THE SITUATION—FEBRUARY 1901
The reign of His Majesty King Edward VII. began in clouds! There was no denying that the last half-year had been one of retrogression. In June 1900, from the Orange River southwards, there had been comparative quietude. The southern and eastern half of the Orange River Colony had become fairly settled, while even in some districts of the Transvaal—towards the south-western area especially—the inhabitants gave indications of a willingness to accept British rule, and of a desire to return to their agricultural and peaceful avocations. But with the end of the year came a deplorable change. The enemy, broken up into a large number of desultory gangs, commenced raiding and wrecking, consequently the British forces, in order to cope with and pursue these vagrant bands, had to be broken up to correspond. The area of hostility and destruction grew larger daily and the difficulty of fighting more extreme. The lack of supplies now drove the Boers, who lived entirely on the country through which they passed, to spend their time in looting, in pouncing on the farms and small villages, and in seizing everything they might need. Stores, clothing, horses, cattle, all were grabbed at the point of the rifle, if not, as in some cases, delivered up on demand. To frustrate the tactics of the enemy, the British forces were compelled to denude the country of every movable thing, and to place whatever could be conveyed there in refuge camps which were established at points along the railway lines. But in this operation great loss was entailed, owing to the difficulty of finding sufficient grass for the number of collected animals, and of keeping them alive en route.
The loss of crops and stock became a still more serious matter than even the destruction of farm buildings—a measure which had almost entirely been abandoned. Having regard to the inexpensive character of these structures, this measure, to quote Sir Alfred Milner, was a “comparatively small item” in the total damage caused by the war to the agricultural community. But, he said, the wanton and malicious injury done to the headgear, stamps, and other apparatus of some of the outlying mines by Boer raiders was a form of destruction for which there was no excuse. It was a vandalism unjustified by the requirements of military operations and outside the scope of civilised warfare. Directly or indirectly, all South Africa, including the agricultural population, owes its prosperity to the mines, and, of course, especially to the mines of the Transvaal. To money made in mining it is indebted for such progress, even in agriculture, as it has recently made, and the same source will have to be relied upon for the recuperation of agriculture after the ravages of war. The damage done to the mines Lord Milner estimated was not large “relatively to the vast total amount of the fixed capital sunk in them. The mining area,” he said, “is excessively difficult to guard against purely predatory attacks having no military purpose, because it is, so to speak, ‘all length and no breadth’—one long thin line, stretching across the country from east to west for many miles. Still, garrisoned as Johannesburg now is, it was only possible successfully to attack a few points in it. Of the raids previously made, and they have been fairly numerous, only one has resulted in any serious damage. In that instance the injury done to the single mine attacked amounted to £200,000, and it is estimated that the mine is put out of working for two years. This mine is only one out of a hundred, and is not by any means one of the most important. These facts may afford some indication of the ruin which might have been inflicted, not only on the Transvaal and all South Africa, but on many European interests, if that general destruction of mine works which was contemplated just before our occupation of Johannesburg had been carried out. However serious in some respects may have been the military consequences of our rapid advance to Johannesburg, South Africa owes more than is commonly recognised to that brilliant dash forward, by which the vast mining apparatus, the foundation of all her wealth, was saved from the ruin threatening it.”
The events of the last six months promised to involve a more vast amount of repair and a longer period of recuperation, especially for agriculture, than would have been anticipated at the commencement of hostilities. Still, having regard to the fact that both the Rand and Kimberley were virtually undamaged, and that the main engines of prosperity, when once set going again, would not take very long to get into working order, the economic consequences of the war, though grave, did not appear by any means appalling. The country population it was admitted would need a good deal of help, first to preserve it from starvation, and then, probably, to supply it with a certain amount of capital to make a fresh start. And the great industry of the country would require some little time before it would be able to render any assistance. But, in a young country with great recuperative powers, many years would not elapse before the economic ravages of the war would be effaced.
Still, the moral effect of the recrudescence of the war was lamentable. Everywhere after the occupation of Pretoria the inhabitants had seemed resigned to the state of affairs—the feeling in the colony had been one of acquiescent relief. The rebellious element was glad of the opportunity to settle down. Had these people been shut off from communication with the enemy they would have maintained their calm, and engaged themselves with their former peaceful pursuits. As it was, while the great advance to Pretoria, and subsequently to Delagoa Bay, demanded the presence of the British troops in the north, the country was left open to raiders, who daily grew more audacious as the small successes of their guerilla leaders appeared to give promise of a turn of fortune’s wheel.
