CHAPTER VII. The Evolution of Free Will.
Two distinct theories may be held by the Evolutionist with respect to volition, both of them being strictly causational, and, therefore, of a scientific, as opposed to a mystical character.
He may hold, in the first place, the double aspect theory pure and simple, according to which all developments of mind are merely dependent concomitants of the development of nerve ramifications, with consequent growths of nerve-cells, ganglions, and the more considerable nerve plexuses, culminating in the growth of a brain. This evolution of a nervous and cerebral system he may hold to be wholly due to the action of molecular and other motions upon a mass of colloid substances of such a constitution as to be fittest, under the action of these external stimuli, to form lines for the transmission of motions and for the discharge of these motions into certain otherwise formed contractile structures called muscles. He will consider that they eventually acquire a power of retaining these motions, so that the effect of all the motions thus caused is not immediate but deferred. And since all motions received are not immediately concerned with the welfare of the organism, he may suppose that separate masses of nervous matter are produced, in which these motions are stored in an organised form, related indirectly rather than directly to the motor apparatus. According to this theory the whole system of determining causes is purely physical. In the simple organisms the response of muscular action to incident motions is quick, direct, and unhesitating. Such action is called reflex or automatic, and is as unconscious as chemical activity. But when the system becomes more complex, when nerves cross each other, when cells and junctions are formed, and more particularly when the storages of motions are formed, as just referred to; then compoundings and recompoundings of nervous motions take place, and, according to the strength of the various currents, to the facility of discharge, and to various physical local or general conditions, the action becomes slower and more hesitating. Under these circumstances, it is held that the nervous system becomes conscious. A double aspect then arises, and the actions which thereafter take place may be described either in terms of the relations of the various molecular motions in the nervous and cerebral systems, or in terms of feeling; but all the same the latter is merely the secondary aspect of series of changes altogether determined by the motions and structure of the former. On this theory memory is the revived motion of a nerve structure; feeling is a consciousness of interaction between different nerve motions; trains of thought are the reverberations of great varieties of motions throughout the system and brain; consciousness resulting from the mingling of the nerve currents and the consequent conflict and retardation of effects.
The element of mystery here lies in the secondary or subjective aspect, but it is placed strictly without the line of deduction and is a merely unexplained accompaniment of a series of changes otherwise fully accounted for.
A second theory—as strictly causational as the former—recognises the presence of a subjective factor. In some of the quotations from Mr. Spencer's "Psychology," given above, it will have been seen that, at the point of development of nerve junctions when different currents meet in the developed ganglion and in proportion as the system becomes more complex, Mr. Spencer asserts not only the rise of a secondary aspect, but of an additional factor. The element of mystery here is the entrance of this additional factor, capable of taking part as an active agent in the affairs of the organism. But since it is itself the result of experience and the organization of experiences of the physical nervous system, it is strictly of a causational or deductive order, and after its unexplained inception, it has to be studied strictly in the scientific order of development and action. Notwithstanding that it plays a part in the conduct of life, and notwithstanding that its dependence upon physical organization and development is so intimate, and that this development again cannot be understood without it—notwithstanding all this incomprehensibleness of relation and our ignorance of its origin, the Evolutionist maintains the orderly development of organism and actions, including the subjective as resultants of the relations of original factors, although he may be for the time being ignorant of the nature of the processes.
It will therefore be seen that in either case he holds the deterministic theory of volition, and believes all purposed actions to be actions determined by pre-existing causes, whether he regards these causes as the structure and condition of nerve centres, or as feelings and thoughts, or whether he regards them as ascribable to some law of correlation between the two.
Nevertheless, it seems to be incumbent upon all writers dealing with the subject of Ethics to define their position as to the Free Will controversy. It is needless to say that we accept unreservedly the deterministic theory, though it may be necessary to attempt its reconciliation with the consciousness in persons of Free Will.
