CHAPTER XXIII
Italian Unity; Victor Emmanuel II; War of 1859; Farini; Cavour; Correspondence; Poerio on Southern Italy; Sir James Lacaita; Visit to Turin; The Biographer.
Perhaps only when Italy shall have given proof of her fitness to hold her own amongst the Powers of Europe will the chain of events which has led to the accomplishment of Italian Unity be fully appreciated. True, these events are recent, and require the mellowness of time to impart to them due historical importance. As time progresses, however, the story of United Italy will attain significance; and there is reasonable hope that the new kingdom, hitherto not too harshly tried, will also attain that healthy maturity of which its youth has given promise. To forge the links to bind these discordant States into one, wars, external or internal, have succeeded each other; but, whilst assigning due weight to fortune without, it would be ungracious to stint the praise of the workers from within, whether we regard the mild wisdom of the school of patriots, whereof Poerio, Settembrini, and Panizzi were examples, or the reckless valour of more ardent revolutionists, valour which, it must be granted, was not without its uses when occasion demanded, and which in its excess was skilfully controlled by one of whom it were but faint commendation to say that amongst all the records of eminent statesmen, his superior could not easily be found.
Our observations have shown that Panizzi did not confine his love of country to that part of Italy wherewith he himself was most intimately connected. Having achieved his mission in favour of liberty in the South, we now (1859) find him turning his attention to the North of the Peninsula. By way of introduction to our account of his proceedings in this quarter, it may be well to give a short epitome of the events of the year in question, when the first foundations of Italian unity may be said to have been laid.
Victor Emmanuel, on succeeding to the throne in consequence of his father’s abdication, enjoyed the reputation of an experienced and intrepid soldier, yet was not in other respects a general favourite with his people. Nor was unpopularity at home the only difficulty in his way. When, after the fatal day of Novara, he received the crown from Charles Albert, who resigned it not until he had vainly sought honourable death in battle, he swore to avenge the wrongs of Italy, and to uphold the free institutions of his own realm. For this he had to reckon both with Austria and Naples, who, with unparalleled effrontery, called upon him to govern his kingdom in such a manner as should be in conformity with the mode of government in the other States of the Peninsula. To such a demand the King did not deign to listen, and his opponents were forced to be content with denouncing Sardinia as a hot-bed of sedition and revolutionary agitation. In the beginning of 1859 Victor Emmanuel, who, in his speech to Parliament, had remarked on the threatening appearance of the political horizon, commenced preparations for war against Austria. The circumstances which precipitated the war are too fresh in the recollection of our readers to be dwelt on here to any length. Cavour, on the part of Sardinia, was under promise to England to make no hostile demonstration against Austria. France had declared that she would aid Sardinia only in the case of the latter being attacked. The preliminaries to an European Congress were actually under discussion, when the Emperor of Austria suddenly broke off all negotiations, and demanded of Sardinia an immediate disarmament, a summons which was treated by Cavour with contempt. At this juncture, Austria, with that peculiar aptitude for blundering which has so characterised her action, sent, in the night of April 28-29, 1859, her armies across the Ticino, thus affording an occasion of action whereof the two allies were not slow to avail themselves. The French troops hastened to cross the Alps. Battle followed battle with uniform success to the allied arms, when, like a thunderbolt, news of the Peace of Villafranca fell on Europe. Unexplained at the time, the reasons for it soon came within the range of tolerably accurate conjecture. In the first place the eagerness with which people of the other States in Italy prepared to unite themselves with Sardinia (which Cavour had foreseen, but which had failed to strike Louis Napoleon,) was hardly to the taste of the French Emperor. Whatever were his objects in the war, the unity of Italy was certainly not one of them. He had employed his army, and thereby diverted his people; he had gained a satisfactory amount of glory, though perhaps not so much as his ambition led him to hope for. In his victories, (though it were hard to apply to them the epithet Pyrrhic,) he had undoubtedly sustained greater loss than his adversary; and he possibly thought it as well to refrain from following the Austrians to the strong position to which they had retired, and from whence not all the armies of Italy, Sardinia, and France united could in all probability have succeeded in dislodging them. His fortitude and forbearance were, however, as all know, not without their substantial reward.
It is ours, not to write history, but simply to supply aid to its study; and these may, we hope, be afforded, to the reader by the somewhat varied correspondence of which this chapter will mainly consist. The several writers quoted are at any rate worth listening to, and not least among them Luigi Carlo Farini, the Dictator, well-known as the friend of Mr. Gladstone, a letter from whom (dated March 18th, 1859) comes first in order on our list:—
“... Times are so serious that my mind is filled with anxious thoughts. Yesterday the Austrians blew up the bridge at Buffalora. It is all very well for our friend Hudson to say they will not attack us, but surely they strike us in our honour by violating our property with their treaties.
