OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF
As a continual reorganisation of the forces was taking place, it will assist us, before going further, to examine a rough table of the date, as compiled from various authorities by the Morning Post:—
DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES
Commanding-in-chief—FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS.
- 2nd Royal Irish Rifles.
- 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1st Royal Scots.
- 1st Derbyshire.
- (Composition not known.)
- 2nd Worcestershire.
- 2nd Bedfordshire.
- 2nd Wiltshire.
- 1st Royal Irish Regiment.
- 2nd East Kent.
- 1st Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 1st West Riding.
- 2nd Gloucester.
- 2nd Norfolk.
- 2nd Lincoln.
- 1st King’s Own Scottish Borderers.
- 2nd Hants.
- 2nd Cheshire.
- 1st East Lancashire.
- 2nd South Wales Borderers.
- 2nd North Stafford.
- 2nd Grenadier Guards.
- 2nd Scots Guards.
- 2nd East Yorks.
- 1st Worcester.
- 2nd Royal West Kent.
- 1st South Stafford.
- 2nd Manchester.
- 1st Argyll and Sutherland.
- 1st Gordon Highlanders.
- 2nd Seaforth Highlanders.
- 2nd Royal Highlanders (Black Watch).
- Highland Light Infantry.
- 2nd Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry.
- 2nd Shropshire Light Infantry.
- Canadian Regiment.
- 2nd Somerset Light Infantry.
- 1st Connaught Rangers.
- 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
- 1st Border.
- 2nd Royal Fusiliers.
- 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers.
- 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
- 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers.
- 1st Essex.
- 1st Yorkshire.
- 1st Welsh.
- 2nd Royal Warwickshire.
- 3rd Grenadier Guards.
- 1st Coldstream Guards.
- 2nd Coldstream Guards.
- 1st Scots Guards.
- 6th Dragoon Guards.
- 6th Dragoons.
- 2nd Dragoons.
- 10th Hussars.
- 12th Hussars.
- Household Cavalry.
- 9th Lancers.
- 16th Lancers.
- 17th Lancers.
- 7th Dragoon Guards.
- 8th Hussars.
- 14th Hussars.
- 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles.
- 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles.
- Lord Strathcona’s Corps.
- One Battalion Imperial Mounted Infantry.
- New South Wales Mounted Infantry.
- West Australian Mounted Infantry.
- Queensland Mounted Infantry.
- New Zealand Mounted Infantry.
- One Battalion Imperial Mounted Infantry.
- Victorian Mounted Infantry.
- South Australian Mounted Infantry.
- Tasmanian Mounted Infantry.
- One Battalion Imperial Mounted Infantry.
- South African Irregulars Mounted Infantry.
- Cape Mounted Rifles.
- Kaffrarian Mounted Rifles.
- Montmorency’s Scouts (200).
- Brabant’s Horse (1200).
- Border Horse.
- Frontier Mounted Rifles.
- Queenstown Volunteers.
- Cape Garrison Artillery.
- Two Naval 12-pounders.
- 2nd Berkshire.
- 1st Royal Sussex.
- 1st Suffolk.
- 1st Cameron Highlanders.
- C.I.V. Infantry.
- Roberts’s Horse.
- Kitchener’s Horse.
- Two Squadrons Imperial Light Horse.
- 7th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry.
- C.I.V. Mounted Infantry.
- Ceylon Mounted Infantry.
- Lumsden’s Horse.
- Lord Loch’s Horse.
Towards the end of April the authorities found that the situation was growing in interest as in difficulty. In the south-east of the Free State Colonel Dalgety and his small but truculent band had become the pivot round which British and Free Staters were manœuvring, and the red drama of war on the north and west of Wepener was becoming tragic as that of the region around Mafeking. Developments on a large and complicated scale were taking place, developments not as might be imagined in the direction of Pretoria, but for the purpose of catching the enemy in the northern and eastern portion of the Free State, and dealing with as much of him as possible before proceeding to larger things. There were now several separate columns on the march, each and all so arranged that, at a given moment and at a given place within a very short time they could concentrate for purposes of battle when battle should be imminent, and with a view to mopping up such Boer commandos as might chance to step in between the fangs of the British lion. (We are already aware that the Boer commandos in this region were far too knowing, and the anxious fangs eventually snapped on nothing at all! Still a vast mass of the foe was held in the south-east of the Free State while plans for the great advance northwards were being elaborated.)