And now came the real tug of war. These raiders, both on the brink of the Orange Colony and the Southern Transvaal, kept the peaceable inhabitants of the colony in an unenviable quandary. These, and many others, on taking the oath of neutrality, instead of being made prisoners of war, had been permitted to return to their farms. But under pressure from their old comrades, they now wavered between the obligations of their oath and the calls of friendship—and many of them fell. Men who had been exceptionally well treated were again in arms, sometimes justifying their break of faith by the poor apology that they had not been “preserved from the temptation to commit it.” Naturally, on the return of the troops to again quell a rising in the south, their conduct was not marked by the same leniency which had characterised the original conquest. Still, these parole breakers were not punished with the severity which might have been meted out to them in the same circumstances by other nations. Though we were by the rules of war entitled to shoot men who had broken their parole, we had not availed ourselves of the right.
We remained as humane as the exigence of discipline would permit. Efforts were made to check the general demoralisation by establishing refuge camps for the peaceable along the railway lines, but these camps were mainly tenanted by the women and children of burghers who still determined to flout us.
Lord Milner, in speaking of the situation in the new territories and the Cape Colony, described it as possibly “the most puzzling that we have had to confront since the beginning of the war.” On the one hand there was the outcry for greater severity and for a stricter administration of martial law. On the other hand, there was the expression of the fear that strict measures would only exasperate the people. He himself was in favour of reasonable strictness as the proper attitude in the presence of a grave national danger, and he further affirmed that exceptional regulations for a time of invasion, the necessity of which every man of sense could understand, if clearly explained and firmly adhered to, were not only not incompatible with, but actually conducive to, the avoidance of injustice and cruelty. He went on to say:—
De Wet’s Rush in Cape Colony viâ Zand Drift, 10th February 1901
“I am satisfied by experience that the majority of those Dutch inhabitants of the Colony who sympathise with the Republics, however little they may be able to resist giving active expression to that sympathy when the enemy actually appear amongst them, do not desire to see their own districts invaded or to find themselves personally placed in the awkward dilemma of choosing between high treason and an unfriendly attitude to the men of their own race from beyond the border. There are extremists who would like to see the whole of the Cape Colony overrun. But the bulk of the farmers, especially the substantial ones, are not of this mind. They submit readily enough even to stringent regulations having for their object the prevention of the spread of invasion. And not a few of them are, perhaps, secretly glad that the prohibition of seditious speaking and writing, of political meetings, and of the free movement of political firebrands through the country, enables them to keep quiet, without actually themselves taking a strong line against the propaganda, and, to do them justice, they behave reasonably well under the pass and other regulations necessary for that purpose, as long as care is taken not to make these regulations too irksome to them in the conduct of their business, or in their daily lives.”
He suggested that the fact that there had been an invasion at all was no doubt due to the weakness of some of the Dutch colonists in tolerating, or supporting, the violent propaganda, which could not but lead the enemy to believe that they had only to come into the Colony in order to meet with general active support. But this had been a miscalculation on the part of the enemy, though a very pardonable one. They knew the vehemence of the agitation in their favour as shown by the speeches in Parliament, the series of public meetings culminating in the Worcester Congress, the writings of the Dutch press, the very general wearing of the Republican colours, the singing of the Volkslied, and so forth, and they regarded these demonstrations as meaning more than they actually did. Three things were forgotten. Firstly, that a great proportion of the Afrikanders in the Colony who really meant business, had slipped away and joined the Republican ranks long ago. Secondly, that the abortive rebellion of a year ago had left the people of the border districts disinclined to repeat the experiment of a revolt. Thirdly, that owing to the precautionary measures of the Government the amount of arms and ammunition in the hands of the country population throughout the greater part of the Colony is not now anything like as large as it usually was, and far smaller than it was at the onset of the war.
In regard to the “call to arms” that took place on the 1st of January, and the vehement response it had met, Lord Milner stated that it had always been admitted, by their friends and foes alike, that the bulk of the Afrikander population would never take up arms on the side of the British Government in this quarrel, even for local defence. The appeal therefore had been virtually directed to the British population, mostly townspeople, and to a small, but no doubt very strong and courageous, minority of the Afrikanders who have always been loyalists. These classes had been already immensely drawn on by the Cape Police, the regular Volunteer Corps, and the numerous Irregular Mounted Corps which had been called into existence because of the war. There must have been 12,000 Cape colonists under arms before the recent appeal, and as things were going, as many more promised to answer that appeal—a truly remarkable achievement under a purely voluntary system.
Position of Troops after the Engagement of 23rd February. De Wet’s Escape from the Enveloping Cordon, 28th February 1901
How gloriously the system worked throughout the year 1901 has yet to be seen, for peace was still a great way off. All yearned for it, all were fairly sick of carnage and ruin and sacrifice, but, nevertheless, it was agreed that to endure and fight to the bitter end were preferable to an ignoble compromise, which must inevitably bring about a recurrence of the terrible scourge in the future. All were determined that South Africa should become one country under one flag, and that the British; and this once accomplished, they would be ready to bury racial animosities for ever. But, in order to bring about that happy, that inevitable end, all decided that a vigorous prosecution of the war, at whatever cost, was an imperative duty.