“I should like to see what John Bull would do if they attempted to mine his house. Even yesterday they expelled from Milan one of our most esteemed staff-officers, Cav. Incisa. Such acts are committed daily, but we must console ourselves by seeing how the whole of Italy is giving a new and great example of unity and strength. Ten thousand volunteers are coming from all parts of Italy; it is a crusade; your Modena has sent more than all the other States, considering its extent (a thing which cannot be seen without emotion). The stupefied Governments have lost strength. National rights reign supreme in public opinion. My dear friend, awful events are at hand. We count much upon your advocating our cause in England.”
“The noble Neapolitan exiles, for whom the English people so justly feel, may prove the means of advancing the common cause. Let them only say that Neapolitan tyranny is not of native, but of foreign growth, and in order to chastise Bomba, it will be necessary to chastise Vienna. Let us hope they may say so, for it is the unvarnished truth.”
That Panizzi rated the strength of Austria and the Quadrilateral at its proper value, and considered that the Italians were about this time in trepidis rebus, is plain from the following letter to Mr. Haywood. It bears no date, but evidently must have been written (from the British Museum) just before the conclusion of the war:—
“These Italian affairs have, as you may suppose, made me feverish. First of all, I think the Austrians are not quite done for yet, although I think they will be. Even in these times of wonder I don’t believe they can have lost Vicenza and Mantua, and if the whole country is not really up, the King of Piedmont will find these two very hard bits. That they are yet in the Austrians’ hands I argue from the fact of Radetzky’s troops retiring in two columns towards them—what is more, taking with him political prisoners, which shows he is not quite defeated. Even when Mantua and Piacenza are taken, there is the pass of Caldiero, fortified in an awful manner, as I have seen myself, and such fortresses as Legnano, Peschiera, and Verona, in which fifty thousand men can defy three times the number.”
“If the Tyrolese are up to the whole of the Venetian territory, the Austrians may find it awkward, as they are out of favour here, and they may not have either time or the means of victualling their forces. But between us I do not very much like the peasants to take up arms in earnest, even if they join in a popular movement at first. They must enrol themselves, and that I do not think they will do. I foresee, therefore, great difficulties, and at all events great fighting. Yes, and depend upon it the French, if they last as a republic, or even have a Bonaparte, will interfere. As to myself, what can I do? I am more than fifty, and not a soldier, and what they want now are young men ready to shoulder a musket or to command.”
“In the second place, I am almost certain that the Italians will differ among themselves (not as to the Austrians, or as to being dismayed, but as to the form of Government.) The King of Sardinia had no chance to keep his crown but by acting as he has done, as they would have proclaimed a republic in Lombardy with the help of the Swiss, and he would have had a revolution in the same sense at home. But the spirit of the ‘Giovine Italia’ is at work there, and I think there will be yet a great deal of trouble before the form of government is settled. My views you know, and I fear I should have no one listening to me, and the utmost I could expect would be to be looked upon as a crazy Angloman. In the third place, I have hardly any friend alive who would care for me, or on whom I could have influence. I am a greater stranger in Italy than here.”
Towards the middle of the year, Panizzi himself visited the scene of action, whence he wrote a graphic account of affairs in the North of Italy to Mr. Gladstone, in a far more cheerful tone than that of the last letter quoted:—
“San Maurizio, near Reggio,
September 4th, 1859.
“My dear Sir,—
... I went to Bologna to see the opening of the Assembly last Thursday, and I hope to give them some good advice as to the wording of the resolutions which are to be proposed to-morrow, proclaiming the independence of Romagna. On Thursday I shall go to Parma again to assist at the opening of their Assembly. I am now staying with some distant cousins at a villa which Ariosto, who lived here, had celebrated.
I cannot tell you how gratified I am at what I have seen ever since I came to this part of Italy, on Monday last. The order and quiet which prevail everywhere are only equalled by the unanimity with which every man, woman, and child is determined not to submit again to the fallen Government. I am happy to see that the determination is supported by large numbers of volunteers who flock to enlist: they come not only from the towns but from the country; and at night, since I have been here, I have heard a variety of songs in dialect in praise of Garibaldi and his soldiers, ridiculing the Austrians and the late Duke of Modena, in very expressive although in not very polite terms. I have seen persons who are well affected to the Duke—the cousins at whose house I am staying, and to whose family the Archbishop of Modena belongs, amongst them—and one and all say that a restoration of the fallen dynasty would be a great calamity. Here, in fact—at Parma as well as Bologna—the universal wish is to be united to Piedmont. The organization of the recruits proceeds with the greatest rapidity, and the instructors (old soldiers) are struck by the military qualities displayed by the population. The Republican and Mazzinian agents are secreted everywhere; still I think that the only danger to be feared is that if things were to continue long in this state of suspense, with hardly any Government in fact, anarchists might cause mischief, although not triumph ultimately.
Yours, &c., &c.,
A. Panizzi.”
“I have just heard that the Austrians, most of them dressed in the uniform of the Duke of Modena, are gathering their forces to cross the Po, and come to the right of it.”
