Academica

by Marcus Tullius Cicero

BOOK II.

ENTITLED LUCULLUS.

[§§1]—[12]. Summary. Lucullus, though an able and cultivated man, was absent from Rome on public service too long during his earlier years to attain to glory in the forum ([1]). He unexpectedly proved a great general. This was due to his untiring study and his marvellous memory ([2]). He had to wait long for the reward of his merits as a commander and civil administrator, and was allowed no triumph till just before my consulship. What I owed to him in those troublous times I cannot now tell ([3]). He was not merely a general; he was also a philosopher, having learned much from Antiochus and read much for himself ([4]). Those enemies of Greek culture who think a Roman noble ought not to know philosophy, must be referred to the examples of Cato and Africanus ([5]). Others think that famous men should not be introduced into dialogues of the kind. Are they then, when they meet, to be silent or to talk about trifles? I, in applying myself to philosophy, have neglected no public duty, nor do I think the fame of illustrious citizens diminished, but enriched, by a reputation for philosophical knowledge ([6]). Those who hold that the interlocutors in these dialogues had no such knowledge show that they can make their envy reach beyond the grave. Some critics do not approve the particular philosophy which I follow—the Academic. This is natural, but they must know that Academicism puts no stop to inquiry ([7]). My school is free from the fetters of dogma; other schools are enslaved to authority ([8]). The dogmatists say they bow to the authority of the wise man. How can they find out the wise man without hearing all opinions? This subject was discussed by myself, Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius, the day after the discussion reported in the Catulus ([9]). Catulus called on Lucullus to defend the doctrines of Antiochus. This Lucullus believed himself able to do, although the doctrines had suffered in the discussion of the day before ([10]). He spoke thus: At Alexandria I heard discussions between Heraclitus Tyrius the pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, and Antiochus. At that very time the books mentioned by Catulus yesterday came into the hands of Antiochus, who was so angry that he wrote a book against his old teacher ([11] and [12]). I will now give the substance of the disputes between Heraclitus and Antiochus, omitting the remarks made by the latter against Philo ([12]).

[§1]. Luculli: see Introd. p. [58], and Dict. Biog. Digna homini nobili: a good deal of learning would have been considered unworthy of a man like Lucullus, see Introd. p. [30]. Percepta: "gained," "won;" cf. percipere fruges, "to reap," Cat. Mai. 24. Caruit: "was cut off from;" carere comes from a root skar meaning to divide, see Corss. I. 403. For the three nouns with a singular verb see Madv. Gram. 213 A, who confines the usage to nouns denoting things and impersonal ideas. If the common reading dissensit in De Or. III. 68 is right, the restriction does not hold. Admodum: "to a degree." Fratre: this brother was adopted by a M. Terentius Varro, and was a man of distinction also; see Dict. Biog. Magna cum gloria: a ref. to Dict. Biog. will show that the whole affair was discreditable to the father; to our notions, the sons would have gained greater glory by letting it drop. Quaestor: to Sulla, who employed him chiefly in the civil administration of Asia. Continuo: without any interval. Legis praemio: this seems to mean "by the favour of a special law," passed of course by Sulla, who had restored the old lex annalis in all its rigour, and yet excepted his own officers from its operation. Prooemio, which has been proposed, would not be Latin, see De Leg. II. 16. Consulatum: he seems to have been absent during the years 84—74, in the East. Superiorum: scarcely that of Sulla.

[§2]. Laus: "merit," as often, so praemium, Virg. Aen. XII. 437, means a deed worthy of reward. Non admodum exspectabatur: Cic. forgets that Luc. had served with distinction in the Social War and the first Mithridatic war. In Asia pace: three good MSS. have Asiae; Baiter ejects Asia; Guilelmus read in Asia in pace (which Davies conjectures, though he prints Asiae). Consumere followed by an ablative without in is excessively rare in Cic. Madv. D.F. V. 53 denies the use altogether. In addition, however, to our passage, I note hoc loco consumitur in T.D. IV. 23, where Baiter's two texts (1861 and 1863) give no variants. Pace here perhaps ought to be taken adverbially, like tranqullo. Indocilem: this is simply passive, = "untaught," as in Prop. I. 2, 12, Ov. Fast. III. 119 (the last qu. by Dav.). Forc. s.v. is wrong in making it active. Factus: = perfectus; cf. Hor. Sat. I. 5, 33 homo factus ad unguem, Cic. De Or. III. 184, In Verr. IV. 126. So effectus in silver Latin. Rebus gestis: military history, so often. Divinam quandam memoriam: the same phrase in De Or. II. 360. Rerum, verborum: same distinction in De Or. II. 359. Oblivisci se malle: the same story is told D.F. II. 104, De Or. II. 299. The ancient art of memory was begun by Simonides (who is the person denoted here by cuidam) and completed by Metrodorus of Scepsis, for whom see De Or. II. 360. Consignamus: cf. consignatae in animis notiones in T.D. I. 57. litteris must be an ablative of the instrument. Mandare monum.: cf. I. [3]. Insculptas: rare in the metaphorical use, cf. N.D. I. 45.

[§3]. Genere: "department" cf. I. [3]. Navalibus pugnis: ναυμαχιαις. Instrumento et adparatu: κατασκευη και παρασκευη. Rex: Mithridates. Quos legisset: = de quibus l.; cf. the use of the passive verb so common in Ovid, e.g. Trist. IV. 4, 14. I take of course rex to be nom. to legisset, the suggestion of a friend that Lucullus is nom. and that quos legisset = quorum commentarios legisset I think improbable. Hodie: Drakenborch on Livy V. 27 wants to read hodieque, which however, is not Ciceronian. In passages like De Or. I. 103 and Verr. V. 64, the que connects clauses and does not modify hodie. On this subject see Madv. Opuscula I. 390. Etsi: M.D.F. V. 68, shows that in Cic. a parenthetic clause with etsi always has a common verb with its principal clause; a rule not observed by the silver writers. The same holds of quamquam, see n. on I. [5]. Calumnia: properly a fraudulent use of litigation, συκοφαντια. The chief enemy was the infamous Memmius who prosecuted him. In urbem: until his triumph Luc. would remain outside the city. Profuisset: this ought properly to be profuerit, but the conditional dicerem changes it. Potius ... quam ... communicem: n. on [23].

[§4]. Sunt ... celebrata: cf. I. [11], [17] for the collocation of the words. Externa ... interiora: cf. De Div. II. 124 sed haec quoque in promptu, nunc interiora videamus. Pro quaestore: for this Faber wrote quaestor, arguing that as Luc. was Sulla's quaestor and Sulla sent him to Egypt, he could not be pro quaestor. But surely after the first year he would be pro quaestor. Dav. reads quaestor here and [11], saying "veterem lectionem iugulavit Faber". Ea memoria ... quam: Bentl., Halm, Baiter give qua, Halm refers to Bentl. on Hor. Sat. I. 6, 15. A passage like ours is D.F. I. 29, ista sis aequitate, quam ostendis, where one MS. has qua. Read Madvig's lucid note there. De quibus audiebat: Madv. Em. 121 makes this equivalent to de eis rebus de quibus, the necessity of which explanation, though approved by Halm, I fail to see. The form of expression is very common in Cic., and the relative always refers to an actually expressed antecedent, cf. e.g. Cat. Mai. 83. I take quibus as simply = libris.

[§5]. Ac: strong, as often, = και μην. Personarum: public characters, προσωπων πολεως (Ad. Fam. XV. 17, 2), so personas [6]. Multi ... plures: cf. Introd. p. [30]. Reliqui: many MSS. insert qui by dittographia, as I think, though Halm, as well as Bait., retains it. On the retention or omission of this qui will depend the choice of putant or putent below. Earum rerum disputationem: for disp. followed by genitive see n. on I. [33]. Non ita decoram: for this feeling see Introd. p. [30]. For non ita cf. the Lowland Scottish "no just sae". Historiae loquantur: hist. means in Cic. rather "memoirs" than "history," which is better expressed by res gestae. Note that the verb loqui not dicere is used, and cf. n. on [101]. Legatione: to the kings in Egypt and the East in alliance with Rome. The censorship was in 199 B.C. About the embassy see Dict. Biogr. art. 'Panactius'. Auctorem: one would think this simple and sound enough, Bentl. however read fautorem, Dav. auditorem.

[§6]. Illigari: "entangled" as though in something bad. For this use Forc. qu. Liv. XXXIII. 21, Tac. Ann. XIII. 40. Aut ludicros sermones: = aut clar. vir. serm. ludic. esse oporteat. Rerum leviorum: a similar argument in D.F. I. 12. Quodam in libro: the Hortensius. Gradu: so the word "degree" was once used, e.g. "a squire of low degree" in the ballad. De opera publica detrahamus: the dative often follows this verb, as in D.F. III. 7 nihil operae reipublicae detrahens, a passage often wrongly taken. Operae is the dat. after the verb, not the gen. after nihil, reip. the gen. after operae, like opera publica here, not the dat. after detrahens. Nisi forensem: the early oratorical works may fairly be said to have this character; scarcely, however, the De Republica or the De Leg. both of which fall within the period spoken of. Ut plurimis prosimus: cf. Introd. p. [29]. Non modo non minui, sed: notice non modo ... sed thrice over in two sentences.

[§7]. Sunt ... qui negent: and truly, see Introd. p. [38]. In Cat. Mai. §3 Cic. actually apologises for making Cato more learned than he really was. Mortuis: Catulus died in 60, Lucullus about 57, Hortensius 50. Contra omnis dicere quae videntur: MSS. mostly insert qui between dicere and quae, one of the best however has dicere quae aliis as a correction, while another has the marginal reading qui scire sibi videntur. The omission of qui, which I conjectured, but now see occurs in a MS. (Pal. 2) referred to by Halm, gives admirable sense. Verum invenire: cf. [60]. Contentione: = φιλονεικια as usual. In ... rebus obscuritas: cf. I. [44] rerum obscuritate. Infirmitas: cf. I. [44] imbecillos animos. Antiquissimi et doctissimi: on the other hand recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et emendata maxime I. [13]. Diffisi: one of the best MSS. has diffissi, which reminds one of the spelling divisssiones, asserted to be Ciceronian in Quint. Inst. Or. I. 7, 20. In utramque partem: επ' αμφοτερα, cf. I. [45]. Exprimant: "embody," cf. n. on I. [19].

[§8]. Probabilia: πιθανα, for which see [33]. Sequi: "act upon," cf. [99]-[101]. Liberiores et solutiores: these two words frequently occur together in Cic. and illustrate his love for petty variations; see [105], also T.D. V. 43, De Div. I. 4, De Rep. IV. 4, N.D. I. 56, Orat. 64. Integra: "untrammelled," cf. the phrase "non mihi integrum est"—"I have committed my self." Et quasi: MSS. have et quibus et quasi. Cogimur: for this Academic freedom see Introd. p. [18]. Amico cuidam: Orelli after Lamb. cuipiam; for the difference see Madv. Gram. 493 b, c.

[§9]. Ut potuerint, potuerunt: thus Lamb. corrected the MSS. reading which was simply ut potuerunt, "granting that they had the ability, they gained it by hearing all things, now as a matter of fact they did decide on a single hearing," etc. Iudicaverunt autem: so Lamb. for MSS. aut. Muretus, by what Dav. calls an "arguta hariolatio," read an for aut and put a note of interrogation at contulerunt. C.F. Hermann (Schneidewin's Philologus VII. 466) introduces by conj. a sad confusion into the text, but no other good critic since Madvig's remarks in Em. 125 has impugned Lambinus' reading. Goerenz indeed, followed by the faithful Schutz, kept the MSS. reading with the insertion of aut between sed and ut at the beginning; of this Madv. says "non solum Latina non est, sed sanae menti repugnat." For the proceeding which Cic. deprecates, cf. N.D. I. 10, De Leg. I. 36. Quam adamaverunt: "which they have learned to love;" the ad has the same force as προ in προμανθανειν, which means "to learn on and on, to learn by degrees" (cf. προυμαθον στεργειν κακοις), not, as the lexica absurdly say, "to learn beforehand, i.e. to learn thoroughly." Constantissime: "most consistently". Quae est ad Baulos: cf. Introd. p. [57]. In spatio: this xystus was a colonnade with one side open to the sea, called ξυστος from its polished floor and pillars. Consedimus: n. on I. [14].

[§10]. Servatam oportuit: a construction very characteristic of Terence, found, but rarely, in Cic. and Livy. In promptu ... reconditiora: cf. in promptu ... interiora in De Div. II. 124, also Ac. I. [4]. Quae dico: Goer. is exceedingly troubled by the pres. tense and wishes to read dixero. But the substitution of the pres. for the future is common enough in all languages cf. Iuv. IV. 130 with Mayor's copious note. Si non fuerint: so all Halm's best MSS. Two, however, of Davies' have si vera etc. In support of the text, see I. [9] (sunt ista) and note. Labefactata: this is only found as an alteration in the best MSS. and in Ed. Rom. (1471); the others have labefacta. Orelli's statement (note to his separate text of the Academica 1827) that Cic. commonly uses the perfect labefeci and the part, labefactus is quite wrong. The former is indeed the vulg. reading in Pro Sestio 101, the latter in De Haruspicum Responsis 60, but the last of these two passages is doubtful. Cic. as a rule prefers long forms like sustentatus, which occurs with labefactatus in Cat. Mai. 20. For the perfect labefactavit cf. I. [33]. Agam igitur: Cic. rather overdoes the attempt to force on his readers a belief in the learning of Lucullus.

[§11]. Pro quaestore: cf. [4]. Essem: MSS. issem, whence Goer. conj. Alexandriam issem. Heraclitus Tyrius: scarcely known except from this passage. Clitomachum: for this philosopher see Zeller 532. Quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur: sc. a Cicerone. Philo's only notable pupils had combined to form the so called "Old Academy," and when Cic. wrote the Academica the New Academic dialectic had been without a representative for many years. Cf. Introd. p. [21]. Libri duo: cf. I. [13]. Heri for this indication of the contents of the lost Catulus, see Introd. p. [50]. Implorans: "appealing to," the true meaning being "to appeal to with tears," see Corss. I. 361. Philonis: sc. esse. Scriptum agnoscebat: i.e. it was an actual work of Ph. Tetrilius: some MSS. are said to have Tetrinius, and the name Tertinius is found on Inscr. One good MS. has Tretilius, which may be a mistake for Tertilius, a name formed like Pompilius, Quintilius, Sextilius. Qy, should Petrilius, a derivative from the word for four, be read? Petrilius and Pompilius would then agree like Petronius and Pomponius, Petreius and Pompeius. For the formation of these names see Corss. I. 116. Rogus: an ill omened and unknown name. Rocus, as Ursinus pointed out, occurs on denarii of the gens Creperia. De Philone ... ab eo ipso: note the change of prep. "from Philo's lips," "from his copy." De and ex are common in Cic. after audire, while ab is rather rarer. See M.D.F. I. 39, and for describere ab aliquo cf. a te in Ad Att. XIII. 22, 3.

[§12]. Dicta Philoni: for this see Introd. p. [50]. It cannot mean what Goer. makes it mean, "coram Philone." I think it probable that Philoni is a marginal explanation foisted on the text. As to the statements of Catulus the elder, they are made clear by [18]. Academicos: i.e. novos, who are here treated as the true Academics, though Antiochus himself claimed the title. Aristo: see Introd. p. [11]. Aristone: Diog. VII. 164 mentions an Aristo of Alexandria, a Peripatetic, who may be the same. Dio seems unknown. Negat: see n. on [18]. Lenior: some MSS. levior, as is usual with these two words. In [11] one of the earliest editions has leviter for leniter.

[§§13]—[18]. Summary. Cicero seems to me to have acted like a seditious tribune, in appealing to famous old philosophers as supporters of scepticism ([13]), Those very philosophers, with the exception of Empedocles, seem to me, if anything, too dogmatic ([14]). Even if they were often in doubt, do you suppose that no advance has been made during so many centuries by the investigations of so many men of ability? Arcesilas was a rebel against a good philosophy, just as Ti. Gracchus was a rebel against a good government ([15]). Has nothing really been learned since the time of Arcesilas? His opinions have had scanty, though brilliant support ([16]). Now many dogmatists think that no argument ought to be held with a sceptic, since argument can add nothing to the innate clearness of true sensations ([17]). Most however do allow of discussion with sceptics. Philo in his innovations was induced to state falsehoods, and incurred all the evils he wished to avoid, his rejection of Zeno's definition of the καταληπτικη φαντασια really led him back to that utter scepticism from which he was fleeing. We then must either maintain Zeno's definition or give in to the sceptics ([18]).

[§13]. Rursus exorsus est: cf. exorsus in [10]. Popularis: δημοτικους. Ii a: so Dav. for MSS. iam. Tum ad hos: so MSS., Dav. aut hos. The omission of the verb venire is very common in Cic.'s letters. C. Flaminium: the general at lake Trasimene. Aliquot annis: one good MS. has annos, cf. T.D. I. 4, where all the best MSS. have annos. The ablative is always used to express point of time, and indeed it may be doubted whether the best writers ever use any accusative in that sense, though they do occasionally use the ablative to express duration (cf. Prop. I. 6, 7 and Madv. Gram. 235, 2). L. Cassium: this is L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla, a man of good family, who carried a ballot bill (De Leg. III. 35), he was the author of the cui bono principle and so severe a judge as to be called scopulus reorum. Pompeium: apparently the man who made the disgraceful treaty with Numantia repudiated by home in 139 B.C. P. Africanum: i.e. the younger, who supported the ballot bill of Cassius, but seems to have done nothing else for the democrats. Fratres: Lamb. viros, but cf. Brut. 98. P. Scaevolam: the pontifex, consul in the year Tib. Gracchus was killed, when he refused to use violence against the tribunes. The only connection these brothers had with the schemes of Gracchus seems to be that they were consulted by him as lawyers, about the legal effect the bills would have. Ut videmus ... ut suspicantur: Halm with Gruter brackets these words on the ground that the statement about Marius implies that the demagogues lie about all but him. Those words need not imply so much, and if they did, Cic. may be allowed the inconsistency.

[§14]. Similiter: it is noticeable that five MSS. of Halm have simile. Xenophanem: so Victorius for the MSS. Xenoplatonem. Ed. Rom. (1471) has Cenonem, which would point to Zenonem, but Cic. does not often name Zeno of Elea. Saturninus: of the question why he was an enemy of Lucullus, Goer. says frustra quaeritur. Saturninus was the persistent enemy of Metellus Numidicus, who was the uncle of Lucullus by marriage. Arcesilae calumnia: this was a common charge, cf. Academicorum calumnia in N.D. II. 20 and calumnia in [18] and [65] of this book. So August. Contra Acad. II. 1 speaks of Academicorum vel calumnia vel pertinacia vel pericacia. Democriti verecundia: Cic. always has a kind of tenderness for Democritus, as Madv. on D.F. I. 20 remarks, cf. De Div. II. 30 where Democr. is made an exception to the general arrogantia of the physici. Empedocles quidem ... videatur: cf. [74]. The exordium of his poem is meant, though there is nothing in it so strong as the words of the text, see R. and P. 108. Quale sit: the emphasis is on sit, the sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. Quasi modo nascentes: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however T.D. II. 5 ut oratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur.

[§15]. haesitaverunt: Goer. cf. De Or. I. 40. Constitutam: so in [14]. Delitisceret: this is the right spelling, not delitesceret, which one good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. Negavissent: "had denied, as they said." Tollendus est: a statement which is criticised in [74]. Nominibus differentis ... dissenserunt: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the Academica Posteriora [17], [43]. De se ipse: very frequent in Cic. (cf. Madv. Gram. 487 b). Diceret: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has agnosceret on the margin; see n. on [88]. Fannius: in his "Annals." The same statement is quoted in De Or. II. 270, Brutus 299. Brutus had written an epitome of this work of Fannius (Ad Att. XII. 5, 3).

[§16]. Veteribus: Bentley's em. of MSS. vetera: C.F. Hermann (Schneid Philol. VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps vetera and changes incognita into incondita, comparing De Or. I. 197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no knowledge, so that incognita is far better. I am not at all certain that the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not knowledge, but mere opinion." The conj. of Kayser veri nota for vetera (cf. [76]) and investigatum below, is fanciful and improbable. Quod investigata sunt: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again disturbs the text which since Madv. Em. 127 supported it (quoting T.D. V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that illa in the former sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects nihilne est igitur actum as a dittographia (!) from [15] nihilne explicatum, and reads quot for quod with Bentl. For the meaning cf. T.D. III. 69 and Arist. on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. Arcesilas Zenoni ... obtrectans: see n. on I. [34]. These charges were brought by each school against the other. In Plutarch Adv. Colotem p. 1121 F, want of novelty is charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno gave, see Aug. Contra Acad. II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. [2] and [35] of the Academica Posteriora. Immutatione verborum: n. on I. [33]. This phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek τροποι (Brut. 69) and αλληγορια in De Or. II. 261, where an ex. is given. Definitiones: n. on [18]. Tenebras obducere: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. [30] (lucem eripere), N.D. I. 6 (noctem obfundere) Aug. Contra Ac. III. 14 (quasdam nebulas obfundere), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse. Non admodum probata: cf. the passage of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. Lacyde: the most important passages in ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. Tenuit: cf. the use of obtinere in De Or. I. 45. In Aeschine: so Dav. for the confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS. have hac nonne Christ conj. Hagnone which Halm, as well as Baiter takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known at all, from these two passages only.

[§17]. Patrocinium: for the word cf. N.D. I. 6. Non defuit: such patronage was wanting in the time of Arcesilas ([16]). Faciendum omnino non putabant: "Epictetus (Arrian, Diss. I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by saying ουκ αγω σχολην προς ταυτα" (Zeller 85, n.). In another passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse. Ullam rationem disputare: the same constr. occurs in [74] and Pro Caecina 15, Verr. Act. I. 24. Antipatrum: cf. fragm. [1] of Book I. Verbum e verbo: so [31], D.F. III. 15, T.D. III. 7, not verbum de verbo, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. Comprehensio: cf. I. [41]. Ut Graeci: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I. [44] ut Democritus. Evidentiam: other translations proposed by Cic. were illustratio (Quint. VI. 2, 32) and perspicientia (De Off. I. 15). Fabricemur: cf. [87], [119], [121]. Me appellabat: Cic. was the great advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (D.F. III. 15). Sed tamen: this often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. Gram. 480. Ipsa evidentia: note that the verb evidere is not Latin.

[§18]. Sustinere: cf. [70]. Pertinaciam: the exact meaning of this may be seen from D.F. II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf. n. on [14], [66], also I. [44] and D.F. V. 94, N.D. I. 13, in the last of which passages the Academy is called procax. Mentitur: cf. [12]. Ita negaret: this ita corresponds to si below,—a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf. [19]. Ακαταληπτον: the conj. of Turnebus καταληπτον is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in negaret. Visum: cf. I. [40]. Trivimus: cf. I. [27]. Visum igitur: the Greek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words impressum effictumque are equivalent to εναπεσφραγισμενη και εναπομεμαγμενη in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration (‛ετεροιωσις) of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in Adv. Math. VIII. 86 Pyrrh. Hypotyp. III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his Academica) that Cic. omits to represent the words κατ' αυτο το ‛υπαρχον. Sextus Adv. Math. VII. 249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The φαντασια therefore which he had although απο ‛υπαρχοντος (proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not κατα το ‛υπαρχον, i.e. did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug. Cont. Acad. II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses it thus; his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est. Iudicium: κριτηριον, a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. Eo, quo minime volt: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the καταληπτικη φαντασια, which he pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. [11], Sextus Pyrr. Hyp. I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans believed all things to be ακαταληπτα, Philo held them to be καταληπτα, and Numenius in Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is evident from the Academica and from Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be in their own nature καταληπτα (‛οσον δε επι τη φυσει των πραγματων αυτων καταλ.). But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that things in themselves were incognisable, but that human faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their καταληπτικη φαντασια professed to be able to get at the thing in itself, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the καταλ. φαντ. and substituted no other mode of curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius treats his polemic against the καταλ. φαντ. as a mere feint intended to cover his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in [112] of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to be "quod impressum esset e vero" (φαντασια απο ‛υπαρχοντος εναπομεμαγμενη), refusing to add "quo modo imprimi non posset a falso (‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο απο μη ‛υπαρχοντος), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the δηλον or πιθανον of Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter that the wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite judgments on phenomena. (See [78] of this book.) The scarcity of references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book entitled Academica (pp. 313—316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles of doubt, to be correct ([12]). I may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical works at the outset of Stobaeus' Ethica, he would appear to have afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as genuinely Academic. Revolvitur: cf. De Div. II. 13, also [148] of this book. Eam definitionem: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that all knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on the truth of the individual perception of sense.

[§§19]—[29]. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain the truth of every sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we always do remove them where we can ([19]). What power the cultivated senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! ([20]). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at definitions and ideas ([21]). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible ([22]). That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false? ([23]) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her? There must he some ground on which action can proceed ([24]). Credence must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action is impossible ([25]). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should be brought to light ([26]). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis ([27]). Hence the Academics have been urged to allow their dogma that perception is impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there can be any true perception ([28]). Antiochus declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they had not even confidence in their one dogma ([29]).

