A serious proposal to the Ladies, for the advancement of their true and greatest interest (In Two Parts)

by Mary Astell

CHAP. III.

Concerning the Improvement of the Understanding. I. Of the Capacity of the Humane Mind in General. II. Of Particular Capacities. III. The most common Infirmities incident to the Understanding and their Cure. IV. A Natural Logic, And V. Rhetoric propos’d. VI. The Application and Use of our Knowlege.

The perfection of the Understanding consisting in the Clearness and Largness of its view, it improves proportionably as its Ideas become Clearer and more Extensive. But this is not so to be understood as if all sorts of Notices contributed to our Improvement, there are some things which make us no wiser when we know ’em, others which ’tis best to be ignorant of. But that Understanding seems to me the most exalted, which has the Clearest and most Extensive view of such Truths as are suitable to its Capacity, and Necessary or Convenient to be Known in this Present State. For being that we are but Creatures, our Understanding in its greatest Perfection has only a limited excellency. It has indeed a vast extent, and it were not amiss if we tarried a little in the Contemplation of its Powers and Capacities, provided that the Prospect did not make us giddy, that we remember from whom we have receiv’d them, and ballance those lofty Thoughts which a view of our Intellectuals may occasion, with the depressing ones which the irregularity of our Morals will suggest, and that we learn from this inspection, how indecorous it is to busy this bright side of us in mean things, seeing it is capable of such noble ones.

Human Nature is indeed a wonderful Composure admirable in its outward structure, but much more excellent in the Beauties of its Inward, and she who considers in whose Image her Soul was Created, and whose Blood was shed to Redeem it, cannot prize it too much, nor forget to pay it her utmost regard. There’s nothing in this Material World to be compar’d to’t, all the gay things we dote on, and for which we many times expose our Souls to ruin, are of no consideration in respect of it. They are not the good of the Soul, its happiness depends not on ’em, but they often deceive and withdraw it from its true Good. It was made for the Contemplation and Enjoyment of its GOD, and all Souls are capable of this tho in a different degree and by measures somewhat different, as we hope will appear from that which follows.

§. I. Truth in general is the Object of the Understanding, but all Truths are not equally Evident, because of the Limitation of the Humane Mind, which tho’ it can gradually take in many Truths, yet cannot any more than our sight attend to many things at once: And likewise, because GOD has not thought fit to communicate such Ideas to us, as are necessary to the disquisition of some particular Truths. For knowing nothing without us but by the Idea we have of it, and Judging only according to the Relation we find between two or more Ideas, when we cannot discover the Truth we search after by Intuition or the immediate companion of two Ideas, ’tis necessary that we shou’d have a third by which to compare them. But if this middle Idea be wanting, though we have sufficient Evidence of those two which we wou’d compare, because we have a Clear and Distinct Conception of them, yet we are Ignorant of those Truths which wou’d arise from their Comparison, because we want a third by which to compare them.

