THE SITUATION—JANUARY 1902

The Blockhouse System

Over a year had passed since Lord Kitchener had embarked on the duties of Commander-in-Chief, and it was now possible to examine the system on which the war had been conducted, and the extent of progress made. The great and most important part of the work, which was still continuing, was the dividing of the settled from the unsettled portions of the country. The development of the blockhouse system, which effectually blocked the inroads of the marauders, went on apace, and already some 14,700 square miles of the Transvaal, and 17,000 square miles of the Orange River Colony were entirely shut off from their incursions. The area protected in the Transvaal was bounded on the north by a line from Zeerust to Middelburg, on the east from Middelburg to Standerton, on the south from Standerton to Klerksdorp, on the west from Klerksdorp to Zeerust. The Orange River Colony protected area went right across the colony south of the line from Kimberley to Winburg, Winburg to Bloemfontein, and Bloemfontein to Ladybrand. Within these boundaries the Boer could not exist, and beyond them the task of clearing the country and hunting down the enemy was pursued by means of small mobile columns.

The work and activity of these columns throughout the year had been enormous. Though about 10,000 Boers remained sprinkled in the field, some 53,000 (half of which number had been accounted for during the last year) had been either killed, wounded, imprisoned, or protected in concentration camps. In regard to these camps a great deal had been said by the enemies of the Government for the purpose of raising a cry of inhumanity against the Ministers, but in a speech made by Mr. Brodrick he lucidly and concisely examined and disposed of these charges. “So long,” he said, “as every house in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony was used at once as a telegraph station, a recruiting office, and a refectory for the enemy, it became impossible for Lord Kitchener to ignore the necessity of relieving the country of the population which was rendering futile the exertions of our troops. Under these circumstances you have to consider not what their condition is now as compared with what it would be in time of peace, but what their condition is now as compared with what it would have been if they had been left on their farms. You have not got to consider the difference between luxury and privation, but between starvation and great suffering, and the less suffering we can arrange for.” He further showed that to a large extent the disease in the camp was due to the fact that the majority of persons who came in (some compulsorily, but the greater number voluntarily) were already half-starved, their resources being at an end, and half-clothed, with their bodies in a condition fitted for the reception of disease. Under those circumstances a large death-rate was certain.

But, he asked, what nation engaged in war has at any time, in any country, or under any conditions, endeavoured to feed, clothe, house, nurse, doctor, and educate 150,000 persons, who have been left on their hands by the enemy, whom they had called on—as Lord Roberts did on two occasions—to take over and maintain their own belongings, but who said they would leave them on our hands. And again, he explained that far from any inhumanity being shown the enemy, many of the troubles had been prolonged by excessive leniency to men who, on many occasions, had violated the rules of civilised warfare. For the last year and before it there had been instances of firing on ambulances, professing to surrender and opening fire again, or firing on the wounded, breaches of parole and treachery, which had provoked no retaliation, no deviation from the usages of the civilised warfare on our part. He put forth reasons which accounted for the abnormal death-rate in the concentration camps, showing in the first place that a death-rate in a camp whence all the healthy males have been removed, cannot be looked on as an ordinary death-rate. He said: “If you look only at infants, it has been pointed out that in the thirty-three great towns of the Kingdom the mortality is 248 per 1000. Birkenhead goes up even to 362 per 1000. Therefore, those who compare the death-rate in these camps with the ordinary death-rate of the great towns are, of course, speaking wrongly. I have heard of people who think that measles cannot have much effect on the death-rate. But what of the gardes mobiles of Paris during the siege, whose death-rate was 40 per cent. in measles cases?” The critics who had discussed the camps had not taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with the ordinary statistics of Boer farm life, for, had they done so, they might have taken into consideration the fact that though many Boers had families of twenty children, as a rule, owing to the neglect, ignorance, or apathy of the parents, only two to a family survived. For this reason their population has not been equal to that of other nations in the same conditions. It is only by a study of the habits of life of these people prior to the English rule that it is possible to judge whether they had in the camps the comfort they were accustomed to. Luxury is but comparative, and, as has been shown, the luxury of soap and other sanitary precautions were ignored by the lower classes of Boers from earliest times. In regard to the matter of diet, that these persons received food at all was a marvel, considering that every convoy had to be protected from their marauding relatives by the lives of our own valiant men, men who themselves were not without anxiety as to how their own wives, mothers, and babes were faring at home in their absence, and who themselves, after a long career of hazard and usefulness, might share a less enviable fate.