[§19]. Sensibus: it is important to observe that the word sensus like αισθησις means two things, (1) one of the five senses, (2) an individual act of sensation. Deus: for the supposed god cf. T.D. II. 67. Non videam: this strong statement is ridiculed in [80]. De remo inflexo et de collo columbae: cf. [79], [82]. The κωπη εναλος κεκλασμενη and περιστερας τραχηλος are frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. Pyrrhon. Hypot. I. 119-121, Adv. Math. VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. Cont. Ac. III. 27. Epicurus hoc viderit: see [79], [80]. Epic. held all sensation, per se, to be infallible. The chief authorities for this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. Lumen mutari: cf. Brut. 261. Intervalla ... diducimus: for this cf. Sext. Pyrrh. I. 118 πεμπτος εστι λογος (i.e. the 5th sceptic τροπος for showing sense to be untrustworthy) ‛ο παρα τας θεσεις (situs) και τα διαστηματα (intervalla) και τους τοπους. Multaque facimus usque eo: Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 258 παντα ποιει μεχρις αν τρανην και πληκτικην σπαση φαντασιαν. Sui iudicii: see for the gen. M.D.F. II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut. Persa V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer. Sui cuiusque: for this use of suus quisque as a single word see M.D.F. V. 46.

[§20]. Ut oculi ... cantibus: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other hand I think it appropriate and almost necessary. Quis est quin cernat: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (D.F. II. 27). Umbris ... eminentia: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses umbra and lumen, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. σκια and σκιασμα are opposed to λαμπρα; cf. also σκιαγραφειν, adumbrare, and Aesch. Agam. 1328. Cic. often applies metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. De Or. III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17, 21. Inflatu: cf. [86] (where an answer is given) and αναβολη. Antiopam: of Pacuvius. Andromacham: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as De Div. I. 23. Interiorem: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools, 296. Quia sentiatur: αισθησις being their only κριτηριον. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. cui adsentiatur, comparing [39], [58]; cf. also [76]. Inter eum ... et inter: for the repetition of inter cf. T.D. IV. 32 and Madv. Gram. 470. Nihil interesse: if the doctrine of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied himself in pleasure, and vice versa; thus the distinction between pleasure and pain would be obscured. Sentiet ... insaniat: For the sequence cf. D.F. I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on T.D. V. 102.

[§21]. Illud est album: these are αξιωματα, judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too long to quote entire: αισθησεσι μεν ουν μοναις λαβειν ταληθες (which resides only in the αξιωμα) ου δυναται ανθρωπος. ... φυσει γαρ εισιν αλογοι ... δει δε εις φαντασιαν αχθηναι του τοιουτου πραγματος "τουτο λευκον εστι και τουτο γλυκυ εστιν." τωι δε τοιουτωι πραγματι ουκετι της αισθησεως εργον εστιν επιβαλλειν ... συνεσεως τε δει και μνημης. Ille deinceps: deinceps is really out of place; cf. [24] quomodo primum for pr. quom. Ille equus est: Cic. seems to consider that the αξιωμα, which affirms the existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from the Greek texts. Expletam comprehensionem: full knowledge. Here we rise to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. Adv. Math. VII. ανθρωπος εστι ζωον λογικον θνητον, νου και επιστημης δεκτικον. The Stoic ‛οροι, and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, Pyrrh. Hyp. II. 208—211. Notitiae: this Cic. uses as a translation both of προληψις and εννοια, for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. [40] notiones rerum is given. Sine quibus: δια γαρ των εννοιων τα πραγματα λαμβανεται Diog. VII. 42.

[§22]. Igitur: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. Gram. 480. Consentaneum: so Sextus constantly uses ακολουθον. Repugnaret: cf. I. [19] and n. Memoriae certe: n. on [106]. Continet: cf. contineant in [40]. Quae potest esse: Cic. nearly always writes putat esse, potest esse and the like, not esse putat etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause. Memoria falsorum: this difficulty is discussed in Plato Sophist. 238—239. Ex multis animi perceptionibus: the same definition of an art occurs in N.D. II. 148, D.F. III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II. 17, 41, Sext. Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 188 τεχνην ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεον συγγεγυμνασμενων ib. III. 250. Quam: for the change from plural to singular (perceptio in universum) cf. n. on I. [38], Madv. D.F. II. 61, Em. 139. Qui distingues: Sext. Adv. Math. VIII. 280 ου διοισει της ατεχνιας ‛η τεχνη. Sextus often comments on similar complaints of the Stoics. Aliud eiusmodi genus sit: this distinction is as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext. Adv. Math. XI. 197 who adds a third class of τεχναι called αποτελεσματικαι to the usual θεωρητικαι and πρακτικαι, also Quint. II. 18, 1 and 2, where ποιητικη corresponds to the αποτ. of Sext. Continget: "will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb contingit denotes necessarily good fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on T.D. III. 4. Tractabit: μελλει μεταχειριζεσθαι.

[§23]. Cognitio: like Germ. lehre, the branch of learning which concerns the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of καταληψις here. In quibus: the antecedent is not virtutum, as Petrus Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but multa. This is shown by etiam; not merely the virtues but also all επιστημη depends on καταληψεις; cf. I. [40], [41], with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. Stabilem: βεβαιον και αμεταπτωτου. Artem vivendi: "tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos" M.D.F. I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about ‛η ονειροπολουμενη περι τον βιον τεχνη (Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 250) the existence of which he disproves to his own satisfaction (Adv. Math. XI. 168 sq). Ille vir bonus: in all ancient systems, even the Epicurean, the happiness of the sapiens must be proof against the rack; cf. esp. D.F. III. 29, 75, T.D. V. 73, Zeller 450, and the similar description of the σοφος in Plato's Gorgias. Potius quam aut: Lamb. ut; but I think C.F. Hermann is right in asserting after Wopkens that Cic. never inserts ut after potius quam with the subj. Tischer on T.D. II. 52 affirms that ut is frequently found, but gives no exx. For the meaning cf. De Off. I. 86, Aug. Cont. Ac. II. 12 who says the sapiens of the Academy must be desertor officiorum omnium. Comprehensi ... constituti: cf. the famous abiit, evasit, excessit, crupit. Iis rebus: note the assumption that the sensation corresponds to the thing which causes it. Adsensus sit ... possint: nearly all edd. before Halm read possunt, but the subj. expresses the possibility as present to the mind of the supposed vir bonus. Cf. Madv. Gram. 368.

[§24]. Primum: out of place, see on [21]. Agere: the dogmatist always held that the sceptic must, if consistent, be ανενεργητος εν βιωι (Sext. Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 23). Extremum: similar attempts to translate τελος are made in D.F. I. 11, 29, V. 17. Cum quid agere: cf. I. [23] for the phrase Naturae accommodatum. a purely Stoic expression, ‛ωμοιωμενον τη φυσει; cf. [38] and D.F. V. 17, also III. 16, Zeller 227, footnote, R. and P. 390. Impellimur: κινουμεθα, Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 391, as often.

[§25]. Oportet videri: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. [39], [81] and [122] of this book. Videri at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to seem." Lucretius often passes rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I. 262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also M.D.F. II. 52, Em. Liv. p. 42. Non poterit: as the Academics allege. Naturae ... alienum: Cic. uses this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by ab; I doubt whether the phrase maiestate alienum (without the preposition) can be right in De Div. II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. Non occurrit ... aget: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on [127].

[§26]. Quid quod si: Goer., outrageously reads quid quod si, si. Tollitur: the verb tollere occurs as frequently in this sense as αναιρειν does in Sextus. Lux lumenque: Bentl. dux The expression dux vitae is of course frequent (cf. N.D. I. 40, T.D. V. 5 and Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. Lux is properly natural light, lumen artificial, cf. Ad Att. XVI. 13, 1. lumina dimiseramus, nec satis lucebat, D.F. III. 45 solis luce ... lumen lucernae. There is the same difference between φως and φεγγος, the latter is used for the former (φεγγος ‛ηλιου) just as lumen is for lux (si te secundo lumine his offendere—Ad Att. VII. 26, 1) but not often vice versa. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 269 where the φαντασια is called φεγγος. Finis: so in the beginning of the Nicom. Eth. Aristot. assumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof that there is a τελος. Aperta: a reminiscence of the frequently recurring Greek terms εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος etc., cf. Sextus passim, and D.F. I. 30. Initium ... exitus = αρχη ... τελος. Tenetur: MSS. tenet, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be ratio above. Αποδειξις: cf. the definition very often given by Sext. e.g. Pyrrh. Hyp. II. 143 λογος δι' ‛ομολογουμενων λημματων (premisses) κατα συναγωγην επιφοραν (conclusion) εκκαλυπτων αδηλον, also Diog. VII. 45, λογον δια των μαλλον καταλαμβανομενων το ‛ηττον καταλαμβανομενον περαινοντα (if the reading be right).

[§27]. Notio: another trans. of εννοια. Conclusisse: although the Greeks used συμπερασμα instead of επιφορα sometimes for the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb συμπεραινειν which has been supposed to correspond to concludere. It is more likely to be a trans. of συναγειν, and conclusum argumentum of συνακτικος λογος, which terms are of frequent occurrence. Rationibus progredi: to a similar question Sextus answers, ουκ εστιν αναγκαιον τας εκεινον (the dogmatists) δογματολογιας προβαινειν, πλασματωδεις ‛υπαρχουσας (Adv. Math. VIII. 367). Sapientiae ... futurum est: for the dat. with facio and fio see Madv. Gram. 241, obs. 5, Opusc. I. 370, D.F. II. 79, and cf. [96] of this book. Lex veri rectique: cf. [29]; the constitutio veri and the determination of what is rectum in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy. Sapientique satis non sit: so Manut. for the sapientisque sit of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads sapientis, neque satis sit, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run neque dubitari potest quin satis sit, which gives the exact opposite of the sense required. Ratum: cf. [141].

[§28]. Perceptum: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very frequent in Sextus, e.g. Adv. Math. VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be provable. Cf. [109] of this book. Postulanti: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. De Leg. I. 21. Consentaneum esse: ακολουθον ειναι. Ut alia: although others. Tantum abest ut—ut: cf. Madv. Gram. 440 a.

[§29]. Pressius: cf. De Fato 31, 33, N.D. II. 20, T.D. IV. 14, Hortensius fragm. 46 ed. Nobbe. The word is mocked in [109]. Decretum: of course the Academics would say they did not hold this δογμα as stabile fixum ratum but only as probabile. Sextus however Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. Sentitis enim: cf. sentis in D.F. III. 26. Fluctuare: "to be at sea," Halm fluctuari, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. Summa: cf. summa philosophiae D.F. II. 86. Veri falsi: cf. n. on [92]. Quae visa: so Halm for MSS. quaevis, which edd. had changed to quae a quovis. Repudiari: the selection depended on the probabile of course, with the Academics. Veri falsique: these words were used in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, ψιλη φασει ισον φερεται ψιλη φασις (A.M. VII. 315), φασει μεν φασις επισχεθησεται (ib. 337). Cognoscendi initium: cf. [26], "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in my probabile." Extremum expetendi: a rather unusual phrase for the ethical finis. Ut moveri non possint: so κινεισθαι is perpetually used in Sext. Est ut opinor: so Halm after Ernesti for sit of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS. reading is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the Greek ‛ικανος ειοησθω and the like. The subj. is supported by D.F. III. 20, De Off. I. 8, Ad Att. XIII. 14, 3, where ut opinor is thrown in as here, and by Ac. II. [17], D.F. III. 21, 24, N.D. I. 109, where si placet is appended in a similar way.

[§§30]—[36]. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge ([30]). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion ([31]). Some sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence. Let us deal with these rather than with the former ([32]). Now they on the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is possible ([33]). This is absurd, a thing cannot be known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing. How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be "evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom ([34])? There is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known. Their "probability" then is mere random guess work ([35]). Even if they only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circumstances, we reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless ([36]).

[§30]. Physicis: neuter not masc.; cf. I. [6]. Libertatem et licentiam: et = "and even." Libertas = παρρησια as often in Tacitus. Abditis rebus et obscuris: cf. n. on I. [15], and the word συνεσκιασμενος Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 26. Lucem eripere: like tollere (n. on [26]), cf. [38], [103] and N.D. I. 6. For the sense see n. on [16], also [61]. Artificio: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to ars in all its senses, cf. [114] and De Or. II. 83. Fabricata esset: the expression is sneered at in [87]. Quem ad modum primum: so Halm rightly for MSS. prima or primo, which latter is not often followed by deinde in Cicero. Primum is out of position, as in [24]. Appetitio pulsa: = mota, set in motion. For ‛ορμη see [24]. Intenderemus: as in the exx. given in [20]. Fons: "reservoir," rather than "source" here. It will be noted that συγκαταθεσις must take place before the ‛ορμη is roused. Ipse sensus est: an approach to this theory is made in Plat. Theaet. 185, 191. Cf. especially Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 350 και ‛οι μεν διαφερειν αυτην των αισθησεων, ‛ως ‛οι πλειους, ‛οι δε αυτην ειναι τας αισθησεις ... ‛ης στασεως ηρξε Στρατον. All powers of sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included in the ‛ηγεμονικον, cf. n. on I. [38]. Alia quasi: so Faber for aliqua. "In vera et aperta partitione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis—alius dixit, multo minus alius—aliquis," M.D.F. III. 63. Goer. on the other hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to produce them. Recondit: so the εννοιαι are called αποκειμεναι νοησεις (Plut. De Sto. Repug. p. 1057 a). In Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 373 μνημη is called θησαυρισμος φαντασιων. Similitudinibus: καθ' ‛ομοιωσιν Sext. Pyrr. Hyp. II. 75. Cic. uses this word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know things not immediately perceived by sense. In D.F. III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there, and the passages he quotes, "analogies" will here best translate the word, which, is used in the same wide sense in N.D. II. 22 38. Construit: so MSS. Orelli gave constituit. Notitiae: cf. [22]. Cic. fails to distinguish between the φυσικαι εννοιαι or κοιναι which are the προληψεις, and those εννοιαι which are the conscious product of the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. M.D.F. III. 21, V. 60, for this and other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79. Rerumque: "facts". Perfecta: sapientia, virtus, perfecta ratio, are almost convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. I. [20].

[§31]. Vitaeque constantiam: which philosophy brings, see [23]. Cognitionem: επιστημην. Cognitio is used to translate καταληψις in D.F. II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. [41]. Ut dixi ... dicemus: For the repetition cf. [135], [146], and M.D.F. I. 41. The future tense is odd and unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote dicimus, I would rather read dicamus; cf. n. on [29]. Per se: καθ' αυτην, there is no need to read propter, as Lamb. Ut virtutem efficiat: note that virtue is throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the reason. Evertunt: cf. eversio in [99]. Animal ... animo: Cic. allows animus to all animals, not merely anima; see Madv. D.F. V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v. animans is therefore wrong. Temeritate: προπετεια, which occurs passim in Sext. The word, which is constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of retort. So in Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 260, the sceptic is called εμβροντητος for rejecting the καταληπτικη φαντασια.

[§32]. Incerta: αδηλα. Democritus: cf. I. [44]. Quae ... abstruserit: "because she has hidden." Alii autem: note the ellipse of the verb, and cf. I. [2]. Etiam queruntur: "actually complain;" "go so far as to complain." Inter incertum: cf. Numenius in Euseb. Pr. Ev. XIV. 7, 12, διαφοραν ειναι αδηλου και ακαταληπτου, και παντα μεν ειναι ακαταληπτα ου παντα δε αδηλα (quoted as from Carneades), also [54] of this book. Docere: "to prove," cf. n. on [121]. Qui haec distinguunt: the followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. [45]. Stellarum numerus: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in Sext. e.g. P.H. II. 90, 98, A.M. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is reckoned among things αιωνιον εχοντα αγνωσιαν. So in the Psalms, God only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf. [110]. Aliquos: contemptuous; απονενοημενους τινας. Cf. Parad. 33 agrestis aliquos. Moveri: this probably refers to the speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. [51]. Aug. Cont. Ac. III. 15 refers to this passage, which must have been preserved in the second edition.

[§33]. Veri et falsi: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repetition is pointed and appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether." The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use the term "true" to denote the probably true, the Academics are not open to the criticism here attempted; cf. [111] tam vera quam falsa cernimus. Ut inter rectum et pravum: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute certainty of this distinction than of the other. Communis: the απαραλλακτος of Sextus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf. κοινη φαντασια αληθους και ψευδους Sext. A.M. VII. 164 (R. and P. 410), also 175. Notam: the σημειον of Sextus; cf. esp. P.H. II. 97 sq. Eodem modo falsum: Sext. A.M. VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) ουδεμια εστιν αληθης φαντασια ‛οια ουκ αν γενοιτο ψευδης. Ut si quis: Madv. in an important n. on D.F. IV. 30 explains this thus; ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit dicere. I do not think our passage at all analogous to those he quotes, and still prefer to construe quem as a strong relative, making a pause between quis and quem. Visionem: Simply another trans. of φαντασια. Ut Carneades: see Sext. A.M. VII. 166 την τε πιθανην φαντασιαν και την πιθανην ‛αμα και απερισπαστον και διεξωδευμενην (R. and P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give Sextus' own explanation. The merely πιθανη is that sensation which at first sight, without any further inquiry, seems probably true (Sext. A.M. VII. 167—175). Now no sensation is perceived alone; the percipient subject has always other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (περισπαν, περιελκειν) from the one which is the immediate object of his attention. This last is only called απερισπαστος when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (Sext. as above 175—181.) The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The διεξωδευμενη ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent agreement of the concomitant sensations with the principal one. Circumstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the space within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (Sext. 181—189).

[§34]. Communitas: απαραλλαξια or επιμιξια των φαντασιων; Sext. A.M. VII. 403, P.H. I. 127. Proprium: so Sext. often uses ιδιομα, e.g. A. M. IX. 410. Signo notari: signo for nota, merely from love of variety. The in before communi, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after notare in De Or., III. 186. Convicio: so Madv. Em. 143 corrected the corrupt MSS. readings, comparing Orator 160, Ad Fam. XV. 18. A.W. Zumpt on Pro Murena 13 rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "Non unum maledictum appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio." He is wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word once in the plural (Ad Att. II. 18, 1), for it occurs N.D. II. 20, and elsewhere. Perspicua: εναργη, a term used with varying signification by all the later Greek schools. Verum illud quidem: "which is indeed what they call 'true'." Impressum: n. on [18]. Percipi atque comprehendi: Halm retains the barbarous ac of the MSS. before the guttural. It is quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both trans. of καταλαμβανεσθαι; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described in D.F. III. 14 erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus. Subtiliter: Cic.'s constant trans. of ακριβως or κατ' ακριβειαν (passim in Sext. e.g. P.H. II. 123). Inaniterne moveatur: MSS. agree in ve for ne, on which see M.D.F. IV. 76. Inaniter = κενως = ψευδως. Cf. n. on I. [35], also II. [47], D.F. V. 3 (inaniter moveri), T.D. IV. 13, De Div. II. 120, 126, 140 (per se moveri), Greek κενοπαθειν (Sext. P.H. II. 49), κενοπαθεια (= inanis motus, Sext. A.M. VIII. 184), κενοπαθηματα και αναπλασματα της διανοιας (ib. VIII. 354), διακενος ‛ελκυσμος (ib. VII. 241), διακενος φαντασια (ib. VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase κινημα της διανοιας. For the meaning see n. on [47]. Relinquitur: so in Sext. απολειπειν is constantly used as the opposite of αναιρειν (tollere).

[§35]. Neminem etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any mark of certainty. Primo quasi adspectu: the merely πιθανη φαντασια is here meant; see [33].

[§36]. Ex circumspectione, etc.: the διεξωδευμενη; see n. on [33]. Primum quia ... deinde: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. M.D.F ed. II. p. 796. Iis visis, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of things, emitting a number of appearances, and you cannot be sure of uniting each appearance to the thing from which it proceeds, then you can have no faith in any appearance even if you have gone through the process required by Carneades' rules. Ad verum ipsum: cf. [40]. Quam proxime: cf. [47], and also [7]. Insigne: σημειον, the same as nota and signum above. Quo obscurato: so Lamb. for MSS. obscuro which Halm keeps. Cf. quam obscurari volunt in [42] and quo sublato in [33]. Argumentum: Cic. seems to be thinking of the word τεκμηριον, which, however, the Stoics hardly use. Id quod significatur: το σημειωντον in Sext.

[§§37]—[40]. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to phenomena ([37]). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life ([38], [39]).

[§37]. Explicabamus: [19]—[21] and [30] (quae vis esset in sensibus). Inanimum: not inanimatum, cf. M.D.F. IV. 36. Agit aliquid: I. [23]. Quae est in nostra: Walker's insertion of non before est is needless, cf. n. on I. [40]. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the assent given to it, that is involuntary (Sext. A.M. VIII. 397 το μεν γαρ φαντασιωθηναι αβουλητον ην). For in potestate cf. De Fato 9, N.D. I. 69

[§38]. Eripitur: cf. [30]. Neque sentire: Christ om. neque; but the sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. Cedere: cf. εικειν, ειξις in Sext. P.H. I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51, των δε αισθητικων μετα ειξεως και συγκαταθεσεως γινονται [‛αι φαντασια]; also [66] of this book. Οικειον: cf. [34]. Adsentitur statim: this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before, esp. [20]. Memoriam: cf. [22]. In nostra potestate: this may throw light on fragm. [15] of the Ac. Post., which see.

[§39]. Virtus: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. [40]. Ante videri aliquid for the doctrine cf. [25], for the passive use of videri, n. on [25]. Adsentiatur: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. Em. 131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after necesse est on D.F. V. 25. Tollit e vita: so De Fato 29.

[§§40]—[42]. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different classes of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong arguments, (1) things which produce sensations such as might have been produced in the same form by other things, cannot be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) sensations must be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real perceptions, while the true are always of a form which the false may assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also a perception ([40]). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. The following two assertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an unreality ([41]). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either class ([42]). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known sensation.">[

[§40]. Quasi fundamenta: a trans. probably of θεμελιος or the like; cf. ‛ωσπερ θεμελιος in Sext. A.M. V. 50. Artem: method, like τεχνη, cf. M.D.F. III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. Vim: the general character which attaches to all φαντασιαι; genera the different classes of φαντασιαι. Totidem verbis: of course with a view to showing that nothing really corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the reductio ad absurdum method. Contineant ... quaestionem: cf. [22] and T.D. IV. 65 una res videtur causam continere. Quae ita: it is essential throughout this passage to distinguish clearly the sensation (visum) from the thing which causes it. Here the things are meant; two things are supposed to cause two sensations so similar that the person who has one of the sensations cannot tell from which of the two things it comes. Under these circumstances the sceptics urge that it is absurd to divide things into those which can be perceived (known with certainty) and those which cannot. Nihil interesse autem: the sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to discern whatever difference may exist, cf. [85]. Alia vera sunt: Numenius in Euseb. Pr. Ev. XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of things, though not of sensations. If we could only pierce through a sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume that sensation and thing correspond. Cf. Sext. P.H. I. 22 περι μεν του φαισθαι τοιον η τοιον το ‛υποκειμενον (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds) ουδεις ισως αμφισβητει, περι δε του ει τοιουτον εστιν ‛οποιον φαινεται ζητειται. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them. Eiusdem modi: cf. [33] eodem modo. Non posse accidere: this is a very remarkable, and, as Madv. (D.F. I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from recta oratio to obliqua. Halm with Manut. reads potest. Cf. [101].

[§41]. Neque enim: a remark of Lucullus' merely. Quod sit a vero: cf. Munio on Lucr. II. 51 fulgor ab auro. Possit: for the om. of esse cf. n. on I. [29].

[§42]. Proposita: cf. προτασεις passim in Sext. In sensus: = in ea, quae ad sensus pertinent cf. I. [20]. Omni consuetudine: "general experience" εμπειρια, cf. N.D. I. 83. Quam obscurari volunt: cf. I. [33]. quod explanari volebant; the em. of Dav. obscurare is against Cic.'s usage, that of Christ quam observari nolunt is wanton without being ingenious. De reliquis: i.e. iis quae a sensibus ducuntur. In singulisque rebus: the word rebus must mean subjects, not things, to which the words in minima dispertiunt would hardly apply. Adiuncta: Sext. A.M. VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) πασηι τη δοκουσηι αληθει καθεσταναι ευρισκεται τις απαραλλακτος ψευδης, also VII. 438, etc.

[§§43]—[45]. Summary. The sceptics ought not to define, for (1) a definition cannot be a definition of two things, (2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that thing must be capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others ([43]). For the purposes of reasoning their probabile is not enough. Reasoning can only proceed upon certain premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference, then you contradict yourselves and say there is none ([44]). Let us discuss the matter farther. The innate clearness of visa, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge ([45]).

