FOOTNOTES:

[11] Graded as a Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX

KURUMAN[12]

At time of the surrender of Kuruman it was impossible to obtain complete details regarding the gallant defence of the place. The following short story published by the Cape Argus serves to throw light on deeds too brave to be overlooked:—

“On the 15th October 1899, the Cape Police, Vryburg, 96 miles north-east of Kuruman, evacuated their station without giving battle to the Boers; the detachment with one Maxim and 110 men retiring on Kimberley. The commanding officer, Major Scott, Cape Police, committed suicide en route. Refugees came into Kuruman on the 16th and following days.

“On the 23rd October communication was cut off from Kuruman except by wire to Koopmansfontein, and on the 5th November all wires were cut. Information reached Kuruman that the South African Republic and Orange Free State Boers, assisted by rebels from that and surrounding districts, intended to march on Kuruman and hoist the ‘Vierkleur.’

“The defence of Kuruman was commenced by Captain Bates,[13] C.P. (formerly captain B.B.P. under Sir Frederick Carrington), assisted by Sergeant Hemsworth, C.P., and Captain Dennison, Intelligence Department. On the 19th October, Colonel Kekewich, officer commanding forces Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, instructed the force to endeavour to prevent Kuruman falling into the hands of the enemy. The officer commanding, Captain Bates, had orders to defend the place, and the Kuruman defence force was raised, consisting of, approximately, 54 Cape Police and Special Police (whites), 62 Bastards and natives—total, 116.

“Redoubts were built on the north, south, east, and west sides of the main camp, which was fortified with trenches and stone walls loopholed and raised with sandbags.

“On the 12th November 1899, a letter was received from Commandant Visser (signed Fighting General), demanding the surrender of Kuruman voluntarily in the name of the Z.A.R. and O.F.S. Governments, saying that he was at Pakani, six miles off, with his commando, and failing compliance with his demand he would attack and take Kuruman by main force at 7 A.M. the following day. A reply was sent that should he attack he would have to take the consequences of his illegal act, as no instructions had been issued by the Colonial Government to evacuate the town.

“At 9 A.M. on the 13th November a commando of about 400 men came at full gallop towards the Soeden Mission Station, three miles from Kuruman. Coming within range (1500 yards) the redoubt on the eastern side opened fire on them with their rifles. The enemy halted, and then at once retired out of range. After about ten minutes, one portion, 250 strong, advanced towards the Mission Station, the other, 150 strong, moving to the ridge above the Court House. At 10 A.M. the commando from Soeden attacked the western redoubt held by Corporal Childs, C.P., with six whites and seven natives. Heavy firing took place. At about 5 P.M. the enemy, who had during the day occupied a ridge about 400 yards from the redoubt, retired, and in so doing lost heavily—they were seen falling from their horses. Our men behaved splendidly. The estimated Boer loss was six killed and fourteen wounded; ours, one native killed. Captain Bates rode up during the day to encourage the men, and both going and returning was received with heavy volleys from the Boers, but both he and his horse returned unhurt. While the fighting was going on Corporal Barnes, C.P., and nine men volunteered to take an extra supply of ammunition to this redoubt, about 1000 yards in the open, under heavy fire, and remained there to the end of the attack without any further casualty. Firing from all the enemy’s schanzes was kept up during the night.

“At dawn next day it was discovered that the enemy had built schanzes (stone entrenchments) all round our redoubts at distances varying from 1200 to 900 yards, and commenced firing volleys into our positions. We replied, and our losses this day were one native slightly wounded and five horses badly wounded. The enemy stuck to their schanzes and continued firing heavily on us daily until the 19th November, when to our surprise they withdrew to Pakani.

“On the 20th November our scouts, who were sent to find out the enemy’s movements, returned, stating that they were retiring towards Vryburg.

“On the 26th November it was reported by our scouts that the Boers had formed three laagers, one at Mooifontein, 30 miles away; one at Magagapirie, 20 miles off; and one at Botitilotse, about 18 miles off; the total commando numbering about 1100 to 1200 men, and a large number of waggons.

“On the 1st December a headman, Seloa, reported that the Boers were waiting for a cannon from Pretoria, and were coming again to attack us or starve us out. Captain Bates strengthened the forts as much as possible to resist shell fire.

