excellent fettle.”
Sir Charles Warren’s report addressed to the Chief of the Staff, ran thus:—
“On the 8th January field orders were published constituting the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant, arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.
“On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt’s Drift to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward, refusing my right (namely) Spion Kop, and bringing my left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill.
“I was provided with four days’ rations with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter’s.
“On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day, and on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one Brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt’s Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela.
“On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela, passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to General Woodgate.
“The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.
“During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the waggons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright’s Farm.
“On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the adjoining hills on the right, and the waggons were successfully brought to Venter’s Spruit.
“In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we could advance, the eastern one by Acton Homes must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking three or four days’ food in our haversacks, and sending all our waggons back across the Tugela, but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of us.
“On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F. Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of outflanking movements, and by the end of the day, after fighting for twelve hours, we were in possession of the whole part of the hills, but found a strongly-intrenched line on the comparatively flat country beyond us.
“On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four from Potgieter’s. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be impossible to get waggons through by the road leading past Fair View, unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within about 2000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put off for a day.
“On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel àCourt, of the Headquarter Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.
“On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command. The whole of the waggons of the 5th Division were got down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2 P.M. on the 26th January.”
In regard to the Council of War, Sir Charles Warren amplified his previous statement:
“Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter’s Laager, I assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers, together. I pointed out to them that, with the three and a half (3½) days’ provisions allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to march through with our rations in our haversacks—without impedimenta.”
Sir Charles then added:—
“The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong intrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by waggons, without first taking Spion Kop.
“Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.
“On 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open—(1) to attack, (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.
“The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.
“The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half-company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.
“The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had intrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties other than three men wounded.
“Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was, ‘Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.’
“He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.
“I replied to Colonel Crofton, ‘I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.’
“This occurred about 10 A.M.
“Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed, ‘With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’
“For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.
“I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of the situation. At 1.20 P.M. I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation. He stated that, unless the Artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.”
Later on in the evening arrangements were made to send two (Naval) 12-pounders, and the Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to the summit, together with half-company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the intrenchments and provide shell cover for the men. The 17th Company, Royal Engineers—it must be noted—proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate’s force, and were employed until daylight upon the intrenchments, then upon road-making and water supply.
Sand-bags were sent up early on the 24th instant, but they were too late. Colonel Sim and his party, while ascending, met Colonel Thorneycroft descending the hill. The position was evacuated. Sir Charles Warren concluded thus:—
“I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by officers and men suffering under a withering artillery fire on the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and ammunition to the troops during the day.
“During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarter Staff was present on the summit, and reported direct to the Commander-in-Chief.
“At sunset I considered that the position could be held next day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled, as already mentioned.
“In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the vigorous protests of General Coke’s Brigade-Major, the Officer commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.
“It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether there should be an investigation into the question of the unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop.”
General Buller, in forwarding to the Secretary of State for War Sir Charles Warren’s report, made the following observations:—
“Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only allowed three and a half days’ provisions. I had told him that transport for three and a half days would be sufficient burden to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it. That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegram which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I had from Sir C. Warren:—
(Sent 7.54 P.M. Received 8.15 P.M.)
‘Left Flank, 19th January.
‘To the Chief of the Staff—
‘I find there are only two roads by which we could possibly get from Trichardt’s Drift to Potgeiter’s, on the north of the Tugela, one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too long, the second is a very difficult road for a large number of waggons, unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some special arrangements which will involve my stay at Venter’s Laager for two or three days. I will send in for further supplies and report progress. Warren.’
“The reply to this was that three days’ supply was being sent.
“I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th, that for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected to undertaking a night attack on a position the road to which he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault Spion Kop that night.
“I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.
“As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were received by our signallers at Spearman and telegraphed to Sir C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the signal station. The telegram Sir C. Warren quotes did not give me confidence in its sender, and at the moment I could see that our men on the top had given way and that efforts were being made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren: ‘Unless you put some really good hard fighting man in command on the top you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.’
“The statement that a staff officer reported direct to me during the day is a mistake. Colonel àCourt was sent down by General Woodgate almost as soon as he gained the summit.
“I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, intrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am sure.
“But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence.
“It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation. Preparations for the second day’s defence should have been organised during the day and have been commenced at nightfall.
“As this was not done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion.
“Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them.
“I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops, the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion King’s Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly.”
