IV.
What place must we assign to this positive ethics, in the usual classification of ethical doctrines? It is often considered as a theory of the moral sentiment. And, as a matter of fact, Comte himself characterises his ethics by “the direct preponderance of the social feeling.” In its origin also it belongs to this group. Comte makes use of Adam Smith and of Hume, when he affirms the existence of inborn altruistic tendencies within the soul. He indicates these tendencies, in his Cerebral Table, under the general name of “sympathy,” which comes from the Scottish school. Establish these altruistic feelings, he says, and morality is given, take them away, and morality disappears.
But these philosophers did not push analysis any further. They neglected to inquire how morality is developed in fact, although the altruistic tendencies are less powerful than the others. Comte reproaches the ethics of the Scottish school with its superficial character and its lack of systematic strictness. He praises their psychology which is less incomplete than that of their contemporaries; he is not satisfied with their theory of human activity. If the existence of sympathetic inclinations is a fact, their evolution must none the less be explained. The latter only becomes intelligible through the continued action of the objective order upon the soul of man, an action which becomes all the more decisive as man becomes more conscious of it, by the discovery of the laws of nature.
Thus, in order to give an account of human morality, Comte adds a rational element to the feeling-elements. Undoubtedly it is not an a priori element. But it is that which for Comte is the substitute of the a priori in metaphysical doctrines: that is the invariableness of the laws of phenomena, which makes the world intelligible. From the speculative point of view this intelligibility, under the name of “the principle of laws,” is the basis of our science. From the practical point of view, the order of the world alone can guarantee the lasting harmony of our inclinations. In this way it becomes the foundation of morality.
In spite of the more than evident differences of all kinds which separate Comte from Malebranche and from Leibnitz, it then appears that in his philosophy as in theirs, the idea of order is made use of to pass from the domain of knowledge to that of action. Undoubtedly, with Comte, from theological or metaphysical this idea has become positive. He does not intend to go beyond experience, and affirms nothing which cannot be verified as a fact. But, like the philosophers his predecessors, he is none the less anxious to find the unity of the soul beneath the diversity of its modes of activity, and to show that theoretical reason and practical reason are one and the same. Malebranche solved the problem by appealing to the idea of divine perfection, expressed everywhere by order. Comte explains that the pressure exercised by external order generates order in our mind (which moreover collaborates in it), then, as a consequence, in our feelings and finally in our actions. The stoics had already said something similar on this subject. Briefly, Comte’s ethics may be presented as the positive form of the ethics of universal order.
Shall we then say that, being sentimental and rational at once, this morality is not definite in character? Is it merely an eclectic attempt at conciliation?—Eclecticism in a certain sense would not frighten Comte. Positive philosophy flatters itself on being just in regard to its predecessors. It takes pleasure in praising each of them for the portion of truth which it contains. But, in the present case there is no occasion for it to be eclectic. It suffices for it to be relative, and, since it is a question of moral and social things, to appeal to history. Thus we see that the sentimental and the rational principles in no way exclude each other. From the historical point of view, that is to say, if we consider the genesis of morality, the latter finds birth in the sympathetic feelings which man, like many other animals, experiences, and which are spontaneously developed in domestic affection and in social life. How is it that subsequently this morality evolves, that friendly relations grow indefinitely in relative importance, in spite of the inborn strength of selfishness, that humanity, in a word, should gradually rise above animality? Without any doubt, that is due to the development of intelligence, itself bound up with the efforts which man is obliged to make to adapt himself to the “milieu” in which he lives.
Instinctive in its animal origin, morality becomes rational in its human evolution. We can say as much of language, of art, of science, and even of religion. All this was in embryo in the primitive nature of man, since nothing absolutely new ever appears in it. All this only manifested itself under pressure from external order, which, consciously or unconsciously, is always being exercised. Only when we know this order, we can make use of our science to turn the natural forces to our own ends, which in themselves are rational. It is in this way that systematic morality is substituted to spontaneous morality.
If we were more intelligent, says Comte, it would be equivalent to our being more moral. Understanding better the intimate connection which in a thousand ways, at every moment, binds each one of us to the whole of our fellows, we should more surely observe the precept: “Live for others.” And, if we were more moral, it would be equivalent to our being more intelligent. We would then act precisely as a more open and a deeper intelligence than our own would lead us to act. Now, we cannot become more moral by an immediate modification of our inclinations. Positive psychology has established that we exercise no direct action upon the affective part of our nature. But we can endeavour to become more intelligent: every successful effort that we make to understand the order of nature affords us the means of making fresh attempts.[332] In this indirect manner morality can grow. Finally, it grows still more surely, when the intellect has understood that it does not contain its end within itself, that it must be subordinated to the heart, and that the only happiness compatible with the nature of man is found in devotion and in love.