To give an instance of this in a point of great consequence, and of late very much controverted tho to little purpose, because we take a wrong method, and wou’d make that the Object of Science which is properly the Object of Faith, the Doctrin of the Trinity. Revelation which is but an exaltation and improvement of Reason has told us, That the Father is GOD, the Son is GOD, and the Holy Ghost is GOD, and our Idea of the Godhead of any one of these Persons, is as clear as our Idea of any of the other. Both Reason and Revelation assure us that GOD is One Simple Essence, Undivided, and Infinite in all Perfection, this is the Natural Idea which we have of GOD. How then can the Father be GOD, the Son GOD, and the Holy Ghost GOD, when yet there is but One GOD? That these two Propositions are true we are certain, both because GOD who cannot lie has Reveal’d ’em, and because we have as clear an Idea of ’em as it is possible a Finite Mind shou’d have of an Infinite Nature. But we cannot find out how this should be, by the bare Comparison of these two Ideas without the help of a third by which to compare them. This GOD has not thought fit to impart to us, the Prospect it wou’d have given us wou’d have been too dazling, too bright for Mortality to bear, and we ought to acquiesce in the Divine Will. So then, we are well assur’d that these two Propositions are true, There is but one GOD; And, There are three Persons in the Godhead: but we know not the Manner how these things are. Nor can our acquiescence be thought Unreasonable, nor the Doctrin we subscribe to be run down as absurd and contradictory by every little warm Disputer and Pretender to Reason, whose Life is perhaps a continual contradiction to it, and he knows little of it besides the Name. For we ought not to think it strange that GOD has folded up his own Nature, not in Darkness, but in an adorable and inaccessible Light, since his Wisdom sees it fit to keep us ignorant of our own. We know and feel the Union between our Soul and Body, but who amongst us sees so clearly, as to find out with Certitude and Exactness, the secret ties which unite two such different Substances, or how they are able to act upon each other? We are conscious of our own Liberty, who ever denies it denies that he is capable of Rewards and Punishments, degrades his Nature and makes himself but a more curious piece of Mechanism; and none but Atheists will call in question the Providence of GOD, or deny that he Governs All, even the most Free of all his Creatures. But who can reconcile me these? Or adjust the limits between GOD’s Prescience and Mans Free-will? Our Understandings are sufficiently illuminated to lead us to the Fountain of Life and Light, we do or may know enough to fill our Souls with the noblest Conceptions, the humblest Adoration, and the intirest Love of the Author of our Being, and what can we desire farther? If we make so ill a Use of that Knowledge which we have, as to be so far puffed up with it, as to turn it against him who gave it, how dangerous would it be for us to have more Knowledge, in a State in which we have so little Humility! But if vain Man will pretend to Wisdom, let him first learn to know the length of his own line.

Tho the Human Intellect has a large extent, yet being limited as we have already said, this Limitation is the Cause of those different Modes of Thinking, which for distinction sake we call Faith, Science and Opinion. For in this present and imperfect State in which we know not any thing by Intuition, or immediate except a few first Principles which we call Self-evident, the most of our Knowlege is acquir’d by Reasoning and Deduction: And these three Modes of Understanding, Faith, Science and Opinion are no otherwise distinguish’d, than by the different degrees of Clearness and Evidence in the Premises from whence the Conclusion is drawn.

Knowlege in a proper and restricted Sense and as appropriated to Science, signifies that clear Perception which is follow’d by a firm assent to Conclusions rightly drawn from Premises of which we have clear and distinct Ideas. Which Premises or Principles must be so clear and Evident, that supposing us reasonable Creatures, and free from Prejudices and Passions, (which for the time they predominate as good as deprive us of our Reason) we cannot withhold our assent from them without manifest violence to our Reason.

But if the Nature of the thing be such as that it admits of no undoubted Premises to argue from, or at least we don’t at present know of any, or that the Conclusion does not so necessarily follow as to give a perfect satisfaction to the Mind and to free it from all hesitation, that which we think of it is then call’d Opinion.

Again, If the Medium we make use of to prove the Proposition be Authority, the Conclusion which we draw from it is said to be Believ’d; This is what we call Faith, and when the Authority is GOD’s a Divine Faith.

Moral Certainty is a Species of Knowlege whose Proofs are of a compounded Nature, in part resembling those which belong to Science, and partly those of Faith. We do not make the whole Process our selves, but depend on another for the immediate Proof, but we our selves deduce the Mediate from Circumstances and Principles as Certain and almost as Evident as those of Science, and which lead us to the immediate Proofs and make it unreasonable to doubt of ’em. Indeed we not seldom deceive our selves in this matter, by inclining alternately to both extremes. Sometimes we reject Truths which are Morally Certain as Conjectural and Probable only, because they have not a Physical and Mathematical Certainty, which they are incapable of. At another time we embrace the slightest Conjectures and any thing that looks with Probability, as moral Certainties and real Verities, if Fancy, Passion or Interest recommend them; so ready are we to be determin’d by these rather than by solid Reason.

In this enumeration of the several ways of Knowing. I have not reckon’d the Senses, in regard that we’re more properly said to be Conscious of than to Know such things as we perceive by Sensation. And also because that Light which we suppose to be let into our Ideas by our Senses is indeed very dim and fallacious, and not to be relied on till it has past the Test of Reason; neither do I think there’s any Mode of Knowlege which mayn’t be reduc’d to those already mentioned.

