RECRUITING OF ARMY AND NAVY.
Our country thus, after an interval of half a century of peace with all nations, found itself engaged in deadly conflict with a foreign enemy. Every nerve was strained to meet the emergency.
The response to the initial call for 125,000 volunteers was instant and complete, as was also the result of the second call of May 25th for 75,000 additional volunteers. The ranks of the regular army were increased to the limits provided by the act of April 26th.
The enlisted force of the navy on the 15th of August, when it reached its maximum, numbered 24,123 men and apprentices. One hundred and three vessels were added to the navy by purchase, one was presented to the government, one leased and the four vessels of the International Navigation Company—the St. Paul, St. Louis, New York and Paris—were chartered. In addition to these the revenue cutters and lighthouse tenders were turned over to the Navy Department and became temporarily a part of the auxiliary navy.
The maximum effective fighting force of the navy during the war, separated into classes, was as follows:
Regular—Four battleships of the first class, one battleship of the second class, two armored cruisers, six coast defense monitors, one armored ram, twelve protected cruisers, three unprotected cruisers, eighteen gunboats, one dynamite cruiser, eleven torpedo boats, fourteen old vessels of the old navy, including monitors.
Auxiliary Navy—Sixteen auxiliary cruisers, twenty-eight converted yachts, twenty-seven converted tugs, nineteen converted colliers, fifteen revenue cutters, four lighthouse tenders and nineteen miscellaneous vessels.
Much alarm was felt along our entire Atlantic seaboard lest some attack might be made by the enemy. Every precaution was taken to prevent possible injury to our great cities lying along the coast. Temporary garrisons were provided, drawn from the State militia. Infantry and light batteries were drawn from the volunteer force. About 12,000 troops were thus employed. The coast signal service was established for observing the approach of an enemy’s ships to the coast of the United States, and the life-saving and lighthouse services co-operated, which enabled the Navy Department to have all portions of the Atlantic coast, from Maine to Texas, under observation.
The auxiliary navy was created under the authority of Congress and was officered and manned by the naval militia of the several States. This organization patrolled the coast and performed the duty of a second arm of defense.
Under the direction of the chief of engineers submarine mines were placed at the most exposed points. Before the outbreak of the war permanent mining casements and cable galleries had been constructed at all important harbors. Most of the torpedo material was not to be found in the market and had to be specially manufactured. Under date of April 19th district officers were directed to take all preliminary measures, short of the actual attaching of the loaded mines to the cables, and on April 22d telegraphic orders were issued to place the loaded mines in position.
The aggregate number of mines placed was 1,535 at the principal harbors from Maine to California. Preparations were also made for the planting of mines at certain other harbors, but owing to the early destruction of the Spanish fleet these mines were not placed.
The signal corps was promptly organized and performed service of most difficult and important character. Its operations during the war covered the electrical connection of all coast fortifications and the establishment of telephonic and telegraphic facilities for the camps at Manila, Santiago and in Porto Rico.
There were constructed 300 miles of line at ten great camps, thus facilitating military movements from those points in a manner heretofore unknown in military administration. Field telegraph lines were established and maintained under the enemy’s fire at Manila, and later the Manila-Hongkong cable was reopened. In Porto Rico cable communications were opened over a discontinued route, and on land the headquarters of the commanding officer were kept in telegraphic or telephonic communication with the division commanders of four different lines of operation.
There was placed in Cuban waters a completely outfitted cable ship, with war cables and cable gear suitable both for the destruction of communications belonging to the enemy and the establishment of our own. Two ocean cables were destroyed under the enemy’s batteries at Santiago. The day previous to the landing of General Shafter’s corps at Caimanera, within twenty miles of the landing place, cable communications were established and cable stations opened, giving direct communication with the Government at Washington. This service was invaluable to the Executive in directing the operations of the army and navy.
With a total force of over 1,300 the loss was by disease and field, officers and men included, only five.