FOOTNOTES:
[8] While dealing with the matter it is due to General Colvile to repeat the statement made by himself at the end of the year to a representative of Reuter’s Agency:—
“I am accused of being chiefly responsible for the surrender of the Yeomanry at Lindley. In my opinion the primary cause of this surrender was the insufficient information given by the headquarters staff to Colonel Spragge and myself. Had I been informed of Lord Roberts’s intentions and of the intended movements of Colonel Spragge, who was in command of the Yeomanry, and had Colonel Spragge been made acquainted with the orders I received from Lord Roberts, this disaster would never have happened. The following details will make it clear that the loss of the Yeomanry was primarily due to bad staff work. On May 20 I received a telegram from the chief of the staff ordering me to concentrate my troops, consisting of the Highland Brigade, the Eastern Province Horse, a field battery, and two naval guns, at Ventersburg on May 23, to leave that town on the 24th and to march to Heilbron, via Lindley, arriving at Lindley on May 26, and at Heilbron on the 29th. I was informed that I should be joined at Ventersburg by the 13th Imperial Yeomanry and Lovat’s Scouts.
“On arrival at Ventersburg, finding that neither the Yeomanry nor the Scouts were there, I informed the chief of the staff by telegraph, but received no answer from him at the time, though his reply was handed to me more than a month later, among a bundle of undelivered telegrams. This telegram was worded as follows: ‘May 24. Yeomanry are so late they cannot catch you at Ventersburg. You must march without them. They will join you later via Kroonstad.’ As I did not receive the telegram till the march was over it did not affect my action, but had I received it at the time its wording would have led me to suppose that the Yeomanry would join me at Heilbron, as was actually the case with Lovat’s Scouts. At this time Lord Roberts’s army was disposed roughly as follows: General Hunter’s Division on the Kimberley-Mafeking Railway, Lord Methuen on the Vaal River, headquarters and General Pole-Carew’s Division on the Bloemfontein-Johannesburg Railway, General Ian Hamilton’s column at Heilbron, and General Rundle and Brabant to the south-east of me. It was, therefore, extended across the Free State, and I assumed that Lord Roberts intended to advance in this formation, sweeping all before him till he got within striking distance of the Vaal, thus forcing the enemy to extend, and that he would then select one point for forcing the passage of the river. I also supposed that Heilbron, which is the head of a short line of railway, would be the supply depot for the columns to the east, as Winburg had been.
“My very definite orders, and the fact that I was not to move till the last possible moment, which necessitated my averaging seventeen miles a day, strengthened the assumption that I was taking part in a combined movement, in which great exactitude in conforming to the time table is, of course, of the utmost importance. In a telegram which Lord Roberts had sent to General Hamilton a short time before on a similar occasion he had impressed on him the importance of columns arriving simultaneously. As I had been officially informed that General Hamilton was in occupation of Heilbron, I assumed that my orders to be there on the 29th indicated that that was the day on which he would be required to take part in the general advance, and that any delay on my part would either retard the advance and upset the Commander-in-Chief’s calculations, or that by leaving Heilbron unoccupied I should hand over an important supply depot to the enemy. I have thus explained why in no circumstances should I have felt myself justified in disobeying Lord Roberts’s orders, which I simply carried out from first to last. I now proceed to recite the circumstances in which I became acquainted with Colonel Spragge’s difficulties, and the action I took.