Now tho there’s a great difference between Opinion and Science, true Science being immutable but Opinion variable and uncertain, yet there is not such a difference between Faith and Science as is usually suppos’d. The difference consists not in the Certainty but in the way of Proof; the Objects of Faith are as Rationally and as Firmly Prov’d as the Objects of Science, tho by another way. As Science Demonstrates things that are Seen, so Faith is the Evidence of such as are Not Seen. And he who rejects the Evidence of Faith in such things as belong to its Cognizance, is as unreasonable as he who denies Propositions in Geometry that are prov’d with Mathematical exactness.

There’s nothing true which is not in it self demonstrable, or which we should not pronounce to be true had we a Clear and Intuitive View of it. But as was said above we see very few things by Intuition, neither are we furnish’d with Mediums to make the Process our selves in Demonstrating all Truths, and therefore there are some Truths which we must either be totally ignorant of, or else receive them on the Testimony of another Person, to whose Understanding they are clear and manifest tho not to ours. And if this Person be one who can neither be Deceiv’d nor Deceive, we’re as certain of those Conclusions which we prove by his Authority, as we’re of those we demonstrate by our own Reason; nay more Certain, by how much his Reason is more Comprehensive and Infallible than our own.

Science is the following the Process our Selves upon Clear and Evident Principles; Faith is a Dependance on the Credit of another, in such matters as are out of our View. And when we have very good Reason to submit to the Testimony of the Person we Believe, Faith is as Firm, and those Truths it discovers to us as truly Intelligible, and as strongly Prov’d in their kind as Science.

In a word, as every Sense so every Capacity of the Understanding has its proper Object. The Objects of Science are things within our View, of which we may have Clear and Distinct Ideas, and nothing shou’d be determin’d here without Clearness and Evidence. To be able to repeat any Persons Dogma without forming a Distinct Idea of it our selves, is not to Know but to Remember; and to have a Confuse Indeterminate Idea is to Conjecture not to Understand.

The Objects of Faith are as Certain and as truly Intelligible in themselves as those of Science, as has been said already, only we become persuaded of the Truth of them by another Method, we do not See them so clearly and distinctly as to be unable to disbelieve them. Faith has a mixture of the Will that it may be rewardable, for who will thank us for giving our Assent where it was impossible to withhold it? Faith then may be said to be a sort of Knowlege capable of Reward, and Men are Infidels not for want of Conviction, but thro an Unwillingness to Believe.

But as it is a fault to Believe in matters of Science, where we may expect Demonstration and Evidence, so it is a reproach to our Understanding and a proof of our Disingenuity, to require that sort of Process peculiar to Science, for the Confirmation of such Truths as are not the proper Objects of it. It is as ridiculous as to reject Musick, because we cannot Tast or Smell it, or to deny there is such a thing as Beauty because we do not hear it. He who wou’d See with his Ears and Hear with his Eyes may indeed set up in Bedlam for a Man of an extraordinary reach, a Sagacious Person who won’t be impos’d on, one who must have more Authentick proofs than his dull Fore-fathers were content with. But Men of dry Reason and a moderate Genius, I suppose will think Nature has done very well in allotting to each Sense its proper employment, and such as these will as readily acknowlege that it is as Honourable for the Soul to Believe what is truly the Object of Faith, as it is for her to Know what is really the Object of her Knowlege. And were we not strangely perverse we shou’d not scruple Divine Authority when we daily submit to Human. Whoever has not seen Paris has nothing but Human Authority to assure him there is such a place, and yet he wou’d be laugh’d at as ridiculous who shou’d call it in question, tho he may as well in this as in another Case pretend that his Informers have designs to serve, intend to impose on him and mock his Credulity. Nay how many of us daily make that a matter of Faith which indeed belongs to Science, by adhering blindly to the Dictates of some famous Philosopher in Physical Truths, the Principles of which we have as much right to examine, and to make deductions from ’em as he had?