We here make a distinction between theories of Will and theories of Free Will. What we have just been considering have been theories of will or volition. They are of the deterministic order because in either case the actions are wholly determined by preceding facts. Human and all actions of organisms are held to be merely resultants of pre-existing factors and their relations. This is the theory held by all scientific philosophers, and the one most analogous to what we know of physical science as well as most in conformity with actual experience of human conduct. Another theory—arising no doubt in the mystery of the secondary aspect or in the mystery of the origin of the subjective factor, denies the rigidity of the scientific order, and asserts the presence and activity of a self-determining factor, thus placing volitional action beyond the scientific order of the dependent and related successions of cause and effect.
Perhaps, however, we would be more correct in attributing the confidence with which this theory of a self-determining power is sometimes held to another cause. There is in all human beings the consciousness of a power more or less developed to regulate their own actions; and this process of self-regulation is held to be inconsistent with the deterministic theory. There can be no doubt that there is such a consciousness and we think there can be no doubt also that there is such a power. The superficial evolutionist, indeed, may admit the consciousness, which he may explain as a secondary aspect of conflicting nerve-currents, and laugh in his sleeve at the egotistic vanity of a trustful man proud of his power of Will. But we think a deeper explanation, and one more commensurate with the phenomena, is to be found: and this brings us back to the distinction, as indicated at the outset of this section, between theories of Will or Volition, and theories of Free Will or the power of regulating one's own conduct.
Will, in its scientific sense, is merely volition, i.e. the mental state accompanying or immediately preceding action. The nature of the action, good, bad, or indifferent, is immaterial. Technically speaking, all volitions are equal, viewed as such. The volition for the time being is the Will for the time being. The Will of a man is the totality of his volitions during the whole of his lifetime. It is a general or collective term relating to conscious actions, or states of consciousness immediately preceding actions, and is not the name of an entity.
But if Will is the volition for the time being, irrespective of any qualitative characteristic, then we have to inquire as to the applicability to it of the term "Free." Now this term is antithetical to the two terms "restrained" and "constrained." Thus if a man's actions are hindered or forcefully prevented by the Will of others, that man's actions are not free. But if some of a man's motives are restrained or his actions constrained by the predominance of some other of his motives—as, for instance, when he performs actions which his conscience tells him are wrong—in his Will not free? The actions are his volitions. If some motives are restrained, and therefore not to be considered free, still the others which have gained the predominance have thereby become his Will; their operation proves their non-restraint or freedom, and the volition or Will is still free. The action is an evidence of freedom. Volition is always free. It is of different kinds, but this does not affect the conclusion that volition proves its own freedom. The Will is always and under all circumstances free.
But although this disposes of the question theoretically, the ordinary man remains unconvinced, and clings to his belief in a Free Will, which is not merely this technical and universal Free Will, but must be interpreted as a power he feels himself to possess of choosing and determining his own actions; and if we say to him, "Undoubtedly you have this power; but your choice, and therefore your volition and consequent action, is still determined in the same manner as if you had not recognized the power," he will demur, and, logically or illogically, he will deny your position, and hold to his consciousness of what he calls his self-determining power over his own actions, which he places out of the line of Determinism, however unmeaning or paradoxical his assertions may be proved to be.
It is this state of consciousness, this clinging to the belief held by many men in their own power of self-rule over their own general conduct, and by most men in their own control over some of their activities, that Evolution is bound to account for and explain. Evolutionists do not sufficiently mark off this practical part of the question from the theoretical part, and thus leave imperfectly explained the consciousness of the so-called "Free Will." They deem that the explanation of Free Will is included in an explanation of Will, and therefore they only deal incidentally and imperfectly with self-rule. The confusion arises from the term Free Will having two meanings—the theoretic or scientific one, as opposed to Determinism, and the practical one, as implying the power of self-rule, choice, effort, and determination.