Amongst the numerous letters in our possession, written by Count Cavour to Panizzi, the most important and interesting, and at the same time the most truly characteristic, both in form and substance, of the great Statesman, is one dated the 24th of October, 1859. It was written from Leri, Cavour’s country seat. Thither he had, immediately after the war, retired for a time from public life, and with a heavy heart; for the obscurity in terms and apparent treachery of the Peace of Villafranca, had affected him with a torturing suspicion that he had been betrayed. It is something of a tribute to Cavour’s greatness that Rattazzi, who succeeded him, was fain, in his embarrassment in carrying on the Government, to seek the counsel of his predecessor, the flame of whose patriotism (however deeply wounded his own feelings may have been) burnt as brightly in his retirement as in office, as it needs but the following letter to show:—
“Leri, October 24th, 1859.
“My dear Panizzi,
Your letter of the 17th inst. was only delivered to me yesterday, too late for me to answer it then. I hasten to do so this morning, though I fear that my reply can hardly reach London before the question of the Congress shall have been decided.
In the present state of affairs, considering the engagements entered into at Villafranca and to a certain extent confirmed at Zurich by the Emperor, it appears evident to me that an European Congress is indispensable. Were there to be no Congress, and were France to prevent the egress of Central Italy from the provisional condition by opposing the stipulated fusions, those countries would be exposed to serious dangers. The eminent men in the Romagna—and there are many such there—might incite Garibaldi to attempt an enterprise in the Marches and perhaps even in the Abruzzi; at Modena the occupation of the trans-Padan Mantuan territory by Austria—an inevitable consequence of the treaty—might give rise to lamentable collisions; Tuscany perhaps might be more patient of an uncertain condition, but even there the intrigues of the reactionaries supported by the priests would probably be the cause of serious perturbations. Hence the interests of Italy absolutely require a Congress, and, if this is plain, England should participate therein both for her own honour and for our benefit. Austria will not oppose her intervention, but will accept her reservations when it is stipulated that nothing is to be said about the provinces retained under Austrian dominion. It is hard for us to renounce a plea in favour of unhappy Venice; still we must repress our deep sympathies for fear of sacrificing the possible for the desirable.
Austria, relieved of apprehension respecting Venice, ought to concur in the English maxim that the wishes of the Italians should be respected. To put this in more diplomatic form it would be sufficient to say that the Powers undertake not to impose by force of arms any form of Government on the people of Central Italy. This is the principle of non-intervention already proclaimed by the Emperor in his writings and in his speeches. Supported by France and by England, and perhaps by Russia too, it will soon be admitted by Austria and accepted by Prussia.
Passing on to the constitution of the Congress, I do not hesitate to declare for the exclusion of the minor Powers. If only the Duchies and Tuscany were concerned their intervention would be advantageous; but as the most difficult—I will say too the most important question—is that of the Romagna provinces, I fear the Pope would find vehement defenders in Spain and in Portugal.
The Congress once assembled, there can be no doubt as to the course of England. She would first of all propose that the wish of the people legally expressed should receive the sanction of Europe. Supposing this proposition to be rejected, the next would be that the people be consulted by means of universal suffrage, to be verified by the members of the Congress. This proposal would find support in France, and would probably be accepted. If it were not, England would have to enter into a negative phase, and to withstand the proposals of Austria and that of France too. The Duke of Modena being abandoned by every one, even his own relations, there will be nothing to oppose but the restoration of the House of Lorraine in Tuscany, the installation of the Duchess of Parma at Modena, and the re-establishment of the Papal dominion in the Romagna provinces.
Such resolutions as these may be resisted, not only on the ground of the popular rights, but also, and still more efficaciously, in the interest of the monarchical principle, and with reference to ideas of order and stability. Unless we wish to see the now stifled revolution revive, menacing and powerful, it must not be confronted by feeble Governments without root in the soil, destitute of both physical and moral force. If we wish to see thrones respected, we ought not to fill them with despised and despicable princes, whose very names are in irritating antagonism to the sentiment—the national sentiment—now dominating in Italy. If the Grand Duke or his son return to Florence, then, in less than a month, Tuscany will be the head quarters of Mazzini and of the belligerent revolution. Perhaps it will be said that the Duchess or Parma is a strong-minded woman, and is not unappreciated. However this may be, the so hateful remembrances of the father could not be effaced, nor could confidence be inspired in the son. Besides, the system of compensations which some would wish to apply in favour of this branch of the Bourbon family is in direct collision with the sentiments and the ideas which now prevail in Europe. The Modenese would be smitten in their dignity if they found themselves allotted by way of jointure to the widow of that rascal, the petty Duke of Parma. Better for them the restoration of their former Sovereign. In that case they would be victims of a false principle; but they would not be treated as a flock of sheep, disposed of as a counterbalance for conditions deemed onerous by one of the contracting parties.