Lord Roberts began the second act of his campaign by deploying the army from Karee Siding as far as Wepener, a distance of some seventy miles. Indeed, on Sunday the 22nd of April, we find that one portion of the army was at Bushman’s Kop, south of Wepener, another was near Dewetsdorp, half-way between the latter place and Bloemfontein, another was moving to Tweede Geluk, some twenty miles from Bloemfontein and twenty-two from Dewetsdorp, and already in communication with General Rundle, who was making for Dewetsdorp, while troops were also at or near Sanna’s Post and fifteen miles west—at Kranz Kraal, a valuable passage of the Modder between Sanna’s Post and the railways which for some weeks had been much used by the Boers. All these troops were sprayed out at distances varying from twenty to thirty miles from each other, and were capable of getting into heliographic communication. As this somewhat complicated machinery requires to be examined and not dismissed with a word, it is better, if possible, to follow the commanding officers as they each moved on his special duty.
Generals Rundle and Chermside had concentrated their divisions at Reddersburg with a view to assisting in what was called “the big partridge drive.” The force of the united commanders moving from Reddersburg towards Dewetsdorp was now about 15,000 strong. It was composed of the 4th and 7th Imperial Yeomanry, the Mounted Infantry companies of the 1st Berkshire and 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, sixty of Montmorency’s Scouts (Captain McNeil), General Campbell’s Brigade, General Boyes’s Brigade, and General Allen’s Brigade. The united artillery was commanded by Colonel Jeffreys, R.A. It comprised the 38th, 69th, 74th, 77th, and 79th Field Batteries. The Boers, disposed by De Wet, occupied a position astride the country from Leeuw Kop to Wepener, those in the former place covering those in the latter, and vice versâ.
About the 20th the troops, under Sir Leslie Rundle, were approaching Dewetsdorp, keeping the Boers in a perpetual state of anxiety and disturbance by worrying tactics which the Dutchmen were at a loss to understand. “The idea is to keep ’em on the dance where they are,” said a Tommy who affected an interest in strategy, “keep ’em lively, so that when they want to run they’ve no legs to do it with.” At the same time the Boers took their share in contributing to the life of the proceedings, and were also the means of bringing to light more deeds of British heroism. Early in the morning of the 20th a strong force of Yeomanry, with Mounted Infantry and two guns, had started out over the green pastures of the Free State to reconnoitre the enemy’s left and discover his strength. (The left was the most vulnerable point of the foe, as, that turned, he would be cut off from Wepener and forced north into the arms of the advancing troops.) They soon came upon the main Boer position, and were assailed with a sharp fire from the Dutchmen. A smart encounter, or rather a series of encounters took place, during which the Yeomanry displayed remarkable steadiness under fire, and executed their share of the movements with the promptness and dexterity of seasoned—Mr. Kipling calls it “salted”—troops.
McNeil’s Scouts (late poor De Montmorency’s), always the first to be “in it,” observed a party of Boers racing for a desirable kopje, and obtained permission to try and cut them off. With the party was Mr. Winston Churchill, who, thinking that fun was in the air, put spurs to his horse and was off with the intrepid band of scouts. For some time there was an animated race, the Boers being nearer to the strong eminence than the British, though less well mounted. When it came to climbing, it seemed as though they might get the worst of it. Rush—rush—rush went the fifty scouts; scamper—scamper—scamper went the foe. It was almost a neck-and-neck affair, when suddenly there came wire, and before this could be cut there were Boers in possession of the great kopje, Boers blazing downwards as fast as muskets would allow. Thereupon Captain McNeil shouted his orders: “Too late! back to the other kopje. Gallop!” and all obeying, the good steeds were off as hard as legs could carry them. And now happened the episode which singles out the reconnaissance from numerous military undertakings of the same kind, for it brought into notice another of the heroes of the war, whose courageous act will not easily be forgotten. As before said, Mr. Winston Churchill, the correspondent of the Morning Post, who, it may be remembered, escaped from the Pretoria prison, was accompanying McNeil’s Scouts in their exciting expedition. No sooner was the order given to “gallop,” than Mr. Churchill made a bound for his saddle. It twisted, the horse, alarmed by the fire, bolted, and the young man found himself on foot and alone, with the Boers a second time within an ace of him. A horrible vision, grown lifelike in a moment, as the vision of his past before a drowning man, now flashed before him; the walls of the dreaded Model School seemed to close in—nearer—nearer. But the Boers, he decided, should not get him again without a struggle. This time he had his pistol, he could not again be hunted down unarmed in the open. He shouted—a despairing roar—to the scouts, who were fleeing all unconscious of the accident that had befallen him. Then one, turning aside, heard, stopped in his rush for life, wheeled about, grasped the dismounted man, and an instant later, with Churchill at the back of his saddle, was off again. Then the rifles above, at a range of only forty yards, rippled out a deadly tune, as the flying hoofs of the horse, wounded, and leaving behind him a track of blood, flung up the turf and sod. Yet, from the showers of lead and dust they came out alive, and Mr. Churchill lived to tell the tale of his miraculous rescue. Curiously enough, the gallant scout whose action saved the journalist’s life, owned the talismanic name which moved the army as the magnet moves a needle. Trooper Roberts was recommended to the notice of Lord Roberts by General Rundle, for, as Mr. Churchill said, all the officers were agreed that the man who pulled up in such a situation to help another, was worthy of some honourable distinction.