In addition to the accusations regarding the concentration camps, invented by traitors to the country that housed and sheltered them, there were other arguments to be met. “How is it, if you send this vast number of horses—if you have your columns—if you have good leaders who are well equipped—that our men cannot catch the enemy? Is your intelligence defective; is your system at fault?” The explanation given by Mr. Brodrick, one which showed a serious development of the war, was this: “The system of our country and people with regard to the Kaffir is different from the Boer system. The Boer columns have only too frequently in the last few months eluded our columns by hiding their tracks, by murdering the Kaffirs behind them. It is a serious charge, and I make it only for this reason, that I had occasion to notice that in the secret intelligence reports so many cases were mentioned of the murder of Kaffirs that I telegraphed to Lord Kitchener to ask whether this was a general practice, or whether it was the occasion of isolated persons. His reply was: ‘Cold-blooded murders by the Boers have been frequent of late. It was only on the 10th inst. two dead infants were found with their hands tied behind them down a main shaft at Freylingstadt.’ The leader of a column, whose letter I saw not long ago, mentioned that he was within two or three hours of a column of the enemy whom he had been pursuing for a considerable number of hours—that was at a Kaffir kraal—and he found the place deserted, but in one of the houses he found four little Kaffir boys, all under twelve, all with their heads battered in two or three hours before.” Mr. Brodrick proceeded to explain that he did not bring this forward with the intention of making an impeachment against the whole Boer nation. Indeed, the statement was forced from him by friends of the enemy who at one time jeered at the Government and our Military Commanders for not beating the Boers, and at another complained that negotiations and blandishments were not substituted for the slow system of physical pressure that was found by the Commander-in-Chief to be the surest means to the end—the peaceable end.

Both Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner decided that it was of no use either to threaten or to wheedle, the one and only thing was imperturbably to squeeze, reserving the policy of clemency for the proper season, when the surrendered Boers should have become our fellow-subjects. Accordingly we still continued to pour fresh regiments into the country. Four thousand trained mounted troops were now on their way out to replace those that needed rest, and India was providing four battalions and two more cavalry regiments in return for other troops which would take their place there. Some militia regiments were also being sent to the front, and further Colonial contingents, so that thus reinforced the tired veterans would receive a fillip for future operations.

For reference in the future, when the resources of the Empire are studied, the following return of troops and horses sent out to South Africa between January 1, 1900, and December 31, 1901, may be found interesting:—

During	From Home and India.
During	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	N.C.O.’s and Men.	Horses
1900.
January	1,099	45	28,072	10,229
February	1,362	47	32,356	5,701
March	1,130	63	26,539	5,501
April	480	18	11,692	4,522
May	321	4	7,020	2,481
June	271	7	10,092	2,649
July	120	6	2,107	1,277
August	93	7	3,137	832
September	128	3	4,644	1,187
October	113	4	2,337	2
November	125	18	2,331	895
December	106	9	1,080	591
Total for 1900	5,348	231	131,407	35,867
1901.
January	288	12	3,333	2,471
February	275	3	5,225	1,495
March	782	9	21,591	2,328
April	366	12	4,498	2,724
May	304	15	3,509	2,801
June	287	11	5,532	2,481
July	99	3	2,055	2,314
August	179	13	3,546	1,672
September	197	4	1,958	2,128
October	191	13	1,466	2,401
November	270	7	5,350	2,856
December	619	16	11,686	5,024
Total for 1901	3,857	118	69,749	30,695
Grand Total	9,205	349	201,156	66,562