“I left Ventersburg on May 24 as ordered, and on the 26th, after a fight outside Lindley, entered it, finding that the place had been vacated by us, a fact of which no notification had been given me, though I had been informed of our occupation of it. Marching at daylight on the following morning we crossed the Rhenoster River just before sunset, having been engaged the greater part of the day, and on the morning of the 28th I received the following message: ‘Colonel Spragge to General Colvile. Found no one in Lindley but Boers. Have five hundred men, but only one day’s food. Have stopped three miles back on Kroonstad road. I want help to get out without great loss.—B. Spragge, Lieutenant-Colonel, May 27, 1900.’ I asked the orderly who Colonel Spragge was, and on hearing from him that he was the officer commanding the Yeomanry I learned for the first time that these troops were following me. The statement, which I have seen several times repeated in the papers, that I had urged the Yeomanry to hurry after me, is absolutely untrue. I have reason to believe that this baseless newspaper report has obtained credence in some high official quarters. I have already expressed my views of the necessity of being at Heilbron at the time ordered, and as it is a recognised rule of war that the lesser must be sacrificed to the greater interest, I should in any circumstances have considered it my duty to push on even had I been sure that such action would have entailed the loss of the Yeomanry. But in this case I had two additional reasons for doing so. First, that, as Colonel Spragge had succeeded in retiring three miles on the Kroonstad road I was convinced that he would have no difficulty in making good his retreat, though possibly with loss, as the colonel himself had said; secondly, that I had then only two days’ more food for my force, and had I fought my way back I should not only have reduced the Highland Brigade to the verge of starvation, but should certainly have had insufficient supplies to take me back to Heilbron.”
CHAPTER VIII
GENERAL BULLER’S ADVANCE TO NEWCASTLE
The relief of Ladysmith caused the Boers to fall back towards the Drakensberg, and Sir Redvers Buller, whose troops were thoroughly exhausted, encamped his army to north and west of the dilapidated town, and there remained stationary for several weeks. It was necessary that the force should thoroughly recuperate and get into working order in time to co-operate with the great central advance when Lord Roberts should give the word. There was an immense amount to be done. The mounted troops, many of them, needed to be remounted, and winter clothing was required. The reconstruction of the transport also demanded alteration, while it was necessary, in conjunction with Lord Roberts’s operations, to keep a wary eye on the Boers and prevent them from crossing into the Free State and swelling the enemy’s forces opposing the great advance.
As with the departure of Sir Charles Warren to the western frontier, some slight changes had taken place in the Natal Field Force, it becomes necessary to inspect a rough table of the divisions at this time under Sir Redvers Buller:—
NATAL
GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER.
- 2nd East Surrey.
- 2nd West Yorks.
- 2nd Devons.
- 2nd West Surrey.
- 1st Rifle Brigade.
- 1st Durham Light Infantry.
- 3rd King’s Royal Rifles.
- 2nd Scottish Rifles (Cameronians).
- 1st Devon.
- 1st Gloucester.
- 1st Manchester.
- 2nd Gordon Highlanders.
- 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers.
- 1st Leicester.
- 1st King’s Royal Rifles.
- 2nd King’s Royal Rifles.
- 2nd Dorset.
- 2nd Middlesex.
- 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
- 2nd Royal Lancaster.
- 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers.
- 1st South Lancashire.
- 1st York and Lancaster.
- 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
- 2nd Rifle Brigade.
- 1st King’s Liverpool.
- Imperial Light Infantry.
- 61st Field Battery (Howitzers).
- Two Nordenfeldts (taken from the Boers).
- Natal Battery 9-pounders.
- Fourteen naval 12-pounder quick-firers.
- 4th Mountain Battery.
- 10th Mountain Battery, two guns.
- Four 4.7 naval guns.
- Naval 6-in. gun.
- Part of Siege Train.
- 5th Dragoon Guards.
- 1st Royal Dragoons.
- 5th Lancers.
- 13th Hussars.
- 18th Hussars.
- 19th Hussars.
- A Battery Royal Horse Artillery.
- South African Light Horse.
- Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry.
- Bethune’s Mounted Infantry.
- Natal Carabineers.
- Natal Mounted Rifles.
- Border Mounted Rifles.
- Umvoti Mounted Rifles.
- Natal Police.
- Colt Battery.
- Addison’s Colonial Scouts.
For some weeks it appeared as though no move were contemplated; but on the 7th of May the machinery began to revolve. General Clery’s Division proceeded from Ladysmith to Modder Spruit, while Lord Dundonald and General Dartnell also prepared to move their troops out of camp at Bug’s Farm. Lord Roberts at this time had reached a point in the Free State level with Ladysmith, and Sir Redvers Buller thus became included in the scheme of advance, and was able to act in conjunction with him. The Boers, numbering some 7000 or 8000, were swarming on the Biggarsberg range, having prepared entrenchments on all points commanding the road from Ladysmith to the Transvaal and as far as Helpmakaar. They knew well by experience, however, the discomforts attendant on their position, for their only clear way of escape was by Laing’s Nek—the passes over the Drakensberg on the west, and Zululand on the east being now closed to them.