That there exists such a power of self-regulation is a fact recognized in every department of social intercourse—in the attribution of praise or blame, in the teachings of the moralist, in the eye of the law, and in the process of education. Every individual is supposed to have a command over his own actions, except such as are purely automatic. It is not supposed that men are responsible for their congenital tastes or abilities; but all members of the community are held responsible for their actions towards other members of the community, and to a certain extent they are judged to be wise or foolish with regard to themselves, on the supposition that they are able to carry out a purposed conduct. And even if in various particulars it is seen that they do not possess such a power, they, or the persons responsible for their earlier education are blamed for their want of this power since it is held to be one of the most characteristic and valuable possessions of humanity. Thus we find the judicious parent, from the very first, endeavours to inculcate in the child habits of command over his temper and his appetites. The youth who has received the lessons of wise counsellers, who has been imbued with the lessons of Christianity, who has drunk in the teachings of the ancient moralists, and framed his ambitions upon the severe examples of early Greece and Rome, or who has found his sympathies excited by the dreams of modern philanthropy, knows that the foundation of all his personal greatness is in his power of self-command. It is no idle verbiage that of the rhetorician, the preacher, the philosophical novelist, the poet, when they exhort to the cultivation of the powers of the Will in their varied representations of the aspirations and struggles of noble humanity. There is something that calls forth the moralist's sympathies in the poet's appeals to the power of Will, and there is no grander spectacle in all this universe than to witness the battle of the will-power of a man against difficulties and oppositions of all sorts; none the less if the scene of the conflict be in the region of his own heart and mind, rather than in the wider field of the battle of life.
The evolutionist is bound to account for this amongst the other phenomena of human existence. The principles of such an evolution are contained in Mr. Spencer's "Psychology," but the development is not elaborated in detail, and is well worthy of a special study. We have previously roughly indicated the outlines of such a study; and as the special psychological question has been treated in an interesting and suggestive manner by the Rev. T. W. Fowle in the number of the "Nineteenth Century" for March 1881, we will find it convenient to take this article as the text or basis of our own remarks.
The writer's argument appears in brief to be this. In the course of Evolution, man became self-conscious (see p. 392). This consciousness of self led, first of all, to self-preservation, then to self-assertion, and finally to self-pleasing. "When man first uttered the words or rather felt the impression to which language subsequently gave definite shape and force, 'I will live in spite of all the forces encompassing my destruction,' then was Free Will created upon the earth."
Note here, that Will is changed to Free Will in the course of a single sentence, and that this "Free Will" is simply human action predominant over external difficulties, which should therefore rather be called Will, and is certainly not the Free Will or self-rule which we have now under consideration. Hence arises a certain amount of confusion, as witness p. 393:—"We ascribe, then, man's consciousness of Free Will to the concentration of all his pre-human experiences into one imperative determination to preserve, to assert, and to please himself." Thus, "Free Will," in the mind of the writer, is simply the human Will as opposed to the forces of nature. Nothing is said about the exterior opposing wills of others, though surely he must intend them also to be included in the environment. At the same time we do not know that it makes the particular point under consideration more difficult of study, although these external wills form a considerable part of the objects determining the activities of the self. Yet, as our particular point of study is self-rule, this extension of the reference to external forces does not directly affect the argument.
But it will be seen that the Will or Free Will mentioned here, and defined as self-assertion and determination to please one's self, is self-assertion as opposed to environment—a self-assertion which, irrespective of the qualities or nature of the motives comprised in that self, determines to work out its own pleasure there and then in spite of all opposition. Such a state is well illustrated in the first self-assertions of childhood—its so-called wilfulness; for as embryology illustrates the stages of biological evolution, so does childhood illustrate the stages of mental and moral evolution. This self-assertion is also illustrated in the conduct of the insane and of the rude, rough, uneducated minds of the masses. Still it is not what is meant by Free Will, but the very reverse; for such persons are said to be slaves to their passions or motives. This is undoubtedly Egoistic Will; and therefore theoretically, as before distinguished, it is free: but it is not the Free Will, the self-rule we are now in search of. This sort of self-assertion is the determination to please oneself, irrespective of consequences. But when it is known that consequences recoil upon self—when the element of time is taken into account, and the self is found to be continuous, then there is reflection, and by-and-by succeeds caution, restraint, and the co-ordination of actions to a given end. This is the germ of self-rule which is mistakenly regarded as identical with the self-determination of volition.