CHAPTER I
CONTINUATION OF THE DE WET CHASE, 1st to 10th MARCH—ACROSS THE ORANGE RIVER
On the last day of February, as we know, De Wet and Steyn, with a bedraggled, hungry commando of some fifteen hundred Boers, precipitately crossed the Orange River at Lilliefontein, near Colesberg Bridge. They were seen by some few men of Nesbitt’s Horse under Sergeant-Major Surworth, and promptly fired upon as men and horses strove to battle with the current. This unlooked for attack caused considerable dismay, so much so, that many Cape carts and some clothing were left on the south bank, while several fugitives were seen to be galloping off in Garden of Eden attire. Many Boers were left in the neighbourhood of the Zeekoe River, and of these some thirty-three were captured by Captain Dallimore and sixteen Victorian Rifles.
The retirement becoming known to General Lyttelton, who was directing the operations, the pursuing columns were ordered to converge on Philippolis. General Plumer, Colonels Haig and Thorneycroft, entering Orange River by Norval’s Pont, operated from Springfontein to the river, while General C. Knox and Colonel Bethune at Orange River Bridge mounted guard there, and threatened such marauders as might retire in their direction. On the arrival of General Plumer at Philippolis, on the 3rd, he discovered that De Wet was fleeing to Fauresmith, and Hertzog, with 500 men, was making for Luckhoff. He therefore, with almost inexhaustible energy, instantly pursued the great raider, and after a rearguard action on the 4th at Zuurfontein, reached Fauresmith on the 5th, only to find the bird flown viâ the Petrusburg Road. On and on then went the troops, past Petrusburg—De Wet ever twenty-four hours ahead—till they reached Abraham Kraal Drift on the Modder River. By this time (the 7th) the Boer flock had dispersed over the enormous track of country with which they are so intimate, and De Wet himself vanished, as usual, into “thin air.” The 8th was spent in recuperation, replenishing stores, and gaining information. On the following two days the northerly march was continued in search of De Wet, who was reported to have crossed the line (on the night of the 8th) on the way to Senekal. But, as the redoubtable one trekked at the rate of some five miles a day more than the best column, General Plumer gave him up as lost, and marched to Brandfort, and thence proceeded under orders to Winburg. The chase had been far from stimulating, for heavy rain had fallen, causing much inconvenience to man and beast, and hindering transport operations. The veldt, however, soon assumed a rich green garb, which rendered all the English horses independent of the Commissariat Department.
Meanwhile Colonel Haig, in conjunction, had moved to Philippolis on the 4th, only to learn that General Plumer was on the track of De Wet. He therefore turned his attention to Hertzog, caught him on the 5th at Grootfontein, ten miles north-west of Philippolis, engaged him and forced him westward. He then waited orders at Springfontein lest a more speedy movement by rail might be directed.
Colonel Bethune, in his position near Orange River Bridge, spent this time in fighting and dispersing large bodies of raiders, passing at length viâ Petrusburg, on the 6th, to the line Abraham’s Kraal, Roodewal, on the 8th. Here he halted. An empty convoy returning from him to Bloemfontein was attacked by the Boers, but the escort tackled the enemy, and, with the assistance of the Prince of Wales’ Light Horse, put them to flight.
General C. Knox’s columns (Colonels Pilcher and Crewe, moving by way of Kalabas Bridge and Koffyfontein respectively), advanced at the same time, reaching Bloemfontein on the 10th and 11th, the astute Pilcher having captured a Boer laager by the way. He had three killed, eleven wounded, three missing, and his captures included twenty-four prisoners, 1500 horses, and some cattle.
Colonel Crewe engaged in a smart tussle with Brand’s commando at Olivenberg (south-west of Petrusburg), and reached his destination plus five prisoners, twenty-one waggons and carts with teams complete, and 2000 horses.
During March, Major Goold-Adams, the Deputy-Administrator of the Orange River Colony, in whom the burghers placed much confidence, bent his mind to the organisation of the civil administration of the colony. Mr. Conrad Linder, an ex-official of the late Government, was provisionally appointed registrar. A scheme of education, based on the Canadian principle, was drawn up, and the organisation of the civil police taken in hand. The Imperial authorities were engaged in a scheme for restocking the country after the war by establishing stock depots on the Government farms in both the Transvaal and Orange River.
MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES KNOX.
Photo Elliott & Fry, London.