On the 11th of May activities began. Dundonald’s Cavalry Brigade and Clery’s Infantry Division were assembled in the neighbourhood of Sunday River Drift south of Elandslaagte. The General’s plan was to post his left at Elandslaagte and swing his right flank round by Helpmakaar and crumple the Boers up towards Dundee.
On the 12th Sir Redvers Buller, with the right column, moved towards Helpmakaar, following the same route as that taken by General Yule in his famous retreat from Glencoe, while General Hildyard (the central column) made a demonstration by crossing Sunday River, near the railway line, and Lyttelton’s Division (the left column) prolonged the line farther west. Meanwhile, the brigades of Clery and Dundonald—over ruts and obstacles, mere apologies for roads—had reached Waschbank, and were facing the frowning heights of the Biggarsberg, which loomed large and ominous and threatening about fifteen miles in the distance.
The Biggarsberg region, now so pregnant with historical interest is so called after one of the early pioneers of Durban, an Englishman, named Edward Biggar, who in 1838 fought side by side with the Boers against Dingaan. Of the great range in those days a Natalian writer said: “Besides being the first eastern plateau terrace of the Drakensberg, musically termed ‘Quathlamba’ by the natives residing in it, it consists of two long lines of elevation, divided by great ravines abounding in romantic cascades, dizzy precipices, and great pointed peaks towering towards the heavens in fantastic forms, veritable mountain forts,—
‘Which like the giants stand
To sentinel enchanted land.’
Majestic krantzes were round us bristling in great tree ferns, huge aloes, and African Euphoboebia, the latter’s bright scarlet blossoms contrasting sharply with the dark green foliage, nursing the base of isolated lofty hills, whose sunless pillars were hidden in earth’s depths, unknown to human search.”
This picturesque range runs across North Natal south-east towards the junction of the Tugela (the “Angry” River of the Kaffirs) and the Mooi River, and some of the peaks tower above the land of Natal 5000 to over 7000 feet; and from these, on a clear day, may be traced the whole crimson history of Buller’s relief of Ladysmith. In the present onward march great precautions had to be taken, as this—a comparatively short cut to save a round of some thirty miles—was teeming with the enemy, whose flank on the Biggarsberg it was the chief’s design to turn. The march was resumed the whole day under menace of the enemy, who hovered, vulture-like, in the distant heights, and towards afternoon came into the plains, attacking and wounding some of the British patrols. They also succeeded in taking prisoners three of the South African Light Horse, Australians lately joined, who, mistaking the enemy in their kharki disguise for friends, walked unsuspectingly into their arms. By nightfall the troops were encamped at Vermaak’s Farm, with the Boers and their guns not very far distant.
Sunday’s proceedings were opened in the haze of the morning with a shell from the hostile band, and after a time the naval guns woke up, spat forth some four times, and reduced the Dutchmen to silence. The Mounted Brigades, with a battery of Royal Horse Artillery, had moved on beforehand, and by the time the passage at arms between the big guns was in full swing, they and the transport were safely in a place of shelter. The Mounted Infantry and the 2nd Brigade, under General Hamilton, then engaged in the herculean task of getting up the rugged steeps of the Biggarsberg, and there, securing a nek which was the key to the summit, prevented the enemy from attempting to waylay the advancing army. On the ridges taken by General Hamilton were formidable trenches prepared for defence, which could now serve the foe no longer.
While this flanking process was taking place, Colonel Bethune, with his composite force of Mounted Infantry, was co-operating in the direction of Helpmakaar, thus threatening the Boers’ left flank, and rendering their position at Helpmakaar distinctly uncomfortable. The guns on both sides worked furiously—those of the Boers with poor success; and at dusk, when the troops bivouacked, there was reason to hope that by morning the region of Helpmakaar would be purged of the enemy. And so it proved.