The Commander-in-Chief, writing to the Secretary of State for War, thus criticised both operations and operators:—
“The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the accompanying documents themselves that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichardt’s Drift, and thence by following the road past Fair View and Acton Homes, to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter’s Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east and branching off from a point east of Three Tree Hill. The selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice to his subordinate Commander, and on the day after the withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command.”
The abandonment of Spion Kop was condemned by Lord Roberts in the following terms:—
“As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop position, which, though occupied almost without opposition in the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the retention of which had become essential to the relief of Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire. Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for strengthening the position during the night, reorganising the defence and bringing up artillery—in regard to which Sir Charles Warren’s report does not altogether bear out Sir Redvers Buller’s contention—admitting also that the senior officers on the summit of the hill might have been more promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s assumption of responsibility and authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy’s fire, if it did not cease altogether, could not have been formidable, and though lamp signalling was not possible at the time owing to the supply of oil having failed, it would not have taken more than two or three hours at most for Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at 9.30 P.M. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Major-General Coke’s departure Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order, without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole plan of operations and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which had already been made to carry it into effect.”
In spite of this somewhat severe criticism, however, Lord Roberts went on to say:—
“On the other hand, it is only right to state that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to retire.”
The action of Captain Phillips he warmly praised:—
“The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was not re-established until 2.30 A.M. on the 25th January, and by that time the Naval guns could not have reached the summit of the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return, and Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft had gone away. Moreover, most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working parties, with the half-company of Royal Engineers, had also withdrawn.”
Briefly the Commander-in-Chief deplored the chaotic state of affairs prior to the retirement. He said:—
“It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that the loss of the position would involve the failure of the operations. He was, consequently, obliged to summon Major-General Coke to his headquarters in the evening, in order that he might ascertain how matters were going on, and the command on Spion Kop thus devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke was not aware of this. About midday, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Warren had directed Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft to assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated to Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30 P.M., was under the impression that the command had devolved on Colonel Hill, as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the course of events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is justified in remarking that ‘there was a want of organisation and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence.’”
In conclusion, the principal actors in the drama were censured, while the troops engaged received well-merited praise:—
“The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these despatches, was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy—probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.
“The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable behaviour of the troops throughout the operations.”
LIST OF STAFF
The following Divisions reached South Africa at the end of 1899 and the beginning of 1900.
FIFTH DIVISION
Lieutenant-General—Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., R.E.
Aides-de-Camp—Major R. M. B. F. Kelly, R.A.; Lieut. I. V. Paton, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Assistant Adjutant-General—Colonel A. W. Morris, p.s.c.
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals—Bt.-Major T. Capper, East Lancashire Regt., p.s.c.; Bt.-Major H. N. Sargent, Army Service Corps.
Assistant Provost-Marshal—Bt.-Major E. C. J. Williams, East Kent Regt.
Principal Medical Officer—Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Allin, M.B., R.A.M.C.
Divisional Signalling Officer—Captain A. A. McHardy, R.A.
10th BRIGADE
Major-General—Colonel (local Maj.-General) J. T. Coke.
Aide-de-Camp—Lieut. W. E. Kemble, R.A.
Brigade-Major—Captain H. G. C. Phillips, Welsh Regt., p.s.c.
11th BRIGADE
Major-General—Colonel (local Maj.-General) E. R. P. Woodgate, K.C.M.G., C.B., p.s.c.
Aide-de-Camp—Captain F. M. Carleton, D.S.O., Royal Lancashire Regt.
Brigade-Major—Captain N. H. Vertue, East Kent Regt.
SIXTH DIVISION
Lieutenant-General—Major-General (local Lieut.-General) T. Kelly-Kenny, C.B., p.s.c.
Aides-de-Camp—Major H. I. W. Hamilton, D.S.O., Royal West Surrey Regt., p.s.c.; Captain W. H. Booth, East Kent Regt.
Assistant Adjutant-General—Colonel A. E. W. Goldsmid, p.s.c.
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals—Major C. C. Monro, Royal West Surrey Regt., p.s.c.; Major J. E. Caunter, Lancashire Fusiliers, p.s.c.
Assistant Provost-Marshal—Major M. G. Wilkinson, King’s Own Scottish Borderers.
Principal Medical Officer—Lieut.-Colonel W. L. Gubbins, M.B., R.A.M.C.
Divisional Signalling Officer—Lieut. J. T. Burnett-Stuart, Rifle Brigade.
12th BRIGADE
Major-General—Colonel (local Maj.-General) R. A. P. Clements, D.S.O., A.D.C.