The Treaty of Vienna is odious enough in many parts; but it is not so odious as that of Campoformio.
With regard to the Romagna provinces, it will be easy for England to get the idea of papal reforms scouted. To entertain such an idea is worse than hateful—it is ridiculous. There is no need to be either a great statesman or a great theologian to feel convinced that the Pope not only does not wish but really cannot consent to serious reforms. So long as he is Pope and King he must in conscience employ the powers of the King to enforce the decrees of the Pontiff. The separation of the two authorities is impossible. The Pope cannot consent to the freedom of instruction, nor to the freedom of public worship, nor to the freedom of the press. He cannot tolerate municipal freedom unless this be understood as an authority of the Town Councils to regulate at will the public roads and the manner of paving them. The Pope as Pope will more easily submit to the loss of a province than to the promulgation of the Napoleonic Civil Code in his States. The Papal restoration ought to be prevented at every cost: it is not only an Italian question, but one of European interest. It concerns us, but it also concerns England, Prussia, even Russia, and all countries where the development of civilization is an object, for this requires as an essential condition the absolute separation of the two Powers. If the Pope should obtain a victory in Italy, the presumption and the pride of the Cullens and the McHales would swell beyond bounds, and Europe would be menaced before very long with the danger of religious struggles similar to those of past ages. Let everything be given up rather than sacrifice the Romagna provinces. Their cause is, I say again, the cause of civilization.
If England should succeed in warding off the Austro-French proposals, let her reproduce those which she originally brought forward: and if these do not prevail, let her propose the immediate union of Parma and Carrara with Piedmont, and the establishment of a Government, provisional but strongly constituted, to rule over Florence, Modena, and Bologna.
These are my views: take them for what they are worth. Far away from the turmoil of affairs, and having but slight relations with the Ministers, I am probably unaware of many things which might modify my opinion. Still, judging the question of Central Italy from the data which history in some way impresses upon our minds, I am strongly of opinion that if England were to follow the part which I have traced, she would succeed in the object of assuring the destinies of Central Italy to our advantage and her own glory. Farewell, my dear friend. Continue the advocacy of our cause before the noble English nation, and your efforts will not be fruitless. I say again now what I said to the Chamber and to Italy in February—the statesmen who have ennobled their career by accomplishing the emancipation of the negroes will not bear the condemnation of Italy to eternal slavery.[[G]]
Most truly yours,
C. Cavour.”
[G]. These memorable words were uttered in the sitting of the 9th of February, 1859, during the discussion on the loan contracted to prepare for war against Austria.
The next letter to Mr. Ellice (to whom, as there was no one whom Panizzi so much loved and respected, he never lost an opportunity of communicating both the intelligence he received and his own comments and opinions thereon[thereon]) is lively and amusing, and contains much matter within a small compass. The observations on the Rattazzi Government probably in no wise exaggerate its defects:—
“B. M., October 29th, 1859.
... I can tell you for certain there will be a Congress about Italy in which England will take part. The Emperor of the French feels he is in a scrape, and urges England to help him out of it, and our Government are inclined to help him under certain conditions, England wanting him in return on some other account. He has accepted as explicitly as possible England’s terms, and hitherto he has kept his word to her; if he does not break it, the Government are quite satisfied that all will go well for Italy. Indeed, if England and France act together, there is no doubt their policy must prevail.”
“As to the Italians themselves, there is too much softness in Piedmont on the part of the Government; the King is the only man who dares; his Ministers are miserable little bureaucrats. We must have a change there, and Cavour must come back; and this is what our Ministers wish. The people of central Italy, who have given themselves up so heartily to Piedmont, are tired of the prudence of the King’s Government, which does nothing for them, and there is great fear that they may break loose, and, taking the matter in their hands, rush on the Pope’s soldiers or the Rubicon, whom they will rout to a certainty. The whole of the Umbria and the Marches will rise at once; they have been quite ready to do so for two months past, and it is with difficulty they are kept quiet. If they rise, and the soldiers of central Italy (Garibaldi is to lead them) rush in, you may be certain that the kingdom of Naples will be in a flame. Garibaldi with ten thousand men, Romagnuoli, will conquer the whole kingdom down to Reggio. The proclamations of Garibaldi, which you will have seen two days ago in the papers, are ominous. In Italy I did my best to keep him quiet, and so did other friends; but I now see he is taking the mord aux dents, and no wonder. The King of Sardinia has sent for him, but as he is no longer in his service it is thought he may, under some pretext or other, respectfully decline the summons. A revolution at Naples, or its invasion by Garibaldi, would just now be very disagreeable to the English Government, as the question of change of government, both in the kingdom of Naples proper and in Sicily, might be brought on the tapis, and then you easily foresee a great imbroglio—greater than any that has hitherto taken place, as far as English interests are concerned.”