MAJOR-GENERAL POLE-CAREW
Photo by Gregory & Co., London
The fighting elsewhere continued with considerable heat, and the long day was vibrant with the brawl of big guns and the cacophonous whirr of shells. Without artillery to help in pounding the enemy, General Brabazon decided it was useless to continue the reconnaissance; he therefore withdrew with what some one described as “an instructive little rear-guard action.” He had done an immense amount of work, reconnoitred, located laagers, forced the enemy to move his guns, and generally discomfited him at the cost of less than a score of men. Now he rested on his oars, for instructions from head-quarters arrived advising General Rundle to wait till reinforcements should arrive before further pressing his attack.
Accordingly, on Sunday the 22nd of April, General French was despatched from Bloemfontein to assist. The force consisted of the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, the Eleventh Division (General Pole-Carew’s), and some naval guns. The plan was to move to Dewetsdorp, and en route to turn out the enemy from his position at Leeuw Kop. General Dickson, with the 4th Brigade of Cavalry and a battery of Horse Artillery, was to move towards the south-east from Springfield, so as to head off the enemy in the event of his retreating to the east. General Stephenson, with the 18th Brigade, 83rd, 84th, and 85th Batteries, R.F.A., and two 4.7 naval guns, was to march south and effect a junction with General Pole-Carew and the Guards’ Brigade, and Colonel Alderson’s Mounted Infantry Brigade. At Leeuw Kop, the Guards were to get round the enemy’s left flank, while a central attack was to be delivered by the 18th Brigade under General Stephenson. The Guards (who had hitherto been protecting the line), were met some five miles out, they having marched from Ferriera Siding. They proceeded to the position mentioned, some fifteen miles south-east of Bloemfontein, where the Boers were encountered. They were found to be ensconced in the high eminence of Leeuw Kop itself, and other kopjes thickly covered with bush in the north. Thereupon operations began, the artillery opening the programme some five miles off, followed by an attack late in the day on the part of the 18th Brigade and the Guards, to front and left of the enemy’s position. On the north side of the position was a picturesque farm, towards which the 18th Brigade advanced. Five scouts were allowed to approach within a hundred yards before the enemy fired. Then our guns (84th Battery Field Artillery) having discovered the position, began to play upon it—hidden though it was by high trees and shrubberies—with such accuracy and vigour that the enemy retreated to some distant kopjes, whence they plied their Vickers-Maxims and Mausers with a will. Shells buzzed and bounded among them, but our men never flinched. They pursued their way more and more to the left, in order to surround the offending kopjes. The Warwicks in the centre, the Essex on the right, the Welsh on the left, moving in echelon, advanced. By-and-by General Dickson’s cavalry, from its distant position, attempted to engage in the flanking movement, and to surround the hills if possible with mounted men during the development of the infantry attack. The operations were suddenly overtaken by an appalling darkness, which turned out to be a flight of locusts that came and went, leaving the land more bare than it was before. The infantry now were pouring volleys on the kopje, whence they were again attacked with such warmth that they had to “lie low.” Their position at this time was an unenviable one, it being too exposed for advance, and too advanced for retirement. At last the Essex made a glorious dash on the western slopes, while the Warwick and Welsh regiments, wildly cheering, clambered ahead of them on the northern heights. The Boers fired half-heartedly for a time, but were subsequently seen careering down the eastern slopes, their sole care being to save themselves. Unfortunately in this gallant assault, Captain Prothero, Welsh Regiment, was mortally wounded.