With the dawn of day it was discovered that the Dutchmen were in full retreat towards Dundee, pursued by the cavalry. But the enemy were covered in their retreat by some 1500 Boers, whose tactics were excellent. Each section as it fell back set fire to the grass, thus drawing a veil of smoke between them and Dundonald’s men, and intercepting the rush of the pursuers, who more than once were almost within a lance-length of them. They succeeded in getting clear away, in spite of the magnificent dash of the pursuit, which covered some forty miles. Then, having secured some kops, they made sufficient stand to check our advance through the rippling sea of flame made by the veldt fires, while their main body vanished, leaving open the road to Dundee.
The Boers, finding themselves outflanked, decided to make no stand, either at Dundee or Glencoe, and both these places, of now historical interest, were occupied in the course of the 15th, and the 16th was spent in resting after the fatigues of the preceding days. Dundee was a sad and deserted-looking place. Though the coal-mines were untouched, its houses were denuded of furniture, and bore evidences of Boer occupation and Boer mischief. Wall papers hung in shreds, doors were unhinged and broken, windows were merely gaps, and the word dilapidation was marked everywhere. The inhabitants, such few as remained, gave the troops a cordial welcome.
General Buller’s Advance to Newcastle.
On Thursday the 17th the force was again up and doing, the earliest birds being the Mounted Infantry. They journeyed along towards Dannhauser Station, midway between Dundee and Newcastle. On the afternoon of the 18th the troops swarmed into the pleasing green-girt town of Newcastle, after a long and fatiguing march along a fire-blackened plain, devilishly prepared by the departing Boers for the purpose of showing up the advance of the kharki-clad legions. Joy and welcome was writ on every face, and hearty cheers greeted the arrival of the army. Sir Redvers Buller was presented with a banner which had been secretly worked by the ladies of the locality in anticipation of his coming. The town they found had been rechristened Viljoensdorp by the Boers, whose labours there had also been anticipatory. They had destroyed the large water-tanks for supplying the engines at Glencoe, Dannhauser, and Newcastle, but the inconveniences were merely temporary, and repairs were actively set on foot. Report came in that the Dutchmen were full of activity, swarming in the direction of the famous Laing’s Nek and Majuba Hill, therefore on the afternoon of Saturday the 19th, Lord Dundonald, with naval guns, went ahead to unearth them. They, however, remained buried wherever they were, and the desperately-fatigued men and horses of the Mounted Brigades returned towards Ingogo Station, while some of the troops encamped on the battlefield. But their fatigues or its grievous memories scarcely damped their spirits, for they were on the confines of the Transvaal, and Pretoria, the land of promise, seemed near at hand.
Sir Redvers Buller forthwith issued the following proclamation:—
“The troops of Queen Victoria are now passing through the Transvaal. Her Majesty does not make war on individuals, but is, on the contrary, anxious to spare them, as far as may be possible, the horrors of war. The quarrel England has is with the Government and not with the people of the Transvaal. Provided they remain neutral no attempt will be made to interfere with persons living near the line of march, every possible protection will be given them, and any of their property that it may be necessary to take will be paid for. But, on the other hand, those who are thus allowed to remain near the line of march must respect and maintain their neutrality, and residents of any locality will be held responsible both in persons and property if any damage is done to the railway or telegraph, or if any violence is done to any member of the British forces in the vicinity of their homes.”
On this, many Natal Dutch gave themselves up and others were captured, but it was again observed that those farmers who tendered their submission tendered with it, not Mausers, but other weapons of more ancient pattern.
Affairs at this time were going on most satisfactorily, the troops, after a 120-mile march, accomplished in nine days, including a day’s halt and two days’ fighting, had almost cleared Natal of the invaders, and were in possession of the country from Van Reenan’s Pass to the Buffalo River. A message of congratulation on their efforts was received from the Queen, and the General expressed his satisfaction at the successful work accomplished. One unfortunate affair damped the spirits of the advancing army.
