OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE AFTER THE BATTLE OF COLENSO, DECEMBER 15, 1899
Since the conduct of General Sir Redvers Buller in regard to the Relief of Ladysmith has been much discussed, it seems necessary for the sake of the completeness of this Record of the War to reproduce, without comment, the Official Correspondence which followed the defeat at Colenso. General Buller himself forwarded the Despatches to the Press Association, accompanied by the following letter:—
“17 Lowdnes Square, W., July 7, 1902.
“I send you the enclosed document in the exact form in which it has been supplied to me by the Secretary of State for War for publication, and I shall be much obliged if you will kindly circulate it to all newspapers, together with this letter, as I wish to supplement the document by the remark that I was delighted to receive the answer of the Secretary of State for War of the 16th December 1899, because it assured me that forces which I had been apprehensive were pledged in another and less important direction would be at my disposal for operations in Natal. Thanking you in anticipation, I am, sir, yours faithfully,”
Redvers Buller, General.”
From Sir R. Buller to the Secretary of State for War.
“Chieveley Camp, December 15, 1899.
“A serious question is raised by my failure to-day. I do not now consider that I am strong enough to relieve Ladysmith. Colenso is a fortress which, if not captured by a rush, could, I think, only be taken by a siege. Within the eight miles from the point of attack there is no water, and in this weather that exhausts infantry. The place is fully entrenched. I do not think we saw either a gun or a Boer all day, but the fire brought to bear on us was very heavy. The infantry were willing enough to fight, but the intense heat absolutely exhausted them. I consider I ought to let Ladysmith go and to occupy a good position for the defence of South Natal, and so let time help us. But I feel I ought to consult you on such a step. Twenty thousand men, I consider, faced us to-day; both in arms and in position they had the advantage. They admit, indeed, that they suffered severely, but my men are dispirited because they have not seen a dead Boer. My losses have not been very heavy; much heavier, indeed, I could have made them, but the moment I failed to get on the run the result would have been the same. I was beaten. I now feel I cannot say that with my available force I can relieve Ladysmith, and I suggest that for me to occupy a defensive position and fight it out in a country better suited to our tactics is the best thing that I can do.”
From the Secretary of State for War to General Sir R. Buller.
“War Office, December 16, 1899.
“The abandonment of White’s force and its consequent surrender is regarded by the Government as a national disaster of the greatest magnitude. We would urge you to devise another attempt to carry out its relief, not necessarily viâ Colenso, making use of the additional men now arriving if you think fit.”
From Sir R. Buller to Sir G. White.
“December 16, 1899.
“I tried Colenso yesterday but failed; the enemy is too strong for my force, except with siege operations, and these will take one full month to prepare. Can you last so long? If not, how many days can you give me in which to take up defensive position? After which I suggest you firing away as much ammunition as you can and making best terms you can. I can remain here if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break in. I find my Infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp, and then only if water can be got, and it is scarce here.”
Note.—In his subsequent message of 17th December Sir R. Buller said the above message had been signalled correctly, but asked to make the following corrections:—
“Strike out from ‘If not how many’ down to ‘after which’ inclusive, and substitute ‘How many days can you hold out?’ Add to end of message, ‘Whatever happens recollect to burn your cipher, decipher, and code-books, and all deciphered messages.’”
Message of 16th December, as altered by that of 17th December 1899:—
“I tried Colenso yesterday but failed; the enemy is too strong for my force, except with siege operations, and these will take one full month to prepare. Can you last so long? How many days can you hold out? I suggest you firing away as much ammunition as you can and making best terms you can. I can remain here if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break in. I find my Infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp, and then only if water can be got, and it is scarce here. Whatever happens recollect to burn your cipher, decipher, and code-books, and all deciphered messages.”
From Sir G. White to Sir R. Buller.
“December 16, 1899.
“Yours of to-day received and understood. My suggestion is that you take up strongest available position that will enable you to keep touch of the enemy and harass him constantly with artillery fire, and in other ways as much as possible. I can make food last for much longer than a month, and will not think of making terms till I am forced to. You may have hit enemy harder than you think. All our native spies report that your artillery fire made considerable impression on enemy. Have your losses been very heavy? If you lose touch of enemy, it will immensely increase his opportunities of crushing me, and have worse effect elsewhere. While you are in touch with him, and in communication with me, he has both of our forces to reckon with. Make every effort to get reinforcements as early as possible, including India, and enlist every man in both colonies who will serve and can ride. Things may look brighter.
“The loss of 12,000 men here would be a heavy blow to England. We must not yet think of it. I fear I could not cut my way to you. Enteric fever is increasing alarmingly here. There are now 180 cases, all within last month. Answer fully; I am keeping everything secret for the present till I know your plans.”