FOOTNOTES:
[107] Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that, if you deny it, no speech is either significant or trustworthy to inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumerable examples both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he proceeded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive information by speech, nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he declares to co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech, and simply pointed with his finger."—Grote's Aristotle, vol. ii. pp. 297, 298.
[108] Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803): Man is made to be the plaything of God.
[109] "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."—Pope.
[110] For further details respecting Rámánuja and his system, see Wilson's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix. The Tattva-muktávalí was printed in the Pandit for September 1871; but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.
CHAPTER V.
THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.
Ánanda-tírtha (Púrṇa-prajña, or Madhva) rejected this same Rámánuja system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences, dependency upon the Pañcha-rátra, the reality of plurality in the universe, and so forth,—yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., it coincides with the tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul, That art thou, and a number of other texts of the Upanishads bear a different import under a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a new explication of the Brahma-Mímáṇsá (or Vedánta).
For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattva-viveka:—
"Independent and dependent, two principles are received;
"The independent is Vishṇu the Lord, exempt from imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."
Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vádins): Why predicate of the absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upanishads, which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and heterogeneity, and of all plurality in itself? To this be it replied: Not so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as contradictory of many proofs positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity; perception, for example, in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. The opponent will rejoin: Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite? The former alternative will not hold: for without a cognition of the thing and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be asked, Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended? It cannot be thus preceded, for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw (apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference); for cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and the cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference; the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let the reply be as follows:—Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes? In the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable Bráhman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart; but if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere; this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart; for example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or contrasted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vishṇu-tattva-nirṇaya: "Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if difference were proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real predicament (or ultimate entity). For this reason (viz., because difference is a thing) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word cow. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a presentation of difference; for the absence of any manifestation of, and judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the same) obstructives (as hinder the perception of other things), viz., aggregation of similars and the rest." Thus it has been said (in the Sáṅkhya-káriká, v. vii.)—
"From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from defect in the organs, from instability of the common sensory,
"From subtilty, from interposition, from being overpowered, and from aggregation of similars."
There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness; of collyrium applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity; of lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common sensory; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility; of things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition; of the light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being overpowered; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of similars.
Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no harm is done; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing progression to infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and say that two things are different as differenced from the different. Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference, for there being no difference to serve as the example in such inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being, then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no trouble.
Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has been said:—
"Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,
"And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence all that they desire."
Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vádins) in their thirst to be one with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishṇu is like a mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishṇu they must enter into the hell of blind darkness (andha-tamasa). The same thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the Mahábhárata-tátparya-nirṇaya:—
"O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishṇu's anger is waxed great;
"He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they decide blindly."
This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised into (1.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of names, (3.) worship.
Of these, (1.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon oneself) of the weapons of Náráyaṇa (or Vishṇu) as a memorial of him, and as a means of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel of the Sákalya-samhitá:—
"The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal Vishṇu, which is the might of the gods,
"He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuṇṭha) which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into:
"The discus Sudarśana by which, uplifted in his arm, the gods entered that heaven;
"Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the world, that weapon Bráhmans wear (stamped upon them);
"Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of Vishṇu;
"Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishṇu), let us become beatified."
Again, the Taittiríyaka Upanishad says: "He whose body is not branded, is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The particular parts to be branded are specified in the Ágneya-puráṇa:—
"On his right hand let the Bráhman wear Sudarśana,
"On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the Veda declared."
In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being branded with the discus:—
"Sudarśana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,
"Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting way of Vishṇu.
"Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the hand of Vishṇu,
"Adored by all the gods; O Páṅchajanya, to thee be adoration."
(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such names as Keśava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme Lord.
(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1.) veracity, (2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; with the body, (5.) alms-giving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; with the common sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and (10.) faith. Worship is the dedication to Náráyaṇa of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has been said:—
"Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is of ten kinds."
Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as: "All rejoice over truth attained; truthful, and celebrating the gift of the divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know the truth, O Bráhman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."
Again:—
"After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,
"In creation they are not born again, in retractation they perish not" (Bhagavad-gítá, xiv. 2).
According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."
Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the absolute; for this text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping a Bráhman devoutly a Śúdra becomes a Bráhman, i.e., becomes exalted.
If any one urge that according to the text:—
"If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end,"
this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined; it may be replied: What you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning; for the real meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt, come to an end; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a fivefold dual universe; and it is not non-existent, because it is mere illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue of the testimony of many such passages as:—
"The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,
"The originant, ideation,—thus is thy will called, O Infinite.
"The originant, because it originates greatly; ideation, because it produces ideas;
"The illusion of Hari, who is called a, is termed (avidyá) ignorance:
"Styled (máyá) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for the name máyá is used of the pre-eminent;
"The excellent knowledge of Vishṇu is called, though one only, by these names;
"For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised by spontaneous beatitude."
That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects sustentation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained, therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible, illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).
If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated, the answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality, Vishṇu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior. Accordingly, the grand revelation:—
"A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference between the unsentient and the Lord,
"A difference among souls, and a difference of the unsentient and the soul each from the other.
"Also the difference of unsentient things from one another, the world with its five divisions.
"This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had a beginning it would have an end:
"Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not illusorily imagined:
"For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never ceases.
"That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those that lack knowledge;
"For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known and sustained by Vishṇu."