GENERAL BULLER’S ADVANCE: PURSUING THE BOERS AFTER THE FIGHT ON HELPMAKAAR HEIGHTS
Drawing by J. Nash, R.I., from a Sketch by G. Foucar
On the 17th, Colonel Bethune was detached, with about 500 men, from Dundee. His column consisted of five squadrons of mounted infantry, two Hotchkiss and two Maxim guns. His instructions were to show his force in N’qutu, in the centre of British Zululand (to which a magistrate and civil establishment were about to return), and afterwards to rejoin Sir Redvers Buller at Newcastle. The orders were executed, and Colonel Bethune moved towards Newcastle on the 20th May, via Vryheid, due north of the road which leads to Utrecht. About six miles north-west of Vryheid, the Boers were ambushed in the thick shrub that abounds in the neighbourhood, with the result that E squadron of Mounted Infantry, which had pushed ahead to reach Vryheid before dark set in, suffered severe loss. Few escaped to tell the tale, the outline of which was as follows: The Boers no sooner saw the troopers approaching than they jumped from their hiding-place and surrounded them. Captain Goff (6th Dragoon Guards), who was commanding the squadron, dismounted his men and made a valiant stand, but the Boers poured a volley on them, incapacitating most of the horses and many of the men. The commanding officer was shot dead. Still the party continued to reply to the fire of the enemy till, ammunition running short, they knew resistance would soon be unavailing. Meanwhile, the scene of confusion was horrible. The Boers had set the crisp, dry grass into a blaze, and behind the smoke of it were able to fire with impunity at the helpless British force. The rest of the column had hastened towards the scene of the disaster, but what with the crackling glare of the flamboyant grass, the suffocating clouds of smoke, and the deceptive darkness of the gloaming, Colonel Bethune dared not open fire at close quarters lest he should injure his own already wounded force. Gallantly the men of D squadron dashed into the mêlée, and rescued from thence such troopers as survived. Lieutenant Capell, who gave his horse to an injured trooper, was taken prisoner, and Lord De la Warr, while going to the relief of another, was slightly injured in the leg.
He afterwards gave to a correspondent of the Central News an interesting narrative of his experiences on that eventful day. He was acting as aide-de-camp to Colonel Bethune, and was directed to take messages to the captains of E and D squadrons, in the thickest of the fight. His instructions were to order them to retire, but when he came upon the scene he found that E squadron was already practically surrounded. He was able, however, to deliver his order to Captain Ford of D squadron, and then set out to return to Colonel Bethune through a heavy fire. In galloping back he saw Trooper Cooper, of Durban, lying wounded in the grass, which was then blazing. The flames were gradually making their way towards the wounded man, who was unable to move. A horrible death in a few minutes was certain, unless succour could be rendered him. Earl De la Warr instantly dismounted, crept up through the smoke, and was in the act of rescuing the man when he was pounced upon by about twenty Boers, who fired at him at close range. He was wounded, though not severely, and just managed to drag himself away from the burning grass. His horse had bolted, and he was only rescued when he had practically given up all hope.
The following casualties among officers occurred: Killed—3rd Dragoon Guards, Captain W. E. D. Goff; Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, Lieutenant H. W. Lanham and Lieutenant W. McLachlan. Wounded—Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, Captain Earl De la Warr and Lieutenant De Lasalle. Missing—Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, Lieutenant A. E. Capell.
The whole of the wounded were taken by the enemy, and Colonel Bethune had no resource but to retire on N’qutu.
The Boers were falling back from Natal, and the British at this date were in possession of Christiana, Kroonstad, Lindley, and Newcastle. Thus, it will be seen, we were sweeping up, like an incoming tide, from all quarters. Sir Redvers Buller now halted to concentrate his army, collect supplies, and repair the rail, in order that his next move should be both rapid and effective. That being the case, his programme for the celebration of the Queen’s Birthday took an unique form. The General decided that the men should spend “a record day” in repairing the rail. This they did with a will, as, indeed, they did all things at the behest of their much-respected chief. Repairs on all sides were prosecuted with ardour, the railway engineering staff working away at bridging operations on the Ingagane River at Waschbank, till, by the 28th, the line was clear to Newcastle. To clear the right flank Generals Hildyard and Lyttelton had been directed to Utrecht and Vryheid respectively, and the month closed with the entry into Utrecht, the first Transvaal town to be taken by the Natal Field Force. In the skirmishing which occurred, Captain St. John and Lieutenant Pearse had their horses shot under them, and Lieutenant Thompson had the misfortune to be wounded and taken prisoner. The town, however, was not really occupied till some weeks later.