[§43]. Horum: Lamb. harum; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv. Gram. 214 b. Luminibus: cf. [101]. Nihilo magis: = ουδεν μαλλον, which was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g. Sext. P.H. I. 14. Num illa definitio ... transferri: I need hardly point out that the ‛ορος of the Academics was merely founded on probability, just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on [29]). An Academic would say in reply to the question, "probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it." Vel illa vera: these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them. Vel = "even" i.e. if even the definition is firmly known, the thing, which is more important, must also be known. In illa vera we have a pointed mocking repetition like that of veri et falsi in [33]. In falsum: note that falsum = aliam rem above. For the sense cf. Sext. P.H. II. 209 μοχθηρους ‛ορους ειναι τους περιεχοντας τι των μη προσοντων τοις ‛οριστοις, and the schoolmen's maxim definitio non debet latior esse definito suo. Minime volunt: cf. [18]. Partibus: Orelli after Goer. ejected this, but omnibus hardly ever stands for omn. rebus, therefore C.F. Hermann reads pariter rebus for partibus. A little closer attention to the subject matter would have shown emendation to be unnecessary, cf. [42] dividunt in partis, T.D. III. 24, where genus = division, pars = subdivision.

[§44]. Impediri ... fatebuntur: essentially the same argument as in [33] at the end. Occurretur: not an imitation of εναντιουσθαι as Goer. says, but of απανταν, which occurs very frequently in Sext. Sumpta: the two premisses are in Gk. called together λημματα, separately λημμα and προσληψις (sumptio et adsumptio De Div II. 108). Orationis: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes use this word like ratio (συλλογισμος), cf. De Leg. I. 48 conclusa oratio. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26. Profiteatur: so ‛υπισχνεισθαι is often used by Sext. e.g. A.M. VIII. 283. Patefacturum: n. on [26], εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος, δηλωτικος (the last in Sext. A.M. VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. Primum esse ... nihil interesse: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that visa, in themselves, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties were incapable of distinguishing those visa which proceed from real things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly represent it. Lucullus confuses essential with apparent difference. Non iungitur: a supposed case of διαρτησις, which is opposed to συναρτησις and explained in Sext. A.M. VIII. 430.

[§45]. Assentati: here simply = assensi. Praeteritis: here used in the strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. in remissis Orat. 59. Primum igitur ... sed tamen: for the slight anacoluthia cf. Madv. Gram. 480. Iis qui videntur: Goer. is qui videtur, which is severely criticised by Madv. Em. 150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see n. on [79], [80].

[§§46]—[48]. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate clearness of some phenomena (εναργεια) is due to two causes, (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic paradoxes ([46]). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? ([47]). Further, they urge that a phantom sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations do command assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? ([48])

[§46]. Circumfusa sint: Goer. retains the MSS. sunt on the ground that the clause quanta sint is inserted παρενθετικως! Orelli actually follows him. For the phrase cf. [122] circumfusa tenebris. Interrogationibus: cf. I. [5] where I showed that the words interrogatio and conclusio are convertible. I may add that in Sextus pure syllogisms are very frequently called ερωτησεις, and that he often introduces a new argument by ερωταται και τουτο, when there is nothing interrogatory about the argument at all. Dissolvere: απολυεσθαι in Sext. Occurrere: cf. [44].

[§47]. Confuse loqui: the mark of a bad dialectician, affirmed of Epicurus in D.F. II. 27. Nulla sunt: on the use of nullus for non in Cic. cf. Madv. Gram. 455 obs. 5. The usage is mostly colloquial and is very common in Plaut. and Terence, while in Cic. it occurs mostly in the Letters. Inaniter: cf. [34]. There are two ways in which a sensation may be false, (1) it may come from one really existent thing, but be supposed by the person who feels it to be caused by a totally different thing, (2) it may be a mere φαντασμα or αναπλασμα της διανοιας, a phantom behind which there is no reality at all. Quae in somnis videantur: for the support given by Stoics to all forms of divination see Zeller 166, De Div. I. 7, etc. Quaerunt: a slight anacoluthon from dicatis above. Quonam modo ... nihil sit omnino: this difficult passage can only be properly explained in connection with [50] and with the general plan of the Academics expounded in [41]. After long consideration I elucidate it as follows. The whole is an attempt to prove the proposition announced in [41] and [42] viz. omnibus veris visis adiuncta esse falsa. The criticism in [50] shows that the argument is meant to be based on the assumption known to be Stoic, omnia deum posse. If the god can manufacture (efficere) sensations which are false, but probable (as the Stoics say he does in dreams), why can he not manufacture false sensations which are so probable as to closely resemble true ones, or to be only with difficulty distinguishable from the true, or finally to be utterly indistinguishable from the true (this meaning of inter quae nihil sit omnino is fixed by [40], where see n.)? Probabilia, then, denotes false sensations such as have only a slight degree of resemblance to the true, by the three succeeding stages the resemblance is made complete. The word probabilia is a sort of tertiary predicate after efficere ("to manufacture so as to be probable"). It must not be repeated after the second efficere, or the whole sense will be inverted and this section placed out of harmony with [50]. Plane proxime: = quam proxime of [36].

[§48]. Ipsa per sese: simply = inaniter as in [34], [47], i.e. without the approach of any external object. Cogitatione: the only word in Latin, as διανοια is in Greek, to express our "imagination." Non numquam: so Madv. for MSS. non inquam. Goer. after Manut. wrote non inquiunt with an interrogation at omnino. Veri simile est: so Madv. D.F. III. 58 for sit. The argument has the same purpose as that in the last section, viz to show that phantom sensations may produce the same effect on the mind as those which proceed from realities. Ut si qui: the ut here is merely "as," "for instance," cf. n. on [33]. Nihil ut esset: the ut here is a repetition of the ut used several times in the early part of the sentence, all of them alike depend on sic. Lamb. expunged ut before esset and before quicquam. Intestinum et oblatum: cf. Sext. A.M. VII. 241 ητοι των εκτος η των εν ‛ημιν παθων, and the two classes of falsa visa mentioned in n. on [47]. Sin autem sunt, etc.: if there are false sensations which are probable (as the Stoics allow), why should there not be false sensations so probable as to be with difficulty distinguishable from the true? The rest exactly as in [47].

[§§49]—[53]. Antiochus attacked these arguments as soritae, and therefore faulty ([49]). The admission of a certain amount of similarity between true and false sensations does not logically lead to the impossibility of distinguishing between the true and the false ([50]). We contend that these phantom sensations lack that self evidence which we require before giving assent. When we have wakened from the dream, we make light of the sensations we had while in it ([51]). But, say our opponents, while they last our dreaming sensations are as vivid as our waking ones. This we deny ([52]). "But," say they, "you allow that the wise man in madness withholds his assent." This proves nothing, for he will do so in many other circumstances in life. All this talk about dreamers, madmen and drunkards is unworthy our attention ([53]).

[§49]. Antiochus: Sext. often quotes him in the discussion of this and similar subjects. Ipsa capita: αυτα τα κεφαλαια. Interrogationis: the sorites was always in the form of a series of questions, cf. De Div. II. 11 (where Cic. says the Greek word was already naturalised, so that his proposed trans. acervalis is unnecessary), Hortens. fragm. 47, and n. on [92]. Hoc vocant: i.e. hoc genus, cf. D.F. III. 70 ex eo genere, quae prosunt. Vitiosum: cf. D.F. IV. 50 ille sorites, quo nihil putatis (Stoici) vitiosius. Most edd. read hos, which indeed in [136] is a necessary em. for MSS. hoc. Tale visum: i.e. falsum. Dormienti: sc. τινι. Ut probabile sit, etc.: cf. [47], [48] and notes. Primum quidque: not quodque as Klotz; cf. M.D.F. II. 105, to whose exx. add De Div. II. 112, and an instance of proximus quisque in De Off. II. 75. Vitium: cf. vitiosum above.

[§50]. Omnia deum posse: this was a principle generally admitted among Stoics at least, see De Div. II. 86. For the line of argument here cf. De Div. II. 106 fac dare deos, quod absurdum est. Eadem: this does not mean that the two sensations are merged into one, but merely that when one of them is present, it cannot be distinguished from the other; see n. on [40]. Similes: after this sunt was added by Madv. In suo genere essent: substitute esse viderentur for essent, and you get the real view of the Academic, who would allow that things in their essence are divisible into sharply-defined genera, but would deny that the sensations which proceed from or are caused by the things, are so divisible.

[§51]. Una depulsio: cf. [128] (omnium rerum una est definitio comprehendendi), De Div. II. 136 (omnium somniorum una ratio est). In quiete: = in somno, a rather poetical usage. Narravit: Goer., Orelli, Klotz alter into narrat, most wantonly. Visus Homerus, etc.: this famous dream of Ennius, recorded in his Annals, is referred to by Lucr. I. 124, Cic. De Rep. VI. 10 (Somn. Scip. c. 1), Hor. Epist. II. 1, 50. Simul ut: rare in Cic., see Madv. D.F. II. 33, who, however, unduly restricts the usage. In three out of the five passages where he allows it to stand, the ut precedes a vowel; Cic. therefore used it to avoid writing ac before a vowel, so that in D.F. II. 33 ut should probably be written (with Manut. and others) for et which Madv. ejects.

[§52]. Eorumque: MSS. om. que. Dav. wrote ac before eorum, this however is as impossible in Cic. as the c before a guttural condemned in n. on [34]. For the argument see n. on [80] quasi vero quaeratur quid sit non quid videatur. Primum interest: for om. of deinde cf. [45], [46]. Imbecillius: cf. I. [41]. Edormiverunt: "have slept off the effects," cf. αποβριζειν in Homer. Relaxentur: cf. ανιεναι της οργης Aristoph. Ran. 700, relaxare is used in the neut. sense in D.F. II. 94. Alcmaeonis: the Alcmaeon of Ennius is often quoted by Cic., e.g. D.F. IV. 62.

[§53]. Sustinet: επεχει; see on [94]. Aliquando sustinere: the point of the Academic remark lay in the fact that in the state of madness the εποχη of the sapiens becomes habitual; he gives up the attempt to distinguish between true and false visa. Lucullus answers that, did no distinction exist, he would give up the attempt to draw it, even in the sane condition. Confundere: so [58], [110], Sext. A.M. VIII. 56 (συγχεουσι τα πραγματα), ib. VIII. 157 (συγχεομεν τον βιον), VIII. 372 (‛ολην συγχεει την φιλοσοφον ζητησιν), Plut. De Communi Notit. adv. Stoicos p. 1077 (‛ως παντα πραγματα συγχεουσι). Utimur: "we have to put up with," so χρησθαι is used in Gk. Ebriosorum: "habitual drunkards," more invidious than vinolenti above. Illud attendimus: Goer., and Orelli write num illud, but the emphatic ille is often thus introduced by itself in questions, a good ex. occurs in [136]. Proferremus: this must apparently be added to the exx. qu. by Madv. on D.F. II. 35 of the subj. used to denote "non id quod fieret factumve esset, sed quod fieri debuerit." As such passages are often misunderstood, I note that they can be most rationally explained as elliptic constructions in which a condition is expressed without its consequence. We have an exact parallel in English, e.g. "tu dictis Albane maneres" may fairly be translated, "hadst thou but kept to thy word, Alban!" Here the condition "if thou hadst kept, etc." stands without the consequence "thou wouldst not have died," or something of the kind. Such a condition may be expressed without si, just as in Eng. without "if," cf. Iuv. III. 78 and Mayor's n. The use of the Greek optative to express a wish (with ει γαρ, etc., and even without ει) is susceptible of the same explanation. The Latin subj. has many such points of similarity with the Gk. optative, having absorbed most of the functions of the lost Lat. optative. [Madv. on D.F. II. 35 seems to imply that he prefers the hypothesis of a suppressed protasis, but as in his Gram. 351 b, obs. 4 he attempts no elucidation, I cannot be certain.]

[§§54]—[63]. Summary. The Academics fail to see that such doctrines do away with all probability even. Their talk about twins and seals is childish ([54]). They press into their service the old physical philosophers, though ordinarily none are so much ridiculed by them ([55]). Democritus may say that innumerable worlds exist in every particular similar to ours, but I appeal to more cultivated physicists, who maintain that each thing has its own peculiar marks ([55], [56]). The Servilii were distinguished from one another by their friends, and Delian breeders of fowls could tell from the appearance of an egg which hen had laid it ([56], [57]). We however, do not much care whether we are able to distinguish eggs from one another or not. Another thing that they say is absurd, viz. that there may be distinction between individual sensations, but not between classes of sensations (58). Equally absurd are those "probable and undisturbed" sensations they profess to follow. The doctrine that true and false sensations are indistinguishable logically leads to the unqualified εποχη of Arcesilas (59). What nonsense they talk about inquiring after the truth, and about the bad influence of authority! (60). Can you, Cicero, the panegyrist of philosophy, plunge us into more than Cimmerian darkness? (61) By holding that knowledge is impossible you weaken the force of your famous oath that you "knew all about" Catiline. Thus ended Lucullus, amid the continued wonder of Hortensius (62, 63). Then Catulus said that he should not be surprised if the speech of Lucullus were to induce me to change my view (63).

[§54]. Ne hoc quidem: the common trans. "not even" for "ne quidem" is often inappropriate. Trans. here "they do not see this either," cf. n. on I. [5]. Habeant: the slight alteration habeat introduced by Goer. and Orelli quite destroys the point of the sentence. Quod nolunt: cf. [44]. An sano: Lamb. an ut sano, which Halm approves, and Baiter reads. Similitudines: cf. [84]—[86]. The impossibility of distinguishing between twins, eggs, the impressions of seals, etc. was a favourite theme with the sceptics, while the Stoics contended that no two things were absolutely alike. Aristo the Chian, who maintained the Stoic view, was practically refuted by his fellow pupil Persaeus, who took two twins, and made one deposit money with Aristo, while the other after a time asked for the money back and received it. On this subject cf. Sextus A.M. VII. 408—410. Negat esse: in phrases like this Cic. nearly always places esse second, especially at the end of a clause. Cur eo non estis contenti: Lucullus here ignores the question at issue, which concerned the amount of similarity. The dogmatists maintained that the similarity between two phenomena could never be great enough to render it impossible to guard against mistaking the one for the other, the sceptics argued that it could. Quod rerum natura non patitur: again Lucullus confounds essential with phenomenal difference, and so misses his mark; cf. n. on [50]. Nulla re differens: cf. the nihil differens of [99], the substitution of which here would perhaps make the sentence clearer. The words are a trans. of the common Gk. term απαραλλακτος (Sext. A.M. VII. 252, etc.). Ulla communitas: I am astonished to find Bait. returning to the reading of Lamb. nulla after the fine note of Madv. (Em. 154), approved by Halm and other recent edd. The opinion maintained by the Stoics may be stated thus suo quidque genere est tale, quale est, nec est in duobus aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas (ουδε ‛υπαρχει επιμιγη απαραλλακτος). This opinion is negatived by non patitur ut and it will be evident at a glance that the only change required is to put the two verbs (est) into the subjunctive. The change of ulla into nulla is in no way needed. Ut [sibi] sint: sibi is clearly wrong here. Madv., in a note communicated privately to Halm and printed by the latter on p. 854 of Bait. and Halm's ed of the philosophical works, proposed to read nulla re differens communitas visi? Sint et ova etc. omitting ulla and ut and changing visi into sibi (cf. Faber's em. novas for bonas in [72]). This ingenious but, as I think, improbable conj. Madv. has just repeated in the second vol. of his Adversaria. Lamb. reads at tibi sint, Dav. at si vis, sint, Christ ut tibi sint, Bait. ut si sint after C.F.W. Muller, I should prefer sui for sibi (SVI for SIBI). B is very frequently written for V in the MSS., and I would easily slip in. Eosdem: once more we have Lucullus' chronic and perhaps intentional misconception of the sceptic position; see n. on [50]. Before leaving this section, I may point out that the επιμιγη or επιμιξια των φαντασιων supplies Sext. with one of the sceptic τροποι, see Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 124.

[§55]. Irridentur: the contradictions of physical philosophers were the constant sport of the sceptics, cf. Sext. A.M. IX. 1. Absolute ita paris: Halm as well as Bait. after Christ, brackets ita; if any change be needed, it would be better to place it before undique. For this opinion of Democr. see R. and P. 45. Et eo quidem innumerabilis: this is the quite untenable reading of the MSS., for which no satisfactory em. has yet been proposed, cf. [125]. Nihil differat, nihil intersit: these two verbs often appear together in Cic., e.g.D.F. III. 25.

[§56]. Potiusque: this adversative use of que is common with potius, e.g.D.F. I. 51. Cf. T.D. II. 55 ingemescere nonnum quam viro concessum est, idque raro, also ac potius, Ad Att. I. 10, etc. Proprietates: the ιδιοτητες or ιδιωματα of Sextus, the doctrine of course involves the whole question at issue between dogmatism and scepticism. Cognoscebantur: Dav. dignoscebantur, Walker internoscebantur. The MSS. reading is right, cf. [86]. Consuetudine: cf. [42], "experience". Minimum: an adverb like summum.

[§57]. Dinotatas: so the MSS., probably correctly, though Forc. does not recognise the word. Most edd. change it into denotatas. Artem: τεχνην, a set of rules. In proverbio: so venire in proverbium, in proverbii usum venire, proverbii locum obtinere, proverbii loco dici are all used. Salvis rebus: not an uncommon phrase, e.g. Ad Fam. IV. 1. Gallinas: cf. fragm. [19] of the Acad. Post. The similarity of eggs was discussed ad nauseam by the sceptics and dogmatists. Hermagoras the Stoic actually wrote a book entitled, ωι σκοπια (egg investigation) η περι σοφιστειας προς Ακαδημαικους, mentioned by Suidas.

[§58]. Contra nos: the sense requires nos, but all Halm's MSS. except one read vos. Non internoscere: this is the reading of all the MSS., and is correct, though Orelli omits non. The sense is, "we are quite content not to be able to distinguish between the eggs, we shall not on that account be led into a mistake for our rule will prevent us from making any positive assertion about the eggs." Adsentiri: for the passive use of this verb cf. [39]. Par est: so Dav. for per, which most MSS. have. The older edd. and Orelli have potest, with one MS. Quasi: the em. of Madv. for the quam si of the MSS. Transversum digitum: cf. [116]. Ne confundam omnia: cf. [53], [110]. Natura tolletur: this of course the sceptics would deny. They refused to discuss the nature of things in themselves, and kept to phenomena. Intersit: i.e. inter visa. In animos: Orelli with one MS. reads animis; if the MSS. are correct the assertion of Krebs and Allgayer (Antibarbarus, ed. 4) "imprimere wird klas sisch verbunden in aliqua re, nicht in aliquam rem," will require modification. Species et quasdam formas: ειδη και γενη, quasdam marks the fact that formas is a trans. I have met with no other passage where any such doctrine is assigned to a sceptic. As it stands in the text the doctrine is absurd, for surely it must always be easier to distinguish between two genera than between two individuals. If the non before vos were removed a better sense would be given. It has often been inserted by copyists when sed, tamen, or some such word, comes in the following clause, as in the famous passage of Cic Ad Quintum Fratrem, II. 11, discussed by Munro, Lucr. p. 313, ed. 3.

[§59]. Illud vero perabsurdum: note the omission of est, which often takes place after the emphatic pronoun. Impediamini: cf. n. on [33]. A veris: if visis be supplied the statement corresponds tolerably with the Academic belief, if rebus be meant, it is wide of the mark. Id est ... retentio: supposed to be a gloss by Man., Lamb., see however nn. on I. [6], [8]. Constitit: from consto, not from consisto cf. [63] qui tibi constares. Si vera sunt: cf. [67], [78], [112], [148]. The nonnulli are Philo and Metrodorus, see [78]. Tollendus est adsensus: i.e. even that qualified assent which the Academics gave to probable phenomena. Adprobare: this word is ambiguous, meaning either qualified or unqualified assent. Cf. n. on [104]. Id est peccaturum: "which is equivalent to sinning," cf. I. [42]. Iam nimium etiam: note iam and etiam in the same clause.

[§60]. Pro omnibus: note omnibus for omnibus rebus. Ista mysteria: Aug. Contra Ac. III. 37, 38 speaks of various doctrines, which were servata et pro mysteriis custodita by the New Academics. The notion that the Academic scepticism was merely external and polemically used, while they had an esoteric dogmatic doctrine, must have originated in the reactionary period of Metrodorus (of Stratonice), Philo, and Antiochus, and may perhaps from a passage of Augustine, C. Ac. III. 41 (whose authority must have been Cicero), be attributed to the first of the three (cf. Zeller 534, n.). The idea is ridiculed by Petrus Valentia (Orelli's reprint, p. 279), and all succeeding inquirers. Auctoritate: cf. [8], [9]. Utroque: this neuter, referring to two fem. nouns, is noticeable, see exx. in Madv. Gram. 214 c.

[§61]. Amicissimum: "because you are my dear friend". Commoveris: a military term, cf. De Div. II. 26 and Forc., also Introd. p. [53]. Sequere: either this is future, as in [109], or sequeris, the constant form in Cic. of the pres., must be read. Approbatione omni: the word omni is emphatic, and includes both qualified and unqualified assent, cf. [59]. Orbat sensibus: cf. [74], and D.F. I. 64, where Madv. is wrong in reproving Torquatus for using the phrase sensus tolli, on the ground that the Academics swept away not sensus but iudicium sensuum Cimmeriis. Goer. qu. Plin. N.H. III. 5, Sil. Ital. XII. 131, Festus, s.v. Cimmerii, to show that the town or village of Cimmerium lay close to Bauli, and probably induced this mention of the legendary people. Deus aliquis: so the best edd. without comment, although they write deus aliqui in [19]. It is difficult to distinguish between aliquis and aliqui, nescio quis and nescio qui, si quis and si qui (for the latter see n. on [81]). As aliquis is substantival, aliqui adjectival, aliquis must not be written with impersonal nouns like terror (T.D. IV. 35, V. 62), dolor (T.D. I. 82, Ad Fam. VII. 1, 1), casus (De Off. III. 33). In the case of personal nouns the best edd. vary, e.g. deus aliqui (T.D. I. 23, IV. 35), deus aliquis (Lael. 87, Ad Fam. XIV. 7, 1), anularius aliqui ([86] of this book), magistratus aliquis (In Verr. IV. 146). With a proper name belonging to a real person aliquis ought to be written (Myrmecides in [120], see my n.). Dispiciendum: not despiciendum, cf. M.D.F. II. 97, IV. 64, also De Div. II. 81, verum dispicere. Iis vinculis, etc. this may throw light on fragm. [15] of the Acad. Post., which see.

[§62]. Motum animorum: n. on [34]. Actio rerum: here actio is a pure verbal noun like πραξις, cf. De Off. I. 83, and expressions like actio vitae (N.D. I. 2), actio ullius rei ([108] of this book), and the similar use of actus in Quintilian (Inst. Or. X. 1, 31, with Mayor's n.) Iuratusque: Bait. possibly by a mere misprint reads iratus. Comperisse: this expression of Cic., used in the senate in reference to Catiline's conspiracy, had become a cant phrase at Rome, with which Cic. was often taunted. See Ad Fam. V. 5, 2, Ad Att. I. 14, 5. Licebat: this is the reading of the best MSS., not liquebat, which Goer., Kl., Or. have. For the support accorded by Lucullus to Cic. during the conspiracy see [3], and the passages quoted in Introd. p. [46] with respect to Catulus, in most of which Lucullus is also mentioned.

[§63]. Quod ... fecerat, ut: different from the constr. treated by Madv. Gram. 481 b. Quod refers simply to the fact of Lucullus' admiration, which the clause introduced by ut defines, "which admiration he had shown ... to such an extent that, etc." Iocansne an: this use of ne ... an implies, Madv. says (on D.F. V. 87), more doubt than the use of ne alone as in vero falsone. Memoriter: nearly all edd. before Madv. make this mean e memoria as opposed to de scripto; he says, "laudem habet bonae et copiosae memoriae" (on D.F. I. 34). See Krebs and Allgayer in the Antibarbarus, ed. 4. Censuerim: more modest than censeo, see Madv. Gram. 380. Tantum enim non te modo monuit: edd. before Madv., seeing no way of taking modo exc. with non, ejected it. Madv. (Em. 160) retains it, making it mean paulo ante. On the other hand, Halm after Christ asserts that tantum non = μονον ου occurs nowhere else in Cic. Bait. therefore ejects non, taking tantum as hoc tantum, nihil praeterea. Livy certainly has the suspected use of tantum non. Tribunus: a retort comes in [97], [144]. Antiochum: cf. I. [13]. Destitisse: on the difference between memini followed by the pres. and by the perf. inf. consult Madv. Gram. 408 b, obs. 2.

