III.
The theory of language, during the eighteenth century, had been one of the favourite subjects of philosophical speculation; in general, it had proceeded in this matter, by way of abstract and logical analysis. It chiefly saw in language a product of the intellectual faculties of man. But, already, from the second half of the century, this conception had been attacked in Germany by the school which began the reaction against the “philosophers,” and in which the most illustrious name is that of Herder. In France the traditionalist school felt that here one of the weak points of the philosophy of the eighteenth century was being touched. It insisted upon the characters of language which this philosophy did not explain. Comte knew the works of this school, and, in particular, those of M. de Bonald, whom he calls an “energetic thinker.”[215] But his method differs from theirs, and he only agrees with them in the critical part of their doctrine.
If the theory of language, says Comte, is encumbered with insoluble questions, the fault lies in the method made use of by the metaphysicians. They have only considered man’s language, in its state of highest complication. They have attributed excessive importance to the signs of articulate human language, they have exaggerated the part played by reflection, and misunderstood that of spontaneity. Condillac especially and his school attributed far too much importance to the “disponibilité” of signs.[216] The scientific method will not isolate humanity from the other species which it dominates. It will connect the positive study of language with biology and with sociology: with biology more particularly for the question of origin; with sociology in so far as the development of language depends upon the reaction of social life upon domestic life.
The starting-point of the theory is a fact of experience. Every strong emotion is accompanied by the impulse to manifest it, and this expression reacts upon the emotion itself. Many species exhibit this.[217] Singing and mimicking, or rather cries and gestures, are often used by them, as by man, not only to relieve the passions, but to excite them more. For instance, anger in carnivorous animals grows to exasperation, through the external signs which the animal gives of it. Comte is in accordance with the observations of Bell and of Gratiolet. The movements which co-operate in expression, he says, coincide in general with those which are made use of in action. Moreover, in the human species, for the most part, the individual expresses his affections in order to satisfy them better, by inducing his fellow-creatures to second him. It is an appeal to sympathy. If then the expression results from the feeling, it tends, conversely to develop and to consolidate it. The origin of language is thus affective, that is to say æsthetic, since “we only express ourselves after having felt strongly.” Language therefore translates feelings before thoughts, and this is what the followers of the ideologist theory did not see. Even to-day, in our most developed language, we can still trace this origin. It reveals itself by the musical accent of the slightest speech. Expression is always inspired and maintained by some affection, even in cases where it is apparently limited to a simple scientific or technical exposition. The affective source of language, dissimulated as it is by the intellectual operations of which it is the instrument, reveals itself in the inflexions of the voice.
Language is made up of signs. According to what has just been said, natural signs are spontaneously produced by the play of the emotions. As a voluntary manifestation language is always artificial. The involuntary signs have been gradually divided into their component parts and simplified, while remaining intelligible. All artificial signs, says Comte, even in our species, spring from a voluntary “imitation” of the natural signs which are spontaneously produced. In this way both the formation and the interpretation of these signs are explained.[218]
Hobbes used to define a sign as a constant relation between two phenomena, seen by the subject. The two phenomena are here a state of consciousness and a motion. Sometimes the state of consciousness determines the motion, sometimes the motion causes the reappearance of the state of consciousness. The institution of a system of signs is a means of “connecting the within with the without.” Language is thus for man a means of making the series of his intellectual states participate in the regularity which characterises external order. The logical function of language therefore springs from its very essence in which the phenomena of the objective world and the phenomena which belong to the feeling and thinking subject are joined. It is equivalent to a system for rendering the mental life objective.[219] Being thus made objective, these phenomena can henceforth be preserved and communicated, without man or the animals having had each an end in view, since the institution of the first signs is involuntary, and arises from “the combination between the muscular and nervous systems.” External order here acts as a regulator, even before thought has grasped it.
The signs which are spontaneously produced are not all transformed into voluntary signs. Those which appeal to sight or to hearing present special advantages for this use, and as a matter of fact, the two classes of signs are concurrently used by the higher animals. Gestures and cries are the origin of what later becomes the system of artificial signs. By degrees, the communication of emotions gives way to the expression of thoughts. Among very civilised populations it even came to be believed that song had come from speech. But, on the contrary, speech came from song. To be convinced of this a glance at the animal world is sufficient.