The Guards, meanwhile, had extended on the right, while the Mounted Infantry, consisting of one battalion Imperial Mounted Infantry, 1st and 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles, and Strathcona’s Horse (on their right) came in for so devastating a welcome from the Creusot gun which the enemy had posted on a neighbouring hill, that they were forced to retire. But the artillery came to the rescue, and the Boers removed their gun. The Dutchmen now found their numbers too meagre to hold their line of defence, which covered a semicircular chain of kopjes on the east, and in the morning of the 23rd all the enemy who held Leeuw Kop were discovered to have trekked eastward. The position was ours. Quantities of ammunition and rifles were seized, and General French had commenced an animated chase to the south, though his cavalry were unable to find the Boers in any strong position in the vicinity. A noticeable feature of the day’s experiences was the exhibition of the white flag on the farmhouse, whence the Boers fired on the Canadians. These gallant fellows came safely out of the treacherous downpour, but lost two horses.
On the same day (the 22nd), while the other tentacles of the great octopus, the British army, were twisting as shown, General Ian Hamilton with his Mounted Infantry Division was moving on towards Sanna’s Post to take possession of the waterworks there. As the enemy in some strength was holding the neighbouring hills, it was found necessary to despatch the Ninth Division, consisting of Smith-Dorien’s and MacDonald’s Brigades, to the support of General Ian Hamilton. With these movements we must deal anon. As Sanna’s Post is situated some twenty miles from Tweede Geluk (where the Eleventh Division was operating), and twenty-five from the road to Dewetsdorp, near where we have left General Rundle, the nicety of the disposition of the troops in their relation to each other may be appreciated.
Moving almost at the same time, was Maxwell’s (late Chermside’s) Brigade (Seventh Division), which marched eastward and seized the hills covering the waggon-bridge over the Modder River at Kranz Kraal—the bridge whose utility to the Boers has been described.
Meanwhile General Brabant with his Mounted Division and General Hart’s Brigade from Rouxville, had reached the vicinity of Bushman’s Kop, some fourteen miles from Wepener. The bulk of the Boer force had opposed themselves to this advance, and during this time the strain on Colonel Dalgety at Wepener had naturally been relaxed. By Monday, the 23rd, the Colonial Division, supported by Hart’s Brigade, had turned the Boer position, after having kept up a running fight all day. The casualties of the fight were twenty-five wounded. Some of these were removed to Basutoland, under arrangement with the resident Commissioner at Mafeteng. General Brabant was moving in a north-easterly direction, keeping Basutoland on his right flank, his operations being watched with amazing interest by the natives in this region. He was now some eight miles from Wepener and sixty from Bloemfontein, and in heliographic communication with Dalgety, a circumstance which caused the Boers round Wepener to grow uneasy as to their positions.
To return to General Pole-Carew. On the morning of Monday, the 23rd, the Boers, as we know, were found to have evacuated their main position at Leeuw Kop, and the Mounted Infantry took possession of the hill from which the enemy had been routed by the infantry. General French by then had moved on independently of his transport. Boers were known to be in the southern fringes of the Leeuw Kop position, but, without engaging them, General French pushed on, posting the 16th Lancers to keep an eye on his flank, till they should be relieved by the mounted troops which were following. Meanwhile, slowly in the rear, screened by the 4th Mounted Infantry, General Pole-Carew advanced his division and baggage train, and sent Roberts’s Horse to relieve the 16th Lancers on the hill they were holding. The relievers came in for nasty attentions from a Maxim, but in spite of this they behaved with great gallantry, made for the kopje on which the Boers were ensconced, and finally cleared the summit. But this was not accomplished without lamentable loss. Major Brazier Creagh, 9th Bengal Lancers, who but recently had succeeded to the command of the regiment, was mortally wounded. Presently, to the assistance of Roberts’s Horse came the 14th Hussars, squadrons of which regiment distributed themselves in hope of cutting off the enemy in retreat, but the Dutchmen, with all smartness, plied their guns till it was deemed best to retire, leaving the 2nd Coldstreams in the original position gained.
The Operations at Dewetsdorp. (A Sketch from the Right of the Boer Position, by Major A. Festing.)