The term "self-preservation" has a wide and also a restricted sense. It may simply mean the continuance in existence of the body; or if the self is equivalent to the preservation of the activities comprised in that self, whatever those activities may be—lust, hate, benevolence, æsthetic feeling, &c.—then it implies the continuous gratification of those activities. This understanding of self-preservation is dependent on the length of time for which the self is expected to continue. The religious man, believing in a God and a future life, preserves what he esteems his self—i.e., his moral and religious being—even in martyrdom. But if there is no future life, then the self that has to be preserved is the self as it is, whatever that may happen to be—gross or refined.
There are no better recognised traits of Free Will—i.e., self-rule—than the power of self-denial, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice. These cannot be explained by any definition of Free Will founded on self-assertion and self-preservation merely. Then, again, self-education, the designed alteration of the character, and the intentional acquirement of self-control, can hardly be held to be consistent with simple self-assertion. Self-assertion is the assertion of self as it is. The resolution to alter is the denial of self-preservation as regards the existing self. The adaptation to environment involved in self-abnegation is the opposite to self-assertion.
Are we to suppose that the Free Will predicated of man is an universal possession of all? If it is a theoretical question, it must be granted that all men's wills are free. But if it is a practical question as to the strength of the Will as opposed to external forces, and held to be free in proportion to its relative strength of self-assertion, surely Free Will is a variable quality. If, again, it is a practical question as to the power of self-rule, are we to suppose that all men have it in equal degrees? Do the idiot and the maniac possess it, or on the contrary is it possessed unequally by men, and by some not at all?
The writer says, p. 391, "Now, from the moment that self became an object of consciousness, it became also a motive."
This consciousness of self is a consciousness of the totality of the activities, a consciousness of the unity of that totality, a consciousness of the continuance of that totality for a more or less certain future. The motive consequent upon such recognition must be the longest continuance of that self, the greatest amount of gratification of the activities of that self, the avoidance of pains to that self, and the aggregation of more activities by that self.
The result of that motive would be the co-ordination of actions to attain the final end thus set before the total self, and the subordination of particular motives to their proper places in the co-ordinative scheme. But as the total self is in relation to environment, that environment, physical or societarian, has to be taken into account; and as consequences of actions recoil upon the individual at a later time, the results of actions have to be taken into account. Therefore there is brought into activity a large amount of rational consideration and judgment as to the eventualities of conduct in regard to the 'total self'; and finally it is found that action must take one of two forms: either the environment must be adjusted to the organism—this is a form of Will—or the organism must be adjusted to the environment—this is Free Will or self-rule—i.e., the Free Will as here understood. This is the solution implied in the writer's statement that "from the moment that self became an object of consciousness it became also a motive."
This rational view of self as an aggregate of faculties and motives likely to last a certain length of time, and surrounded by a social environment which has in great measure formed it, and which exercises upon it a continual pressure, brings forward the relation of Free Will to Ethics in the fact that the acquired power of self-rule has to take into account, in-so-far as it exists in the individuals forming the social coercions and approvals, and in so far as the Ego approaches the normal standard of regulating his own sympathies, which together in an instructed community make up personal responsibility to the ethical law, and supply the ethical as distinguished from the merely altruistic motive.
The evolutionist's definition of life is "the continuous adjustment of inner to outer relation," or of organism to environment. The principles and results of this continuous adjustment, in the modifications of structure and function, and their transmission by heredity in gradually more permanently established forms, is well understood from the writings of Mr. Darwin, Mr. Spencer, and others.
The progress of development in the human race has consisted in the establishment of correspondences of a definite and permanent character between organism and environment. Why it should have been possible for such a grand development to take place as that which has actually taken place lies beyond the limits of our subject; but if Evolution is true, the fact remains that the human organism has continually been increasing the number of its correspondences, in accordance with the increasing complexity of its surroundings. Roughly, this establishment of relations with the external world may be classed under two divisions, each containing a great variety of details. Firstly, the class of cognitions, including the knowledge of the physical world, the field, the forest, the stream, the animals, the sky and heavenly bodies, and also the knowledge of men, and their ways in society; secondly, the class of direct relations with other individuals, such as the relations of wife, children, parents, chiefs, involving also property, and inducing the feelings of love, friendship, hate, justice, and other social affections.