Up to this point the theory of language has been biological, and the acquired facts can thus be summed up: 1, Man does not express his thought in order to communicate it, but he communicates because he expresses it. 2, What is first expressed is emotion, not thought. By degrees language becomes intellectualized, as the mental life itself. 3, Expression is spontaneous and primary. It arises from the relation between the nervous and muscular systems. In the progressive transformation where, from being involuntary, the signs gradually become voluntary, they are at once causes and effects.
The essential condition for this transformation to take place is social life. Undoubtedly, language appears very quickly, as soon as individuals of the same species find themselves in constant relations with one another. Each one learns to attribute the character of signs to the movements which accompany his emotions. Similar beings in whom the same phenomena take place, become equally capable of interpreting those signs. From this moment a language is born; and this is true for the animal species as for man. But human evolution follows an evolution which is peculiar to itself, and which determines that of language. Our language would not have far exceeded the period in which it especially expresses emotions, if human societies had remained purely domestic groupings, without any other organisation than that of the family. “The institution of human language,” says Comte, “appears, in sociology, as the chief continuous instrument of the necessary reaction of political upon domestic life.”[220]
Henceforth we can picture to ourselves, in its broad outlines, the prehistoric evolution of language. Originally it comprised gestures and cries. Gestures predominated in the first place as being more immediately expressive. By degrees they took a second place. As the natural signs became divided up so as to become artificial, the superiority of vocal signs appeared. Among other reasons it was due to the “spontaneous correspondence” between the voice and hearing which allows everyone to develop his own education. We hear young children practising for long hours, playing with the articulate sounds which they begin to emit. From this more or less organised singing, still a melody of vocal signs, poetry was born. Finally from poetry, much later, springs, what is commonly called prose, that is, the use of non-rhythmic phrases. Three great evolutions in the history of humanity: how many centuries have not been required for their accomplishment!
Writing is to drawing what speaking is to singing. Originally it was not an artifice invented to help vocal language. Here again the ideological theory aggravates the part played by reflection. Man was obeying an instinct when by drawing he reproduced the familiar objects which met his gaze, occupied his imagination, and caused his strongest and most frequent emotions. Gradually, these spontaneous endeavours at imitation assumed the character of signs, became divided up and simplified, and finally were co-ordinated with vocal sounds which themselves had gone through a separate evolution.
Thus language and art have a common origin, which is the æsthetic, that is to say, the affective expression. Comte does not separate these two terms. He takes the word “æsthetic” at once in its etymological and in its modern sense. Our movements, at first involuntary, then voluntary, translate our impressions and react upon them, because they spring from them; that is the humble source from which everything else is derived. With animals it only gives rise to inarticulate vocal sounds, and to a more or less expressive mimicry. In man, it is the principle of language and of art. The latter begins by being a simple imitation. Then the reproduction of objects is perfected. It becomes more faithful “by bringing out better the chief features which were at first obscured by an empirical mixture.” “Idealisation” consists in this. Finally “expression” properly so called is developed, and “style.”[221]
Thus, if we call language the whole of the means suitable for the transmission beyond ourselves of our various impressions, this whole forms a system in which the most customary and least expressive portion, language, was at first mingled with the portion which bears the name of art, taking art in its most primitive elements: song and drawing. These two parts became differentiated in evolution. Our social requirements have continually increased the use and extension of the vocal and visual signs which are made use of in active life and in speculative thought. These signs have become simpler and simpler and even abstract: to such an extent that their origin ended by being considered the result of a convention.[222]
The primitive parentage of language and of art accounts for many facts which current theories do not explain. For instance, language is not only created but preserved by the people. Grammarians, “even more absurd than logicians,”[223] in general have understood nothing about it. Their claim to authority is amusing. But it is to popular spontaneity, at once conservative and progressive, that our languages owe their admirable rectitude. The basis of each language collects what is essential and universal in the æsthetic evolution of humanity. Hence the magic charm of poetry, the most ancient of all the arts. Words possess a power of evoking images from which the artist draws inexhaustible effects. Often during the long childhood of human reason even the power of words must have seemed to be supernatural: Nomina Numina. By dint of considering language as ideologists and logicians, we have forgotten that its nature is emotional and æsthetic. However, even to-day the mysterious power of words has not disappeared. How great is the action of forms of prayer on tender souls, even when faith has deserted them! Next to action itself, language is the most powerful of the exciting causes of feeling, and religions are well aware of this fact. They know how to make use of it to conquer or to retain souls.