[§§64]—[71]. Summary. Cic. much moved thus begins. The strength of Lucullus argument has affected me much, yet I feel that it can be answered. First, however, I must speak something that concerns my character ([64]). I protest my entire sincerity in all that I say, and would confirm it by an oath, were that proper ([65]). I am a passionate inquirer after truth, and on that very account hold it disgraceful to assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make slips, but we must deal with the sapiens, whose characteristic it is never to err in giving his assent ([66]). Hear Arcesilas' argument: if the sapiens ever gives his assent he will be obliged to opine, but he never will opine therefore he never will give his assent. The Stoics and Antiochus deny the first of these statements, on the ground that it is possible to distinguish between true and false ([67]). Even if it be so the mere habit of assenting is full of peril. Still, our whole argument must tend to show that perception in the Stoic sense is impossible ([68]). However, a few words first with Antiochus. When he was converted, what proof had he of the doctrine he had so long denied? ([69]) Some think he wished to found a school called by his own name. It is more probable that he could no longer bear the opposition of all other schools to the Academy ([70]). His conversion gave a splendid opening for an argumentum ad hominem ([71]).

[§64]. Quadam oratione: so Halm, also Bait. after the best MSS., not quandam orationem as Lamb., Orelli. De ipsa re: cf. de causa ipsa above. Respondere posse: for the om. of me before the infin, which has wrongly caused many edd. either to read respondere (as Dav., Bait.) or to insert me (as Lamb.), see n. on I. [7].

[§65]. Studio certandi: = φιλονεικια. Pertinacia ... calumnia: n. on [14]. Iurarem: Cic. was thinking of his own famous oath at the end of his consulship.

[§66]. Turpissimum: cf. I. [45], N.D. I. 1. Opiner: opinio or δοξα is judgment based on insufficient grounds. Sed quaerimus de sapiente: cf. [115], T.D. IV. 55, 59 also De Or. III. 75 non quid ego sed quid orator. Magnus ... opinator: Aug. Contra Acad. III. 31 qu. this passage wrongly as from the Hortensius. He imitates it, ibid. I. 15 magnus definitor. Qua fidunt, etc.: these lines are part of Cic.'s Aratea, and are quoted in N.D. II. 105, 106. Phoenices: the same fact is mentioned by Ovid, Fasti III. 107, Tristia IV. 3, 1. Sed Helicen: the best MSS. om. ad, which Orelli places before Helicen. Elimatas: the MSS. are divided between this and limatas. Elimare, though a very rare word occurs Ad Att. XVI. 7, 3. Visis cedo: cf. n. on [38]. Vim maximam: so summum munus is applied to the same course of action in D.F. III. 31. Cogitatione: "idea". Temeritate: cf. I. [42], De Div. I. 7, and the charge of προπετεια constantly brought against the dogmatists by Sext. Praepostere: in a disorderly fashion, taking the wrong thing first.

[§67]. Aliquando ... opinabitur: this of course is only true if you grant the Academic doctrine, nihil posse percipi. Secundum illud ... etiam opinari: it seems at first sight as though adsentiri and opinari ought to change places in this passage, as Manut. proposes. The difficulty lies in the words secundum illud, which, it has been supposed, must refer back to the second premiss of Arcesilas' argument. But if the passage be translated thus, "Carneades sometimes granted as a second premiss the following statement, that the wise man sometimes does opine" the difficulty vanishes. The argument of Carneades would then run thus, (1) Si ulli rei, etc. as above, (2) adsentietur autem aliquando, (3) opinabitur igitur.

[§68]. Adsentiri quicquam: only with neuter pronouns like this could adsentiri be followed by an accusative case. Sustinenda est: εφεκτεον. Iis quae possunt: these words MSS. om. Tam in praecipiti: for the position of in cf. n. on I. [25]. The best MSS. have here tamen in. Madv. altered tamen to tam in n. on D.F. V. 26. The two words are often confused, as in T.D. IV. 7, cf. also n. on I. [16]. Sin autem, etc.: cf. the passage of Lactantius De Falsa Sapientia III. 3, qu. by P. Valentia (p. 278 of Orelli's reprint) si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, neque opinari, oportet, ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est. Nitamur ... percipi: "let us struggle to prove the proposition, etc." The construction is, I believe, unexampled so that I suspect hoc, or some such word, to have fallen out between igitur and nihil.

[§69]. Non acrius: one of the early editions omits non while Goer. reads acutius and puts a note of interrogation at defensitaverat. M. Em. 161 points out the absurdity of making Cic. say that the old arguments of Antiochus in favour of Academicism were weaker than his new arguments against it. Quis enim: so Lamb. for MSS. quisquam enim. Excogitavit: on interrogations not introduced by a particle of any kind see Madv. Gram. 450. Eadem dicit: on the subject in hand, of course. Taken without this limitation the proposition is not strictly true, see n. on [132]. Sensisse: = iudicasse, n. on I. [22]. Mnesarchi ... Dardani: see Dict. Biogr.

[§70]. Revocata est: Manut. here wished to read renovata, cf. n. on I. [14]. Nominis dignitatem, etc.: hence Aug. Contra Acad. III. 41 calls him foeneus ille Platonicus Antiochus (that tulchan Platonist). Gloriae causa: cf. Aug. ibid. II. 15 Antiochus gloriae cupidior quam veritatis. Facere dicerent: so Camerarius for the MSS. facerent. Sustinere: cf. [115] sustinuero Epicureos. Sub Novis: Faber's brilliant em. for the MSS. sub nubes. The Novae Tabernae were in the forum, and are often mentioned by Cic. and Livy. In De Or. II. 266 a story is told of Caesar, who, while speaking sub Veteribus, points to a "tabula" which hangs sub Novis. The excellence of Faber's em. may be felt by comparing that of Manut. sub nube, and that of Lamb. nisi sub nube. I have before remarked that b is frequently written in MSS. for v. Maenianorum: projecting eaves, according to Festus s.v. They were probably named from their inventor like Vitelliana, Vatinia etc.

[§71]. Quoque ... argumento: the sentence is anacoluthic, the broken thread is picked up by quod argumentum near the end. Utrum: the neuter pronoun, not the so called conjunction, the two alternatives are marked by ne and an. The same usage is found in D.F. II. 60, T.D. IV. 9, and must be carefully distinguished from the use of utrum ... ne ... an, which occurs not unfrequently in Cic., e g De Invent. II. 115 utrum copiane sit agri an penuria consideratur. On this point cf. M. Em. 163, Gram. 452, obs. 1, 2, Zumpt on Cic. Verr. IV. 73. Honesti inane nomen esse: a modern would be inclined to write honestum, in apposition to nomen, cf. D.F. V. 18 voluptatis alii putant primum appetitum. Voluptatem etc.: for the conversion of Dionysius (called ‛ο μεταθεμενος) from Stoicism to Epicureanism cf. T.D. II. 60, Diog. Laert. VII. 166—7. A vero: "coming from a reality," cf. [41], n. Is curavit: Goer. reads his, "solet V. D. in hoc pronomen saevire," says Madv. The scribes often prefix h to parts of the pronoun is, and Goer. generally patronises their vulgar error.

[§§72]—[78]. Summary. You accuse me of appealing to ancient names like a revolutionist, yet Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Metrodorus, philosophers of the highest position, protest against the truth of sense knowledge, and deny the possibility of knowledge altogether ([72], [73]). Empedocles, Xenophanes, and Parmenides all declaim against sense knowledge. You said that Socrates and Plato must not be classed with these. Why? Socrates said he knew nothing but his own ignorance, while Plato pursued the same theme in all his works ([74]). Now do you see that I do not merely name, but take for my models famous men? Even Chrysippus stated many difficulties concerning the senses and general experience. You say he solved them, even if he did, which I do not believe, he admitted that it was not easy to escape being ensnared by them ([75]). The Cyrenaics too held that they knew nothing about things external to themselves. The sincerity of Arcesilas may be seen thus ([76]). Zeno held strongly that the wise man ought to keep clear from opinion. Arcesilas agreed but this without knowledge was impossible. Knowledge consists of perceptions. Arcesilas therefore demanded a definition of perception. This definition Arcesilas combated. This is the controversy which has lasted to our time. Do away with opinion and perception, and the εποχη of Arcesilas follows at once ([77], [78]).

[§72]. De antiquis philosophis: on account of the somewhat awkward constr. Lamb. read antiquos philosophos. Popularis: cf. [13]. Res non bonas: MSS. om. non, which Or. added with two very early editions. Faber ingeniously supposed the true reading to be novas, which would be written nobas, and then pass into bonas. Nivem nigram: this deliverance of Anaxagoras is very often referred to by Sextus. In P.H. I. 33 he quotes it as an instance of the refutation of φαινομενα by means of νοουμενα, "Αναξαγορας τωι λευκην ειναι την χιονα, ανετιθει ‛οτι χιων εστιν ‛υδορ πεπηγος το δε ‛υδορ εστι μελαν και ‛η χιων αρα μελαινα." There is an obscure joke on this in Ad Qu. Fratrem II. 13, 1 risi nivem atram ... teque hilari animo esse et prompto ad iocandum valde me iuvat. Sophistes: here treated as the demagogue of philosophy. Ostentationis: = επιδειξεος.

[§73]. Democrito: Cic., as Madv. remarks on D.F. I. 20, always exaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans, cf. T.D. I. 22, De Div. I. 5, II. 139, N.D. I. 120, De Or. I. 42. Quintae classis: a metaphor from the Roman military order. Qui veri esse aliquid, etc.: cf. N.D. I. 12 non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus. Non obscuros sed tenebricosos: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a reference here to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., by which he meant that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a γνησιη γνωσις, dealing with the realities of material existence, the atoms and the void, which exist ετεηι and not merely νομωι as appearances do. See R. and P. 51.

[§74]. Furere: cf. [14]. Orbat sensibus: cf. [61], and for the belief of Empedocles about the possibility of επιστημη see the remarks of Sextus A.M. VII. 123—4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say "patet errare eos qui scepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant." Sonum fundere: similar expressions occur in T.D. III. 42, V. 73, D.F. II. 48. Parmenides, Xenophanes: these are the last men who ought to be charged with scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but held that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, Plato I. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. Minus bonis: Dav. qu. Plut. De Audit. 45 A, μεμψαιτο δ' αν τις Παρμενιδου την στιχοποιιαν. Quamquam: on the proper use of quamquam in clauses where the verb is not expressed see M.D.F. V. 68 and cf. I. [5]. Quasi irati: for the use of quasi = almost cf. In Verr. Act. I. 22, Orat. 41. Aiebas removendum: for om. of esse see n. on I. [43]. Perscripti sunt: cf. n. on I. [16]. Scire se nihil se scire: cf. I. [16], [44]. The words referred to are in Plat. Apol. 21 εοικα γουν τουτου σμικρωι τινι αυτωι τουτωι σοφωτερος ειναι, ‛οτι α μη οιδα ουδε οιομαι ειδεναι, a very different statement from the nihil sciri posse by which Cic. interprets it (cf. R. and P. 148). That επιστημη in the strict sense is impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists. De Platone: the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon Plato. The dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham knowledge, all assume that the real επιστημη is attainable. Ironiam: the word was given in its Greek form in [15]. Nulla fuit ratio persequi: n. on [17].

[§75]. Videorne: = nonne videor, as videsne = nonne vides. Imitari numquam nisi: a strange expression for which Manut. conj. imitari? num quem, etc., Halm nullum unquam in place of numquam. Bait. prints the reading of Man., which I think harsher than that of the MSS. Minutos: for the word cf. Orat. 94, also De Div. I. 62 minuti philosophi, Brut. 256 minuti imperatores. Stilponem, etc.: Megarians, see R. and P. 177—182. σοφισματα: Cic. in the second edition probably introduced here the translation cavillationes, to which Seneca Ep. 116 refers, cf. Krische, p. 65. Fulcire porticum: "to be the pillar of the Stoic porch". Cf. the anonymous line ει μη γαρ ην Χρυσιππος, ουκ αν ην Στοα. Quae in consuetudine probantur: n. on [87]. Nisi videret: for the tense of the verb, see Madv. Gram. 347 b, obs. 2.

[§76]. Quid ... philosophi: my reading is that of Durand approved by Madv. and followed by Bait. It is strange that Halm does not mention this reading, which only requires the alteration of Cyrenaei into Cyrenaici (now made by all edd. on the ground that Cyrenaeus is a citizen of Cyreno, Cyrenaicus a follower of Aristippus) and the insertion of tibi. I see no difficulty in the qui before negant, at which so many edd. take offence. Tactu intimo: the word ‛αφη I believe does not occur in ancient authorities as a term of the Cyrenaic school; their great word was παθος. From [143] (permotiones intimas) it might appear that Cic. is translating either παθος or κινησις. For a clear account of the school see Zeller's Socrates, for the illustration of the present passage pp 293—300 with the footnotes. Cf. also R. and P. 162 sq. Quo quid colore: cf. Sext. A.M. VII. 191 (qu. Zeller Socrates 297, R. and P. 165). Adfici se: = πασχειν. Quaesieras: note the plup. where Eng. idiom requires the perfect or aorist. Tot saeculis: cf. the same words in [15]. Tot ingeniis tantisque studiis: cf. summis ingeniis, maximis studiis in [15]. Obtrectandi: this invidious word had been used by Lucullus in [16]; cf. also I. [44].

[§77]. Expresserat: "had put into distinct shape". Cf. [7] and I. [19]. Exprimere and dicere are always sharply distinguished by Cic., the latter merely implying the mechanic exercise of utterance, the former the moulding and shaping of the utterance by conscious effort; cf. esp. Orat. 3, 69, and Ad Att. VIII. 11, 1; also De Or. I. 32, De Div. I. 79, qu. by Krebs and Allgayer. The conj. of Dav. exposuerat is therefore needless. Fortasse: "we may suppose". Nec percipere, etc.: cf. [68], n. Tum illum: a change from ille, credo (sc. respondit), the credo being now repeated to govern the infin. For the constr. after ita definisse cf. M.D.F. II. 13 (who quotes exx.); also the construction with ita iudico in [113]. Ex eo, quod esset: cf. [18], n. Effictum: so Manut. for MSS. effectum, cf. [18]. Ab eo, quod non est: the words non est include the two meanings "is non existent," and "is different from what it seems to be"—the two meanings of falsum indeed, see n. on [47]. Eiusdem modi: cf. [40], [84]. MSS. have eius modi, altered by Dav. Recte ... additum: the semicolon at Arcesilas was added by Manutius, who is followed by all edd. This involves taking additum = additum est, an ellipse of excessive rarity in Cic., see Madv. Opusc. I. 448, D.F. I. 43, Gram. 479 a. I think it quite possible that recte consensit additum should be construed together, "agreed that the addition had been rightly made." For the omission of esse in that case cf. Madv. Gram. 406, and such expressions as dicere solebat perturbatum in [111], also ita scribenti exanclatum in [108]. Recte, which with the ordinary stopping expresses Cic.'s needless approval of Arcesilas' conduct would thus gain in point. Qy, should concessit be read, as in [118] concessisse is now read for MSS. consensisse? A vero: cf. [41].

[§78]. Quae adhuc permanserit: note the subj., "which is of such a nature as to have lasted". Nam illud ... pertinebat: by illud is meant the argument in defence of εποχη given in [67]; by nihil ... pertinebat nothing more is intended than that there was no immediate or close connection. Cf. the use of pertinere in D.F. III. 55. Clitomacho: cf. n. on [59].

[§§79]—[90]. Summary You are wrong, Lucullus, in upholding your cause in spite of my arguments yesterday against the senses. You are thus acting like the Epicureans, who say that the inference only from the sensation can be false, not the sensation itself ([79], [80]). I wish the god of whom you spoke would ask me whether I wanted anything more than sound senses. He would have a bad time with me. For even granting that our vision is correct how marvellously circumscribed it is! But say you, we desire no more. No I answer, you are like the mole who desires not the light because he is blind. Yet I would not so much reproach the god because my vision is narrow, as because it deceives me ([80], [81]). If you want something greater than the bent oar, what can be greater than the sun? Still he seems to us a foot broad, and Epicurus thinks he may be a little broader or narrower than he seems. With all his enormous speed, too, he appears to us to stand still ([82]). The whole question lies in a nutshell; of four propositions which prove my point only one is disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it a false one indistinguishable from it ([83]). A man who has mistaken P. for Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognising Cotta. You say that no such indistinguishable resemblances exist. Never mind, they seem to exist and that is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw all the others into uncertainty ([84]). You say everything belongs to its own genus this I will not contest. I am not concerned to show that two sensations are absolutely similar, it is enough that human faculties cannot distinguish between them. How about the impressions of signet rings? ([85]) Can you find a ring merchant to rival your chicken rearer of Delos? But, you say, art aids the senses. So we cannot see or hear without art, which so few can have! What an idea this gives us of the art with which nature has constructed the senses! ([86]) But about physics I will speak afterwards. I am going now to advance against the senses arguments drawn from Chrysippus himself ([87]). You said that the sensations of dreamers, drunkards and madmen were feebler than those of the waking, the sober and the sane. The cases of Ennius and his Alcmaeon, of your own relative Tuditanus, of the Hercules of Euripides disprove your point ([88], [89]). In their case at least 'mind and eyes agreed. It is no good to talk about the saner moments of such people; the question is, what was the nature of their sensations at the time they were affected? ([90])

[§79]. Communi loco: τοπω, that of blinking facts which cannot be disproved, see [19]. Quod ne [id]: I have bracketed id with most edd. since Manut. If, however, quod be taken as the conjunction, and not as the pronoun, id is not altogether insupportable. Heri: cf. Introd. [55]. Infracto remo: n. on [19]. Tennyson seems to allude to this in his "Higher Pantheism"—"all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool". Manent illa omnia, iacet: this is my correction of the reading of most MSS. maneant ... lacerat. Madv. Em. 176 in combating the conj. of Goer. si maneant ... laceratis istam causam, approves maneant ... iaceat, a reading with some MSS. support, adopted by Orelli. I think the whole confusion of the passage arises from the mania of the copyists for turning indicatives into subjunctives, of which in critical editions of Cic. exx. occur every few pages. If iacet were by error turned into iaceret the reading lacerat would arise at once. The nom. to dicit is, I may observe, not Epicurus, as Orelli takes it, but Lucullus. Trans. "all my arguments remain untouched; your case is overthrown, yet his senses are true quotha!" (For this use of dicit cf. inquit in [101], [109], [115]). Hermann approves the odd reading of the ed. Cratandriana of 1528 latrat. Dav. conjectured comically blaterat iste tamen et, Halm lacera est ista causa. Habes: as two good MSS. have habes et eum, Madv. Em. 176 conj. habet. The change of person, however, (from dicit to habes) occurs also in [101]. Epicurus: n. on [19].

[§80]. Hoc est verum esse: Madv. Em. 177 took verum as meaning fair, candid, in this explanation I concur. Madv., however, in his critical epistle to Orelli p. 139 abandoned it and proposed virum esse, a very strange em. Halm's conj. certum esse is weak and improbable. Importune: this is in one good MS. but the rest have importata, a good em. is needed, as importune does not suit the sense of the passage. Negat ... torsisset: for the tenses cf. [104] exposuisset, adiungit. Cum oculum torsisset: i.e. by placing the finger beneath the eye and pressing upwards or sideways. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Eud. VII. 13 (qu. by Dav.) οφθαλμους διαστρεψαντα ‛ωστε δυο το ‛εν φανηναι. Faber qu. Arist. Problemata XVII. 31 δια τι εις το πλαγιον κινουσι τον οφθαλμον ου (?) φαινεται δυο το ‛εν. Also ib. XXXI. 3 inquiring the reason why drunkards see double he says ταυτο τουτο γιγνεται και εαν τις κατωθεν πιεση τον οφθαλμον. Sextus refers to the same thing P.H. I. 47, A.M. VII. 192 (‛ο παραπιεσας τον οφθαλμον) so Cic. De Div. II. 120. Lucretius gives the same answer as Timagoras, propter opinatus animi (IV. 465), as does Sext. A.M. VII. 210 on behalf of Epicurus. Sed hic: Bait. sit hic. Maiorum: cf. [143]. Quasi quaeratur: Carneades refused to discuss about things in themselves but merely dealt with the appearances they present, το γαρ αληθες και το ψευδες εν τοις πραγμασι συνεχωρει (Numen in Euseb. Pr. Eu. XIV. 8). Cf. also Sext. P.H. I. 78, 87, 144, II. 75. Domi nascuntur: a proverb used like γλαυκ' εσ' Αθηνας and "coals to Newcastle," see Lorenz on Plaut. Miles II. 2, 38, and cf. Ad Att. X. 14, 2, Ad Fam. IX. 3. Deus: cf. [19]. Audiret ... ageret: MSS. have audies ... agerent. As the insertion of n in the imp. subj. is so common in MSS. I read ageret and alter audies to suit it. Halm has audiret ... ageretur with Dav., Bait. audiet, egerit. Ex hoc loco video ... cerno: MSS. have loco cerno regionem video Pompeianum non cerno whence Lipsius conj. ex hoc loco e regione video. Halm ejects the words regionem video, I prefer to eject cerno regionem. We are thus left with the slight change from video to cerno, which is very often found in Cic., e.g. Orat. 18. Cic. sometimes however joins the two verbs as in De Or. III. 161. O praeclarum prospectum: the view was a favourite one with Cic., see Ad Att. I. 13, 5.

[§81]. Nescio qui: Goer. is quite wrong in saying that nescio quis implies contempt, while nescio qui does not, cf. Div. in qu. Caec. 47, where nescio qui would contradict his rule. It is as difficult to define the uses of the two expressions as to define those of aliquis and aliqui, on which see [61] n. In Paradoxa 12 the best MSS. have si qui and si quis almost in the same line with identically the same meaning Dav. quotes Solinus and Plin. N.H. VII. 21, to show that the man mentioned here was called Strabo—a misnomer surely. Octingenta: so the best MSS., not octoginta, which however agrees better with Pliny. Quod abesset: "whatever might be 1800 stadia distant," aberat would have implied that Cic. had some particular thing in mind, cf. Madv. Gram. 364, obs. 1. Acrius: οξυτερον, Lamb. without need read acutius as Goer. did in [69]. Illos pisces: so some MSS., but the best have ullos, whence Klotz conj. multos, Orelli multos illos, omitting pisces. For the allusion to the fish, cf. Acad. Post. fragm. [13]. Videntur: n. on [25]. Amplius: cf. [19] non video cur quaerat amplius. Desideramus: Halm, failing to understand the passage, follows Christ in reading desiderant (i.e. pisces). To paraphrase the sense is this "But say my opponents, the Stoics and Antiocheans, we desire no better senses than we have." Well you are like the mole, which does not yearn for the light because it does not know what light is. Of course all the ancients thought the mole blind. A glance will show the insipidity of the sense given by Halm's reading. Quererer cum deo: would enter into an altercation with the god. The phrase, like λοιδορεσθαι τινι as opposed to λοιδορειν τινα implies mutual recrimination, cf. Pro Deiotaro 9 querellae cum Deiotaro. The reading tam quererer for the tamen quaereretur of the MSS. is due to Manut. Navem: Sextus often uses the same illustration, as in P.H. I. 107, A.M. VII. 414. Non tu verum testem, etc.: cf. [105]. For the om. of te before habere, which has strangely troubled edd. and induced them to alter the text, see n. on I. [6].

[§82]. Quid ego: Bait. has sed quid after Ernesti. Nave: so the best MSS., not navi, cf. Madv. Gram. 42. Duodeviginti: so in [128]. Goer. and Roeper qu. by Halm wished to read duodetriginta. The reff. of Goer. at least do not prove his point that the ancients commonly estimated the sun at 28 times the size of the earth. Quasi pedalis: cf. D.F. I. 20 pedalis fortasse. For quasi = circiter cf. note on [74]. Madv. on D.F. I. 20 quotes Diog. Laert. X. 91, who preserves the very words of Epicurus, in which however no mention of a foot occurs, also Lucr. V. 590, who copies Epicurus, and Seneca Quaest. Nat. I. 3, 10 (solem sapientes viri pedalem esse contenderunt). Madv. points out from Plut. De Plac. Phil. II. 21, p. 890 E, that Heraclitus asserted the sun to be a foot wide, he does not however quote Stob. Phys. I. 24, 1 ‛ηλιον μεγεθος εχειν ευρος ποδος ανθρωπειου, which is affirmed to be the opinion of Heraclitus and Hecataeus. Ne maiorem quidem: so the MSS., but Goer. and Orelli read nec for ne, incurring the reprehension of Madv. D.F. p. 814, ed 2. Nihil aut non multum: so in D.F. V. 59, the correction of Orelli, therefore, aut non multum mentiantur aut nihil, is rash. Semel: see [79]. Qui ne nunc quidem: sc. mentiri sensus putat. Halm prints quin, and is followed by Baiter, neither has observed that quin ne ... quidem is bad Latin (see M.D.F. V. 56). Nor can quin ne go together even without quidem, cf. Krebs and Allgayer, Antibarbarus ed. 4 on quin.

[§83]. In parvo lis sit: Durand's em. for the in parvulis sitis of the MSS., which Goer. alone defends. Quattuor capita: these were given in [40] by Lucullus, cf. also [77]. Epicurus: as above in [19], [79] etc.