To sum up all: We may know enough for all the purposes of Life, enough to busie this active Faculty of Thinking, to employ and entertain the spare Intervals of Time and to keep us from Rust and Idleness, but we must not pretend to fathom all Depths with our short Line, we shou’d be Wise unto Sobriety, and reckon that we know very little if we go about to make our Own Reason the Standard of all Truth. It is very certain that nothing is True but what is conformable to Reason, that is to the Divine Reason of which ours is but a short faint Ray, and it is as certain that there are many Truths which Human Reason cannot Comprehend. Therefore to be throughly sensible of the Capacity of the Mind, to discern precisely its Bounds and Limits and to direct our Studies and Inquiries accordingly, to Know what is to be Known, and to Believe what is to be Believ’d is the property of a Wise Person. To be content with too little Knowlege, or to aspire to over-much is equally a fault, to make that use of our Understandings which GOD has Fitted and Design’d them for is the Medium which we ought to take. For the difference between a Plow-man and a Doctor does not seem to me to consist in this, That the Business of the one is to search after Knowlege, and that the other has nothing to do with it. No, whoever has a Rational Soul ought surely to employ it about some Truth or other, to procure for it right Ideas, that its Judgments may be true tho its Knowlege be not very extensive. But herein lies the difference, that tho Truth is the Object of every Individual Understanding, yet all are not equally enlarg’d nor able to comprehend so much; and they whose Capacities and Circumstances of Living do not fit ’em for it, lie not under that obligation of extending their view which Persons of a larger reach and greater leisure do. There is indeed often times a mistake in this matter, People who are not fit will be puzling their heads to little purpose, and those who are prove Slothful and decline the trouble; and thus it will be if we do not throughly understand our selves, but suffer Pride or Ease to make the estimate.

§. II. It is therefore very fit that after we have consider’d the Capacity of the Understanding in general, we shou’d descend to the view of our own particular, observing the bent and turn of our own Minds, which way our Genius lies and to what it is most inclin’d. I see no reason why there may not be as great a variety in Minds as there is in Faces, that the Soul as well as the Body may not have something in it to distinguish it, not only from all other Intelligent Natures but even from those of its own kind. There are different proportions in Faces which recommend them to some Eyes sooner than to others, and tho All Truth is amiable to a Reasonable Mind, and proper to employ it, yet why may there not be some particular Truths, more agreeable to each individual Understanding than others are? Variety gives Beauty to the Material World and why not to the Intellectual? We can discern the different Abilities which the Wise Author of all things has endow’d us with, the different Circumstances in which he has plac’d us in reference to this World and the Concerns of an Animal Life, that so we may be mutually useful, and that since each single Person is too limited and confin’d to attend to many, much less to all things, we may receive from each other a reciprocal advantage, and why may we not think he has done the like in respect of Truth? that since it is too much for one, our united Strength shou’d be employ’d in the search of her. Especially since the Divine Being who contains in himself all Reality and Truth is Infinite in Perfection, and therefore shou’d be Infinitely Ador’d and Lov’d; and If Creatures are by their being so uncapable of rendering to their Incomprehensible Creator an Adoration and Love that’s worthy of him, it is but decorous that they shou’d however do as much as they can. All that variety of sublime Truths of Beautiful and Wondrous Objects which surround us, are nothing else but a various display of his unbounded Excellencies, and why shou’d any of ’em pass unobserv’d? Why shou’d not every individual Understanding be in a more especial manner fitted for and employ’d in the disquisition of some particular Truth and Beauty? ’Tis true after all our researches we can no more sufficiently Know GOD than we can worthily Love him, and are as much unable to find out all his Works as we are his Nature, yet this shou’d only prompt us to exert All our Powers and to do our best, since even that were too little cou’d we possibly do more. We can never offer to him so much Praise as he deserves, and therefore it is but fit that he shou’d have All that Mankind can possibly render him. He is indeed immutable in his own Nature, but those discoveries we daily make of his Operations will always afford us somewhat New and Surprizing, for this All-glorious Sun the Author of Life and Light is as inexhaustible a Source of Truth as he is of Joy and Happiness.