Their part of the strategical programme accomplished, General Hildyard’s Division left for Ingogo, while that of General Lyttelton marched to Coetze’s Drift, due east of Ingogo, for the purpose of clearing the country between Vryheid and Wakkerstroom.
CHAPTER IX
THE INTERREGNUM AT PRETORIA
While tremendous excitement was convulsing Johannesburg, Pretoria was simmering. The populace was trekking away towards the Lydenburg Mountains, their ox-carts rumbling incessantly along the streets, while a stream of Dutchmen, motley of habit and of mien, moved out before the rumour of the advancing army. They had decided that, though they might no longer be able to resist, they could still retain the ability to annoy! Mr. Kruger, with his Executive, amid the lamentations of his admirers, also fled. He hurried to the Middleburg Railway, leaving behind him a committee of citizens who were deputed to surrender the town to the British. He fled not empty-handed. In the dead of night gold in bars was piled recklessly into whatever vehicles could be found to hold it, and the spoil was shipped on board the train which bore the President from the scene of his really amazing career. With him went a good many of the British prisoners, though many more stoutly resisted the order for removal and showed fight. Their attitude betokened a general uproar, the story of which may be gleaned from the accounts of various officers who lived through days of tension which, coming atop of a long experience of incarceration, seemed to them like some hideous nightmare of the senses.
An officer, who had been captured by the Boers while in the hospital at Dundee after the retreat of General Yule, described the circumstances connected with the threatened commotion:—
“We were all at dinner, when Wood, of Standard Bank, and Hay, the American Consul, came in with two Hollanders. Their object in coming was to get us to send officers to the 5000 odd men out at Waterval, who were threatening to break out. It transpired that Kruger and the Government were ‘clearing’ (the report said in ambulance carts). The town was in a state of chaos, looting and drinking, and the British were expected next morning. The commandant—a Hollander, and not a bad chap in spite of it—then came in and announced that the British scouts were within six miles of Pretoria, and that he expected them in on the following morning. He appealed to us as soldiers, and asked us not to make it difficult for him to carry out his duty till the end. Well, we were in such good spirits that we gave him three cheers. Then Colonel H—— got up and called for three cheers for Wood and Hay, who have done so much for our men at Waterval. If it had not been for these two, and for subscriptions in the town and from us, the men would have been absolutely neglected. For though the Boer authorities took all the credit for what was done, they did nothing, discouraging all efforts, and treating with suspicion any one who stirred in the matter. At one time the hospital almost broke down for want of funds. Well, we gave them a tremendous ovation, and then sang ‘For he’s a jolly good fellow’ over and over again. Then we struck up ‘God save the Queen.’ You never heard it sung as it was! It had been forbidden for nearly eight months. For the first Sunday when it was sung they took away the organ, and made themselves objectionable in many small ways. We had only once before sung it—on the Queen’s birthday....
“About twenty-five officers went off after dinner to keep the men in order. Waterval is about ten miles from here. If this step had not been taken there is no saying what might have happened. The men had heard the booming of guns all day, in the direction of Johannesburg, and it is not to be wondered at that when the Boers tried to move them they flatly refused to budge. There are Maxims at each corner, and the loss of life would have been very great. But the Boers gave in. What might have happened if the men got loose in the town, after so much privation and such hardships, can be imagined, but the sending of officers should alter all things.”