[§84]. Geminum: cf. [56]. Nota: cf. [58] and the speech of Lucullus passim. Ne sit ... potest: cf. [80] quasi quaeratur quid sit, non quid videatur. Si ipse erit for ipse apparently = is ipse cf. M.D.F. II. 93.

[§85]. Quod non est: = qu. n. e. id quod esse videtur. Sui generis: cf. [50], [54], [56]. Nullum esse pilum, etc.: a strong expression of this belief is found in Seneca Ep.. 113, 13, qu. R. and P. 380. Note the word Stoicum; Lucullus is of course not Stoic, but Antiochean. Nihil interest: the same opinion is expressed in [40], where see my note. Visa res: Halm writes res a re, it is not necessary, however, either in Gk. or Lat. to express both of two related things when a word is inserted like differat here, which shows that they are related. Cf. the elliptic constructions in Gk. with ‛ομοιον, μεταξυ, μεσος, and such words. Eodem caelo atque: a difficult passage. MSS. have aqua, an error easy, as Halm notes, to a scribe who understood caelum to be the heaven, and not γλυφειον, a graving tool. Faber and other old edd. defend the MSS. reading, adducing passages to show that sky and water were important in the making of statues. For aqua Orelli conj. acu = schraffirnadel, C.F. Hermann caelatura, which does not seem to be a Ciceronian word. Halm's aeque introduces a construction with ceteris omnibus which is not only not Ciceronian, but not Latin at all. I read atque, taking ceteris omnibus to be the abl. neut. "all the other implements." Formerly I conj. ascra, or atque in, which last leading would make omnibus = om. statuis. Alexandros: Lysippus alone was privileged to make statues of Alexander, as Apelles alone was allowed to paint the conqueror, cf. Ad Fam. V. 12, 7.

[§86]. Anulo: cf. [54]. Aliqui: n. on [61]. Gallinarium: cf. [57]. Adhibes artem: cf. [20] adhibita arte. Pictor ... tibicen: so in [20]. Simul inflavit: note simul for simul atque, cf. T.D. IV. 12. Nostri quidem: i.e. Romani. Admodum: i.e. adm. pauci cf. De Leg. III. 32 pauci enim atque admodum pauci. Praeclara: evidently a fem. adj. agreeing with natura. Dav. and Ern. made the adj. neuter, and understanding sunt interpreted "these arguments I am going to urge are grand, viz. quanto art. etc."

[§87]. Scilicet: Germ. "natürlich." Fabricata sit: cf. [30], [119], [121] and N.D. I. 19. Ne modo: for modo ne, a noticeable use. Physicis: probably neut. Contra sensus: he wrote both for and against συνηθεια; cf. R. and P. 360 and 368. Carneadem: Plut. Sto. Rep. 1036 B relates that Carneades in reading the arguments of Chrysippus against the senses, quoted the address of Andromache to Hector: δαιμονιε φθισει σε το σον μενος. From Diog. IV. 62 we learn that he thus parodied the line qu. in n. on [75], ει μη γαρ ην Χρυσιππος ουκ αν ην εγω.

[§88]. Diligentissime: in [48]—[53]. Dicebas: in [52] imbecillius adsentiuntur. Siccorum: cf. Cic. Contra Rullum I. 1 consilia siccorum. Madere is common with the meaning "to be drunk," as in Plaut. Mostellaria I. 4, 6. Non diceret: Orelli was induced by Goer. to omit the verb, with one MS., cf. [15] and I. [13]. The omission of a verb in the subjunctive is, Madv. says on D.F. I. 9, impossible; for other ellipses of the verb see M.D.F. V. 63. Alcmaeo autem: i.e. Ennius' own Alcmaeon; cf. [52]. Somnia reri: the best MSS. have somniare. Goer. reads somnia, supplying non fuisse vera. I have already remarked on his extraordinary power of supplying. Halm conj. somnia reprobare, forgetting that the verb reprobare belongs to third century Latinity, also sua visa putare, which Bait. adopts. Thinking this too large a departure from the MSS., I read reri, which verb occurred in I. [26], [39]. Possibly putare, a little farther on, has got misplaced. Non id agitur: these difficulties supply Sextus with one of his τροποι, i.e. ‛ο περι τας περιστασεις; cf. P.H. I. 100, also for the treatment of dreams, ib. I. 104. Si modo, etc.: "if only he dreamed it," i.e. "merely because he dreamed it." Aeque ac vigilanti: = aeque ac si vigilaret. Dav. missing the sense, and pointing out that when awake Ennius did not assent to his sensations at all, conj. vigilantis. Two participles used in very different ways not unfrequently occur together, see Madv. Em. Liv. p. 442. Ita credit: MSS. have illa, which Dav. altered. Halm would prefer credidit. Itera dum, etc.: from the Iliona of Pacuvius; a favourite quotation with Cic.; see Ad Att. XIV. 14, and T.D. II. 44.

[§89]. Quisquam: for the use of this pronoun in interrogative sentences cf. Virg. Aen. I. 48 with the Notes of Wagner and Conington. Tam certa putat: so Sextus A.M. VII. 61 points out that Protagoras must in accordance with his doctrine παντων μετρον ανθρωπος hold that the μεμηνως is the κριτηριον των εν μανιαι φαινομενων. Video, video te: evidently from a tragedy whose subject was Αιας μαινομενος, see Ribbeck Trag. Lat. rel. p. 205. Cic. in De Or. III. 162 thus continues the quotation, "oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape." So in Soph. Aiax 100 the hero, after killing, as he thinks, the Atridae, keeps Odysseus alive awhile in order to torture him. Hercules: cf. Eur. Herc. Fur. 921—1015. The mad visions of this hero, like those of Orestes, are often referred to for a similar purpose by Sext., e.g. A.M. VII. 405 ‛ο γουν ‛Ερακλης μανεις και λαβων φαντασιαν απο των ιδιων παιδων ‛ως Ευρυσθεος, την ακολουθον πραξιν ταυτηι τη φαντασιαι συνηψεν. ακολουθον δε ην το τους του εχθρου παιδας ανελειν, ‛οπερ και εποιησεν. Cf. also A.M. VII. 249. Moveretur: imperf. for plup. as in [90]. Alcmaeo tuus: cf. [52]. Incitato furore: Dav. reads incitatus. Halm qu. from Wesenberg Observ. Crit. ad Or. p. Sestio p. 51 this explanation, "cum furor eius initio remissior paulatim incitatior et vehementior factus esset," he also refers to Wopkens Lect. Tull. p. 55 ed. Hand. Incedunt etc.: the MSS. have incede, which Lamb. corrected. The subject of the verb is evidently Furiae. Adsunt: is only given once by MSS., while Ribbeck repeats it thrice, on Halm's suggestion I have written it twice. Caerulea ... angui: anguis fem is not uncommon in the old poetry. MSS. here have igni. Crinitus: ακερσεκομης, "never shorn," as Milton translates it. Luna innixus: the separate mention in the next line of Diana, usually identified with the moon, has led edd. to emend this line. Some old edd. have lunat, while Lamb. reads genu for luna, cf. Ov. Am. I. 1, 25 (qu. by Goer.) lunavitque genu sinuosum fortiter arcum. Wakefield on Lucr. III. 1013 puts a stop at auratum, and goes on with Luna innixans. Taber strangely explains luna as = arcu ipso lunato, Dav. says we ought not to expect the passage to make sense, as it is the utterance of a maniac. For my part, I do not see why the poet should not regard luna and Diana as distinct.

[§90]. Illa falsa: sc. visa, which governs the two genitives. Goer. perversely insists on taking somniantium recordatione ipsorum closely together. Non enim id quaeritur: cf. [80] n. Sext. very often uses very similar language, as in P.H. I. 22, qu. in n. on [40]. Tum cum movebantur: so Halm for MSS. tum commovebantur, the em. is supported by [88].

[§§91]—[98]. Summary: Dialectic cannot lead to stable knowledge, its processes are not applicable to a large number of philosophical questions ([91]). You value the art, but remember that it gave rise to fallacies like the sorites, which you say is faulty ([92]). If it is so, refute it. The plan of Chrysippus to refrain from answering, will avail you nothing ([93]). If you refrain because you cannot answer, your knowledge fails you, if you can answer and yet refrain, you are unfair ([94]). The art you admire really undoes itself, as Penelope did her web, witness the Mentiens, ([95]). You assent to arguments which are identical in form with the Mentiens, and yet refuse to assent to it Why so? ([96]) You demand that these sophisms should be made exceptions to the rules of Dialectic. You must go to a tribune for that exception. I just remind you that Epicurus would not allow the very first postulate of your Dialectic ([97]). In my opinion, and I learned Dialectic from Antiochus, the Mentiens and the arguments identical with it in form must stand or fall together ([98]).

[§91]. Inventam esse: cf. [26], [27]. In geometriane: with this inquiry into the special function of Dialectic cf. the inquiry about Rhetoric in Plato Gorg. 453 D, 454 C. Sol quantus sit: this of course is a problem for φυσικη, not for διαλεκτικη. Quod sit summum bonum: not διαλεκτικη but ηθικη must decide this. Quae coniunctio: etc. so Sext. often opposes συμπλοκη or συνημμενον to διεζευγμενον, cf. esp P.H. II. 201, and Zeller 109 sq. with footnotes. An instance of a coniunctio (hypothetical judgment) is "si lucet, lucet" below, of a disiunctio (disjunctive judgment) "aut vivet cras Hermarchus aut non vivet". Ambigue dictum: αμφιβολον, on which see P.H. II. 256, Diog VII. 62. Quid sequatur: το ακολουθον, cf. I. [19] n. Quid repugnet: cf. I. [19], n. De se ipsa: the ipsa, according to Cic.'s usage, is nom. and not abl. Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli) justly remarks that an art is not to be condemned as useless merely because it is unable to solve every problem presented to it. He quotes Plato's remarks (in Rep. II.) that the Expert is the man who knows exactly what his art can do and what it cannot. Very similar arguments to this of Cic. occur in Sext., cf. esp. P.H. II. 175 and the words εαυτου εσται εκκαλυπτικον. For the mode in which Carneades dealt with Dialectic cf. Zeller 510, 511. The true ground of attack is that Logic always assumes the truth of phenomena, and cannot prove it. This was clearly seen by Aristotle alone of the ancients; see Grote's essay on the Origin of Knowledge, now reprinted in Vol II. of his Aristotle.

[§92]. Nata sit: cf. [28], [59]. Loquendi: the Stoic λογικη, it must be remembered, included ‛ρητορικη. Concludendi: του συμπεραινειν or συλλογιζεσθαι. Locum: τοπον in the philosophical sense. Vitiosum: [49], n. Num nostra culpa est: cf. [32]. Finium: absolute limits; the fallacy of the sorites and other such sophisms lies entirely in the treatment of purely relative terms as though they were absolute. Quatenus: the same ellipse occurs in Orator 73. In acervo tritici: this is the false sorites, which may be briefly described thus: A asks B whether one grain makes a heap, B answers "No." A goes on asking whether two, three, four, etc. grains make a heap. B cannot always reply "No." When he begins to answer "Yes," there will be a difference of one grain between heap and no heap. One grain therefore does make a heap. The true sorites or chain inference is still treated in books on logic, cf. Thomson's Laws of Thought, pp 201—203, ed 8. Minutatim: cf. Heindorf's note on κατα σμικρον in Sophistes 217 D. Interrogati: cf. [104]. In [94] we have interroganti, which some edd. read here. Dives pauper, etc.: it will be easily seen that the process of questioning above described can be applied to any relative term such as these are. For the omission of any connecting particle between the members of each pair, cf. [29], [125], T.D. I. 64, V. 73, 114, Zumpt Gram. 782. Quanto addito aut dempto: after this there is a strange ellipse of some such words as id efficiatur, quod interrogatur. [Non] habemus: I bracket non in deference to Halm, Madv. however (Opusc. I. 508) treats it as a superabundance of negation arising from a sort of anacoluthon, comparing In Vatin. 3, Ad Fam. XII. 24. The scribes insert and omit negatives very recklessly, so that the point may remain doubtful.

[§93]. Frangite: in later Gk. generally απολυειν. Erunt ... cavetis: this form of the conditional sentence is illustrated in Madv. D.F. III. 70, Em. Liv. p. 422, Gram. 340, obs. 1. Goer. qu. Terence Heaut. V. 1, 59 quot incommoda tibi in hac re capies nisi caves, cf. also [127], [140] of this book. The present is of course required by the instantaneous nature of the action. Chrysippo: he spent so much time in trying to solve the sophism that it is called peculiarly his by Persius VI. 80. inventus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acervi. The titles of numerous distinct works of his on the Sorites and Mentiens are given by Diog. Tria pauca sint: cf. the instances in Sext. A.M. VII. 418 τα πεντηκοντα ολιγα εστιν, τα μυρια ολιγα εστιν, also Diog. VII. 82 ‛ησυχαζειν the advice is quoted in Sext. P.H. II. 253 (δειν ‛ιστασθαι και επεχειν), A.M. VII. 416 (‛ο σοφος στησεται και ‛ησυχασει). The same terms seem to have been used by the Cynics, see Sext. P.H. II. 244, III. 66. Stertas: imitated by Aug. Contra Ac. III. 25 ter terna novem esse ... vel genere humano stertente verum sit, also ib. III. 22. Proficit: Dav. proficis, but Madv. rightly understands το ‛ησυχαζειν (Em. 184), cf. N.D. II. 58. Ultimum ... respondere: "to put in as your answer" cf. the use of defendere with an accus. "to put in as a plea". Kayser suggests paucorum quid sit.

[§94]. Ut agitator: see the amusing letter to Atticus XIII. 21, in which Cic. discusses different translations for the word επεχειν, and quotes a line of Lucilius sustineat currum ut bonu' saepe agitator equosque, adding semperque Carneades προβολην pugilis et retentionem aurigae similem facit εποχη. Aug. Contra Ac. trans. εποχη by refrenatio cf. also Lael. 63. Superbus es: I have thus corrected the MSS. responde superbe; Halm writes facis superbe, Orelli superbis, which verb is hardly found in prose. The phrase superbe resistere in Aug. Contra Ac. III. 14 may be a reminiscence. Illustribus: Bait. with some probability adds in, comparing in decimo below, and [107], cf. however Munro on Lucr. I. 420. Irretiat: parallel expressions occur in T.D. V. 76, De Or. I. 43, De Fato 7. Facere non sinis: Sext. P.H. II. 253 points the moral in the same way. Augentis nec minuentis: so Halm for MSS. augendi nec minuendi, which Bait. retains. I cannot believe the phrase primum augendi to be Latin.

[§95]. Tollit ... superiora: cf. Hortensius fragm. 19 (Orelli) sed ad extremum pollicetur prolaturum qui se ipse comest quod efficit dialecticorum ratio. Vestra an nostra: Bait. after Christ needlessly writes nostra an vestra. αξιωμα: "a judgment expressed in language"; cf. Zeller 107, who gives the Stoic refinements on this subject. Effatum: Halm gives the spelling ecfatum. It is probable that this spelling was antique in Cic.'s time and only used in connection with religious and legal formulae as in De Div. I. 81, De Leg. II. 20, see Corss. Ausspr. I. 155 For the word cf. Sen. Ep. 117 enuntiativum quiddam de corpore quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edictum, in T.D. I. 14 pronuntiatum is found, in De Fato 26 pronuntiatio, in Gellius XVI. 8 (from Varro) prologium. Aut verum esse aut falsum: the constant Stoic definition of αξιωμα, see Diog. VII. 65 and other passages in Zeller 107. Mentiris an verum dicis: the an was added by Schutz on a comparison of Gellius XVIII. 10 cum mentior et mentiri me dico, mentior an verum dico? The sophism is given in a more formally complete shape in De Div. II. 11 where the following words are added, dicis autem te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris igitur. The fallacy is thus hit by Petrus Valentia (p. 301, ed Orelli), quis unquam dixit "ego mentior" quum hoc ipsum pronuntiatum falsum vellet declarare? Inexplicabilia: απορα in the Greek writers. Odiosius: this adj. has not the strong meaning of the Eng. "hateful," but simply means "tiresome," "annoying." Non comprehensa: as in [99], the opposite of comprehendibilia III. 1, 41. The past partic. in Cic. often has the same meaning as an adj. in -bilis. Faber points out that in the Timaeus Cic. translates αλυτος by indissolutus and indissolubilis indifferently. Imperceptus, which one would expect, is found in Ovid.

[§96]. Si dicis: etc. the words in italics are needed, and were given by Manut. with the exception of nunc which was added by Dav. The idea of Orelli, that Cic. clipped these trite sophisms as he does verses from the comic writers is untenable. In docendo: docere is not to expound but to prove, cf. n. on [121]. Primum ... modum: the word modus is technical in this sense cf. Top. 57. The προτος λογος αναποδεικτος of the Stoic logic ran thus ει ‛ημερα εστι, φως εστιν ... αλλα μην ‛ημερα εστιν φως αρα εστιν (Sext. P.H. II. 157, and other passages qu. Zeller 114). This bears a semblance of inference and is not so utterly tautological as Cic.'s translation, which merges φως and ‛ημερα into one word, or that of Zeller ([114], note). These arguments are called μονολημματοι (involving only one premise) in Sext. P.H. I. 152, 159, II. 167. Si dicis te mentiri, etc.: it is absurd to assume, as this sophism does, that when a man truly states that he has told a lie, he establishes against himself not merely that he has told a lie, but also that he is telling a lie at the moment when he makes the true statement. The root of the sophism lies in the confusion of past and present time in the one infinitive mentiri. Eiusdem generis: the phrase te mentiri had been substituted for nunc lucere. Chrysippea: n. on [93]. Conclusioni: on facere with the dat. see n. on [27]. Cederet: some edd. crederet, but the word is a trans. of Gk. εικειν; n. on [66]. Conexi: = συνημμενον, cf. Zeller 109. This was the proper term for the hypothetical judgment. Superius: the συνημμενον consists of two parts, the hypothetical part and the affirmative—called in Greek ‛ηγουμενον and ληγον; if one is admitted the other follows of course.

[§97]. Excipiantur: the legal formula of the Romans generally directed the iudex to condemn the defendant if certain facts were proved, unless certain other facts were proved; the latter portion went by the name of exceptio. See Dict. Ant. Tribunum ... adeant: a retort upon Lucullus; cf. [13]. The MSS. have videant or adeant; Halm conj. adhibeant, comparing [86] and Pro Rabirio 20. Contemnit: the usual trans. "to despise" for contemnere is too strong; it means, like ολιγωρειν, merely to neglect or pass by. Effabimur; cf. effatum above. Hermarchus: not Hermachus, as most edd.; see M.D.F. II. 96. Diiunctum: διεζευγμενον, for which see Zeller 112. Necessarium: the reason why Epicurus refused to admit this is given in De Fato 21 Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit fato fieri quaecumque fiant. The context of that passage should be carefully read, along with N.D. I. 69, 70. Aug. Contra Ac. III. 29 lays great stress on the necessary truth of disjunctive propositions. Catus: so Lamb. for MSS. cautus. Tardum: De Div. II. 103 Epicurum quem hebetem et rudem dicere solent Stoici; cf. also ib. II. 116, and the frequent use of βραδυς in Sext., e.g. A.M. VII. 325. Cum hoc igitur: the word igitur, as usual, picks up the broken thread of the sentence. Id est: n. on I. [8]. Evertit: for the Epicurean view of Dialectic see R. and P. 343. Zeller 399 sq., M.D.F. I. 22. E contrariis diiunctio: = διεζευγμενον εξ εναντιων.

[§98]. Sequor: as in [95], [96], where the Dialectici refused to allow the consequences of their own principles, according to Cic. Ludere: this reminds one of the famous controversy between Corax and Tisias, for which see Cope in the old Journal of Philology. No. 7. Iudicem ... non iudicem: this construction, which in Greek would be marked by μεν and δε, has been a great crux of edd.; Dav. here wished to insert cum before iudicem, but is conclusively refuted by Madv. Em. 31. The same construction occurs in [103]. Esse conexum: with great probability Christ supposes the infinitive to be an addition of the copyists.

[§§98]—[105]. Summary. In order to overthrow at once the case of Antiochus, I proceed to explain, after Clitomachus, the whole of Carneades' system ([98]). Carneades laid down two divisions of visa, one into those capable of being perceived and those not so capable, the other into probable and improbable. Arguments aimed at the senses concern the first division only; the sapiens will follow probability, as in many instances the Stoic sapiens confessedly does ([99], [100]). Our sapiens is not made of stone; many things seem to him true; yet he always feels that there is a possibility of their being false. The Stoics themselves admit that the senses are often deceived. Put this admission together with the tenet of Epicurus, and perception becomes impossible ([101]). It is strange that our Probables do not seem sufficient to you. Hear the account given by Clitomachus ([102]). He condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy; nothing is swept away but its necessary certainty ([103]). There are two modes of withholding assent; withholding it absolutely and withholding it merely so far as to deny the certainty of phenomena. The latter mode leaves all that is required for ordinary life ([104]).

[98]. Tortuosum: similar expressions are in T.D. II. 42, III. 22, D.F. IV. 7. Ut Poenus: "as might be expected from a Carthaginian;" cf. D.F. IV. 56, tuus ille Poenulus, homo acutus. A different meaning is given by the ut in passages like De Div. II. 30 Democritus non inscite nugatur, ut physicus, quo genere nihil arrogantius; "for a physical philosopher."

[§99]. Genera: here = classifications of, modes of dividing visa. This way of taking the passage will defend Cic. against the strong censure of Madv. (Pref. to D.F. p. lxiii.) who holds him convicted of ignorance, for representing Carneades as dividing visa into those which can be perceived and those which cannot. Is it possible that any one should read the Academica up to this point, and still believe that Cic. is capable of supposing, even for a moment, that Carneades in any way upheld καταληψις? Dicantur: i.e. ab Academicis. Si probabile: the si is not in MSS. Halm and also Bait. follow Christ in reading est, probabile nihil esse. Commemorabas: in [53], [58]. Eversio: cf. D.F. III. 50 (the same words), Plat. Gorg. 481 C ‛ημων ‛ο βιος ανατετραμμενος αν ειη, Sext. A.M. VIII. 157 συγχεομεν τον βιον. Et sensibus: no second et corresponds to this; sic below replaces it. See Madv. D.F. p. 790, ed. 2. Quicquam tale etc.: cf. [40], [41]. Nihil ab eo differens: n. on [54]. Non comprehensa: n. on [96].

[§100]. Si iam: "if, for example;" so iam is often used in Lucretius. Probo ... bono: it would have seemed more natural to transpose these epithets. Facilior ... ut probet: the usual construction is with ad and the gerund; cf. De Div. II. 107, Brut. 180. Anaxagoras: he made no ‛ομοιομερειαι of snow, but only of water, which, when pure and deep, is dark in colour. Concreta: so Manut. for MSS. congregata. In [121] the MSS. give concreta without variation, as in N.D. II. 101, De Div. I. 130, T.D. I. 66, 71.

[§101]. Impeditum: cf. [33], n. Movebitur: cf. moveri in [24]. Non enim est: Cic. in the vast majority of cases writes est enim, the two words falling under one accent like sed enim, et enim (cf. Corss. Ausspr. II. 851); Beier on De Off. I. p. 157 (qu. by Halm) wishes therefore to read est enim, but the MSS. both of the Lucullus and of Nonius agree in the other form, which Madv. allows to stand in D.F. I. 43, and many other places (see his note). Cf. fragm. [22] of the Acad. Post. E robore: so Nonius, but the MSS. of Cic. give here ebore. Dolatus: an evident imitation of Hom. Od. T 163 ου γαρ απο δριος εσσι παλαιφατου ουδ' απο πετρης. Neque tamen habere: i.e. se putat. For the sudden change from oratio recta to obliqua cf. [40] with n. Percipiendi notam: = χαρακτηρα της συγκταθεσεως in Sext. P.H. I. 191. For the use of the gerund cf. n. on [26], with Madv. Gram. 418, Munro on Lucr. I. 313; for propriam 34. Exsistere. cf. [36]. Qui neget: see [79]. Caput: a legal term. Conclusio loquitur: cf. historiae loquantur ([5]), consuetudo loquitur (D.F. II. 48), hominis institutio si loqueretur (ib. IV. 41), vites si loqui possint (ib. V. 39), patria loquitur (In Cat. I. 18, 27); the last use Cic. condemns himself in Orat. 85. Inquit: "quotha," indefinitely, as in [109], [115]; cf. also dicit in [79].

[§102]. Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis: Bait. follows Madv. in placing a comma after est, and a full stop at probabilia. Tamen ought in that case to follow dicimus, and it is noteworthy that in his communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., and Hahn's ed. of the philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word tamen altogether, nor does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice the omission. Ista diceret: "stated the opinions you asked for." Poetam: this both Halm and Bait. treat as a gloss.