During	Colonial Contingents.				Remounts from Abroad.
During	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	N.C.O.’s and Men.	Horses.	Remounts from Abroad.
1900.
January	134	2	2,080	2,145	840
February	69	3	1,313	1,384	2,703
March	149	1	2,739	3,065	10,341
April	45		834	880	7,879
May	81	1	1,349	1,690	7,761
June					12,551
July					3,305
August					5,293
September					8,680
October					2,213
November					1,120
December					5,272
Total for 1900	478	7	8,315	9,164	67,958
1901.
January	17		567	580	4,224
February	77	1	1,424	1,391	5,991
March	162	6	3,806	2,722	9,022
April	86	3	1,672	1,951	4,850
May	3		2		4,384
June					4,742
July	9		7		9,130
August	21	2	324		7,800
September					7,550
October					10,728
November					8,099
December					15,463
Total for 1901	375	12	7,802	6,644	91,983
Grand Total	853	19	16,117	15,808	159,941

During	Totals.
During	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	N.C.O.’s and Men.	Horses.
1900.
January	1,233	47	30,152	13,214
February	1,431	50	33,669	9,788
March	1,279	64	29,278	18,907
April	525	18	12,526	13,281
May	402	5	8,369	11,932
June	271	7	10,092	15,200
July	120	6	2,107	4,582
August	93	7	3,137	6,125
September	128	3	4,644	9,867
October	113	4	2,337	2,215
November	125	18	2,331	2,015
December	106	9	1,080	5,863
Total for 1900	5,826	238	139,722	112,989
1901.
January	305	12	3,900	7,275
February	352	4	6,649	8,877
March	944	15	25,397	14,072
April	452	15	6,170	9,525
May	307	15	3,511	7,185
June	287	11	5,532	7,223
July	108	3	2,062	11,444
August	200	15	3,870	9,472
September	197	4	1,958	9,678
October	191	13	1,466	13,129
November	270	7	5,350	10,955
December	619	16	11,686	20,487
Total for 1901	4,232	130	77,551	129,322
Grand Total	10,058	368	217,273	242,311

Owing to the efficacy of Lord Kitchener’s slow but sure efforts the railway disasters became fewer. In October 1900 the railway was cut thirty-two times, or more than once per day. In November thirty times, in December twenty-one times, in January sixteen, in February (after De Wet’s incursion into Cape Colony) thirty, in March eighteen, in April eighteen, in May twelve, in June eight, in July four, in August four, in September two, and in October not at all. Thus it became possible for more than a hundred refugees per week to resume work at Johannesburg.

The supreme authority throughout the Transvaal rested with Lord Kitchener. Civil considerations had of necessity to give way to military exigency. The work of the civil authorities was naturally restricted and subject to limitations from which on the return to normal conditions it would be freed. Nevertheless they acted with foresight, preparing such seeds as would ensure a good harvest in time to come. In a report made to Mr. Chamberlain in December, Lord Milner spoke hopefully of this happy era: “We have come into possession of a magnificent estate, which has been woefully mismanaged. As far as local administration is concerned—I am not speaking of the political development of South Africa as a whole—it requires no extraordinary statesmanship, it simply requires ordinary decent government and reasonable liberality in public finance to ensure not only a great advance in material prosperity, but in all the essentials of civilisation.” Lord Milner also expressed the opinion that, terrible as had been the ravages of the war, the great fact remained that the Transvaal possesses an amount of mineral wealth virtually unaffected by the war which will ensure the prosperity of South Africa for the next fifty years, and other resources, both industrial and agricultural, which, properly developed, should make it a rich country, humanly speaking, for ever.

Before constructing the blockhouse lines Lord Kitchener determined that the enemy must be deprived of his guns. His efforts in that direction were speedily rewarded. By June 1901 nearly the whole Boer artillery was captured or had been destroyed by the Boers themselves. General French was responsible for the capture of guns in the Eastern Transvaal, and we know how effectively his work was carried out. General Babington deprived Delarey of nine guns, two were taken by Rawlinson and more by Dartnell and others. In all twenty-seven guns were reported to have been taken during the year; twenty-six of them during the months of February, March, April, and May. They included half-a-dozen pom-poms, seven or eight Maxims, several 15-pounders, Krupp guns of varying calibre, Creusot, Hotchkiss, and quick-firing guns. In addition to these armaments, more than half-a-dozen of our own guns taken from British positions at various times were recovered. Of rifles 7993 were captured, and during the year it was estimated that 8589 vehicles had been taken by the British. In fact the process of the gradual depletion of the enemy’s resources had been most effective. The number of prisoners taken was about 27,000. The surrenders prior to Lord Kitchener’s proclamation in August had averaged about 500 a month. During the later months the surrenders decreased, while the number of prisoners captured increased. Naturally at the close of the year there was a decline in the number of Boer casualties, for the continued attrition of the Boer resistance necessarily reduced the number of antagonists accounted for.

