(ORIGINAL.)
Light Camp, October 30th, 1780.
MY DEAR GENERAL,—In our conversations upon military operations you have often told me that, since the beginning of the campaign, your eyes were turned towards a project upon which I generally agree in opinion with you, and beg leave to offer some observations.
Far from lessening my desire of finishing the campaign by some brilliant stroke, the project of Staten Island, though it miscarried, has strengthened my opinions, as I have clearly seen, by the details of this operation, that we should, in all human probability, have succeeded, and that our men were fully equal to any enterprise of that kind.~{1}
My reasons for wishing to undertake something are these:—1st. Any enterprise will please the people of this country, and shew them that when we have men we do not lie still; and even a defeat (provided it was not fatal) would have its good consequences. 2ndly. The French court have often complained to me of the inactivity of the American army, who, before the alliance, had distinguished themselves by their spirit of enterprise. They have often told me, your friends leave us now to fight their battles, and do no more risk themselves: it is, moreover, of the greatest political importance to let them know, that, on our side, we were ready to co-operate. Be sure, my dear general, that many people's interest will be to let it be believed that we were not ready, and if anything may engage the ministry to give us the asked for support, it will be our proving to the nation that, on our side, we had been ready. So far was the Chevalier de la Luzerne convinced of this (and on this point the minister's interest is the same as ours) that he was made happy by my mentioning to him the Staten Island affair. I well know the court of Versailles, and were I to go to it, I should think it very impolitic to go there unless we had done something. 3rdly. It is more than probable that mediators will interfere this winter by a negotiation. Then England will say, how can we give up people whom we consider as half conquered; their best city has been taken by an army not much superior to the people that were to defend it; their southern army was routed almost as soon as looked at by the British troops New York is so much ours, that they dare not approach it, and General Washington's army does not exceed five thousand men. What shall France answer? Principally now that from the letters I have received I find the Charleston affair has brought our arms into contempt. But what difference, if France might say, the American army has taken, sword in hand, your best works; they have offered to you the battle upon your own island, and, perhaps they may add (for news increases in travelling), they are now in possession of New York.
Upon these considerations, my dear general, what I want is this, to find an expedition which may wear a brilliant aspect, and afford probable advantages, also an immense, though very remote one, which, if unsuccessful, may not turn fatal to us, for the loss of two or three hundred men, half of them being enlisted for two months, I do not consider as a ruinous adventure.
The basis of the plan will be, that Fort Washington, being in our possession, may, with the Fort Lee batteries, protect our crossing North River, and be a security for our retreat, principally if some works are added on the point of embarkation. The taking of Fort Washington we may demonstrate to be very probable, and upon that point you are of my opinion.
The enemy have, on the upper part of the Island from fifteen hundred to two thousand men, who would immediately occupy all the other upper posts. Their army on Long Island would repair to New York, and there would also retire the troops posted at Harlem.
As soon as Fort Washington should be ours, the army would cross over to the island, and those of West Point arrive in the same time (which calculation may be easily done) so that we should effectually possess all the upper posts, or cut them off from their main army. Some militia would come to our assistance, and as these posts are not well furnished with provisions we should take them, at least, by famine.
The enemy's army consists of nine thousand men: they must certainly leave one thousand men in their several posts; fifteen hundred of them, at least, will be either killed at Fort Washington or blocked up at Laurel Hill, and they will then have between six and seven thousand men to attack ten. The two thousand militia (in supposing that they durst take them out) I do not mention, because we may have four thousand militia for them: under such circumstances it is, probable that Sir Henry Clinton will venture a battle. If he does, and by chance beat us, we retire under Fort Washington; but, if we beat him, his works will be at such a distance, that he will be ruined in the retreat. If, on the contrary, he knows that the French army is coming, and if we spread the report of a second division, or of Count de Guichen being upon the coasts, he will keep in his works, and we will, some way or other, carry the upper posts. When we are upon the spot we may reconnoitre New York, and see if something is to be done. If Clinton was making a forage into the Jerseys, I should be clear for pushing to the city.
If we undertake, the circumstances of the weather make it necessary that we undertake immediately. I would move the army, as soon as possible, to our position near the new bridge. This movement may invite Clinton in the Jerseys, and bring us nearer to the point of execution.
Though my private glory and yours, my dear general, both of which are very dear to my heart, are greatly interested, not so much for the opinions of America, as for those of Europe, in our doing something this campaign, I hope you know me too well to think I should insist upon steps of this nature unless I knew that they were politically necessary, and had a sufficient military probability.
I have the honour to be, &c.
The six hundred men of Luzerne's legion might be got in twelve days. If our movements had no other effect but to make a diversion in favour of the south, it would, on that footing, meet with the approbation of the world, and perhaps impeach the operations of General Leslie.
Endnote:
1. M. de Lafayette had taken, since the 7th of August, command of the corps of light infantry, consisting of six companies of men, selected in different lines of the army. Those battalions were divided into two brigades; one under the command of General Hand, the other of General Poor. The inactivity of the army was very opposite to the character and policy of M. de Lafayette; he endeavoured incessantly to find means of putting an end to it, at least as far as regarded himself. The 14th of August he had written to General Washington to ask his permission to attempt a nocturnal surprise on the two camps of Hessians established at New York Island. At the beginning of October, he attempted an expedition on Italian Island, which could not be accomplished, owing to a mistake made by the administration of the materality of the army. This letter, and the letters of the 13th of November, allude to this circumstance. We have been obliged to retrench ten letters, which relate solely to the unimportant incidents of a war of observation.