“I understand the ministers are quite united with each other, and all pleased with Lord Palmerston, of whom Mr. Gibson has spoken to a friend of mine not long ago. Lord Palmerston and Lord John are particularly united together; this I know from the latter. Gladstone, I am also told, runs quite straight. The Court is quite Austrian, and, were it not for fear of this trio, would probably try the Tories again. There is a conspiracy of crinolines in favour of the Duchess of Parma, the Empress of the French, and the Queen of Spain. The latter wanted to send ten thousand men to assist the Pope, but France and England have put a veto on that.”
This may be fitly succeeded by two more letters from Panizzi to Mr. Ellice. To each reader’s judgment and discretion may fairly be left the decision whether the historical parallel in the second of these is thoroughly correct, and whether either Elizabeth or Cromwell had much notion of religious liberalism, or defended Protestantism on the ground of its being the liberal religion.
“B. M., January 4th, 1860.
“... All the diplomacy in the world will not bring back either those d—d Dukes or the Pope, and the provinces whence they have been expelled. If Napoleon sticks to the point of not allowing any armed intervention in their favour, the legitimate Sovereigns are dished. But, it is said, he has some interested motive if he act so. I suppose he has; so much the better if his interests coincide with the interests and wishes of Italy. It is a pity no one else has the same interest; but, if no one will do the trick, even he is welcome. I see that after all he is the only one who does something for that country. If the Pope and Austrian influence are done for, what is to come after it is of less importance. If the European powers will aid and abet Austria in keeping Venice, and in preventing a united kingdom of North Italy being formed under Victor Emmanuel, I am sorry for it, but they cannot complain if Plonplon is preferred by the Italians to the Austrian and priestly tyranny. Better Austria than the Pope, but better Plonplon than either. That is the scale.”
“B. M., April 21st, 1860.
“... How could you suppose that I ever could have said that Elizabeth and Cromwell interfered to support Catholicism? My answer was, and is, this:
“Europe is now in about the same state with respect to politics as it was in Elizabeth’s and Cromwell’s times as to religion. These two personages did not follow the policy which is now so much praised of taking no side with either party, but showing the greatest indifference to right or wrong. England, I think, has not reached the lofty station it now occupies, by adopting this policy; nor will she keep that position by such means.
“In the same manner that Elizabeth and Cromwell took the side of liberalism in religion (Protestantism) England ought now to take the side of liberty in politics, and she would thus rise still higher.
“In 1848 England allowed liberty to be crushed everywhere; she even allowed Russia to lend an army to Austria to crush an old and constitutional kingdom. See how the Protestants are now treated all over the Austrian Empire; how the Jesuitical party is rampant in Germany and in Ireland; how Europe is crouching to Napoleon. Is this to the advantage of free Protestant England?
“Now, suppose, instead of proclaiming her determination to keep aloof (which neither Elizabeth nor Cromwell would have approved) the Government of Queen Victoria has told Russia and Austria that if Despots were to join to crush liberty, free governments would support those who tried to recover their freedom, do you think England would now be worse off?
“If, instead of cheering Austria on to crush little Piedmont, whose great crime was to support the principles of civil and religious liberty, England had stood by those principles as she ought, do you think Napoleon would now stand as high as he does?
“Austria would never have dared to act as she did, had she not been encouraged by the then English Government; and the war which has given Savoy and Nice to France would never have taken place if England had done something for the cause of freedom. That position which now Napoleon occupies would have been occupied by England to her manifest advantage, and to that of mankind.
“When the Protestants were hard pushed at La Rochelle, Elizabeth did not stand by looking on, nor did her Parliament talk so much as ours does. When the poor Vaudois were persecuted by the Duke of Savoy, Cromwell was not so squeamish about non-intervention, but sent word to Mazarin to make the Duke understand that the persecution must cease—and it did cease.
“Compare those times with ours, and then laugh, if you can, at my political notions. When do you return?”
Two months after the date of the last-quoted letter, Panizzi received an interesting account of Southern Italy from Poerio, which is subjoined:—
“Turin, June 1st, 1860.
“My dearest Friend,
While I have been waiting for an answer to the letter which I wrote to you from Florence, new and unexpected events and new complications have arisen, demanding the prompt and energetic co-operation of everybody who is devoted to our cause.
Therefore I am forced to have recourse to you as one of those few who, to a fixed determination of aiding their country, add by their own personal importance the capacity of doing good upon an extensive scale.
Palermo has fallen, and the National idea is triumphant throughout the island.
Of course there are many obstacles to be overcome. Nevertheless before long that noble region will be irrevocably lost to the Bourbons, and regained for Italy. But what will become of the seven millions of Italians who still groan beneath the detestable tyranny of the Bourbons? It is now said that the Government, in order to gain time (as it did in 1848) intends putting on the mask of liberalism, and retains the Count of Syracuse as the principal actor in this impudent farce. He has a few adherents, and is not wanting in desire to represent a Louis-Philippe in miniature.