“On the 5th December the enemy arrived with from 1100 to 1200 men under Visser, of the Transvaal, now Commandant, and Field-Cornet Wessels, of the Free State, but without any cannon. They commenced by attacking Captain Dennison’s (Intelligence Officer to Commanding Officer, Kimberley, Colonel Kekewich) redoubt on the east, but were repulsed. The enemy made five night attacks on this redoubt and a smaller one held by Private Brown, Special Police, about 300 yards on the S.E. Their mode of attack was as follows:—They built schanzes within 500 yards of these redoubts, surrounding them, and threw up small schanzes of stone and bags within thirty or forty yards of the redoubts early in the night and attacked about two or three o’clock in the morning, retiring from time to time to these small schanzes. They thus succeeded in pushing off the sandbags from our redoubts on the S.E. side, but were driven back, losing about four killed and ten or twelve wounded. This redoubt was held by Private Brown, three white men, and two natives, the enemy numbering from sixty to seventy men. Our casualties were one white man wounded. During these attacks a bullet (presumably an explosive one) struck inside the east fort or redoubt, badly wounding two whites and two others slightly. Firing was kept up night and day for these five days. The enemy ceased their attacks and went in for volley firing and sniping, coming nearer our redoubts by building schanzes during the night. These two redoubts had to be abandoned, as the loopholes of sandbags were shot away, and there was no means of building them up agin. The enemy occupied them after being abandoned for two nights, and also took possession of a store in a hollow about 800 yards from the main camp, between it and the Court House. This left only one of our redoubts occupied by our defence force, and which commanded the water. Corporal Gash, C.P., was in charge. Our horses had to be watered at night.

“The Boers made several attempts to cut us off from the water, but were prevented by our pickets, who were placed in entrenched positions to cover our cattle and horses while watered. The Boers must have fired away an enormous quantity of ammunition, and they had five waggon-loads of it. A unique armistice was arranged on Christmas Day. F. C. Wessels, of the Free State, wrote to the Commanding Officer saying that if we would not fire on them this day, the Boers would not fire on us. This was agreed to, and word was sent round to all the schanzes and redoubts notifying this. The men came out, but to our surprise, as one of us was going to bathe, a volley from the Transvaal Boer schanzes on the east was sent after him. Wessels went to inquire the reason, and was told that the Transvaal commando would not agree to this armistice, whereupon Wessels arranged with us that the Free State men, who were on the south and south-east side, would not fire on us, and our men, running the gauntlet of the Transvaal fire for about 20 yards, went under cover of the Free State schanzes, and British and Boer bathed together at the bathing-place. This circumstance caused a split in the Boer camp, and Wessels with 150 men of the Free State burghers left for the south, presumably towards Kimberley. The Boers continued firing and sniping daily. Up to this we had one white (Private Ward, C.P.) and two natives killed, seven whites and seven natives wounded. Of the animals 23 horses were killed and wounded and three oxen killed. We were holding out and were confident of doing so for another two months, when on the 1st January 1900, a New Year’s gift arrived in the Boer camp in the shape of a 9-pounder. They started shelling at dawn, with common shell, the redoubt on the north side; then came to a ridge on the south and shelled the main camp, four shells falling in the camp without doing any serious damage. They then fired on the western redoubt without hitting it. On going to their schanzes about 2000 yards on the eastern side, they shelled the only remaining redoubt on that side, held by Corporal Gash, C.P., and 15 men. The 90th shell breached the redoubt, the 91st and 92nd striking it, and the 93rd falling inside. The men in the redoubt got into the trenches, which, owing to the stony nature of the ground, could not be dug deep, and were subjected to such a heavy fire from three of the enemy’s schanzes, that they were compelled to surrender.

“Captain Bates then saw that as the key of the position had fallen, and that reinforcements could not possibly arrive for weeks or months, it was hopeless to continue to hold out.

“Thus Kuruman was surrendered after seven weeks, and its defence was principally due to Captain Bates. Captain Dennison and Sergeant Hemsworth and Captain Bates were sent to the Pretoria gaol (as they were supposed to know too much, whatever that meant), and the Magistrate was sent to the State Model School with the other officers.”