If then we are convinc’d that there’s some peculiar Task allotted us, our next business will be to enquire what it is. To know our own Strength and neither to over not underrate our selves is one of the most material points of Wisdom, and which indeed we are most commonly ignorant of, else we shou’d not reach at all, how unable soever we are to attain it, nor make so many successless attempts and be forc’d to come off with that pitiful Apology, I was mistaken, I did not think it. But we can scarce duly estimate our Understandings till we have regulated our Wills, reform’d Self-love and a train of immortified Passions, which it is not our Business to speak of here, we shall have occasion to do’t hereafter. Let it suffice that we remark a frequent Error which these engage us in, that is, an aptness to lessen the Human Mind, to detract from its Grandeur and abridge its Powers when we consider it in General, and as great a forwardness when we look on our selves to extend our Abilities beyond their bounds. Are we conscious of a Defect? the shallowness of Human Reason at large must bear the blame, we Harangue very excellently on the Ignorance and Vanity of Mankind, and it were well if we rested there, and wou’d forbear to murmur even at our Creator himself for allowing us so scanty a Portion. But if Reason has shone out, dispelling those Clouds which Eclips’d the bright face of Truth, we arrogate all to our selves. My Discovery, My Hypothesis, the Strength and Clearness of My Reasonings, rather than the Truth are what we wou’d expose to view; ’tis that we Idolize our selves and wou’d have every one Admire and Celebrate. And yet all this is no more perhaps than another has done before us, or at least might have done with our Opportunities and Advantages. The reverse of this procedure wou’d become us better, and it were more Glorious as well as more Just to ascribe the Excellencies of the Mind to Human Nature in the Lump and to take the Weaknesses to our selves. By this we shou’d both avoid Sloth, (the best use we can make of our Ignorance and Infirmity being first to be humbled for, and then sedulously to endeavour their Amendment) and likewise secure our Industry from the Mixtures of Pride and Envy. By looking on our own Acquisitions as a general Treasure, in which the Whole have a Right, we shou’d pretend to no more than a share; and considering our selves as Parts of the same Whole, we should expect to find our own account in th’ Improvement of every part of it, which wou’d restrain us from being puft up with the Contemplation of our Own, and from repining at our Neighbours Excellencies. For let Reason shine forth where it may, as we can’t engross, so neither can we be excluded from sharing in the Benefit, unless we wilfully exclude our selves; every one being the better for True Worth and Good Sense, except the little Soul’d Enviers of ’em.

To help us to the Knowledge of our own Capacities the Informations of our Friends, nay even of our Enemies may be useful. The former if Wise and True will direct us to the same Course to which our Genius Points, and the latter will industriously endeavour to divert us from it, and we can’t be too careful that these don’t disguise themselves under the specious appearance of the former, to do us an ill-turn the more effectually. For it is not seldom seen that such as pretend great Concern for us, will press us on to such Studies or Ways of Living as inwardly they know we are unfit for, thereby to gratify their Secret Envy, by diverting us from that to which our Genius disposes, and in which therefore they have reason to suppose we wou’d be Excellent. But tho we may make use of the Opinions of both, yet if we will be Sincere and Ingenuous we cannot have a more faithful Director than our own heart. He who gave us these Dispositions will excite us to the Use and Improvement of ’em; and unless we drive him from us by our Impurity, or thro negligence and want of Attention let slip his secret Whispers, this Master within us will lay most in our view such Lessons as he wou’d have us take. Our care then must be to open our Eyes to that Beam of Light which does in a more especial manner break in upon us, to fix them steadily, and to examine accurately those notices which are most vividly represented to us, and to lay out our Thoughts and Time in the Cultivation of ’em. It may be our Humor won’t be gratified, nor our Interest serv’d by such a Method. Other Business or Amusements put on a finer Garb, and come attended with more Charms and Grandeur, these recommend us to the World make us Belov’d and Illustrious in it: Whilst the followers of Truth are despis’d and look’d askew on, as fantastick Speculatists, unsociable Thinkers, who pretend to see farther than their Neighbours, to rectifie what Custom has establish’d, and are so Unmannerly as to Think and Talk out of the Common way. He who speaks Truth makes a Satyr on the greatest part of Mankind, and they are not over apt to forgive him, he contradicts the vogue of the Times, is so hardy as to lay open Mens darling Errors, to draw a lively Picture of their most secret Corruptions, a Representation which they cannot bear. Their Gall is touch’d proportionably as their Wounds are more deeply search’d into, altho it be only in order to a Cure. They therefore who Love Truth shall be Hated by the Most, who tho they openly pretend to Honour, yet secretly Malign her, because she reproaches them. And as a plausible Life is not often a very Religious one, which made the best Judge pronounce a Wo on those whom all Men shall speak well of, so neither is the most Just and Illuminated Understanding the most admir’d and trusted to, but a plausible Speaker, as well as a plausible Liver, commonly bears away the Bell. If then we consult our Passions and Vanity we shall go near to determine amiss, and make that use of our Intellectuals which Fancy or Interest pushes us on to, not which Nature has fitted us for. Hence it is that those who might have done very well in some Studies and Employments, make but bungling work when they apply themselves to others. We go on apace when the Wind and Tide are on our side, but it costs us much Labour, and we make little speed, when we Row against both.