The cavalry soon became engaged. The Boers were espied in a long, low kopje to the east and west of the Dewetsdorp Road, the wide, flat ridge of which General French meant to seize. The 9th Lancers advanced to secure it, but the Boers instantly raced for the most advantageous position, with the result that while the troopers planted themselves on one edge of the plateau the Boers did likewise on the other. An animated combat ensued, the Lancers fighting most pluckily. The Boers offered determined resistance, whereon a “pom-pom” was ordered to the rescue of the Lancers, who were losing heavily. This weapon disturbed the efforts of the Dutchmen to sweep onwards, and soon they were put to flight, the “pom-poms” of the British harrying them in their retreat. The cavalry engagement was a pretty affair but costly, the dashing Lancers, enfiladed with a cruel fire, losing one officer, Captain Denny, K.D.G.’s, three wounded, and thirty-two men killed and wounded. The wounded officers were Captain H. F. W. Stanley, 9th Lancers, Lieutenant V. R. Brooke, 9th Lancers, and Lieutenant the Hon. A. W. J. C. Skeffington, 17th Lancers.
| (Corporal) | (Officer) |
General Pole-Carew, whose object was to establish communications with General Rundle, and for that purpose was advancing his division, with baggage train, as quickly as possible, now appeared in the direction of the main kopje, where the Boers for some days had been hiding. Here Roberts’s Horse came into action; they located the position, which was shelled with great vigour, while at the base was a containing line of the Warwickshire Regiment, which enabled the General to pass with division and baggage, almost under the nose of the enemy, in perfect safety. The Boers made a struggle to arrest the passage of the column, but it was a feeble one. They opened fire from the ridge where they had first ensconced themselves, and past which General Pole-Carew had to march, but the guns of the 85th Battery made their acquaintance with such scant ceremony and so much warmth that there was a stampede. After a few shots had burst into some groups of Boers they all speedily got out of range, taking with them their baggage and guns.
General Rundle, who as we know was waiting to march on Dewetsdorp, now communicated by heliograph that there were some 7000 of the enemy in his vicinity, and also that the country in front was crowded with low hills in which they might be hidden; but General Pole-Carew proceeded boldly to advance, and in his advance made some very necessary reprisals on such farmers, who, preferring covert-guile to open war, had been found aiding the enemy after receiving lenient treatment at our hands. He had previously set fire to a farmhouse whence, with a white flag flying over it, the Boers on Sunday had fired on our men. The farmers were told they could no longer play their double games, acting as they did at one moment the slim warrior, and the next the pastoral innocent.
Meanwhile General Rundle with some 2500 Boers in front of him was waiting till he should get into touch with General Pole-Carew. He was warned by heliograph of the approach of the 4th Cavalry Brigade and of General French, and throughout the 23rd there was little done save running the gantlet of shells which the Boers persistently fired but without doing serious damage. The Yeomanry, who already had shown remarkable “grit,” received considerable attention from the “Creusots” of the enemy, who were apparently holding on to all their eastern positions regardless of the fact that the gigantic prongs of the steel trap which was being prepared for them were shortly about to close. All the forces were now gradually getting in touch with each other, and the Dutchmen’s days were numbered. So it was thought on the night of the 23rd. The 24th broke quietly. No shot was fired. Rundle’s force swung to the left, pivoted on Chermside, who remained in defence of the position, while the mounted brigade protected the outer flank. In this General French, now arrived from the north, also assisted, and proceeded to turn the enemy’s left. The British movements were conducted with due silence and secrecy, they being determined to produce a surprise for the Boers. The surprise “came off,” as the saying is, but it was on the wrong side. When the men creeping up the stony kopje came to peer for the enemy in the trenches they found—merely trenches. “Not a bloomin’ Boer anywhere,” cried a disgusted Tommy, kicking the quiet boulders with a dilapidated boot! The Dutchmen were galloping to Ladybrand. The magnificent web that had been prepared for them was empty.
