III.
Every new philosophical doctrine is in general guided by a double tendency. At the same time it seeks to establish its originality and to find out its antecedents. In order to reach the former result, it criticises preceding and contemporary doctrines, and shows that, better than any of the others, it succeeds in “summing up experience.” But, at the same time, it discovers a pedigree for itself in history which is never very difficult to establish.
Like the others, positive philosophy fulfils this twofold requirement, in such measure, however, as its particular nature and the definition of its object reasonably allow. Properly speaking, it does not undertake to refute the metaphysical systems which it deems itself destined to replace. Those systems in refuting positive philosophy, are faithful to their principle; and positive philosophy is faithful to its own principle in not following their example. It suffices for it to “locate” them in the general evolution of the human mind, and to show, according to this law of evolution, how the very necessity which brought them into being is also the cause of their disappearance. Their office is fulfilled, their part is ended. It matters little that they should seek to prolong an ebbing existence; cases of survival may slacken the rate of progress, but they are powerless to arrest it. And so positive philosophy is the only one which can be perfectly just towards its adversaries. “It ceases,” says Comte, “being critical in regard to the whole of the past.” In order to be established, it does not require to combat and to supplant the philosophies which have preceded it. With itself, it places all doctrines in history. It substitutes the historical genesis to abstract dialectics.
Undoubtedly Comte recognises a long series of his precursors properly so-called, in the double line of philosophers and scientific men who have contributed to the progress of the positive spirit from Aristotle and Archimedes to Condorcet and Gall. But positive philosophy, none the less, looks upon itself as heir to all the philosophies, even to those which are most opposed to its principle. For they, like the others, have been necessary moments in the progress which was to end in the positive system.
Thus considered in its relation to the metaphysical speculation which preceded it, this system does not refute it, for it is neither necessary nor even possible for it to do so. Neither does it incorporate it within itself, for it could not do so without a formal contradiction. Still, according to Comte’s own confession, it proceeds from metaphysics as much as from science properly so-called. In what then does this relation consist, if positive philosophy neither opposes nor adopts previous doctrines?—It transposes them. What its predecessors had studied from the absolute point of view, it projects upon the relative plane.
As we proceeded we have noted more than one of these transpositions. It may perhaps not be useless to make a recapitulation of them here, without, however, claiming for it perfect completeness.
| Metaphysical Philosophy. | Positive Transpositions. | |
|---|---|---|
| I. Distinction between potentiality and reality. | I. Distinction between the statical and the dynamical points of view, or between order and progress. | |
| II. Principle of finality. | II. Principle of the conditions of existence. | |
| III. Theory of innateness. | III. Definition of human nature as immutable, evolution creating nothing, but bringing out the latent potentialities in that nature. | |
| IV. The idea of the universe. | IV. The idea of the world. | |
| V. All the phenomena of the universe are related to one another. | V. The idea of humanity is the only really universal conception, because the conditions of existence of human societies are in a necessary relation, not only with the laws of our organisation, but also with all the physical and chemical laws of our planet, and the mechanical laws of the solar system. | |
| VI. The Aristotelian theory of science, (knowledge through causes, a priori), and Cartesian theory, (deductive knowledge starting from the simple). | VI. Science consists in substituting rational prevision to the empirical establishment of facts. | |
| VII. The principles of mathematics are synthetical a priori propositions. (Kant). | VII. Geometry and mechanics are natural sciences, and pure analysis can never establish their principles. | |
| VIII. The order of the universe is the basis of moral order: (Stoics, Spinoza, Leibnitz). | VIII. The conduct of man is regulated externally by the whole of the laws of the world in which he lives. | |
| IX. The history of humanity is directed by a providential wisdom. | IX. The evolution of humanity is accomplished according to a law. | |
| X. The notion of a natural law does not necessarily imply a mechanism. | X. The various orders of natural phenomena are irreducible and nevertheless convergent, the real becoming richer at each new degree. | |
| XI. Theory of the immortality of the soul. | XI. Theory of the “subjective existence,” or of survival in the consciousness of others. | |
| XII. Rational theology. | XII. The positive science of Humanity. |
This list might easily be prolonged. Once again it shows us that, in the history of philosophy as in history in general, the result of the most apparently radical revolutions is not so much to abolish as to transform. Thus, Kant’s philosophy might seem to be entirely opposed to that of Leibnitz. Yet we see that the metaphysics of Leibnitz is to be found almost in its entirety in Kant. Of this dogmatic philosophy Kant has preserved the doctrine. He only rejected its dogmatism; which, as a matter of fact, was of capital importance. In the same way, positive philosophy has often been presented as the formal negation of the philosophy which preceded it. When we verify this, we nearly always find them both concerned with the same problems, and often reaching analogous solutions. Here again it is only a question of transposition; an extremely serious one it is true, on account of all that it implies.
Errors of interpretation are very often due to a lack of historical perspective. Once they have been formulated and adopted by current opinion they are difficult to rectify. Time is needed in order that beneath superficial differences, deep seated resemblances may appear. During many years Kant was in all sincerity looked upon as a sceptic in France. Those who criticised him could not conceive how any one could give up metaphysical dogmatism, without at the same time abandoning the doctrines which had been cast in the metaphysical form before Kant. In the same way, in the eyes of most of his adversaries, Comte’s system must have appeared as the very negation of philosophy, because the terms “philosophy” and “relative” seemed incompatible to them. But this system, which is an effort to realise, from the point of view of positive science, the unity of the understanding, and the “perfect logical coherence,” in reality ends by putting the traditional problems of philosophy in a form suitable to the spirit of our age.