GENERAL BABINGTON.
Photo Charles Knight, London.

In an intercepted letter from Mr. Schalk Burger to Mr. Steyn, dated Tautesberg, March 21, 1901, stating that the condition of the Boers at that time was becoming very serious, the Acting President said:—

“The question is, what must we, what shall we do? May we, can we, continue the struggle further? I pray the Lord day and night to give us wisdom and light hereon, and cause us not to sin against His will, but also not to fall into disbelief. If we are convinced that our last resources are exhausted, our last strength broken, we must bow down and surrender ourselves to the power of the enemy, no matter how bitter this cup may be to us. I can, however, not yet decide upon this latter course. My hope and trust is still that we shall be delivered and saved; the sacrifices of lives, prayers, and misery, are too great not to be crowned with our hopes and expectations, according to our belief. As you will see for yourself, from the correspondence between Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, there is no mention of terms which meet us in any way, therefore I keep to the decision to surrender unconditionally if this must happen, which I trust God forbid. No, let us keep our nation unsullied, to receive no favour from our enemy, that the gulf which exists through former years and this cruel war remains and still widens. ‘Where there is a will there’s a way,’ and if we are not exiled, we can, by exerting our strength, form committees, and supported by loving gifts from Europe, again build up our country and people, to advance our language and religion, to educate our children, and to keep alive our oppressed national spirit and cause it to come to life again. This is my ideal.”

Many months had now elapsed since the penning of that letter, and the condition of the Boers had gone from bad to worse. Their hitherto stubborn resistance was now little more than suicidal lunacy. A rough estimate of their losses for the year, so far as could be judged, is shown in the following table:—

1901.	Killed.		Wounded.	Prisoners.	Surrenders.	Total.
January	{	Killed and wounded, 670		Prisoners and surrenders, 2,174		}	2,844
February
March
April
May	153		90	1,512	535	2,290
June	223		109	1,074	504	1,910
July	147		111	1,045	367	1,670
August	202		86	1,504	549	2,341
September	170		114	1,379	393	2,056
October	425		368	980	197	1,970
November	233		269	1,156	93	1,751
December	164		97	1,106	121	1,488
Total	1,717		1,244	9,756	2,759	18,320

Lord Milner, in reviewing the situation at the end of the year, commended the marked change which had come to pass:—

“Six months ago the enemy were everywhere, outside the principal towns. It is true they held nothing, but they raided wherever they pleased, and, though mostly in small bodies, which made little or no attempt at resistance when seriously pressed, they almost invariably returned to their old haunts when the pressure was over. It looked as though the process might go on indefinitely. I had every opportunity of watching it, for during the first two months of my residence here it was in full swing in the immediate neighbourhood. There were half-a-dozen Boer strongholds, or rather trysting-places, quite close to Pretoria and Johannesburg, and the country round was quite useless to us for any purpose but that of marching through it, while the enemy seemed to find no difficulty in subsisting there. To-day, on the other hand, a great quadrilateral, bounded roughly as follows: on the east by the Wilge River and a line drawn from its head-waters to Villiersdorp on the Vaal River; on the south, by the Vaal River from Villiersdorp to about Klerksdorp; on the west, by an irregular line drawn from Klerksdorp to the centre of the Magaliesberg Range; and on the north, by that range and the Pretoria-Delagoa Bay Railway, is virtually denied to the enemy. This area is more important, economically, politically, and strategically than all the rest of the Transvaal. It contains not only Pretoria and the whole of the Rand mining area, but one of the most important coalfields and a large extent of the best agricultural land. Similarly, a great improvement is manifest in the southern part of the Orange River Colony—the districts lying south of a line drawn from Ladybrand to Bloemfontein, and thence westward through Boshof to the colonial border. It would not be true to say that this region is entirely clear of the enemy, but great progress has recently been made in clearing it. Strategically this is a very important region owing to its central position, and to the fact that it connects the northern states with the ‘friendly and allied’ districts of Cape Colony.”