[§103]. For this section cf. Lucullus' speech, passim, and Sext. P.H. I. 227 sq. Academia ... quibus: a number of exx. of this change from sing. to plural are given by Madv. on D.F. V. 16. Nullum: on the favourite Ciceronian use of nullus for non see [47], [141], and Madv. Gram. 455, obs. 5. Illud sit disputatum: for the construction cf. [98]; autem is omitted with the same constr. in D.F. V. 79, 80. Nusquam alibi: cf. [50].

[§104]. Exposuisset adiungit: Madv. on D.F. III. 67 notices a certain looseness in the use of tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the opinions of philosophers, but no ex. so strong as this is produced. Ut aut approbet quid aut improbet: this Halm rejects. I have noticed among recent editors of Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced by ut. Halm brackets a similar clause in [20], and is followed in both instances by Bait. Kayser, who is perhaps the most extensive bracketer of modern times, rejects very many clauses of the kind in the Oratorical works. In our passage, the difficulty vanishes when we reflect that approbare and improbare may mean either to render an absolute approval or disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely based on probability. For example, in [29] the words have the first meaning, in [66] the second. The same is the case with nego and aio. I trace the whole difficulty of the passage to the absence of terms to express distinctly the difference between the two kinds of assent. The general sense will be as follows. "There are two kinds of εποχη, one which prevents a man from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the two senses above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving an answer to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute approval or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will neither absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely give a qualified 'yes' or 'no,' dependent on probability." My defence of the clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the Philologus (vol. VII.), which I had not read when this note was first written. Alterum placere ... alterum tenere: "the one is his formal dogma, the other is his actual practice." For the force of this see my note on non probans in [148], which passage is very similar to this. Neget ... aiat: cf. [97]. Nec ut placeat: this, the MSS. reading, gives exactly the wrong sense, for Clitomachus did allow such visa to stand as were sufficient to serve as a basis for action. Hermann's neu cui labours under the same defect. Various emendations are nam cum (Lamb., accepted by Zeller 522), hic ut (Manut.), et cum (Dav. followed by Bait.), sed cum (Halm). The most probable of these seems to me that of Manut. I should prefer sic ut, taking ut in the sense of "although." Respondere: "to put in as an answer," as in [93] and often. Approbari: sc. putavit. Such changes of construction are common in Cic., and I cannot follow Halm in altering the reading to approbavit.

[§105]. Lucem eripimus: cf. [30].

[§§105]—[111]. Summary. You must see, Lucullus, by this time, that your defence of dogmatism is overthrown ([105]). You asked how memory was possible on my principles. Why, did not Siron remember the dogmas of Epicurus? If nothing can be remembered which is not absolutely true, then these will be true ([106]). Probability is quite sufficient basis for the arts. One strong point of yours is that nature compels us to assent. But Panaetius doubted even some of the Stoic dogmas, and you yourself refuse assent to the sorites, why then should not the Academic doubt about other things? ([107]) Your other strong point is that without assent action is impossible ([108]). But surely many actions of the dogmatist proceed upon mere probability. Nor do you gain by the use of the hackneyed argument of Antiochus ([109]). Where probability is, there the Academic has all the knowledge he wants ([110]). The argument of Antiochus that the Academics first admit that there are true and false visa and then contradict themselves by denying that there is any difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny that the difference exists; we do deny that human faculties are capable of perceiving the difference ([111]).

[105]. Inducto ... prob.: so Aug. Cont Ac. II. 12 Soluto, libero: cf. n. on [8]. Implicato: = impedito cf. [101]. Iacere: cf. [79]. Isdem oculis: an answer to the question nihil cernis? in [102]. Purpureum: cf. fragm. [7] of the Acad. Post. Modo caeruleum ... sole: Nonius (cf. fragm. [23]) quotes tum caeruleum tum lavum (the MSS. in our passage have flavum) videtur, quodque nunc a sole. C.F. Hermann would place mane ravum after quodque and take quod as a proper relative pronoun, not as = "because." This transposition certainly gives increased clearness. Hermann further wishes to remove a, quoting exx. of collucere without the prep., which are not at all parallel, i.e. Verr. I. 58, IV. 71. Vibrat: with the ανηριθμον γελασμα of Aeschylus. Dissimileque: Halm, followed by Bait., om. que. Proximo et: MSS. have ei, rightly altered by Lamb., cf. e.g. De Fato 44. Non possis ... defendere: a similar line is taken in [81].

[§106]. Memoria: cf. [22]. Polyaenus: named D.F. I. 20, Diog. X. 18, as one of the chief friends of Epicurus. Falsum quod est: Greek and Latin do not distinguish accurately between the true and the existent, the false and the non existent, hence the present difficulty; in Plato the confusion is frequent, notably in the Sophistes and Theaetetus. Si igitur: "if then recollection is recollection only of things perceived and known." The dogmatist theory of μνημη and νοησις is dealt with in exactly the same way by Sext. P.H. II. 5, 10 and elsewhere, cf. also Plat Theaet. 191 sq. Siron: thus Madv. on D.F. II. 119 writes the name, not Sciron, as Halm. Fateare: the em. of Dav. for facile, facere, facias of MSS. Christ defends facere, thinking that the constr. is varied from the subj. to the inf. after oportet, as after necesse est in [39]. For facere followed by an inf. cf. M.D.F. IV. 8. Nulla: for non, cf. [47], [103].

[§107]. Fiet artibus: n. on [27] for the constr., for the matter see [22]. Lumina: "strong points." Bentl. boldly read columina, while Dav. proposed vimina or vincula. That an em. is not needed may be seen from D.F. II. 70. negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est) N.D. I. 79, and [43] of this book. Responsa: added by Ernesti. Faber supplies haruspicia, Orelli after Ern. haruspicinam, but, as Halm says, some noun in the plur. is needed. Quod is non potest: this is the MSS. reading, but most edd. read si is, to cure a wrong punctuation, by which a colon is placed at perspicuum est above, and a full stop at sustineat. Halm restored the passage. Habuerint: the subj. seems due to the attraction exercised by sustineat. Bait. after Kayser has habuerunt. Positum: "when laid down" or "assumed."

[§108]. Alterum est quod: this is substituted for deinde, which ought to correspond to primum above. Actio ullius rei: n. on actio rerum in [62], cf. also [148]. Adsensu comprobet: almost the same phrase often occurs in Livy, Sueton., etc. see Forc. Sit etiam: the etiam is a little strange and was thought spurious by Ernesti. It seems to have the force of Eng. "indeed", "in what indeed assent consists." Sensus ipsos adsensus: so in I. [41] sensus is defined to be id quod est sensu comprehensum, i.e. καταληψις, cf. also Stobaeus I. 41, 25 αισθητικη γαρ φαντασια συγκαταθεσις εστι. Appetitio: for all this cf. [30]. Et dicta ... multa: Manut. ejected these words as a gloss, after multa the MSS. curiously add vide superiora. Lubricos sustinere: cf. [68] and [94]. Ita scribenti ... exanclatum: for the om. of esse cf. [77], [113] with notes. Herculi: for this form of the gen. cf. Madv. on D.F. I. 14, who doubts whether Cic. ever wrote -is in the gen. of the Greek names in -es. When we consider how difficult it was for copyists not to change the rarer form into the commoner, also that even Priscian (see M.D.F. V. 12) made gross blunders about them, the supposition of Madv. becomes almost irresistible. Temeritatem: προπετειαν, εικαιοτητα.

[§109]. In navigando: cf. [100]. In conserendo: Guretus interprets "εν τω φυτυεσθαι τον αγρον," and is followed by most commentators, though it seems at least possible that manum is to be understood. For the suppressed accus. agrum cf. n. on tollendum in [148]. Sequere: the fut. not the pres. ind., cf. [61]. Pressius: cf. [28]. Reprehensum: sc. narrasti. Id ipsum: = nihil posse comprehendi. Saltem: so in [29]. Pingue: cf. Pro Archia 10. Sibi ipsum: note that Cic. does not generally make ipse agree in case with the reflexive, but writes se ipse, etc. Convenienter: "consistently". Esse possit: Bait. posset on the suggestion of Halm, but Cic. states the doctrine as a living one, not throwing it back to Antiochus time and to this particular speech of Ant. Ut hoc ipsum: the ut follows on illo modo urguendum above. Decretum quod: Halm followed by Bait. gives quo, referring to altero quo neget in [111], which however does not justify the reading. The best MSS. have qui. Et sine decretis: Lamb. gave nec for et, but Dav. correctly explains, "multa decreta habent Academici, non tamen percepta sed tantum probabilia."

[§110]. Ut illa: i.e. the decreta implied in the last sentence. Some MSS. have ille, while Dav. without necessity gives alia. Sic hoc ipsum: Sext. then is wrong is saying (P.H. I. 226) that the Academics διαβεβαιουνται τα πραγματα ειναι ακαταληπτα, i.e. state the doctrine dogmatically, while the sceptics do not. Cognitionis notam: like nota percipiendi, veri et falsi, etc. which we have already had. Ne confundere omnia: a mocking repetition of Lucullus phrase, cf. [58]. Incerta reddere: cf. [54]. Stellarum numerus: another echo of Lucullus; see [32]. Quem ad modum ... item: see Madv. on D.F. III. 48, who quotes an exact parallel from Topica 46, and sicut ... item from N.D. I. 3, noting at the same time that in such exx. neither ita nor idem, which MSS. sometimes give for item, is correct.

[§111]. Dicere ... perturbatum: for om. of esse cf. [108], etc. Antiochus: this Bait. brackets. Unum ... alterum: cf. [44]. Esse quaedam in visis: it was not the esse but the videri, not the actual existence of a difference, but the possibility of that difference being infallibly perceived by human sense, that the Academic denied. Cernimus: i.e. the probably true and false. Probandi species: a phenomenal appearance which belongs to, or properly leads to qualified approval.

[§§112]—[115]. Summary. If I had to deal with a Peripatetic, whose definitions are not so exacting, my course would be easier; I should not much oppose him even if he maintained that the wise man sometimes opines ([112]). The definitions of the real Old Academy are more reasonable than those of Antiochus. How, holding the opinions he does, can he profess to belong to the Old Academy? ([113]) I cannot tolerate your assumption that it is possible to keep an elaborate dogmatic system like yours free from mistakes ([114]). You wish me to join your school. What am I to do then with my dear friend Diodotus, who thinks so poorly of Antiochus? Let us consider however what system not I, but the sapiens is to adopt ([115]).

[§112]. Campis ... exsultare ... oratio: expressions like this are common in Cic., e.g. D.F. I. 54, De Off. I. 61, Orat. 26; cf. also Aug. Cont. Ac. III. 5 ne in quaestionis campis tua eqitaret oratio. Cum Peripatetico: nothing that Cic. states here is at discord with what is known of the tenets of the later Peripatetics; cf. esp. Sext. A.M. VII. 216—226. All that Cic. says is that he could accept the Peripatetic formula, putting upon it his own meaning of course. Doubtless a Peripatetic would have wondered how a sceptic could accept his formulae; but the spectacle of men of the most irreconcilable opinions clinging on to the same formulae is common enough to prevent us from being surprised at Cicero's acceptance. I have already suggested (n. on [18]) that we have here a trace of Philo's teaching, as distinct from that of Carneades. I see absolutely no reason for the very severe remarks of Madvig on D.F. V. 76, a passage which very closely resembles ours. Dumeta: same use in N.D. I. 68, Aug. Cont. Ac. II. 6; the spinae of the Stoics are often mentioned, e.g. D.F. IV. 6. E vero ... a falso: note the change of prep. Adhiberet: the MSS. are confused here, and go Halm reads adderet, and Bait. follows, while Kayser proposes adhaereret, which is indeed nearer the MSS.; cf. however I. [39] adhiberet. Accessionem: for this cf. [18] and [77]. Simpliciter: the opposite of subtiliter; cf. simpliciter—subtilitas in I. [6]. Ne Carneade quidem: cf. [59], [67], [78], [148].

[§113]. Sed qui his minor est: given by Halm as the em. of Io. Clericus for MSS. sed mihi minores. Guietus gave sed his minores, Durand sed minutior, while Halm suggests sed minutiores. I conj. nimio minares, which would be much nearer the MSS.; cf. Lucr. I. 734 inferiores partibus egregie multis multoque minores. Tale verum: visum omitted as in D.F. V. 76. Incognito: cf. [133]. Amavi hominem: cf. Introd. p. [6]. Ita iudico, politissimum; it is a mistake to suppose this sentence incomplete, like Halm, who wishes to add eum esse, or like Bait., who with Kayser prints esse after politissimum. Cf. [108] ita scribenti, exanclatum, and the examples given from Cic. by Madv. on D.F. II. 13. Horum neutrum: cf. [77] nemo. Utrumque verum: Cic. of course only accepts the propositions as Arcesilas did; see [77].

[§114]. Illud ferre: cf. [136]. Constituas: this verb is often used in connection with the ethical finis; cf. [129] and I. [19]. Idemque etiam: Krebs and Allgayer (Antibarbarus, ed. 4) deny that the expression idem etiam is Latin. One good MS. here has atque etiam, which Dav. reads; cf. however Orat. 117. Artificium: = ars, as in [30]. Nusquam labar: cf. [138] ne labar. Subadroganter: cf. [126].

[§115]. Qui sibi cum oratoribus ... rexisse: so Cic. vary often speaks of the Peripatetics, as in D.F. IV. 5, V. 7. Sustinuero: cf. [70]. Tam bonos: Cic. often speaks of them and of Epicurus in this patronising way; see e.g. T.D. II. 44, III. 50, D.F. I. 25, II. 81. For the Epicurean friendships cf. esp. D.F. I. 65. Diodoto: cf. Introd. p. [2]. Nolumus: Halm and Bait., give nolimus; so fine a line divides the subjunctive from the indicative in clauses like these that the choice often depends on mere individual taste. De sapiente loquamur: n. on [66].

[§§116]—[128]. Summary. Of the three parts of philosophy take Physics first. Would your sapiens swear to the truth of any geometrical result whatever? ([116]) Let us see which one of actual physical systems the sapiens we are seeking will select ([117]). He must choose one teacher from among the conflicting schools of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenos, Anaxagoras, Xenophanes, Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Melissus, Plato and Pythagoras. The remaining teachers, great men though they be, he must reject ([118]). Whatever system he selects he must know absolutely; if the Stoic, he must believe as strongly in the Stoic theology as he does in the sunlight. If he holds this, Aristotle will pronounce him mad; you, however, Lucullus, must defend the Stoics and spurn Aristotle from you, while you will not allow me even to doubt ([119]). How much better to be free, as I am and not compelled to find an answer to all the riddles of the universe! ([120]) Nothing can exist, say you, apart from the deity. Strato, however, says he does not need the deity to construct the universe. His mode of construction again differs from that of Democritus. I see some good in Strato, yet I will not assent absolutely either to his system or to yours ([121]). All these matters lie far beyond our ken. We know nothing of our bodies, which we can dissect, while we have not the advantage of being able to dissect the constitution of things or of the earth to see whether she is firmly fixed or hovers in mid air ([122]). Xenophanes, Hicetas, Plato and Epicurus tell strange things of the heavenly bodies. How much better to side with Socrates and Aristo, who hold that nothing can be known about them! ([123]) Who knows the nature of mind? Numberless opinions clash, as do those of Dicaearchus, Plato and Xenocrates. Our sapiens will be unable to decide ([124]). If you say it is better to choose any system rather than none, I choose Democritus. You at once upbraid me for believing such monstrous falsehoods ([125]). The Stoics differ among themselves about physical subjects, why will they not allow me to differ from them? ([126]) Not that I deprecate the study of Physics, for moral good results from it ([127]). Our sapiens will be delighted if he attains to anything which seems to resemble truth. Before I proceed to Ethics, I note your weakness in placing all perceptions on the same level. You must be prepared to asseverate no less strongly that the sun is eighteen times as large as the earth, than that yon statue is six feet high. When you admit that all things can be perceived no more and no less clearly than the size of the sun, I am almost content ([128]).

[§116]. Tres partes: cf. I. [19]. Et a vobismet: "and especially by you". The threefold division was peculiarly Stoic, though used by other schools, cf. Sext. P.H. II. 13 (on the same subject) ‛οι Στωικοι και αλλοι τινες. For other modes of dividing philosophy see Sext. A.M. VII. 2. At illud ante: this is my em. for the MSS. velut illud ante, which probably arose from a marginal variant "vel ut" taking the place of at; cf. a similar break in [40] sed prius, also in [128] at paulum ante. Such breaks often occur in Cic., as in Orator 87 sed nunc aliud, also T.D. IV. 47 repenam fortasse, sed illud ante. For velut Halm writes vel (which Bait. takes), Dav. verum. Inflatus tumore: cf. De Off. I. 91 inflati opinionibus. Bentl. read errore. Cogere: this word like αναγκαζειν and βιαζεσθαι often means simply to argue irresistibly. Initia: as in [118], bases of proof, themselves naturally incapable of proof, so αρχαι in Gk. Digitum: cf. [58], [143]. Punctum esse etc.: σημειον εστιν ου μερος ουθεν (Sext. P.H. III. 39), στιγμη = το αμερες (A.M. IX. 283, 377). Extremitatem: = επιφανειαν. Libramentum: so this word is used by Pliny (see Forc.) for the slope of a hill. Nulla crassitudo: in Sext. the επιφανεια is usually described not negatively as here, but positively as μηκος μετα πλατους (P.H. III. 39), περας (extremitas) σοματος δυο εχον διαστασεις, μηκος και πλατος (A.M. III. 77). Liniamentum ... carentem: a difficult passage. Note (1) that the line is defined in Greek as μηκος απλατες. (Sext. as above), (2) that Cic. has by preference described the point and surface negatively. This latter fact seems to me strong against the introduction of longitudinem which Ursinus, Dav., Orelli, Baiter and others propose by conjecture. If anything is to be introduced, I would rather add et crassitudine before carentem, comparing I. [27] sine ulla specie et carentem omni illa qualitate. I have merely bracketed carentem, though I feel Halm's remark that a verb is wanted in this clause as in the other two, he suggests quod sit sine. Hermann takes esse after punctum as strongly predicative ("there is a point," etc.), then adds similiter after liniamentum and ejects sine ulla. Observe the awkwardness of having the line treated of after the superficies, which has induced some edd. to transpose. For liniamentum = lineam cf. De Or. I. 187. Si adigam: the fine em. of Manut. for si adiiciamus of MSS. The construction adigere aliquem ius iurandum will be found in Caes. Bell. Civ. I. 76, II. 18, qu. by Dav., cf. also Virg. Aen. III. 56 quid non mortalia pectora cogis auri sacra fames? Sapientem nec prius: this is the "egregia lectio" of three of Halm's MSS. Before Halm sapientemne was read, thus was destroyed the whole point of the sentence, which is not that the sapiens will swear to the size of the sun after he has seen Archimedes go through his calculations, but that the sapiens, however true he admits the bases of proof to be which Archimedes uses, will not swear to the truth of the elaborate conclusions which that geometer rears upon them. Cicero is arguing as in [128] against the absurdity of attaching one and the same degree of certainty to the simplest and the most complex truths, and tries to condemn the Stoic sapiens out of his own mouth, cf. esp. nec ille iurare posset in [123]. Multis partibus: for this expression see Munro on Lucr. I. 734, for the sense cf. [82], [123], [126], [128]. Deum: see [126].

[§117]. Vim: = αναγκην, cf. cogere in [116]. Ne ille: this asseverative ne is thus always closely joined with pronouns in Cic. Sententiam eliget et: MSS. have (by dittographia of m, eli) added melius after sententiam, and have also dropped et. Dav. wished to read elegerit, comparing the beginning of [119]. Insipiens eliget: cf. [115] quale est a non sapiente explicari sapientiam? and [9] statuere qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse sapientis. Infinitae quaestiones: θεσεις, general propositions, opposed to finitae quaestiones, limited propositions, Gk. ‛υποθεσεις. Quintal III. 5, 5 gives as an ex. of the former An uxor ducenda, of the latter An Catoni ducenda. These quaestiones are very often alluded to by Cic. as in D.F. I. 12, IV. 6, De Or. I. 138, II. 65—67, Topica 79, Orat. 46, cf. also Quint. X. 5, II. E quibus omnia constant: this sounds like Lucretius, omnia = το παν.

[§118]. For these physici the student must in general be referred to R. and P., Schwegler, and Grote's Plato Vol. I. A more complete enumeration of schools will be found in Sext. P.H. III. 30 sq. Our passage is imitated by Aug De Civ. Dei XVIII. 37. Concessisse primas: Cic. always considers Thales to be sapientissimus e septem (De Leg. II. 26). Hence Markland on Cic. Ad Brutum II. 15, 3 argued that that letter cannot be genuine, since in it the supremacy among the seven is assigned to Solon. Infinitatem naturae: το απειρον, naturae here = ουσιας. Definita: this is opposed to infinita in Topica 79, so definire is used for finire in Orat. 65, where Jahn qu. Verr. IV. 115. Similis inter se: an attempt to translate ‛ομοιομερειας. Eas primum, etc.: cf. the exordium of Anaxagoras given from Diog. II. 6 in R. and P. 29 παντα χρηματα ην ‛ομου ειτα νους ελθων αυτα διεκοσμησε. Xenophanes ... deum: Eleaticism was in the hands of Xenoph. mainly theological. Neque natum unquam: cf. neque ortum unquam in [119]. Parmenides ignem: cf. Arist. Met. A. 5 qu. R. and P. 94. He only hypothetically allowed the existence of the phenomenal world, after which he made two αρχαι, θερμον και ψυχρον τουτων δε το μεν κατα μεν το ‛ον θερμον ταττει, θατερον δε κατα το μη ον. Heraclitus: n. on I. [39]. Melissus: see Simplicius qu. R. and P. 101, and esp. το εον αιει αρα ην τε και εσται. Plato: n. on I. [27]. Discedent: a word often used of those vanquished in a fight, cf. Hor. Sat. I. 7, 17.

[§119]. Sic animo ... sensibus: knowledge according to the Stoics was homogeneous throughout, no one thing could be more or less known than another. Nunc lucere: cf. [98], also [128] non enim magis adsentiuntur, etc. Mundum sapientem: for this Stoic doctrine see N.D. I. 84, II. 32, etc. Fabricata sit: see [87] n. Solem: [126]. Animalis intellegentia: reason is the essence of the universe with the Stoics, cf. Zeller 138—9, also [28], [29] of Book I. Permanet: the deity is to the Stoic πνευμα ενδιηκον δι ‛ολου του κοσμου (Plut. De Plac. Phil. I. 7 qu. R. and P. 375), spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus. (Seneca, Consol. ad Helvid. 8, 3 qu. Zeller 147). Deflagret: the Stoics considered the κοσμος φθαρτος, cf. Diog. VII. 141, Zeller 156—7. Fateri: cf. tam vera quam falsa cernimus in [111]. Flumen aureum: Plut. Vita Cic. 24 alludes to this (‛οτι χρυσιου ποταμος ειη ρεοντος). This is the constant judgment of Cic. about Aristotle's style. Grote, Aristot. Vol I. p. 43, quotes Topica 3, De Or. I. 49, Brut. 121, N.D. II. 93, De Inv. II. 6, D.F. I. 14, Ad Att. II. 1, and discusses the difficulty of applying this criticism to the works of Aristotle which we possess. Nulla vis: cf. I. [28]. Exsistere: Walker conj. efficere, "recte ut videtur" says Halm. Bait. adopts it. Ornatus: = κοσμος.

[§120]. Libertas ... non esse: a remarkable construction. For the Academic liberty see Introd. p. [18]. Quod tibi est: after these words Halm puts merely a comma, and inserting respondere makes cur deus, etc. part of the same sentence. Bait. follows. Nostra causa: Cic. always writes mea, tua, vestra, nostra causa, not mei, tui, nostri, vestri, just as he writes sua sponte, but not sponte alicuius. For the Stoic opinion that men are the chief care of Providence, see N.D. I. 23, II. 37, D.F. III. 67, Ac. I. [29] etc., also Zeller. The difficulties surrounding the opinion are treated of in Zeller 175, N.D. II. 91—127. They supply in Sext. P.H. I. 32, III. 9—12 an example of the refutation of νοουμενα by means of νοουμενα. Tam multa ac: MSS. om. ac, which I insert. Lactantius qu. the passage without perniciosa. Myrmecides: an actual Athenian artist, famed for minute work in ivory, and especially for a chariot which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee concealed. See Plin. Nat. Hist. VII. 21, XXXVI. 5.

[§121]. Posse: n. on I. [29]. Strato: R. and P. 331. Sed cum: sed often marks a very slight contrast, there is no need to read et, as Halm. Asperis ... corporibus: cf. fragm. [28] of the Ac. Post., also N.D. I. 66. Somnia: so N.D. I. 18 miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed somniantium, ib. I. 42 non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia, also ib. I. 66 flagitia Democriti. Docentis: giving proof. Optantis: Guietus humorously conj. potantis, Durand oscitantis (cf. N.D. I. 72), others opinantis. That the text is sound however may be seen from T.D. II. 30 optare hoc quidem est non docere, De Fato 46, N.D. I. 19 optata magis quam inventa, ib. III. 12 doceas oportet nec proferas; cf. also Orat. 59 vocis bonitas optanda est, non est enim in nobis, i.e. a good voice is a thing to be prayed for, and not to be got by exertion. There is a similar Greek proverb, ευχη μαλλον η αληθεια, in Sext. P.H. VIII. 353. Magno opere: Hermann wishes to read onere. The phrase magnum onus is indeed common (cf. De Or. I. 116), but magnum opus, in the sense of "a great task," is equally so, cf. T.D. III. 79, 84, Orat. 75. Modo hoc modo illud: [134].