In the meantime the Mazzini set are agitating because they know that of the whole Italian territory the Southern Provinces of the peninsula are best adapted to their designs.
Neither are the partisans of Murat standing idle, but are working effectually in the army with the most seductive promises.
Finally, there is the Subversive (Sanfedista) Party, of the purest race, who would like to reserve for Naples the fate of Palermo, and who have decided to put the whole country to fire and pillage. You see, therefore, that there are four parties, all fairly strong, and all hostile to the true National Party, which solely desires the unity of Italy under the constitutional sceptre of King Victor Emmanuel. Any one who has any experience in political matters will easily understand that for this National Party to engage in the struggle with any hope of success it must be provided with ready means, otherwise the remaining divisions will pre-occupy the field, and the country, after going through twelve years of the most cruel despotism, will fall into civil war, and thence into the most frightful state of anarchy. The danger is imminent, and the remedy must be prompt. The numbers who have decided to undertake the enterprise amount to several thousands; but the pecuniary resources are most limited. Besides, it must be borne in mind that if delay is disastrous, to enter upon the task with insufficient means would be still more so, since a failure would lend strength to a detested Government, which is now tottering under the weight of its crimes, and which could never stand against a well-supported effort. In this state of affairs your political friends, of whom you have so many in that noble country, ought not to let slip this favourable occasion for assisting us—an opportunity which cannot again present itself, and of which others will avail themselves, to the eternal prejudice of Italy, unless steps be taken in time to prevent it. Nor do I think that they ought to be influenced by certain restricted views which several of them wish to put forward.
The only solution of the question is really the Italy of the Italians, which, far from compromising the peace of Europe, would serve to consolidate it by removing a continued incentive to foreign ambition. Once decide upon a policy of non-intervention, and the struggle between the two principles in Italy can neither be long nor sanguinary.
The liberal party in Europe will then count one more truly independent state, which will make its principles respected, and will certainly contribute both to their triumph and to the general development of civilization.
The Bourbons will be crushed, and to the great benefit of every one, since their detestable Government is incompatible with Italian independence. The most disastrous error of the times would be that of wishing to maintain them on the throne at any cost, because it would outrage the moral sense of the whole of Italy. Neither do I see the necessity of supporting and bolstering up a race which is the very incarnation of perjury. If the Bourbons were to remain in Naples, even with a fictitious constitution, they would sooner or later be supplanted by a Napoleonic régime.
Enthusiasm evaporates in time; but if we now follow up this terrible current which urges the main stream, Italy can be rendered free and united. If, however, the opportunity is allowed to pass, dualism, with all its terrible consequences, will be the result.
A thousand greetings to our friends! I embrace you heartily, and am ever
Your most affectionate friend,
Carlo Poerio.”
While on the subject of Southern Italy we may remind our readers that there has been frequent mention made above of a gentleman, who, as a constant friend and correspondent of Panizzi, and as a prominent personage in Neapolitan matters, demands some further notice. Mr., afterwards Sir James Lacaita, was, previously to the year 1850, legal adviser to the British Legation at Naples. In this position, by his great official capacity, and by his well-proved exemplary character, he succeeded in gaining the friendship of Sir William Temple. He had the further good fortune to make the acquaintance of Mr. Gladstone, at the house of Lord Leven, who was spending a winter at Naples. This acquaintance soon ripened into intimacy, a consequence which was almost a matter of course, for Lacaita was well fitted to win the confidence and attract the liking of those who, themselves possessed of merit, could discover and value merit in others. Endowed with distinguished abilities, and a master of the English language; in political matters of sound and matured judgment, and (as will hereafter be seen) of unassailable honour and integrity; such very exceptional characteristics soon marked him out for invidious distinction by the partisans of King Bomba. On the 26th of December, 1850, he was arrested in the street as a dangerous person and thrown into prison. All his papers were ordered to be examined in his presence; but, Sir William Temple having requested the “Attaché” of the Legation, Mr. Fagan, to claim as many of these as possible in the name of Her Britannic Majesty’s Government, a large proportion was thereby saved.
A certain note, however, which originated in a mere joke, was detained, and turned out to be the innocent cause of serious trouble. Previously to his arrest, Lacaita, in conjunction with Lord and Lady Leven and their three daughters, had planned a tour for eight days to La Cava, Salerno and Amalfi. In sportive mood it was laid down by the “tourists” that no authority of one over the other was to be recognised amongst the members of this party, and to distinguish nominally the perfect freedom and equality of the society, they dubbed themselves the “Republic.” It must have been with mingled feelings of indignation and gratification that the police discovered amongst the confiscated papers a note written by Lady Anne Melville, after the return from the tour, containing the words, Will you come to tea, and talk over the grand Republican days? In vain was it explained to the authorities that the note had no political significance, but the suspicious adjective was merely playful reference to the little temporary republic of “tourists,” and to no dangerous revolutionary organisation.