And as a due Consideration of our Particular Capacity wou’d put us right in our own Studies, so wou’d it keep us from clashing with our Neighbours, whom we many times Contend with not so much out of a Love to Truth, as thro a humor of Contradiction, or because we think this the best way to shew our Parts, and by this tryal of Skill to exalt our selves above them. But is there no better way to discover our Penetration, and to try our Strength, than by a Malicious and Litigious Opposition? The field of Truth is large, and after all the Discoveries that have been made by those who have gone before, there will still be untroden Paths, which they who have the Courage and Skill may beat out and beautify. If then instead of Jostling and Disputing with our Fellow Travellers, of bending all the force of our Wit to Contradict and Oppose those advances which they make, we wou’d well understand, duly Employ and kindly Communicate our Peculiar Talent, how much more Service might we do our Lord, how much more useful might we be to one another? What vast Discoveries wou’d be made in the wide Ocean of Truth? How many Moral Irregularities wou’d be observ’d and rectify’d? We shou’d be restrain’d from aspiring to things above our reach, move regularly in our own Sphere, not abuse those good Parts which were given us for Common Benefit, to the Destruction of our selves and others, be in a fair way to discern the Defects of our Mind and to proceed to the Cure of ’em.

§. III. We have already exprest our thoughts concerning the Capacity and Perfection of the Understanding, and what has been said if duly consider’d, is sufficient to bring every particular Person acquainted with their own defects. But because they who need Amendment most, are commonly least dispos’d to make such reflections as are necessary to procure it, we will spend a few Pages in considering for them, and in observing the most usual defects of the Thinking Faculty.

If we are of their Opinion who say that the Understanding is only Passive, and that Judgment belongs to the Will, I see not any Defect the former can have, besides Narrowness and a disability to extend it self to many things, which is indeed incident to all Creatures, the brightest Intelligence in the highest Order of Angels is thus defective, as well as the meanest Mortal, tho in a less degree. Nor ought it to be complain’d of, since ’tis Natural and Necessary, we may as well desire to be Gods as desire to Know all things. Some sort of Ignorance therefore, or Non perception we cannot help; a Finite Mind, suppose it as large as you please, can never extend it self to Infinite Truths. But no doubt it is in our Power to remedy a great deal more than we do, and probably a larger Range is allowed us than the most Active and Enlightned Understanding has hitherto reach’d. Ignorance then can’t be avoided but Error may, we cannot Judge of things of which we have no Idea, but we can suspend our Judgment about those of which we have, till clearness and evidence oblige us to pass it. Indeed in strictness of Speech the Will and not the Understanding is blameable when we Think amiss, since the latter opposes not the Ends for which GOD made it, but readily extends it self as far as it can, receiving such Impressions as are made on it; ’tis the former that directs it to such Objects, that fills up its Capacity with such Ideas as are foreign to its Business and of no use to it, or which does not at least oppose the incursions of Material things, and deface as much as it is able those impressions which Sensible Objects leave in the Imagination. But since it is not material to the present Design, whether Judgment belongs to the Understanding or Will, we shall not nicely distinguish how each of ’em is employ’d in acquiring Knowledge, but treat of ’em both together in this Chapter, allotted to the Service of the Studious, who when they are put in the way may by their own Meditations and Experience, rectifie the mistakes and supply the Omissions we happen to be guilty of.