[§122]. Latent ista: see n. on fragm. [29] of the Ac. Post.; for latent cf. I. [45]. Aug. Cont. Ac. II. 12, III. 1 imitates this passage. Circumfusa: cf. I. [44], and [46] of this book. Medici: cf. T.D. I. 46 Viderentur: a genuine passive, cf. [25], [39], [81]. Empirici: a school of physicians so called. Ut ... mutentur: exactly the same answer was made recently to Prof. Huxley's speculations on protoplasm; he was said to have assumed that the living protoplasm would have the same properties as the dead. Media pendeat: cf. N.D. II. 98, De Or. III. 178.

[§123]. Habitari ait: for this edd. qu. Lactant. Inst. III. 23, 12. Portenta: "monstrosities these," cf. D.F. IV. 70. Iurare: cf. [116]. Neque ego, etc.: see fragm. [30] of Ac. Post. Αντιποδας: this doctrine appears in Philolaus (see Plut. Plac. Phil. III. 11 qu. R. and P. 75), who give the name of αντιχθων to the opposite side of the world. Diog. VIII. 26 (with which passage cf. Stob. Phys. XV. 7) mentions the theory as Pythagorean, but in another passage (III. 24) says that Plato first invented the name. The word αντιπους seems to occur first in Plat. Tim. 63 A. The existence of αντιποδες; was of course bound up with the doctrine that the universe or the world is a globe (which is held by Plat. in the Tim. and by the Stoics, see Stob. Phys. XV. 6, Diog. VII. 140), hence the early Christian writers attack the two ideas together as unscriptural. Cf. esp Aug. De Civ. Dei XVI. 9. Hicetas: he was followed by Heraclides Ponticus and some Pythagoreans. Sext. A.M. X. 174 speaks of the followers of Aristarchus the mathematician as holding the same doctrine. It seems also to be found in Philolaus, see R. and P. 75. Theophrastus: who wrote much on the history of philosophy, see R. and P. 328. Platonem: the words of Plato (Tim. 40 B) are γην δε τροφον μεν ‛ημετεραν, ειλλομενην δε περι τον δια παντος πολον τεταμενον. Quid tu, Epicure: the connection is that Cic., having given the crotchets of other philosophers about φυσικη, proceeds to give the peculiar crotchet of Epic. Putas solem ... tantum: a hard passage. Egone? ne bis is the em. of Lamb. for MSS. egone vobis, and is approved by Madv., who thus explains it (Em. 185) "cum interrogatum esset num tantulum (quasi pedalem [82]) solem esse putaret, Epic. non praecise definit (tantum enim esse censebat quantus videretur vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem) sed latius circumscribit, ne bis quidem tantum esse, sed inter pedalem magnitudinem et bipedalem". (D.F. I. 20) This explanation though not quite satisfactory is the best yet given. Epicurus' absurdity is by Cic. brought into strong relief by stating the outside limit to which Epic. was prepared to go in estimating the sun's size, i.e. twice the apparent size. Ne ... quidem may possibly appear strange, cf. however ne maiorem quidem in [82]. Aristo Chius: for this doctrine of his see R. and P. 358.

[§124]. Quid sit animus: an enumeration of the different ancient theories is given in T.D. I. 18—22, and by Sext. A.M. VII. 113, who also speaks in P.H. II. 31 of the πολλη και ανηνυτος μαχη concerning the soul. In P.H. II. 57 he says Γοργιας ουδε διανοιαν ειναι φησι. Dicaearcho: T.D. I. 21. Tres partis: in Plato's Republic. Ignis: Zeno's opinion, T.D. I. 19. Animam: ib. I. 19. Sanguis: Empodocles, as in T.D. I. 19 where his famous line ‛αιμα γαρ ανθρωποις περικαρδιον εστι νοημα is translated, see R. and P. 124. Ut Xenocrates: some edd. read Xenocrati, but cf. I. [44], D.F. II. 18, T.D. III. 76. Numerus: so Bentl. for mens of MSS., cf. I. [39], T.D. I. 20, 41. An explanation of this Pythagorean doctrine of Xenocrates is given in R. and P. 244. Quod intellegi etc.: so in T.D. I. 41 quod subtiliter magis quam dilucide dicitur. Momenta n. on I. [45].

[§125]. Verecundius: cf. [114] subadroganter. Vincam animum: a common phrase in Cic., cf. Philipp. XII. 21. Queru potissimum? quem?: In repeated questions of this kind Cic. usually puts the corresponding case of quisnam, not quis, in the second question, as in Verr. IV. 5. The mutation of Augustine Contra Ac. III. 33 makes it probable that quemnam was the original reading here. Zumpt on Verr. qu. Quint. IX. 2, 61, Plin. Epist. I. 20, who both mention this trick of style, and laud it for its likeness to impromptu. Nobilitatis: this is to be explained by referring to [73]—[75] (imitari numquam nisi clarum, nisi nobilem), where Cic. protests against being compared to a demagogue, and claims to follow the aristocracy of philosophy. The attempts of the commentators to show that Democr. was literally an aristocrat have failed. Convicio: cf. [34]. Completa et conferta: n. on I. [27]. Quod movebitur ... cedat: this is the theory of motion disproved by Lucr. I. 370 sq., cf. also N.D. II. 83. Halm writes quo quid for quod (with Christ), and inserts corpus before cedat, Baiter following him. The text is sound. Trans. "whatever body is pushed, gives way." Tam sit mirabilis: n. on I. [25]. Innumerabilis: [55]. Supra infra: n. on [92]. Ut nos nunc simus, etc.: n. on fragm. [13] of Ac. Post. Disputantis: [55]. Animo videre: cf. [22]. Imagines: ειδωλα, which Catius translated (Ad Fam. XV. 16) by spectra, Zeller 432. Tu vero: etc. this is all part of the personal convicium supposed to be directly addressed to Cic. by the Antiocheans, and beginning at Tune aut inane above. Commenticiis: a favourite word of Cic., cf. De Div. II. 113.

[§126]. Quae tu: elliptic for ut comprobem quae tu comprobas cf. [125]. Impudenter: [115]. Atque haud scio: atque here = καιτοι, "and yet," n. on [5] ac vereor. Invidiam: cf. [144]. Cum his: i.e. aliis cum his. Summus deus: "the highest form of the deity" who was of course one in the Stoic system. Ether is the finest fire, and πυρ τεχνικον is one of the definitions of the Stoic deity, cf. I. [29], Zeller 161 sq. Solem: as of course being the chief seat of fire. Solis autem ... nego credere: Faber first gave ac monet for MSS. admonens, which Halm retains, Manut. then restored to its place permensi refertis, which MSS. have after nego. Hic, which MSS. have after decempeda, Madv. turns into hunc, while hoc, which stands immediately after nego, he ejects (Em. 187). Ergo after vos is of course analeptic. Halm departs somewhat from this arrangement. Leniter: Halm and Hermann leviter; the former reads inverecundior after Morgenstern, for what reason it is difficult to see.

[§127]. Pabulum: similar language in D.F. II. 46. Consideratio contemplatioque: Cic. is fond of this combination, as De Off. I. 153; cf. Wesenberg on T.D. V. 9, who qu. similar combinations from D.F. V. 11, 58. Elatiores: MSS. mostly have latiores. Halm with Lamb. reads altiores, in support of which reading Dav. qu. D.F. II. 51, Val. Flaccus Argon. II. 547, add Virg. Aen. VI. 49, Cic. Orat. 119. Exigua et minima: σμικρα και ελαχιστα. Madv. on D.F. V. 78 notes that except here Cic. always writes exigua et paene minima or something of the kind. Occultissimarum: n. on I. [15]. Occurit ... completur: MSS. have occuret mostly, if that is retained complebitur must be read. Madv. Opusc. II. 282 takes occurit, explaining it as a perfect, and giving numerous exx. of this sequence of tenses, cf. also Wesenb. on T.D. IV. 35.

[§128]. Agi secum: cf. nobiscum ageret in [80]. Simile veri: cf. [66]. Notionem: = cognitionem, επιστημην. At paulum: MSS. et Halm sed.; cf. at illud ante in [116]. Si quae: Halm and many edd. have se, quae. But the se comes in very awkwardly, and is not needed before the infinitive. Madv. indeed (Em. 114), after producing many exx. of the reflexive pronoun omitted, says that he doubts about this passage because considero does not belong to the class of verbs with which this usage is found, but he produces many instances with puto, which surely stands on the same level. Non magis: so in [119] nec magis approbabit nunc lucere, etc. The sunlight was the stock example of a most completely cognisable phenomenon; hence the Academics showed their hostility to absolute knowledge by refusing τον ‛ηλιον ‛ομολογειν ειναι καταληπτον (Galen De Opt. Gen. Dicendi 497 B qu. P. Valentia 304 ed. Or.). Cornix: for the Stoic belief in divination see Zeller 349—358. Signum illud: the xystus ([9]) was adorned with statues; edd. qu. Plin. Nat. Hist. XXXIV. 8. Duodeviginti: [82], I just note that octodecim is not used by Cic. Sol quantus sit: [91]. Omnium rerum ... comprehendendi: not a case of a plural noun with a singular gerund like spe rerum potiendi, etc., but of two genitives depending in different ways on the same word (definitio). M. Em. 197 qu. Plat. Leg. 648 E την παντων ‛ητταν φοβουμενος ανθρωπον τοι πωματος, Brut. 163 Scaevolae dicendi elegantia, De Or. III. 156. Other exx. in M.D.F. I. 14. For the turn of expression cf. T.D. IV. 62 omnium philosophorum una est ratio medendi, Lael. 78 omnium horum vitiorum una cautio est, also [51] of this book.

[§§129]—[141]. Summary. What contention is there among philosophers about the ethical standard! I pass by many abandoned systems like that of Herillus but consider the discrepancies between Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Euclides, Menedemus, Aristo, Pyrrho, Aristippus, Epicurus, Callipho, Hieronymus, Diodorus, Polemo, Antiochus, Carneades ([129]-[131]). If I desire to follow the Stoics, Antiochus will not allow me, while if I follow Polemo, the Stoics are irate ([132]). I must be careful not to assent to the unknown, which is a dogma common to both you, Lucullus, and myself ([133]). Zeno thinks virtue gives happiness. "Yes," says Antiochus, "but not the greatest possible." How am I to choose among such conflicting theories? ([134]) Nor can I accept those points in which Antiochus and Zeno agree. For instance, they regard emotion as harmful, which the ancients thought natural and useful ([135]). How absurd are the Stoic Paradoxes! ([136]) Albinus joking said to Carneades "You do not think me a praetor because I am not a sapiens." "That," said Carneades, "is Diogenes' view, not mine" ([137]). Chrysippus thinks only three ethical systems can with plausibility be defended ([138]). I gravitate then towards one of them, that of pleasure. Virtue calls me back, nor will she even allow me to join pleasure to herself ([139]). When I hear the several pleadings of pleasure and virtue, I cannot avoid being moved by both, and so I find it impossible to choose ([141], [142]).

[§129]. Quod coeperam: in [128] at veniamus nunc ad boni maique notionem. Constituendi: n. on [114]. Bonorum summa: cf. D.F. V. 21 and Madv. Est igitur: so in De Div. II. 8, igitur comes fourth word in the clause; this is not uncommon in Cic., as in Lucretius. Omitto: MSS. et omitto, but cf. Madv. Em. 201 certe contra Ciceronis usum est 'et omitto' pro simplici 'omitto,' in initio huius modi orationis ubi universae sententiae exempla subiciuntur per figuram omissionis. Relicta: cf. [130] abiectos. Cic. generally classes Herillus (or Erillus as Madv. on D.F. II. 35 spells the name), Pyrrho and Aristo together as authors of exploded systems, cf. D.F. II. 43, De Off. I. 6, T.D. V. 85. Ut Herillum. MSS. have either Erillum or et illum, one would expect ut Herilli. Cognitione et scientia: double translation of επιστημη. For the finis of Herillus see Madv. on D.F. II. 43. Megaricorum: Xenophanes. Cic considers the Eleatic and Megarian schools to be so closely related as to have, like the schools of Democritus and Epicurus, a continuous history. The Megarian system was indeed an ethical development of Eleatic doctrine. Zeller, Socrates 211. Unum et simile: for this see Zell. Socr. 222 sq, with footnotes, R. and P. 174 sq. Simile ought perhaps to be sui simile as in Tim. c. 7, already quoted on I. [30], see my note there and cf. I. [35]. Menedemo: see Zeller Socr. 238, R. and P. 182. The Erctrian school was closely connected with the Megarian. Fuit: = natus est, as often. Herilli: so Madv. for ulli of MSS.

[§130]. Aristonem: this is Aristo of Chios, not Aristo of Ceos, who was a Peripatetic; for the difference see R. and P. 332, and for the doctrines of Aristo the Chian ib. 358, Zeller 58 sq. In mediis: cf. I. [36], [37]. Momenta = aestimationes, αξιαι in [36], where momenti is used in a different way. Pyrrho autem: one would expect Pyrrhoni as Dav. conj., but in [124] there is just the same change from Pyrrhoni to Xenocrates. Απαθεια: Diog. IX. 108 affirms this as well as πραιοτης to be a name for the sceptic τελος, but the name scarcely occurs if at all in Sext. who generally uses αταραξια, but occasionally μετριοπαθεια; cf. Zeller 496, R. and P. 338. Απαθεια was also a Stoic term. Diu multumque: n. on I. [4].

[§131]. Nec tamen consentiens: cf. R. and P. 352 where the differences between the two schools are clearly drawn out, also Zeller 447, 448. Callipho: as the genitive is Calliphontis, Cic. ought according to rule to write Calliphon in the nom; for this see Madv. on D.F. II. 19, who also gives the chief authorities concerning this philosopher. Hieronymus: mentioned D.F. II. 19, 35, 41, V. 14, in which last place Cic. says of him quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio. Diodorus: see Madv. on D.F. II. 19. Honeste vivere, etc.: in D.F. IV. 14 the finis of Polemo is stated to be secundum naturam vivere, and three Stoic interpretations of it are given, the last of which resembles the present passage—omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem vivere. This interpretation Antiochus adopted, and from him it is attributed to the vetus Academia in I. [22], where the words aut omnia aut maxima, seem to correspond to words used by Polemo; cf. Clemens Alex. qu. by Madv. on D.F. IV. 15. See n. below on Carneades. Antiochus probat: the germs of many Stoic and Antiochean doctrines were to be found in Polemo; see I. [34], n. Eiusque amici: Bentl. aemuli, but Halm refers to D.F. II. 44. The later Peripatetics were to a great degree Stoicised. Nunc: Halm huc after Jo. Scala. Carneades: this finis is given in D.F. II. 35 (frui principiis naturalibus), II. 42 (Carneadeum illud quod is non tam ut probaret protulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum gerebat opponeret), V. 20 (fruendi rebus iis, quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus, Carneades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor disserendi causa fuit), T.D. V. 84 (naturae primus aut omnibus aut maximis frui, ut Carneades contra Stoicos disserebat). The finis therefore, thus stated, is not different from that of Polemo, but it is clear that Carneades intended it to be different, as he did not include virtus in it (see D.F. II. 38, 42, V. 22) while Polemo did (I. [22]). See more on [139]. Zeno: cf. D.F. IV. 15 Inventor et princeps: same expression in T.D. I. 48, De Or. I. 91, De Inv. II. 6; inv. = οικιστης.

[§132]. Quemlibet: cf. [125], [126]. Prope singularem: cf. T.D. I. 22 Aristoteles longe omnibus—Platonem semper excipio—praestans; also D.F. V. 7, De Leg. I. 15. Per ipsum Antiochum: a similar line of argument is taken in Sext. P.H. I. 88, II. 32, etc. Terminis ... possessione: there is a similar play on the legal words finis terminus possessio in De Leg. I. 55, 56, a noteworthy passage. Omnis ratio etc.: this is the constant language of the later Greek philosophy; cf. Aug. De Civ. Dei XIX. 1 neque enim existimat (Varro) ullam philosophiae sectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distat a ceteris, quod diversos habeat fines bonorum et malorum, etc. Si Polemoneus: i.e. sapiens fuerit. Peccat: a Stoic term turned on the Stoics, see I. [37]. Academicos et: MSS. om. et as in I. [16], and que in [52] of this book. Dicenda: for the omission of the verb with the gerundive (which occurs chiefly in emphatic clauses) cf. I. [7], and Madv. on D.F. I. 43, who how ever unduly limits the usage. Hic igitur ... prudentior: MSS. generally have assentiens, but one good one (Halm's E) has assentientes. I venture to read adsentietur, thinking that the last two letters were first dropt, as in [26] (tenetur) and that then adsentiet, under the attraction of the s following, passed into adsentiens, as in [147] intellegat se passed into intelligentes. N, I may remark, is frequently inserted in MSS. (as in I. [7] appellant, [16] disputant, [24] efficerentur), and all the changes involved in my conj. are of frequent occurrence. I also read sin, inquam (sc. adsentietur) for si numquam of MSS. The question uter est prudentior is intended to press home the dilemma in which Cicero has placed the supposed sapiens. All the other emendations I have seen are too unsatisfactory to be enumerated.

[§133]. Non posse ... esse: this seems to me sound; Bait. however reads non esse illa probanda sap. after Lamb., who also conj. non posse illa probata esse. Paria: D.F. III. 48, Paradoxa 20 sq., Zeller 250. Praecide: συντομος or συνελων ειπε, cf. Cat. Mai. 57, Ad Att. VIII. 4, X. 16. Inquit: n. on [79]. Quid quod quae: so Guietus with the approval of Madv. (Em. 203) reads for MSS. quid quae or quid quaeque, Halm and Bait., follow Moser in writing Quid? si quae removing the stop at paria, and make in utramque partem follow dicantur, on Orelli's suggestion. When several relative pronouns come together the MSS. often omit one. Dicebas: in [27]. Incognito: [133].

[§134]. Etiam: = "yes," Madv. Gram. 454. Non beatissimam: I. [22], n. Deus ille: i.e. more than man (of Aristotle's η θεος η θηριον), if he can do without other advantages. For the omission of est after the emphatic ille cf. [59], n. Theophrasto, etc.: n. on I. [33], [35]. Dicente: before this Halm after Lamb., followed by Bait., inserts contra, the need for which I fail to see. Et hic: i.e. Antiochus. Ne sibi constet: Cic. argues in T.D. V. that there cannot be degrees in happiness. Tum hoc ... tum illud: cf. [121]. Iacere: [79]. In his discrepant: I. [42] in his constitit.

[§135]. Moveri: κινεισθαι, [29]. Laetitia efferri: I. [38]. Probabilia: the removal of passion and delight is easier than that of fear and pain. Sapiensne ... deleta sit: see Madv. D.F. p. 806, ed. 2, who is severe upon the reading of Orelli (still kept by Klotz), non timeat? nec si patria deleatur? non doleat? nec, si deleta sit? which involves the use of nec for ne ... quidem. I have followed the reading of Madv. in his Em., not the one he gives (after Davies) in D.F. ne patria deleatur, which Halm takes, as does Baiter. Mine is rather nearer the MSS. Decreta: some MSS. durata; Halm conj. dictata. Mediocritates: μεσοπετες, as in Aristotle; cf. T.D. III. 11, 22, 74. Permotione: κινεσει. Naturalem ... modum: so T.D. III. 74. Crantoris: sc. librum, for the omission of which see n. on I. [13]; add Quint. IX. 4, 18, where Spalding wished to read in Herodoti, supplying libro. Aureolus ... libellus: it is not often that two diminutives come together in Cic., and the usage is rather colloquial; cf. T.D. III. 2, N.D. III. 43, also for aureolus [119] flumen aureum. Panaetius: he had addressed to Tubero a work de dolore; see D.F. IV. 23. Cotem: T.D. IV. 43, 48, Seneca De Ira III. 3, where the saying is attributed to Aristotle (iram calcar esse virtutis). Dicebant: for the repetition of this word cf. [146], I. [33].

[§136]. Sunt enim Socratica: the Socratic origin of the Stoic paradoxes is affirmed in Parad. 4, T.D. III. 10. Mirabilia: Cic. generally translates παραδοξα by admirabilia as in D.F. IV. 74, or admiranda, under which title he seems to have published a work different from the Paradoxa, which we possess: see Bait., and Halm's ed. of the Phil. works (1861), p. 994. Quasi: = almost, ‛ως επος ειπειν. Voltis: cf. the Antiochean opinion in I. [18], [22]. Solos reges: for all this see Zeller 253 sq. Solos divites: ‛οτι μονος ‛ο σοφος πλουσιος, Parad. VI. Liberum: Parad. V. ‛οτι μονος ‛ο σοφος ελευθερος και πας αφρον δουλος. Furiosus: Parad. IV. ‛οτι πας αφρον μαινεται.

[§137]. Tam sunt defendenda: cf. [8], [120]. Bono modo: a colloquial and Plautine expression; see Forc. Ad senatum starent: "were in waiting on the senate;" cf. such phrases as stare ad cyathum, etc. Carneade: the vocative is Carneades in De Div. I. 23. Huic Stoico: i.e. Diogeni; cf. D.F. II. 24. Halm brackets Stoico, and after him Bait. Sequi volebat: "professed to follow;" cf. D.F. V. 13 Strato physicum se voluit "gave himself out to be a physical philosopher:" also Madv. on D.F. II. 102. Ille noster: Dav. vester, as in [143] noster Antiochus. But in both places Cic. speaks as a friend of Antiochus; cf. [113]. Balbutiens: "giving an uncertain sound;" cf. De Div. I. 5, T.D. V. 75.

[§138]. Mihi veremini: cf. Caes. Bell. Gall. V. 9 veritus navibus. Halm and Bait. follow Christ's conj. verenti, removing the stop at voltis. Opinationem: the οιησιν of Sext., e.g. P.H. III. 280. Quod minime voltis: cf. I. [18]. De finibus: not "concerning," but "from among" the different fines; otherwise fine would have been written. Cf. I. [4] si qui de nostris. Circumcidit et amputat: these two verbs often come together, as in D.F. I. 44; cf. also D.F. III. 31. Si vacemus omni molestia: which Epicurus held to be the highest pleasure. Cum honestate: Callipho in [131]. Prima naturae commoda: Cic. here as in D.F. IV. 59, V. 58 confuses the Stoic πρωτα κατα φυσιν with τα του σωματος αγαθα και τα εκτος of the Peripatetics, for which see I. [19]. More on the subject in Madvig's fourth Excursus to the D.F. Relinquit: Orelli relinqui against the MSS.

[§139]. Polemonis ... finibus: all these were composite fines. Adhuc: I need scarcely point out that this goes with habeo and not with probabilius; adhuc for etiam with the comparative does not occur till the silver writers. Labor eo: cf. Horace's nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor, also D.F. V. 6 rapior illuc: revocat autem Antiochus. Reprehendit manu: M.D.F. II. 3. Pecudum: I. [6], Parad. 14 voluptatem esse summum bonum, quae mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non hominum; similar expressions occur with a reference to Epicurus in De Off. I. 105, Lael. 20, 32. T.D. V. 73, D.F. II. 18; cf. also Aristoph. Plut. 922 προβατιου βιον λεγεις and βοσκηματων βιος in Aristotle. The meaning of pecus is well shown in T.D. I. 69. Iungit deo: Zeller 176 sq. Animum solum: the same criticism is applied to Zeno's finis in D.F. IV. 17, 25. Ut ... sequar: for the repeated ut see D.F. V. 10, Madv. Gram. 480, obs. 2. Bait. brackets the second ut with Lamb. Carneades ... defensitabat: this is quite a different view from that in [131]; yet another of Carneades is given in T.D. V. 83. Istum finem: MSS. ipsum; the two words are often confused, as in I. [2]. Ipsa veritas: MSS. severitas, a frequent error; cf. In Verr. Act. I. 3, III. 162, De Leg. I. 4, also Madv. on D.F. IV. 55. Obversetur: Halm takes the conj. of Lamb., adversetur. The MSS. reading gives excellent sense; cf. T.D. II. 52 obversentur honestae species viro. Bait. follows Halm. Tu ... copulabis: this is the feigned expostulation of veritas (cf. [34] convicio veritatis), for which style see [125].