[CHAPTER II]
SOCIAL ETHICS
“Live for others”: such is the supreme formula of positive ethics. Feeling bears witness to its justice; science discloses its far-reaching importance and its deep consequences. But this formula is not only applied in a general way to the natural society formed by men among themselves, a society in which Comte even includes animals capable of affection and of devotion, whose services deserve our gratitude. The moral law finds a precise application in the definite relations established among men by civic society, that is to say in the rights and in the mutual duties of individuals. If it be true that ethics and politics are distinct from each other, politics is none the less closely subordinated to ethics. The spiritual power does not govern; however it directs those who govern as well as those who are governed. It is this power which gives to all the sum of common beliefs and feelings which enable Society to live. Thus to ethics belongs the task of determining the principles according to which positive politics will regulate the relations between men.
Now, as a matter of fact, these relations are in a very unsettled condition to-day. Public order is unstable, revolutions are frequent, suffering is excessive. Are we to lay the blame upon public institutions? They are rather an effect than a cause. In order to understand the present condition it is necessary to grasp the law of the general evolution of humanity, and in particular that of European Society. It then becomes apparent that the actual disturbances proceed from the great conflict inaugurated by the French revolution. This conflict is still going on. The old régime has not yet quite disappeared, and the régime which is to take its place is not yet organised. The struggle is prolonged between the theologico-metaphysical spirit and the positive spirit, between revealed belief which is becoming weaker and demonstrated belief which is being formed, and finally between the old economic landmarks and an industrial activity whose laws have not yet been discovered.
The relations between masters and workmen are at the present time “anarchical.” The advance of industry, as it grows, oppresses the majority of those whose co-operation in it is indispensable. And the ever more strongly marked division between “brains and hands” is far more due to the political incapacity, the social thoughtlessness, and especially to the blind selfishness of the masters than to the inordinate demands of the workmen.[333] The capitalists have not dreamt of organising a liberal education for the people to defend it against the seductions of the revolutionary propaganda. They seem to fear that the people should receive instruction. As far as they can, they take the place of the ancient chiefs whose social rank they covet. But they do not inherit their generosity. They do not understand that “noblesse oblige.” In this way the great masters of industry too often tend to utilise their political influence to the detriment of the public, to appropriate important monopolies and to take the advantage of the power of capital to make the claims of the masters predominate over those of the workers, without any regard for equity, since the right of coalition which is allowed to the former is refused to the latter.
Comte saw the bourgeoisie at work during Louis-Philippe’s reign, and he passes severe judgment upon it. Its political conceptions, he says, refer not to the aim and exercise of power, but especially to its possession. It regards the revolution as terminated by the establishment of the parliamentary régime, whereas this is only an “equivocal halting place.” A complete social reorganisation is not less feared by this middle class than by the old upper classes. Although filled with the critical spirit of the XVIII. century, even under a Republican form it would prolong a system of theological hypocrisy, by means of which the respectful submission of the masses is insured, while no strict duty is imposed upon the leaders.[334] This is hard upon the proletariat, whose condition is far from improving. It “establishes dungeons for those who ask for bread.”[335] It believes that these millions of men will be able to remain indefinitely “encamped” in modern society without being properly settled in it with definite and respected rights.[336] The capital which it holds in its hands, after having been an instrument of emancipation, has become one of oppression. It is thus that, by a paradox difficult to uphold, the invention of machinery, which a priori, one would be led to believe, would soften the condition of the proletariat, has, on the contrary, been a new cause of suffering to them, and has made their lot a doubly hard one.[337]
Here, in brief, we have a formidable indictment against the middle classes, and in particular against the political economy which has nourished them. Comte has in view sometimes the classical economists of the end of the XVIII. century, sometimes their orthodox successors in the XIX. Those of the XVIII. he regards as having collaborated in the great revolutionary work. They took part in the diffusion of critical doctrines and of negative philosophy. In this capacity they have, no doubt, rendered certain services. They contributed to the decomposition of the old régime. Political economy had succeeded in convincing the governments themselves of their unfitness to direct the commercial and industrial movement.[338]
The affinities between the philosophers and the economists of the XVIII. century are evident enough: is it necessary to recall the spirit of “individualism” of the economists, and their characteristic tendency to restrict the functions of government as much as possible? Despite the efforts of a great number among them, conservatives by temperament or by political tendencies, the logical consequences of their principles were bound to come to light. Thus “the superfluity of all regular moral teaching, the suppression of all official encouragement of science and the fine arts; even the recent attacks against the fundamental institution of property find their origin in economical metaphysics.” It was with this doctrine as with the other parts of negative philosophy; after having accomplished its work of destruction, it sought to transform its critical principles into organic ones, without realising that this amounted to repudiating beforehand any positive organisation.