Either lacking a natural sense of humour, or holding jocosity to be impossible in so grave a matter as anything Republican in the then state of Italian politics, they altogether rejected this, to them, fanciful interpretation. The letter was registered (it is still in the archives of the Criminal Court of Naples), and formed one of the chief grounds for the charge of sedition and conspiracy brought against Lacaita.
In the summer of 1860, Cavour, well aware of the negotiations that were being carried on between England, France and Naples, and desirous of obtaining some trustworthy person to watch his interests, and supply him with information—and being, moreover, unable, for reasons which may be easily understood, to charge his own Minister, the Marquis d’Azeglio, with the mission—applied to Lacaita, who, on receiving the message, although laid up with severe illness, immediately rose from his bed and went straight to Lord Russell’s house. His Lordship, having an engagement with the Neapolitan Minister, had given direction that no person whatever should be admitted. Sir James, however, being intimate with the family, managed to see his Lordship, and was able there and then to turn the current of affairs in a totally different direction, and to prevent the French Ambassador Count Persigny, and his Neapolitan colleague the Marquis La Greca, from carrying out their plans. Had it not been for Sir James Lacaita’s prompt and skilful intervention, England would doubtless have been remitted to the position she had held in 1848.
Nothing now remained to those whom Lacaita had thus thwarted but to win him over to the side of Francis II., and this it was thought might be effected by offering him the post of Minister at the Court of St. James’s, in the room of Count Ludolf. The chief instrument employed for the conversion of this dangerous opponent was Signor Giovanni Manna, the Neapolitan Minister of Finance, who was now at Paris, whither he had been sent to negotiate a loan. Manna, who was a personal friend of Lacaita’s, started from Paris in August with the sole object of persuading him to accept the offer; holding out as a further inducement to a change of opinion a considerable bonus, besides a not insignificant salary and the title of Marquis, which might well be regarded as superseding the inferior rank of knighthood which had already been conferred upon him.
The unification of Italy was regarded by most politicians of the time, Lacaita included, as, to say the least of it, a remote possibility. To the King’s offer, and the numerous advantages accompanying it, Lacaita simply replied, This is bribery. In this conclusion he was supported by the advice of two distinguished statesmen, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Gladstone, and by a letter from Panizzi (dated Homburg, 23rd of August, 1860), which did not reach him until a few days after his refusal of the post:—
“... I willingly comply with your request, and frankly give you the advice which you ask on the point which you truly describe as delicate and knotty—that is, whether you ought to accept the appointment as Minister of His Sicilian Majesty at the Court of St. James’s.
“As Minister of that King you must first of all oppose the enterprise of Garibaldi, who wishes to unite the whole of Italy under one sole head, and if that head should be Victor Emmanuel, you, Sir James Lacaita, would have to support an abominable and cruel scion of an execrated race against the only Sovereign who has shown that he is an Italian; in fact, you would have to help in cutting up Italy. I do not presume to judge those gentlemen who have undertaken to serve his said Neapolitan Majesty; but they were on the spot, had served—at least some of them—the dynasty, and perhaps had not duly considered before they accepted their posts. But are you, who are free, and in your sober senses, to serve a Bourbon like him of Naples? Are you to stand by the side of those who proclaimed martial law?—you to join a Government which now shoots down the noblest Italians who have liberated Sicily from a detested yoke? No one cui sanum sinciput can believe that the King of Naples is to be trusted, when he gives utterance to the sentiments which he now pretends to profess, and every one who is not bereft of sense knows and feels that the man is still the faithful and true ally of Austria, the tool of the harsh stepmother, the blind and abject slave of the priesthood which has made Rome a sewer. And would you give your honoured name, your influence, your talents to a man without affection and without faith like that King? My dear Lacaita, that name, that influence, those talents belong to Italy and to an honourable King, not to a schismatic party—not to a perfidious and treacherous perjurer.
“I use strong expressions: the case justifies them. You may show this letter of mine to any one you please, and tell what I think without any reserve whatever!...”
In September, 1860, Panizzi paid another visit to Italy, of which, and of the condition of affairs in that country, he gave an account in the two following extracts from letters to Mr. Ellice, written after his return.
Some remarks on the evil which Garibaldi’s mistaken zeal was likely to produce on the state of Rome and on the French Emperor are well worth reading. The “confabulation” with the King at Turin, mentioned in the first letter, at which Cavour was present, was held in a stable with great secrecy. Only such passages are given as bear most directly on the history of the time:—
“B. M., Oct. 5, 1860.
“... I have seen and had long confabulations with the King at Turin, and with the Emperor at Paris. I can tell you that Garibaldi, who seemed to have lost his senses, and who was surrounded by a set of scamps who made a fool and tool of him, honest fellow! will by this time have made an amende honorable, and submitted to the King, or be put down.