[§140]. Voluptas cum honestate: this whole expression is in apposition to par, so that cum must not be taken closely with depugnet; cf. Hor. Sat. I. 7, 19 Rupili et Persi par pugnat uti non compositum melius (sc. par) cum Bitho Bacchius. Si sequare, ruunt: for constr. cf. I. [7]. Communitas: for Stoic philanthropy see Zeller 297. Nulla potest nisi erit: Madv. D.F. III. 70 "in hac coniunctione—hoc fieri non potest nisi—fere semper coniunctivus subicitur praesentis—futuri et perfecti indicativus ponitur." Gratuita: "disinterested." Ne intellegi quidem: n. on I. [7], cf. also T.D. V. 73, 119. Gloriosum in vulgus: cf. D.F. II. 44 populus cum illis facit (i.e. Epicureis). Normam ... regulam: n. on Ac. Post. fragm. [8]. Praescriptionem: I. [23], n.

[§141]. Adquiescis: MSS. are confused here, Halm reads adsciscis, comparing [138]. Add D.F. I. 23 (sciscat et probet), III. 17 (adsciscendas esse), III. 70 (adscisci et probari) Bait. follows Halm. Ratum ... fixum: cf. [27] and n. on Ac. Post. fragm. [17]. Falso: like incognito in [133]. Nullo discrimine: for this see the explanation of nihil interesse in [40], n. Iudicia: κριτηρια as usual.

[§§142]—[146]. Summary. To pass to Dialectic, note how Protagoras, the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, and Plato disagree ([142]). Does Antiochus follow any of these? Why, he never even follows the vetus Academia, and never stirs a step from Chrysippus. Dialecticians themselves cannot agree about the very elements of their art ([143]). Why then, Lucullus, do you rouse the mob against me like a seditious tribune by telling them I do away with the arts altogether? When you have got the crowd together, I will point out to them that according to Zeno all of them are slaves, exiles, and lunatics, and that you yourself, not being sapiens, know nothing whatever ([144]). This last point Zeno used to illustrate by action Yet his whole school cannot point to any actual sapiens ([145]). Now as there is no knowledge there can be no art. How would Zeuxis and Polycletus like this conclusion? They would prefer mine, to which our ancestors bear testimony.

[§142]. Venio iam: Dialectic had been already dealt with in [91]—[98] here it is merely considered with a view to the choice of the supposed sapiens, as was Ethical Science in [129]—[141] and Physics in [116]—[128]. With the enumeration of conflicting schools here given compare the one Sextus gives in A.M. VII. 48 sq. Protagorae: R. and P. 132 sq. Qui putet: so MSS., Halm and Bait. putat after Lamb. Trans. "inasmuch as he thinks". Permotiones intimas: cf. [20] tactus interior, also [76]. Epicuri: nn. on [19], [79], [80]. Iudicium: κριτηριον as usual. Rerum notitiis: προληψεσι, Zeller 403 sq. Constituit: note the constr. with in, like ponere in. Cogitationis: cf. I. [30]. Several MSS. have cognitionis, the two words are frequently confused. See Wesenberg Fm. to T.D. III. p. 17, who says, multo tamen saepius "cogitatio" pro "cognitio" substituitur quam contra, also M.D.F III. 21.

[§143]. Ne maiorum quidem suorum: sc. aliquid probat. For maiorum cf. [80]. Here Plato is almost excluded from the so-called vetus Academia, cf. I. [33]. Libri: titles of some are preserved in Diog. Laert. IV. 11—14. Nihil politius: cf. [119], n. Pedem nusquam: for the ellipse cf. [58], [116], Pro Deiot. 42 and pedem latum in Plaut. Abutimur: this verb in the rhetorical writers means to use words in metaphorical or unnatural senses, see Quint. X. 1, 12. This is probably the meaning here; "do we use the name Academic in a non natural fashion?" Si dies est lucet: a better trans of ει φως εστιν, ‛ημερα εστιν than was given in [96], where see n. Aliter Philoni: not Philo of Larissa, but a noted dialectician, pupil of Diodorus the Megarian, mentioned also in [75]. The dispute between Diodorus and Philo is mentioned in Sext. A.M. VIII. 115—117 with the same purpose as here, see also Zeller 39. Antipater: the Stoic of Tarsus, who succeeded Diogenes Babylonius in the headship of the school. Archidemus: several times mentioned with Antipater in Diog., as VII. 68, 84. Opiniosissimi: so the MSS. I cannot think that the word is wrong, though all edd. condemn it. Halm is certainly mistaken in saying that a laudatory epithet such as ingeniosissimi is necessary. I believe that the word opiniosissimi (an adj. not elsewhere used by Cic.) was manufactured on the spur of the moment, in order to ridicule these two philosophers, who are playfully described as men full of opinio or δοξα—just the imputation which, as Stoics, they would most repel. Hermann's spinosissimi is ingenious, and if an em. were needed, would not be so utterly improbable as Halm thinks.

[§144]. In contionem vocas: a retort, having reference to [14], cf. also [63], [72]. For these contiones see Lange, Romische Alterthumer II. 663, ed 2. They were called by and held under the presidency of magistrates, all of whom had the right to summon them, the right of the tribune being under fewer restrictions than the right of the others. Occludi tabernas in order of course that the artisans might all be at the meeting, for this see Liv. III. 27, IV. 31, IX. 7, and compare the cry "to your tents, O Israel" in the Bible. Artificia: n. on [30]. Tolli: n. on [26]. Ut opifices concitentur: cf. Pro Flacc. 18 opifices et tabernarios quid neqoti est concitare? Expromam: Cic. was probably thinking of the use to which he himself had put these Stoic paradoxes in Pro Murena 61, a use of which he half confesses himself ashamed in D.F. IV. 74. Exsules etc.: [136].

[§145]. Scire negatis: cf. Sext. A.M. VII. 153, who says that even καταληψις when it arises in the mind of a φαυλος is mere δοξα and not επιστημη; also P.H. II. 83, where it is said that the φαυλος is capable of το αληθες but not of αληθεια, which the σοφος alone has. Visum ... adsensus: the Stoics as we saw (II. [38], etc.) analysed sensations into two parts; with the Academic and other schools each sensation was an ultimate unanalysable unit, a ψιλον παθος. For this symbolic action of Zeno cf. D.F. II. 18, Orat. 113, Sextus A.M. II. 7, Quint. II. 20, 7, Zeller 84. Contraxerat: so Halm who qu. Plin. Nat. Hist. XI. 26, 94 digitum contrahens aut remittens; Orelli construxerat; MSS. mostly contexerat. Quod ante non fuerat: καταλαμβανειν however is frequent in Plato in the sense "to seize firmly with the mind." Adverterat: the best MSS. give merely adverat, but on the margin admoverat which Halm takes, and after him Bait.; one good MS. has adverterat. Ne ipsi quidem: even Socrates, Antisthenes and Diogenes were not σοφοι according to the Stoics, but merely were εν προκοπηι; see Diog. VII. 91, Zeller 257, and cf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 1056 (qu. by P. Valentia p. 295, ed Orelli) εστι δε ουτος (i.e. ‛ο σοφος) ουδαμου γης ουδε γεγονε. Nec tu: sc. scis; Goer. has a strange note here.

[§146]. Illa: cf. illa invidiosa above ([144]). Dicebas: in [22]. Refero: "retort," as in Ovid. Metam. I. 758 pudet haec opprobria nobis Et dici potuisse et non potuisse referri; cf. also par pari referre dicto. Ne nobis quidem: "nor would they be angry;" cf. n. on. I. [5]. Arbitrari: the original meaning of this was "to be a bystander," or "to be an eye-witness," see Corssen I. 238. Ea non ut: MSS. have ut ea non aut. Halm reads ut ea non merely, but I prefer the reading I have given because of Cicero's fondness for making the ut follow closely on the negative: for this see Madv. Gram. 465 b, obs.

[§147]. Obscuritate: cf. I. [44], n. on I. [15]. Plus uno: [115]. Iacere: cf. [79]. Plagas: cf. n. on [112].

[§148]. Ad patris revolvor sententiam: for this see Introd. [50], and for the expression [18]. Opinaturum: see [59], [67], [78], [112]. Intellegat se: MSS. intellegentes, cf. n. on [132]. Qua re: so Manut. for per of MSS. Εποχην illam omnium rerum: an odd expression; cf. actio rerum in [62]. Non probans: so Madv. Em. 204 for MSS. comprobans. Dav. conj. improbans and is followed by Bait. I am not sure that the MSS. reading is wrong. The difficulty is essentially the same as that involved in [104], which should be closely compared. A contrast is drawn between a theoretical dogma and a practical belief. The dogma is that assent (meaning absolute assent) is not to be given to phenomena. This dogma Catulus might well describe himself as formally approving (comprobans). The practice is to give assent (meaning modified assent). There is the same contrast in [104] between placere and tenere. I may note that the word alteri (cf. altero in [104]) need not imply that the dogma and the practice are irreconcilable; a misconception on this point has considerably confirmed edd. in their introduction of the negative. Nec eam admodum: cf. non repugnarem in [112]. Tollendum: many edd. have gone far astray in interpreting this passage. The word is used with a double reference to adsensus and ancora; in the first way we have had tollere used a score of times in this book; with regard to the second meaning, cf. Caes. Bell. Gall. IV. 23, Bell. Civ. I. 31, where tollere is used of weighing anchor, and Varro De Re Rust. III. 17, 1, where it occurs in the sense "to get on," "to proceed," without any reference to the sea. (The exx. are from Forc.) This passage I believe and this alone is referred to in Ad Att. XIII. 21, 3. If my conjecture is correct, Cic. tried at first to manage a joke by using the word inhibendum, which had also a nautical signification, but finding that he had mistaken the meaning of the word, substituted tollendum.

[1] De Leg. II. §3.

[2] Cf. De Or. II. §1 with II. §5.

[3] Ad Fam. XIII. 1, Phaedrus nobis,... cum pueri essemus, valde ut philosophus probabatur.

[4] N.D. I. §93, Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius.

[5] Ad Fam. XIII. 1.

[6] Brutus, §309.

[7] Ad Att. II. 20, §6.

[8] Ad Fam. XIII. 16. T.D. V. §113. Acad. II. §[115].

[9] Brutus, §306.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Rep. I. §7. T.D. V. §5. De Off. II. §§3,4. De Fato, §2.

[12] Cf. Brutus, §§312, 322.

[13] Cf. Brutus, §§312, 314, 316.

[14] Brutus, §315.

[15] N.D. I. §59.

[16] VII. I. §35.

[17] Cf. N.D. I. §93 with Ad Fam. XIII. 1, §1.

[18] Ac. I. §[46].

[19] D.F. V. §3.

[20] D.F. I. §16.

[21] D.F. V. §6, etc.

[22] D.F. V. §8.

[23] Ac. II. §[4].

[24] Ib. §[69].

[25] Ad Att. XIII. 19, §5.

[26] Ac. II. §[113].

[27] Ac. II. §[113]. De Leg. I. §54.

[28] II. §[12].

[29] Brutus, §316.

[30] Hortensius, fragm. 18, ed. Nobbe.

[31] T.D. II. §61.

[32] De Div. I. §130.

[33] D.F. I. §6.

[34] Ad Att. I. 10 and 11.

[35] Ibid. II. 1, §3. N.D. I. §6.

[36] Ad Att. II. 2.

[37] Ibid. I. 20. Cf. II. 1, §12.

[38] II. 6.

[39] Ad Att. II. 7 and 16.

[40] Ibid. II. 6, §2.

[41] Cf. Ad Att. IV. 11 with IV. 8 a.

[42] Ibid. IV. 10.

[43] Ibid. IV. 16, §2.

[44] Ibid. IV. 16 c, §10, ed. Nobbe.

[45] Ad Qu. Fr. II. 14.

[46] Ad Qu. Fr. III. 5 and 6.

[47] §332.

[48] Ad Fam. XIII. 1. Ad Att. V. 11, §6.

[49] Ad Att. V. 10, §5.

[50] De Off. I. §1.

[51] Tim. c. 1.

[52] Cf. Tim. c. 1 with De Div. I. §5. Brutus, §250.

[53] Ad Att. VI. 1, §26.

[54] Ibid. VI. 2, §3.

[55] Ibid. VI. 6, §2.

[56] Ibid. VI. 7, §2. Ad Fam. II. 17, §1.

[57] T.D. V. §22.

[58] Ad Att. VII. 1, §1.

[59] Ibid. VII. 3, VIII. 11.

[60] Ad Att. X. 8, §6.

[61] Ibid. VIII. 2, §4.

[62] περι ‛ομονοιας, Ad Att. IX. 9, §2, etc.

[63] Ibid. IX. 4, §2; 9, §1.

[64] Ibid. IX. 10, §2.

[65] Ad Fam. IX. 1.

[66] Ibid. IX. 3.

[67] Ibid. IV. 3 and 4.

[68] De Rep. I. §7. T.D. V. §5, etc.

[69] Cf. N.D. I. §6.

[70] Esp. I. §§[26], [37].

[71] Cf. Ac. II. §[29].

[72] Ac. II. §[70].

[73] De Div. II. §1. Ac. I. §[45], etc.

[74] N.D. I. §1.

[75] Cf. esp. N.D. I. §5. T.D. II. §5.

[76] De Div. II. §1. N.D. I. §7, etc.

[77] T.D. II. §4.

[78] N.D. I. §10.

[79] Cf. Ac. II. §[8]. N.D. I. §§10, 66.

[80] T.D. II. §9.

[81] N.D. I. §10.

[82] Ibid. I. §17. Ac. II. §§[120], [137].

[83] T.D. V. §33.

[84] Ac. II. §[121].

[85] T.D. V. §82, libas ex omnibus.

[86] Ac. II. §[143].

[87] T.D. V. §11.

[88] Ac. II. §[10].

[89] N.D. I. §12.

[90] Parad. §2. De Fato, §3. T.D. I. §7. De Off. I. §3.

[91] D.F. IV. §5.

[92] Paradoxa, §2.

[93] T.D. I. §55. De Div. II. §62.

[94] T.D. V. §11. D.F. II. §§1 and 2, etc.

[95] §[13].

[96] Cf. esp. N.D. i. §6. Ac. ii. §§[11] and [17].

[97] De Leg. I. §39.

[98] Ibid. I. §§55, 56.

[99] N.D. I. §4.

[100] T.D. IV. §53.

[101] Cf. De Off. III. §20.

[102] T.D. V. §§21-31, esp. §23.

[103] Ibid. V. §75.

[104] De Off. II. §35.

[105] T.D. V. §34.

[106] Ac. I. §[16].

[107] Paradoxa, §4. Ac. II. §§[136], [137]. T.D. III. §10.

[108] Ac. II. §[135].

[109] See esp. N.D. I. §§3, 4.

[110] Ibid., also T.D. V. §83.

[111] Grote's Aristotle, vol. I. ch. 11.

[112] T.D. IV. §9. D.F. III. §41.

[113] I. §[6].

[114] T.D. IV. §7.

[115] Ibid. IV. §7. Cf. D.F. II. §44, populus cum illis facit.

[116] Ac. I. §[6]. T.D. IV. 6, 7; II. §7; III. §33. D.F. III. §40.

[117] T.D. IV. §3.

[118] D.F. I. §§4-6. Ac. I. §[10]. D.F. III. §5.

[119] De Div. I. §§4, 5.

[120] D.F. III. §5. N.D. I. §8. T.D. III. §§10, 16.

[121] T.D. I. §5.

[122] T.D. II. §5.

[123] De Div. II. §1. De Off. II. §4.

[124] De Div. II. §6. De Off. II. §2.

[125] See esp. De Consolatione, fragm. 7, ed. Nobbe. T.D. V. §5. Ac. I. §[11].

[126] N.D. I. §6.

[127] T.D. II. §§1, 4. De Off. II. §3. D.F. I. §1.

[128] T.D. II. §1. D.F. I. §§1, 3.

[129] D.F. I. §§1, 11.

[130] De Div. II. §5. De Off. II. §2. T.D. IV. §1.

[131] De Div. II. §4.

[132] N.D. I. §9. T.D. II. §1.

[133] De Div. II. §4.

[134] Ad Att. XII. 19, §1.

[135] Ibid. XII. 14, §3.

[136] Ibid. XII. 15, 16.

[137] Ibid. XII. 21, §5.

[138] Ibid. XII. 23, §2.

[139] Ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam.

[140] De Or. III. §109.

[141] Ad Att. XII. 28, §2.

[142] Cf. esp. Ad Att. XII. 40, §2 with 38, §3.

[143] Ibid. XII. 40, §2.

[144] Ibid. XII. 40, §5.

[145] Ibid. XIII. 26.

[146] Ibid. XII. 41, §1, also 42, 43; XIII. 26.

[147] Ibid. XII. 46.

[148] Ad Att. XII. 45, §1.

[149] Über Cicero's Akademika, p. 4.

[150] Cf. Ad Att. XII. 12, §2, where there is a distinct mention of the first two books.

[151] Ibid. XIII. 12, §3.

[152] Ibid. XIII. 19, §4.

[153] Ibid. XIII. 21, §§4, 5; 22, §3.

[154] II. §2.

[155] De Fin. Praef. p. lvii. ed. 2.

[156] Ad Att. XIII. 12, §3; 16, §1.

[157] Ibid. XVI. 3, §1.

[158] Ibid. XVI. 6, §4.

[159] Ac. II. §[61].

[160] D.F. I. §2.

[161] T.D. II. §4. De Div. II. §1.

[162] Cf. Krische, p. 5.

[163] Ac. II. §[61].

[164] Ad Att. XIII. 5, §1.

[165] Ibid. XIII. 32, §3.

[166] Ad Att. XIII. 33, §4.

[167] Ibid. XIII. II. §1.

[168] Ibid. XII. 42.

[169] Ibid. XIII. 16, §1.

[170] Ibid. XIII. 12, §3.

[171] Ibid. IV. 16a, §2.

[172] Ibid. XIII. 12, §3; also IV. 16a, §2.

[173] Ad Att. XIII. 12, §3.

[174] Ibid. XIII. 19, §4.

[175] Ibid. XIII. 12, §3.

[176] Ibid. XIII. 19, §4.

[177] Ibid. XIII. 12, §3; 19, §4; 16, §1.

[178] Ibid. XIII. 19, §3.

[179] Ad Att. XIII. 22, §1.

[180] Ibid. XIII. 19, §5.

[181] Cf. Ibid. XIII. 14, §3; 16, §2; 18; 19, §5.

[182] Ibid. XIII. 19, §5.

[183] Ibid. XIII. 25, §3.

[184] Ad Att. XIII. 24.

[185] Ibid. XIII. 13, §1; 18.

[186] Ibid. XIII. 13, §1; 18; 19, §4.

[187] Ibid. XIII. 12, §3. I may here remark on the absurdity of the dates Schütz assigns to these letters. He makes Cicero execute the second edition of the Academica in a single day. Cf. XIII. 12 with 13.

[188] Ad Att. XIII. 13, §1.

[189] Ibid. XIII. 19, §5.

[190] Ibid. XIII. 19, §3.

[191] Ibid. XIII. 25, §3.

[192] Ibid. XIII. 25, §3.

[193] Ibid. XIII. 21, §4.

[194] Ibid. XIII. 21, §5.

[195] Ad Att. XIII. 22, §3.

[196] Ibid. XIII. 24.

[197] Ibid. XIII. 35, 36, §2.

[198] Ibid. XIII. 38, §1.

[199] Ibid. XIII. 21, §§3, 4.

[200] T.D. II. §4. Cf. Quintil. Inst. Or. III. 6, §64.

[201] Ad Att. XVI. 6, §4. N.D. I. §11. De Div. II. §1.

[202] De Off. II. §8, Timæus, c. 1. Ad Att. XIII. 13, §1; 19, §5.

[203] Ad Att. XIII. 12; 16; 13; 19.

[204] Ibid. XVI. 6, §4. T.D. II. §4. N.D. I. §11. De Div. II. §1.

[205] Nat. Hist. XXXI. c. 2.

[206] Inst. Or. III. 6, §64.

[207] Plut. Lucullus, c. 42.

[208] §§[12], [18], [148].

[209] Cf. Att. XIII. 19, §4.

[210] Lucullus, §12.

[211] Ad Att. XIII. 16, §1.

[212] Lactant. Inst. VI 2.

[213] Cf. esp. De Off. I. §133 with Brutus, §§133, 134.

[214] Esp. Pro Lege Manilia, §51.

[215] Brutus, §222.

[216] In Verrem, II. 3, §210.

[217] Pro Lege Manilia, §59.

[218] Pro Sestio, §122.

[219] Pro Sestio, §101.

[220] Philipp. II. §12.

[221] Ad Att. II. 24, §4.

[222] Pis. §6. Pro Sestio, §121. Pro Domo, §113. Post Reditum in Senatu, §9. Philipp. II. §12.

[223] Ad Fam. IX. 15, §3.

[224] Cf. Post Reditum in Senatu, §9. Pro Domo, §113.

[225] Pro Archia, §§6, 28.

[226] Cf. Ac. II. §[9] with §[80].

[227] §[62].

[228] Pro Plancio, §12. Pro Murena, §36. Pro Rabirio, §26. Pro Cornelia II. fragm. 4, ed. Nobbe.

[229] T.D. V. §56. Cf. De Or. III. §9. N.D. III. §80.

[230] Cf. esp. III. §173.

[231] Ibid. II. §28.

[232] Ibid. II. §§13, 20, 21.

[233] Ibid. II. §51.

[234] Cf. ibid. II. §74 with III. §127.

[235] Cf. II. §152 with III. §187.

[236] Ibid. II. §154.

[237] Brutus, §§132, 133, 134, 259. De Or. III. §29.

[238] Brutus, §132.

[239] De Or. II. §244. N.D. I. §79. Cf. Gellius, XIX. 9.

[240] De Or. II. §155.

[241] Ibid. III. §194.

[242] Cf. De Or. II. §68 with III. §§182, 187.

[243] De Or. I. §82 sq.; II. §360.

[244] Ibid. I. §45; II. §365; III. §§68, 75.

[245] §[12], commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni.

[246] Cf. De Or. III. §110.

[247] Ac. II. §[148].

[248] Cf. Ac. II. §[11].

[249] Ibid.

[250] Ibid. §§[12], [18], with my notes.

[251] Ac. II. §[12]: ista quae heri defensa sunt compared with the words ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.

[252] See below.

[253] Ac. II. §§[33]—[36] inclusive; §[54].

[254] Ac. II. §[28].

[255] Cf. Ac. II. §§[59], [67], [78], [112], [148], with my notes.

[256] Ibid. II. §[10].

[257] Ibid. II. §[28].

[258] Cf. II. §[61] with the fragments of the Hortensius; also T.D. II. §4; III. §6; D.F. I. §2.

[259] Lactant. III. 16.

[260] Cf. Ac. II. §[10].

[261] Ib. II. §[61].

[262] §§[44]—[46].

[263] §[13].

[264] Cf. II. §[14] with I. §[44], and II. §§[55], [56].

[265] II. §§[17], [18], [22].

[266] Cf. II. §[31] with I. §[45].

[267] II. §§[17], [24], [26], [27], [29], [38], [54], [59].

[268] II. §[79].

[269] Cf. the words tam multa in II. §[79].

[270] See II. §[42], where there is a reference to the "hesternus sermo."

[271] II. §[10].

[272] Cf. II. §[10]: id quod quaerebatur paene explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur.

[273] What these were will appear from my notes on the Lucullus.

[274] II. §[12].

[275] Ad Fam. IX. 8.

[276] Cf. Ad Att. XIII. 25, §3: Ad Brutum transeamus.

[277] This is not, as Krische supposes, the villa Cicero wished to buy after Hortensius' death. That lay at Puteoli: see Ad Att. VII. 3, §9.

[278] II. §[9].

[279] Cf. II. §6[1].

[280] II. §[80]: O praeclarum prospectum!

[281] Cf. II. §[9] with §[128] (signum illud), also §§[80], [81], [100], [105], [125].

[282] II. §[115].

[283] II. §[63].

[284] II. §§[147], [148].

[285] II. §[135].

[286] Cf. II. §§[11], 12 with the words quae erant contra ακαταληψιαν praeclare collecta ab Antiocho: Ad Att. XIII. 19, §3.

[287] Varro, De Re Rust. III. 17.

[288] II. §[11].

[289] Paradoxa, §1. D.F. III. §8. Brutus, §119.

[290] Ac. I. §[12]. D.F. V. §8.

[291] Cf. II. §[80].

[292] Cf. Aug. Adv. Acad. III. §35. Nonius, sub v. exultare.

[293] Cf. the word nuper in §[1].

[294] §[11].

[295] §§[3], [18].

[296] Ad Fam. IX. 8, §1.

[297] Ad Att. II. 25, §1.

[298] Ibid. III. 8, §3.

[299] Ibid. III. 15, §3; 18, §1.

[300] Ad Fam. IX. 1—8. They are the only letters from Cicero to Varro preserved in our collections.

[301] Above, pp. xxxvii—xlii.

[302] De Civ. Dei, XIX. cc. 1—3.

[303] See Madvig, De Fin. ed. 2, p. 824; also Krische, pp. 49, 50. Brückner, Leben des Cicero, I. p. 655, follows Müller.

[304] Cf. Krische, p. 58.