The famous formula, “Laissez faire, laissez passer,” is no more a real principle in political economy than liberty itself is one in politics properly so-called. Comte vigorously opposes the dogma of non-intervention. Because in some particular and secondary cases political economy has ascertained “the natural tendencies of societies in the direction of a certain necessary order, it concluded from this that any special institution is useless.” But this order is extremely imperfect. The knowledge of sociological laws will give us the power of improving it, as we already do in the case of medicine and surgery. Merely to admit the degree of order which is spontaneously established in practice is equivalent to “a solemn dismissal in the case of every difficulty which arises.” Look at the social crisis brought about by the development of machinery. In reply to the just and urgent claims of the workmen suddenly deprived of their means of livelihood, and unable in a day to find another, our economists can only repeat, “with merciless pedantry,” their barren aphorism about absolute industrial liberty. To all complaints they dare to answer that it is a question of time! And this to men who require food to-day! “Such a theory proclaims its own social impotence.”[339]
And so neither is political economy a science yet, nor, so far, are economists men of science. Originally being nearly all barristers or men of letters, they were strangers to the idea of scientific observation, to the precise notion of a natural law, and finally to the sense of what constitutes a demonstration. If we make an exception of Adam Smith and of a few others, how could they apply the positive method which they did not know to the most difficult cases of analysis? Destutt de Tracy placed political economy between logic and ethics. And this was not without reason: for it is nearer to metaphysics than to positive science. In it, work preserves its personal character, schools contend with each other, the discussions as to the elementary notions of value, of utility, etc., savour of scholasticism. The very idea of studying economical phenomena separately is not scientific, since the various “social series” are interdependent, and since in sociology more particular laws depend upon more general laws.[340] There is no scientific study of economical facts unless we first look at them from the sociological point of view. We can no more isolate the laws which regulate the material existence of societies than we can describe man as an essentially calculating being, only actuated by the motive of personal interest.
The same objections naturally hold good against the adversaries of the economists, since, in general, socialists and communists have confined themselves to an analogous conception of their science. However, while criticising them, Comte recognises the fact that they have established some truths. Everything they say is not false. Thus, they justly claim the right for the government to intervene in economical relations. And, if it be absurd to wish to abolish private property, as certain sects demanded, it is very true that property is of a social nature, and that it is necessary to regulate it.[341] To endow it with an absolute character is, says Comte, an “anti-social” theory. No property can be created, nor even transmitted, by its mere possessor without the concurrence of society. Thus always and everywhere the community has intervened in the exercise of the right of property. The tax makes the public a partner in every private fortune.
In discussing the essential problems of property, the communists (whom Comte confuses with the socialists), to-day render an important service. The very dangers called forth by the solution they propose concur in fixing the general attention upon this great subject, “without which the metaphysical empiricism and the aristocratic selfishness of the leading classes would cause it to be set aside or disdained.” Merely to state the problem without the solution with which the communists associate it, would not suffice. Our weak intellect does not fasten upon a question for long, unless a reply to it, be it true or false, which we must accept or reject is forthcoming at the same time. Moreover, are the communist “aberrations” more useless, and at bottom, more dangerous than the current illusion according to which the Revolution is ended by the establishment of the parliamentary régime?[342]
But, this being admitted the innovating schools have all fallen into grave mistakes. In general, being devoid of the historic sense, and on the other hand, ignoring the principles of social statics, they do not see that man’s action upon social phenomena is only usefully exercised within certain limits. The idea that a revolution can, in a moment, transform the régime of property and all the social conditions which depend upon it is destined to disappear, when the “positive mode of thought” shall have extended to the social phenomena in the same way as it has to all others. Then the “extravagant proposals” of the socialists will find no adherents, and the demand for what is recognised as impossible will no longer be made by anyone.[343]
Finally, Comte reproaches communism with its tendency to restrain individuality. This objection, coming from him, is remarkable, for it has very often been made in his own case. As an organiser of despotism, John Stuart Mill has compared him to Ignatius of Loyola. But Comte reminds us that, according to him, the collective organism, or society, differs from the individual organisms, or living beings, by the fact that in it the elements live an independent life. The problem consists in conciliating, as much as possible, this free division with the convergence of the activities. Neither of the two must be sacrificed to the other. To restrain individualities would tend to destroy the dignity of man by doing away with his responsibility, while the want of independence, and the subjection to a community indifferent to him would make life intolerable. “Such is the immense danger of all utopias which sacrifice real liberty to an anarchical equality, or even to an exaggerated fraternity.”[344] On this point, positive philosophy on its own account takes up again the “decisive criticism” of communism made by our economists.