The establishment of a correspondence between the organism and the environment, of such a definite character as to be transmitted by heredity, involves the establishment of motives. The stomach without food experiences hunger, a want, and forms a motive. So of the other organs, and so of all other established relations inwoven in the organism. However subtle and refined any established relation may be, but less in proportion to its later order of development, and directly as its necessity to existence, so its force. It experiences a want in respect of its correlate, and this want becomes a motive or incentive to its own gratification.
The kinds of actions, then, may be distinguished as—
The Functional, such as the action of the heart, the intestines, &c. These are wholly involuntary.
The Emotional Involuntary, such as the feelings and desires, and the muscular expression of some of them, as in laughing, crying, &c.
The Emotional Volitional, or actions proceeding from the emotions, and constraining the muscles to the means of their gratification.
Here must be added the Rational Volitional; and if the rational choice of actions and ordering of conduct, in which the emotions and passions play a subordinate part as factors in a general estimate or judgment, can be interpreted as a recognition of "self as an object," and the establishment of a correspondence therewith, then the "motive of self" as advanced by the essayist may be considered as the highest motive of the Emotional Volitional class. Thus self as an enduring whole becomes established as the predominating object in the mind of the Ego, towards which object or ideal attainment in continuity, and in expansiveness of relation the motives of the individual turn—co-ordinating to it all the more special motives; and evolving in a higher degree the powers of self-rule.
In this manner Self-Rule or Free Will is explained and vindicated as a natural possession of humanity and one of its highest and most characteristic attainments. At the same time it is found to be consistent with a Deterministic scheme and not to require the assistance of an incomprehensible Self-Determining Power on the part of the Ego. The Deterministic theory as regards the actions and conduct of an individual is not, however, so narrow in its purview as this. It recognises a great many kinds of conditions as the more or less direct or remote causes of actions. It recognises—
Heredity, by which the physical qualities, and emotional and intellectual tendencies, of the parents, more or less obscurely known on account of intermixture, are transmitted to the offspring. The child is born with a certain inherited constitution, containing potentially within it a course of development through certain physiological changes up to decay and old age. This constitution is one of a definite character, having definite proportions of parts, as of head, chest, abdomen, &c., and definite relations of systems, such as nervous, vascular, muscular, visceral, &c., and partly as a consequence of this the child also possesses mental and moral tendencies which, while very susceptible of influence, are primarily derived by heredity.
Action of Environment.—From the moment of birth, (or sooner), the organism comes into relation with very complex conditions, which variously affect its course of development. The suitable or unsuitable conditions of the mother's health, food, warmth, sleep, &c., influence the development of the child; and thenceforward all through life the conditions of nourishment, diet, climate, exposure, disease, accident, &c., have strong and recognisable effects upon the organism, physical and mental.
General Tuition, or the education by contact with the members of the family, playmates, companions, and the great body of the individuals of the environment with whom the child or youth comes into contact, into the general tone and principles of his age, country, class, or sect, gradually fashioning him into a certain pattern, shaping the general mode of his life, and forming within him certain standards of action, certain codes of obligation, moral or ceremonial, certain customs, fashions, &c., as well as implanting in him the convictions, theological or otherwise, of his time.
Special Tuition.—Tuition affects the whole of the activities of the individual according to the nature of the training, its suitability or unsuitability, its persistence, and the force exerted. The value of a long course of direct education is well understood in all civilised communities, and in modern times is recognised as one of the great means of effecting the general improvement of society, if only it could be thoroughly applied.
The Education of Circumstances affects not only the physical constitution, but also very much the mental and moral qualities of the individual. And as these circumstances are widely varied and the hereditary tendencies very different, the results will be widely diverse in different individuals; but there is no doubt that a condition of poverty or of affluence, good or ill usage, neglect or over-governing, a solitary or a social condition, surroundings of town or country, status of parents, nature of and facilities for amusements and studies, the degree of early responsibilities, the kind of business occupation or other avocation, all largely affect the conduct and modify the motives of the individual.