Aide-de-Camp—Captain H. de C. Moody, South Wales Borderers.
Brigade-Major—Captain R. S. Oxley, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, p.s.c.
13th BRIGADE
Major-General—Colonel (local Maj.-General) C. E. Knox.
Aide-de-Camp—Captain O. H. E. Marescaux, Shropshire Light Infantry.
Brigade-Major—Captain R. W. Thompson, North Lancashire Regt., p.s.c.
SEVENTH DIVISION
Lieutenant-General—Major-General (local Lieut.-General) C. Tucker, C.B. Aides-de-Camp—
Assistant Adjutant-General—Colonel H. E. Belfield, p.s.c.
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals—Brevet-Major H. G. Fitton, D.S.O., Royal Berkshire Regt., p.s.c.; Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Rice, Army Service Corps.
Assistant Provost-Marshal—Brevet-Major F. Wintour, Royal West Kent Regt., p.s.c.
Principal Medical Officer—Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Gormley, M.D., R.A.M.C.
Divisional Signalling Officer—Captain J. R. K. Birch, Cheshire Regt.
14th BRIGADE
Major-General—Major-General Sir H. C. Chermside, G.C.M.G., C.B., R.E.
Aide-de-Camp—Captain E. FitzG. M. Wood, Devonshire Regt.
Brigade-Major—Captain W. M. Marter, 1st Dragoon Guards, p.s.c.
15th BRIGADE
Major-General—Colonel (local Maj.-General) A. G. Wavell, p.s.c.
Brigade-Major—Captain L. R. Carleton, Essex Regt., p.s.c.
END OF VOL. III.
Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson & Co.
Edinburgh & London
Transcribers' Notes
Page vi: "Birds-eye" standardised to "Bird's-eye" before "View of the Ground"
Page vi: "Potgeiter's" corrected to "Potgieter's" after "The Crossing of"
Page vii: "Blue-jackets" standardised to "Bluejackets" before "blew up Tugela Road"
Page viii: "Jacobdsal" corrected to "Jacobsdal" after "Free State territory near"
Page viii: "re-occupied" standardised to "reoccupied" after "British force"
Page viii: "Dekeil's" corrected to "Dekiel's" after "Relief of Kimberley, seized"
Page 5: "enroll" standardised to "enrol" after "forward in crowds to"
Page 15: "Divison" corrected to "Division" after "the Sixth"
Page 30: Variant spelling "viâ" not standardised as part of a quotation
Page 31: "bombproof" standardised to "bomb-proof" after "burrowing like rabbits, or in"
Page 55: "Jaysfontein" corrected to "Jasfontein" after "away from a farm at"
Page 56: "Zoutspansdrift" corrected to "Zoutpansdrift" after "in the direction of Kamak and"
Page 56: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "lot of those around"
Page 58: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "The inhabitants of"
Page 71: "bloodthirsty" standardised to "blood-thirsty" after "They proved to be not"
Page 71: "farm-house" standardised to "farmhouse" after "bivouacked at the"
Page 73: "horse-shoe" as in the original. Not standardised as this is an adjectival usage
Page 77: "look-out" standardised to "lookout" after "They employed"
Page 78: "Koodoosberg" corrected to "Koodoesberg" after "troops from Barkly and"
Page 85: "bloodstained" standardised to "blood-stained" after "the eyes of those who,"
Page 86: "gantlet" as in the original
Page 92: "Divsion" corrected to "Division" after "Second"
Page 96: "POTGEITER'S" corrected to "POTGIETER'S" after "THE CROSSING OF"
Page 99: "Carbineers" corrected to "Carabineers" after "one squadron Natal"
Page 108: "roast" corrected to "roost" after "We shall be rulers of the"
Page 123: "head-quarters" standardised to "headquarters" after "some even reaching"
Page 134: "Blomfontein" corrected to "Bloemfontein" after "Steyn and Kruger dated"
Page 148: "rough-riders" standardised to "roughriders" after "despatch of 500 expert"
Page 174: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "thirty-seven miles north of"
Page 179: "sandstorms" standardised to "sand-storms" after "These"
Page 182: "Ochtertang" corrected to "Achtertang" after "reconnoitring towards"
Page 185: "unusally" corrected to "unusually" after "Boer movements rendered"
Page 194: "Sandbags" standardised to "Sand-bags" before "were sent up early"
Page 195: "Potgeiter's" as in the original. Left as part of a quotation.