Naturally, at this time, the officers, who were prisoners, were bursting with excitement. On the 3rd, guns, about ten or twelve miles to south and south-west, were heard, and on the 4th, early, shells from British guns crashed on the ridge of hills south of the town—the first shots being fired at a redoubt behind the Artillery Barracks in Pretoria. Soon, to their delight, this was cleared of Boers, and subsequently two big forts on either side of the gorge in which is the railway then received attention. Three lyddite shells from the howitzer batteries were placed in the western fort, and a fierce and continuous fire from the 4.7 naval gun was concentrated on the railway station, and though the place remained intact the moral effect of the attack was sufficient to clear the course. Before dusk, more lyddite and shrapnel were concentrated on the huge hill south of Pretoria, and on part of the main ridge which had been shelled all day. The prisoners, acutely listening in their “bird cage,” fancied they heard in the distance a British cheer, and confidently went to rest calculating on the morrow’s freedom. At 1 A.M., however, they were awakened. The commandant declared that he had received orders from Botha, and they must at once pack and trek outside the town—as the town was to be defended, and was therefore unsafe. Waggons were prepared to receive the kit; and the guard, usually numbering about forty-eight, had been more than doubled; and over one hundred armed Boers and Hollanders were waiting to escort 125 defenceless officers.
Colonel Hunt, Royal Artillery, the senior prisoner, was consulted. It was known that once moved, chance of release would be uncertain; and the colonel with his brother officers decided to adopt a policy of passive resistance. They parleyed; they argued the impossibility of removal at so short notice. They demanded what mounts were provided. The commandant declared they must walk. This the officers refused to do. Colonels never walked, they said. Cavalry and field officers must be provided with horses to ride. And again in the matter of food—how about that? Thus arguing, the commandant was detained about an hour and a half; but still he declared he had come to do a duty, and do it he must. The policy of passive resistance having run to its extreme limits, the colonels decided to place the commandant under arrest—to detain him in the building and trust to luck. The assistant-commandant, who arrived to “put in his oar,” was promptly “bagged” also. At 2.45 A.M. more wrangling took place. The commandant was reminded that an agreement had been practically entered into with the Transvaal Government that the men at Waterval should be kept quiet on condition that they were not moved, and that the Transvaal Government could not move the prisoners without a breach of faith. The commandant seemed impressed, and offered his word of honour that if released he would telephone to say there could be no removal—and countermand waggons and cancel arrangements. His word of honour was accepted. The commandant retired from the prison, and the officers went to bed fearing the worst.
The remainder of the story is soon told. At 9 A.M. the Duke of Marlborough, accompanied by his irrepressible kinsman, Winston Churchill, galloped to the prison and told the prisoners they were free. The prisoners cheered and shouted themselves hoarse. The guard was disarmed without a murmur, and the prisoners’ servants placed to do duty in their stead, an arrangement which afforded them much merriment and infinite satisfaction. The whole situation was the result of a most successful piece of bluff, and the officers were not a little gratified with the exercise of diplomacy which had brought about delay at a most critical moment. They had been unable, however, to prevent the departure, on the 4th, of some 1000 prisoners, which removal was a distinct breach of faith, considering the negotiations before alluded to.