And it is wonderful in a highly developed and complex state of society, where the possession of great wealth creates a large leisure class, and the enormous activity pervading the whole ever tends to put the organisms included into every possible relation with the outer world, and with every relation that can grow up in its own complex social mixture—it is wonderful, we say, in such circumstances, the number of motives that will grow up. The relations extend to the past and the future. The most paltry, evanescent, and adventitious relations become more or less motives of action, and grow more or less established in the individual and more or less transmitted to posterity. Besides the great number of these relationships, there is the difference of kind. Many are of a concrete sort; as for instance, the love of dogs, horses, &c.; others are of a very abstract description. These latter are principally the outcome of social and intellectual relationships. They are generalisations of conduct, or they are abstractions of the intellect. Virtue, ideal conduct, justice, beauty, truth, science, philosophy, a perfected humanity, all become realised abstractions, as it were, with which a relation is established, and which, therefore, assume the guise of motives seeking their means of gratification. We recognize the fact that abstractions may become objects of motives, as distinct from the concrete objects which are definitely in relation with corresponding affections of the organism. These abstractions grow into definite parts of self, and, if they largely predominate in an individual, he will become a martyr rather than abandon his devotion to them. He will esteem them the principal part of self, and let his body perish rather than act against them. Such organic abstractions may, indeed, become the objects of the most powerful passions, before which concrete objects sink into utter insignificance. We have found that the recognition of the continuous or "total self" can become such an object and induce the establishment of a corresponding motive.
At the outset, we distinguish the province of Reason, in which is included the calculation of the results of actions, and the devising of the best means for accomplishing a desired end without incurring pains and inconveniences. If a certain end is desired, the intellect has to forecast the outcome of different modes for effecting the desired result, and to discern that which secures the end with the fewest drawbacks. The end may be good or bad; the motives may be of the most elevated and generous character or they may be of the worst; but all the same, it must be duly considered what is the best means of securing it. What would be the result if I did this? on the other hand, would it not be better to do that? It will be seen that here there is no choice between motives, no dispute to settle between conflicting principles and passions, but only a kind of mental calculus or intellectual engineering. This state of the mind is sometimes taken to be the exercise of a choice, and it may be so; but it is of a different kind to that involved in self-rule, which we now approach.
As a power of very gradual growth must we regard that cognition, (with its subsequent establishment as an object and a motive in the human organism) which recognises the Self as a whole—as a whole at any given time, and as a whole extending over seventy years, and perhaps indefinitely longer!
Man's total self can become an object of thought and that object a motive, as distinguished from any of the particular motives of which it is made up. Man's future self may be an object of thought as well as the present; and man's Continuous Self may become a constant and all-predominating object of regard and interest—an all-absorbing motive. Indeed, so far may this go, that the long continuous self prospected after death may and has been so much an object of motive as to overshadow and dwarf every interest of the present. And if this Continuous Self is recognised by the Reason as the complete object, the one and chief motive—and it must be so since it includes every motive at every instant of time—then the Reason accords to it and claims for it a ruling position, a claim before which every other must give way. There is no doubt that this is substantially taught, although in different terms of exposition, in all ethical books and in all verbal precepts of good counsel.
The psychogeny of this development of the continuous self into an object and a motive is to be found in the intellectual recognition of the actual order displayed by nature in the processes of life. It is the harmonising of the volitional actions with the laws of natural change. We have seen that the process of life is the continuous adaptation of organism to environment. But this is a natural, non-volitional process. Change in the environment produces change of organism to correspond with it. When cognitions are developed the sequences of action are foreseen, the changes of environment are foreseen, the developments of organism are foreseen; a generalisation is made of all the factors, and logical conclusions drawn as to the necessary adaptations. Then follows a rational or intentional adaptation of organism and environment, due to the motive of Self which we have just considered; this rational or intentional adaptation may be either incidental or continuous, and the adaptation may be either of organism or of environment. And in this calculus the relation of the individual to the mass of individuals constituting society must be taken into account.