An officer in the Royal Scots gave some interesting details regarding the part taken by the Third Division in this somewhat complex movement:—
“At this time we heard rumours that one of our mounted companies, the one commanded by Captain Molyneux-Seel, was, together with the Colonial Division, besieged at Wepener. This proved to be correct. At 1.30 A.M. on 12th April we got orders to march at 9 A.M., under General Chermside, who had taken over the command of the Third Division from General Gatacre, towards Dewetsdorp and Wepener, to the relief of the column at Wepener. We reached Reddersburg that afternoon. The rain came on late that evening, and literally flooded us out. Every officer and man was up from midnight, running about trying to keep warm. We had been without tents since 31st March, and are still without them (17th May). On 14th April we moved forward again and reached Rosendal, the scene of the recent disaster to the three companies of the Royal Irish Rifles and Mounted Company of the Northumberland Fusiliers. Graves, shells, cartridges, &c., here showed the tough work they had had. We remained at Rosendal waiting for the Eighth Division to come up until 19th, and had a very wet time of it. We marched again on 19th towards Dewetsdorp, about ten miles, when we went into bivouac. On 20th we moved off at 6 A.M., and after marching some six or seven miles we found the enemy in a position of very great strength covering Dewetsdorp. Our mounted infantry and artillery drove in the advanced posts, and we established ourselves on the Wakkerstroom Hills, in front of the enemy’s position. It was then quite dark. We cooked our dinners as best we could, and lay down and slept the sleep of the just. I forgot to say that we found it very difficult to put out our outpost pickets in the dark, and one unfortunate party, belonging to the Worcestershire Regiment, actually walked into the enemy’s lines and were captured.”
The circumstances of the capture were these. A party of some twenty-five cooks and mates were carrying food to their comrades on the top of a hill. In climbing, dinner in hand, they sought an easy place of ascent, and while doing so, moved too far and found themselves practically in the Boers’ arms. Another portion of this unlucky regiment, a few days later, was drawn up for “foot and arms” inspection, and while thus exposed made a target for the enemy, who promptly seized the opportunity and killed two and wounded four of the men. Continuing his story, the officer before quoted said:—
“At 6.15 A.M. on the 21st we were standing under arms, with extra ammunition issued, awaiting orders, when, “boom,” the first gun had been fired, and the shell burst some 300 yards to our left. To cut a long story short, the battalion remained in reserve that day with the rest of the brigade, and also the next day, but early on the 23rd we were moved up to the first line. The battalion was on the right of a battery of artillery, behind the crest of the hill on a gentle slope. Except for the men in the trenches our position was unknown to the enemy, but the mere fact of manning the trenches was sufficient to draw fire, and in less than half-an-hour we had four of the men who were with the main body of the battalion behind the brow hit. The bullets flew all round us, and went “phut, phut” into the ground at our feet, and it is strange that more did not find resting-places in our bodies. In half-an-hour we had thrown up parapets in front of each company, behind which the men were safe, and we suffered no more casualties. All that day and the next we remained in this position. It was most interesting watching the shells as they burst amongst our trenches, around the gunners, and over ourselves. The Boers had nine guns, and, I believe, 5000 men. Amongst the guns was a quick-firer, a 9-pounder Krupp gun, a high-velocity gun, and two pom-poms. The last-named are unpleasant to the senses, but do little harm. The noise of the discharge resembles in the distance the knocking at a door, and the men constantly replied, ‘Come in,’ cheery and fearless fellows that they are! On the early morning of the 25th (?) we missed our usual awakener of guns and pom-poms, and eventually we found the Boers had evacuated their positions, and, alas! had escaped us and Generals French and Hart. We at once pushed forward on to Dewetsdorp.”
After all the marching and turning and fighting and manœuvring the knowing hordes had been able to steal off from every part of their horse-shoe position round Wepener entirely without chastisement! Here were five infantry and three cavalry brigades with more than seventy guns engaged in surrounding them, and yet they had succeeded in slipping through our fingers! Quite quietly, on the night of the 22nd, they had sent off their waggons; on the 23rd they had taken a parting kick at Wepener; and on the 24th they had retreated—“silently stolen away” to Ladybrand—while part of their force before Dewetsdorp, acting as a covering party, had retired on Thabanchu. That we were foiled and fooled may in a measure have been due to some tactical bungling, but certain it was that the Boers had superior advantages, for they were moving in a country entirely friendly to them, were well informed of all our intentions and movements, and were assisted in all their schemes by so-called farmers who, subtle and shifty, had comfortably surrendered the better to engage in covert operations which, while replenishing their pockets, did not imperil their skins! Moreover they escaped scot free, because Lord Roberts was not inclined to fritter more of his troops on side issues while the great object of the campaign, the seizure of Pretoria and the crippling of the Boers for prolonged military operations, was occupying his entire attention. The capture of De Wet’s forces, or a part of them, was of secondary importance in comparison to the protection of railway communication with the sea base, and De Wet’s minor successes, even when the disasters of Koorn Spruit and Reddersburg were counted among them, were not sufficient to frighten the Chief into a change of his larger strategical design.