“Be assured that Cavour and the rational party in Italy (that is ninety-nine per cent. of the population) are not such fools as to attack Austria. It is owing to the threats of Garibaldi, the French Emperor having undertaken to preserve from injury or insult the person of the Pope, that the French garrison at Rome has been increased. But that garrison will not defend any part of the Papal territory except what it actually occupies; and should the Pope leave Rome, as he was on the point of doing ten days ago, the French will withdraw, and the Sardinian army occupy Rome.
“The note or letter of Lord John to Cavour has disgusted many and surprised all. I think it was written of his own accord, and perhaps without the knowledge of his colleagues. He who has been so long a consistent friend of Italy write such a letter, when the Government of the King of Sardinia was supposed to be in difficulties, and was in fact so! Those are the acts which make even the French Emperor popular, and which, by encouraging the despotic party in Germany, may kindle a war.... There will be no anarchy in Italy, and the Emperor Napoleon may be relied on.
“Nothing serves more in France than English abuse. Of this I am certain, and I have most curious proofs. I am also positive that he is personally a firm friend of England, and that he has more to do than people suppose to quiet the Anglophobia of the French.... I had the pleasure of seeing prisoner of war at Turin, that worthy companion in arms of Monsignor Lamoricière, Monsignor Schmidt, he who butchered people at Perugia where he was obliged to surrender at last. It was delightful to see the provoking indifference with which the Piedmontese looked at him.... Cavour wanted to make a present of several hundred Irishmen taken prisoners to the English Government, but the present was respectfully declined....”
“B. M., Oct. 11th, 1860.
“... I am astonished to see the Paris correspondent of The Times allowed to write as he does about the King of Sardinia and his Minister. His misrepresentations are all directed to disparage them all and so far favourable to Austria. In to-day’s number that correspondent, in order to throw discredit on Cavour’s statement, said that he was not to be believed, as he had asked Savoy although he had promised not to give up any part of the Piedmontese territory. The King is represented as swearing and mad with rage whenever the cession of Savoy is mentioned. Now I have spoken to the King about this transaction, and have most respectfully said things which were, from their nature, calculated to irritate. The King was not irritated, he was not in a rage, and did not swear; he spoke with great moderation, and with great feeling. I was struck with it....”
Our budget of correspondence, which has been resorted to more copiously than was at first intended, may be closed, so far as this chapter is concerned, by a letter from Panizzi to Mr. Gladstone, which is given in its entirety[entirety]:—
“British Museum,
November 27th, 1860.
“My dear Sir,
Your letter has filled me with apprehension for poor Italy, and with gratitude for your warm interest in her cause. I felt reason daily to mistrust the conduct of my Paris interlocutor, and I am the more afraid, seeing that you, too, feel there is reason for mistrust. When the conduct of the fleet at Gaeta was first known, I wrote to say that it was suspicious, and at variance with recent professions. My letter went through the Minister to St. Cloud, and I received from my friend with whom the correspondence was carried on the enclosed answer, which please return. Lord P. has seen it, but no one else. I was not satisfied, and I wrote again to my friend to say so, but he is not in Paris, and he had to send my last letter from the country to Paris. He has since written that the Minister would be glad to correspond chiefly with me; but now he is out, and my communications are stopped. Nor do I know how I could reach St. Cloud without it being known to many who ought not to know it. The appointment of Walewski and that of Flahaut portend no good to Italy and to the English alliance. If this interference by sea and by land continue, it is evident that it is intended to allow a civil war to kindle in Italy, to have a pretext for interfering, not certainly for the good of the country. Is it possible that the three Emperors and the supporters of the Pope and of despotism in Germany have agreed to settle matters to their own advantage, leaving Prussia, England, and Italy out? Allowing Russia to act as she thinks best in the East, France on the Rhine and in Italy, and Austria in the outer provinces of the Turkish Empire, close to Hungary! It is an extravagant supposition, but the conduct of France is still more so.
Believe me always,
Yours most sincerely obliged,
A. Panizzi.”
The author is well aware that nothing short of his long-standing intimacy with the subject of this “Memoir” could justify the introduction into the work of anything approaching egotism, unless it were to illustrate an essential point in the character of which he is treating; but in writing of the year 1860, recollections crowd upon the memory which he trusts his readers will excuse him for committing to paper. In that same year he (then a boy of thirteen) was sent, under the charge of a Queen’s Messenger, from Naples to a school in England. Arriving in London, he was most kindly received by Panizzi, and well remembers his first interview with one who was thenceforth to be his staunchest friend. Not that this was the first time that the latter had bestowed his good offices upon the family of the writer, whose eldest brother, now Major Fagan, owes and acknowledges a debt of gratitude for the kindness received at his hands in youthful days, and up to the time of receiving his Commission and starting for India in 1859.
But pleasant and important as it would be, for some reasons, to dwell upon many happy reminiscences of uninterrupted intercourse with a pre-eminent man, the task which is here undertaken leads us to more serious matters relating to that period, and that yet remain to occupy the space which should be devoted rather to the information of our readers than to a recital of personal recollections.