An officer related his experiences on the momentous 4th and 5th of June:—
“On Monday morning, 9 A.M., guns were heard quite close. We knew the Boers, 15,000 strong, had taken up a position about six miles out, and it was said they had solemnly sworn to die or win. About 10 A.M. we saw a shell burst over the hill to the south close to one of the forts. Then shrapnel after shrapnel was landed just over the fort and all along the crest line, about four miles away from us. Then some larger gun placed a lyddite close to the big fort, sending up an enormous column of red dust and making a huge report. It was a grand sight. It went on all day, and we sat there in deck chairs watching. We could see very few Boers about. About 3 P.M. we saw the balloon, about fifteen miles off, I should think. Later in the afternoon the railway was shelled near the suburbs, and just before dark, away to the west, we saw clouds of dust and what we took to be fleeing commandos. After such a day we all went to bed in excellent spirits. Our long depressing wait was very near its end, and we should now escape the terrible prospect of being moved away to the east. About 1 A.M. we were wakened up by the commandant, who turned on the electric light and walked along the line of beds, saying, ‘Pack up, gentlemen, you have got to start at 3 P.M. and march six miles.’ ‘Why?’ ‘I don’t know why; those are my orders.’ ‘Which direction?’ ‘To the railway, to the east.’ Well, I knew what that meant at once, for I had expected the move for the last month, and many a very depressed hour had I spent thinking of the possibility of being carted about for six months in the cold—no food—no news—and every chance of being shot down. I lay in bed thinking what I should do—what we ought all to do. Some got up at once and dressed, quite ready to move, saying they were only going to move us out of range of the firing. But Colonel H—— luckily was not of that opinion, and nearly every one felt what it meant. We knew nothing for certain, but we thought our people were only six miles off. Outside the Hollanders’ guard had been trebled—about 200—and there were about twenty armed and mounted Boers. It was soon agreed that no one should move unless a rifle was pointed at his head. The Hollanders are only half-hearted, and the Boers don’t act without leaders. So the commandant and sub-commandant, who were alone inside, and only armed with revolvers, were made prisoners. They were told we refused to move; that they would have to shoot; and that, if they did shoot, every one of them would be hung by Bobs, who, we knew, was only seven miles off. Well, the commandant was talked round and fairly bluffed. He undertook not to move us, and to become a prisoner of the Boers if they insisted. He went out and had a talk with the Boer commandant; they had words, and the Boers galloped off to the town, calling him a —— Hollander, and saying they would have to get a Maxim. We had delayed the thing anyway for a time, and the railway might be cut any time by French. It was frightfully cold; I did not turn in again. Many went and hid in the roof, in ditches, and all sorts of places, where they were bound to be found. I got a bread-knife and cut a hole in the rabbit wire, which is only a small part of the obstacle, and asked the Hollander sentry to look the other way if I tried to get out when the commander came. But there were so many of them that one was afraid of the other. He only hesitated, and said he would see. We waited on till daylight and no one came. We looked anxiously at the hills all round in hopes of seeing our troops on the hills, but could see nothing. We waited and watched anxiously, and thought we should have a day of suspense. About 8 A.M. on Tuesday, 5th June, large bodies of men were visible to the west, about seven miles off, but it was impossible to say whether they were our men or Boers. Even if they were our men, it was possible that we should be hustled off under their noses. About 9 A.M. two men in felt hats and kharki and a civilian galloped up. Even till they were 100 feet off I feared they might be Boers. Then they took off their hats and waved them; there was a yell, and we all rushed through the gate. They were Marlborough and Winston Churchill, and we were free!”
Some of the late prisoners rushed out of the enclosure down hill into the town, scampering and yelling. It was so good to be free! It was so grand to feel that the scene of their incarceration had already almost become British soil! One climbed up the flagstaff with the Union Jack in his mouth and fastened it at the top (the great emblem, manufactured from a Transvaal flag, had been held in readiness for many months). There, in the town, were British sentries over all the Government buildings, over the house of the President—where Mrs. Kruger still remained—and over all the banks, and in the square. But the smart guardsman of Pall Mall was nowadays strangely transmogrified. Battered and travel-stained in his shabby kharki and worn helmet—the latter perhaps adorned, in lieu of plume, with tooth-brush, spoon, or other useful article—and equipped with loaf or cook-pot, or like practical paraphernalia not laid down in the regulations, he made a quaint, yet inspiriting picture of martial vagabondage. But to the eyes of his long-expecting fellow-countrymen he was none the less refreshing, almost adorable, and in a perfect frenzy of rejoicing the prisoners laughed and threw up their hats and waved their arms like very lunatics freed from strait-waistcoats, or the thrall of the padded room.
The chief was not timed to arrive till two, but long before that hour the prisoners of war were drawn up in the square to feast their eyes with a sight for which they had hungered wearily, some of them since the grievous autumn days when they had found themselves in Dundee hospital at the mercy of the Boers. And sure enough the spectacle that then followed was worth waiting a lifetime to see, and one which none who witnessed it will ever forget.
To return, however, to Johannesburg, and to those who, during this time of terrific suspense, were marching as fast as legs would carry them to take possession of the Boer capital.