A man having regard to his continuous self finds himself in a certain position. The motive relating to the continuous self determines that his conduct shall be regulated by the best regard for that continuous self. And it must be admitted at once that technically it is not qualitatively related to any abstraction, such as virtue, &c., unless, indeed, virtue be interpreted as the establishment of such a harmony, but has regard purely to the establishment of the most harmonious correspondence between himself and his environment for the remainder of his life. It might be that such a resolve would result in a system of ethics, but we wish to limit the consideration to our special subject.
And, in the first place, we must recognise the quantitative character of such an adaptation. The self is surrounded by an enormous and highly complex environment; but it may, from heredity, or want of education, or perverse education, be a very narrow, poor, meagre, little self, having very few, weak, feeble correspondences with the environment. A pig in his stye may be well adjusted to his environment; but his correspondences with the external world are few in number and of small intensity. We would therefore assert with Mr. Spencer as a corollary from the continuous adjustment of the organism and the environment, not merely the establishment of a convenient modus vivendi, but an adjustment of the organism by enlargement of the number of its correspondences with the environment, so as to render the adjustment between organism and environment more perfect by making the former co-extensive with the latter. In proportion to the number of points of interest or correspondences established between organism and environment, so is the perfection of the continuous self. In this manner then Free Will or Self-Rule in its very nature is related to the conception of a continuous self towards which it acts as the object of a motive, and possesses also an ethical bearing with regard to the enlargement of the correspondences with the external world. For what is there of greater interest in the external world than the subjective individuals of our surroundings, the society of which we form a part, the mysterious past out of which we came and the dependent nations of the future which we are helping to make?
It is evident that in thus setting up the continuous self as an object, whose realisation is to be the ruling power in the regulation of conduct, (whether this self be the complete self we have just contemplated, or the incomplete self which we may happen to be, and to be pretty well contented with,) a certain amount of self-regulation will always be necessary in order to effect the object in view, and at occasional crises a very great amount of struggle and effort will have to be exerted in order to put down the influence of some active motive which would, by its hasty and blind gratification, mar the result of that line of conduct already decided upon as the best. Here will come in the conflict of passion with reason, and of impulse with prudence, which is really of the greatest practical interest in our study.
And here we find, as one of the chief motives in such a conflict, the motive of regard for the continuous self. It is not always a ruling motive. It is best that it should be so. The object of education and self-culture is to make it so. But at any rate it is a motive, and a strong one. In proportion to its predominance is the amount of self-rule, of self-control, and, as we read it, of Free Will.
Thus the rational regard for self becomes recognised as a motive. The Rational Volitional becomes the Emotional Volitional. It has been recognised in many philosophies under various names, advanced sometimes as a motive, sometimes as the very self of self, and sometimes designated by the term "self-determining power," &c.; but its true character and genesis is best explained by Evolution.
The great practical question is this: Has man the power of choice amongst motives? Has he the vaunted power of self-rule? and can he cultivate it?
We can only reply that, as a matter of fact, some men have it and some have not; that some have in some respects and not in others. As a matter of possibility, most men may attain in a considerable degree to the power of self-rule by judicious self-culture: and in the education of the young, more particularly in home education, a very high standard in this respect may be attained. Some feeble minds and flighty or impassioned natures, as well as idiots, may not be able to reach it, and some fools may lose it after they have got it; but as a general rule and a safe fact for all to accept, we may say that a high degree of self-rule may by most people be attained, and that the possession of it is for the most part happiness.
Adopting, then, the statement of the essayist, "from the moment that self became an object of consciousness it became also a motive," we would add the element of time and recognise a continuous self. Then, placing the statement in a subordinate position, as part of the general evolution of life—which is the continuous adjustment of organism and environment—and acknowledging the growth of reason, we would define the course of action which results from all these factors as the rational quantitative and continuous adjustment of organism and environment. This is the Evolutionist formula of Free Will or self-rule.
Thus the consciousness of choice and of the power of self-rule receives an explanation on the Evolution of Deterministic hypothesis in this respect, that the recognition of the continuous self as an object of thought and an important object of interest and regard, becomes thereby a motive determining action and conduct, even against the immediate urgencies of passion. Determinism is thus acknowledged to be a correct theory: but the dignity of the claim for self-rule and free choice is vindicated, and the attainment of it by most people is shown to be both desirable and feasible.