The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme excellence of Vishṇu. With this in view the Lord declared:—
"Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and the imperishable;
"The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the unmodified.
"The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme Spirit,
"Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three worlds.
"Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent than the imperishable (soul),
"Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best of persons (Purushottama);
"He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he all-knowing worships me in every wise.
"Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless (Arjuna):
"Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he has to do, O Bhárata" (Bhagavad-gítá, xv. 16-20).
So in the Mahá-varáha—
"The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme spouse of Śrī;
"Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity must be subordinate."
It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme excellence of Vishṇu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men, according to the text of the Bhállaveya Upanishad: While merit, wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal; therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. And emancipation is not won without the grace of Vishṇu, according to the text of the Náráyaṇa Upanishad: Through whose grace is the highest state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration, while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated; the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated from this snare of works. According also to the words of the Vishṇu-puráṇa—
"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won? Enough of all wealth and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of emancipation."
And it is declared that the grace of Vishṇu is won only through the knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality. Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of the real purport.
"The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally unknown,
"The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these be one?"
And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand revelation:—
"The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either similarity of cognition,
"Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the place of the individual;
"Not essential unity, for even when it is emancipated it is different,
"The difference being independence and completeness (in the Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the individual spirit)."
Or to propose another explanation of the text, Átmá tat tvam asi, That art thou, it may be divided, átmá tat tvam asi. He alone is soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art not-that (atat) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said:—
"Or the division may be Atat tvam, and thus unity will be well got rid of."
According, therefore, to the Tattva-váda-rahasya, the words in the nine examples (in the Chhándogya Upanishad), He like a bird tied with a string, &c., teach unity with the view of giving an example of non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopanishad:—
"Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various trees;
"Like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water;
"Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy;
"So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.
"Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form, the supreme Hari
"Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the individual spirit, though he is its actuator;
"On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated: otherwise he is bound."
And again—
"Brahmá, Śiva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the decay of their bodies;
"Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is for the sustentation of Lakshmí.
"By reason of all his attributes, independence, power, knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,
"All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to him."
And again:—
"Knowing Vishṇu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted from transmigration,
"Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.
"Vishṇu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme ruler.
"Obedient to him are they for ever; he is the Lord."
That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is known or not known; and as when the father the cause is known, a man knows the son; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior and the effect is known). Otherwise (on the doctrine of the Advaita-vádins that the world is false and illusory) the words one and lump in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is made of clay is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of clay recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, modification, name, clay (or other determinate object),—these alone are real, cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the words name and alone would be otiose. There is no proof anywhere, then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.
Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness permanent or transitory? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the author of the Nyáya-nirváṇa: The proof of the permanence of the transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism. And in the Tárkika-rakshá—
"When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such, or not such and such,
"The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is called Nitya-sama."
With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is stated in the Prabodha-siddhi: Equality of characteristic modes results from significancy. If it be said, This then is a valid rejoinder, we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold, general and particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma in question (viz., Is the statement that the world is unreal itself true or false? &c.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.
If you reply: We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.
The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to be desired to be known, is as follows:—The word then is allowed to purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the qualification (of the aspirant). The word hence indicates a reason.
Accordingly it is stated in the Gáruḍa-puráṇa:—
"All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence regularly; what then is the reason of this?
"And what is the sense of those words, O sage? Why are those the most excellent?
"Tell me this, Brahmá, that I may know it truly."
Thus addressed by Nárada, the most excellent Brahmá replied:—
"The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and in an auspicious sense,
"And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."
It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute, because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Náráyana, and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of the second aphorism): From which the genesis, and so forth, of this. The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which result emanation, sustentation, and retractation; according to the words of the Skanda-puráṇa—
"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, knowledge, involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;"
and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these. The evidence adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upanishads. Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the Kaurma-puráṇa—
"Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case
"Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of evidence;
"Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by revelation and tradition,
"Acquires the rank of probation, about this there can be no hesitation."
What a Śástra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in the Skanda-puráṇa:—
"The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sáma-veda, the Atharva-veda, the Mahábhárata, the Pañcha-rátra, and the original Rámáyaṇa, are called Śástras.
"That also which is conformable to these is called Śástra.
"Any aggregate of composition other than this is a heterodoxy."
According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view, viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected: for as there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it has said:—
"I ever laud Náráyaṇa, the one being to be known from genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."
It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, Brahman). (The fourth aphorism is): But that is from the construction. In regard to this, the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the construction, in the Bṛihat-saṃhitá:—
"Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit, eulogy, and demonstration, are the marks by which the purport is ascertained."
It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What remains may be sought from the Ánandatírtha-bháshya-vyákhyána (or exposition of the Commentary of Ánanda-tírtha). We desist for fear of giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was promulgated by Púrṇa-prajña Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the third incarnation of Váyu:—
"The first was Hanumat, the second Bhíma,
"The third Púrṇa-prajña, the worker of the work of the Lord."
After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the following stanza at the conclusion of his work:—
"That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the text of the Veda, sufficiently
"Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the splendour of the Veda;
"The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to the words of Ráma (Hanumat); the second was Bhíma;
"By this Madhva, who is the third, this book has been composed in regard to Keśava."
The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic texts.
The purport of this is that Vishṇu is the principle above all others in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[111]
A. E. G.