In discussing the Cape rebels he declared that—

“If the enemy now find this region difficult to live in, and impossible to traverse in any considerable numbers, the circumstance is both militarily and politically important, for it means that their dwindling numbers in the late Republics are now deprived of that reinforcement from the south, which has all along been of such immense assistance to them. For even holding, as I do (though competent opinions differ on the subject), that the number of colonial rebels who have actually crossed the border during the past twelve months has not been large, it would be hard to overestimate the moral support which Colonial information, sympathy, and encouragement, and the touch with the outside world maintained by free communication with Cape Colony, has hitherto afforded to the enemy. Such communication is now greatly hampered, and may soon become absolutely impossible.”

On the 25th of January a Peace Movement was made by the Dutch Government, in which it was proposed that the British Government should give safe conducts to three Boer delegates in order that they might go from Europe to induce their fighting compatriots to conclude a treaty of peace. Since a treaty is a compact between two Governments, and since one of the Governments—the Boer Government—ceased, with the annexation of the Boer territories, to exist, there was only one reply possible to the British Government, and this reply was given. The following is the text of the document:—

“The Marquess of Lansdowne to Baron Gericke.

“Foreign Office, January 29, 1902.

“Sir,—You were good enough to lay before me on the 25th instant a communication from the Netherland Government, in which it was proposed that, with the object of bringing the war to an end, his Majesty’s Government might grant a safe conduct to the Boer delegates now in Holland for the purpose of enabling them to confer with the Boer leaders in South Africa. It is suggested that after the conference the delegates might return to Europe with power to conclude a Treaty of Peace with this country, and the Netherland Government intimate that, in this event, they might at a later stage be instrumental in placing the Boer Plenipotentiaries in relation with the Plenipotentiaries who might be appointed by his Majesty’s Government.

“The Netherland Government intimate that if this project commends itself to his Majesty’s Government, they will inquire of the delegates whether they are prepared to make the suggested visit to South Africa.

“It may therefore be inferred that the communication which I received from you was made on the responsibility of the Netherland Government alone, and without authority from the Boer delegates or leaders.

“His Majesty’s Government have given it their best consideration, and, whilst they entirely appreciate the motives of humanity which have led the Netherland Government to make this proposal, they feel that they must adhere to the decision, adopted and publicly announced by them some months after the commencement of hostilities by the Boers, that it is not their intention to accept the intervention of any foreign Power in the South African War.

“Should the Boer delegates themselves desire to lay a request for safe conduct before his Majesty’s Government, there is no reason why they should not do so. But his Majesty’s Government are obviously not in a position to express an opinion on any such application until they have received it and are aware of its precise nature, and the grounds on which the request is made.

“I may, however, point out that it is not at present clear to his Majesty’s Government that the delegates retain any influence over the representatives of the Boers in South Africa, or have any voice in their councils. They are stated by the Netherland Government to have no letters of credence or instructions later in date than March 1900. His Majesty’s Government had, on the other hand, understood that all powers of government, including those of negotiation, were now completely vested in Mr. Steyn for the Boers of the Orange River Colony, and in Mr. Schalk Burger for those of the Transvaal.

“If this be so, it is evident that the quickest and most satisfactory means of arranging a settlement would be by direct communication between the leaders of the Boer forces in South Africa and the Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty’s forces, who has already been instructed to forward immediately any offers he may receive for the consideration of his Majesty’s Government.

“In these circumstances his Majesty’s Government have decided that if the Boer leaders should desire to enter into negotiations for the purpose of bringing the war to an end, those negotiations must take place, not in Europe, but in South Africa.

“It should, moreover, be borne in mind that if the Boer delegates are to occupy time in visiting South Africa, in consulting with the Boer leaders in the field, and in returning to Europe for the purpose of making known the results of their errand, a period of at least three months would elapse, during which hostilities would be prolonged, and much human suffering, perhaps needlessly, occasioned.

“I have, &c.,

(Signed) “Lansdowne.”

Thus the situation remained much the same as before, save that the British more than ever realised the necessity of bringing home to the Boers the fact that the death-blow to their independence had been struck by Kruger’s insolent ultimatum of October 1899.