Pursuit being useless, General French sent General Brabazon to the relief of Wepener (which was already free), and he himself occupied Dewetsdorp. On the 25th, however, he received orders from Bloemfontein to chase the Boers to Thabanchu, which, at dawn, he proceeded to do, followed later by General Rundle and the Eighth Division. Meanwhile part of the Third Division under Chermside kept the Union Jack floating in Dewetsdorp and watched over the outlying districts. General Pole-Carew, his work in the south done, started for Bloemfontein to prepare for the main advance.
Then followed a glorious march into Wepener. Generals Hart and Brabant riding to Jammersberg Drift were cheered with enthusiasm, and the former General congratulated the defenders on their dogged pluck, and declared that the credit of the relief was due to General Brabant, “with whom it was an honour to serve.” General Brabant, on his side, was loud in praise of the gallant Colonials, and of the assistance given him by the Cape Field Artillery, declaring that the very first time they came into action they saved him at a critical moment. His story merits repetition. He was advancing to the relief of Wepener, and had to take Bester’s Kop, a very difficult position indeed, and he had to turn the position and leave his infantry supports a long way behind him and make a wide sweep round. In doing so his force came suddenly upon a body of the enemy within 190 yards of them. For a few minutes the enemy made it very warm. The General called up two guns under Lieutenant Janisch. He knew, he said, that Lieutenant Janisch’s gunners had never been in action before, and in the circumstances he was a little doubtful as to how they would behave. But what did Lieutenant Janisch do? He at once set to work, and under a terrible fire, with shrapnel at 650 yards, and any man who knew what that meant, or who had seen it done as he had, would say that it was marvellously well done, with perfect coolness—with the coolness of veterans. In ten minutes Lieutenant Janisch had cleared the hillside. That, said the General, was a grand thing for men to do, men who, many of them, had never seen a shot fired in anger, and he had drawn the attention of the Commander-in-chief to the fact. There were no braver men in the service than the Royal Artillery, but the R.A. could not possibly have behaved better than the Cape Field Artillery did, and his only regret was that he could not get the other guns under Major Inglesby.
| NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS | DURHAM LIGHT INFANTRY |
| (Corporal) | (Lance-Corporal) |
The Colonials afterwards proceeded to join General Rundle’s force, as the enemy, to avoid being caught, was now “on the run.” Flying north-eastward along the Ladybrand Road some three or four thousand of them went as fast as legs, equine and human, would carry them. They evacuated the kopjes near the waterworks, they bolted from the neighbourhood of Dewetsdorp, they rushed from Jammersberg Drift—in fact, as the jovial Colonials said, “the enemy conjugated the verb to skedaddle” from all positions in a masterly manner. They were getting good practice, but they began to fear that there were others who might learn to cut across country besides themselves.
On the 28th General Brabazon, having completed his work at Wepener, moved via Dewetsdorp on the way towards Thabanchu. As he was nearing this place he suddenly became aware that a British convoy had been caught in between the hills and was being briskly shelled by the Boers. Promptly he bribed a Kaffir to worm through the Boer lines and convey to the sturdy Yeomanry who were defending the convoy, the advice to hold on till he should advance to their aid. The message was delivered, and the Yeomanry stuck out manfully until, at dawn, the General and his Yeomanry came upon the scene. Thereupon the Boers, with their usual astuteness, made off, while rescuers and rescued alike pursued their way in triumph to Thabanchu.
Soon Wepener was deserted. The British in that locality took refuge in Mafeteng, while the troops which had evacuated the place were sweeping up the Free State after the Federals. These “slimly” enough were getting away with herds, and stores, and guns without being caught in any very huge numbers. A large party of Free Staters had taken up a truculent position to the north of Thabanchu Mountain, for the purpose of protecting their fellows and covering the withdrawal of their waggon convoys from the south, and they succeeded in taking with them the twenty-five prisoners of the Worcesters, who had unwarily dropped into their clutches at Dewetsdorp. The Transvaalers, on the other hand, at the instance of President Kruger, were trekking towards the north in order to save their energies for coming operations across the Vaal, but they took good care before leaving to make themselves as obnoxious as possible to such farmers as had surrendered to the British Government.