They who apply themselves to the Contemplation of Truth, will perhaps at first find a Contraction or Emptiness of Thought, and that their Mind offers nothing on the Subject they wou’d consider, is not ready at unfolding, nor in representing correspondent Ideas to be compar’d with it, is as it were asleep or in a Dream, and tho’ not empty of all Thought, yet Thinks nothing clearly or to the purpose. The Primary Cause of this is that Limitation which all Created Minds are Subject to, which Limitation appears more visible in some than in others, either because some Minds are endow’d by their Creator with a larger Capacity than the rest, or if you are not inclin’d to think so, then by reason of the Indisposition of the Bodily Organs, which cramps and contracts the Operations of the Mind. And that Person whose Capacity of receiving Ideas is very little, whose Ideas are disorder’d, and not capable of being so dispos’d as that they may be compar’d in order to the forming of a Judgment, is a Fool or little better. If we find this to be our Case, and that after frequent tryals there appears no hopes of Amendment, ’tis best to desist, we shall but lose our Labour, we may do some Good in an Active Life and Employments that depend on the Body, but we’re altogether unfit for Contemplation and the Exercises of the Mind. Yet e’er we give out let’s see if it be thus with us in all Cases: Can we Think and Argue Rationally about a Dress, an Intreague, an Estate? Why then not upon better Subjects? The way of Considering and Meditating justly is the same on all Occasions. ’Tis true, there will fewest Ideas arise when we wou’d Meditate on such Subjects as we’ve been least conversant about; but this is a fault which it is in our power to remedy, first by Reading or Discoursing, and then by frequent and serious Meditation, of which hereafter.

As those we have been speaking of are hindred in their search after Truth, thro a want of Ideas out of which to deduce it, so there are another sort who are not happy in their Enquiries, on account of the multitude and Impetuosity of theirs. Volatileness of Thought, very pernicious to true Science, is a fault which People of warm Imaginations and Active Spirits are apt to fall into. Such a Temper is readily dispos’d to receive Errors and very well qualified to propagate them, especially if a volubility of Speech be join’d to it. These thro an immoderate nimbleness of Thinking skip from one Idea to another, without observing due Order and Connexion, they content themselves with a superficial view, a random glance, and depending on the vigor of their Imagination, are took with Appearances, never tarrying to penetrate the Subject, or to find out Truth if she float not upon the Surface. A multitude of Ideas not relating to the matter they design to think of rush in upon them, and their easie Mind entertains all comers how impertinent soever; instead of examining the Question in debate they are got into the Clouds, numbring the Cities in the Moon and building Airy Castles there. Nor is it easie to cure this Defect, since it deceives others as well as those who have it with a shew of very great Ingenuity. The vivacity of such Persons makes their Conversation plausible, and taking with those who consider not much, tho not with the Judicious; it procures for them the Character of Wit, but hinders them from being Wise. For truth is not often found by such as won’t take Time to examine her Counterfeits, to distinguish between Evidence and Probability, Realities and Appearances, but who thro a conceit of their own sharp-sightedness think they can pierce to the bottom with the first glance.

To cure this Distemper perfectly perhaps it will be necessary to apply to the Body as well as to the Mind: The Animal Spirits must be lessen’d, or rendred more Calm and Manageable; at least they must not be unnaturally and violently mov’d, by such a Diet, or such Passions, Designs and Divertisments as are likely to put ’em in a ferment. Contemplation requires a Governable Body, a sedate and steady Mind, and the Body and the Mind do so reciprocally influence each other, that we can scarce keep the one in tune if the other be out of it. We can neither Observe the Errors of our Intellect, nor the Irregularity of our Morals whilst we are darkned by Fumes, agitated with unruly Passions, or carried away with eager Desires after Sensible things and vanities. We must therefore withdraw our Minds from the World, from adhering to the Senses, from the Love of Material Beings, of Pomps and Gaieties; for ’tis these that usually Steal away the Heart, that seduce the Mind to such unaccountable Wandrings, and so fill up its Capacity that they leave no room for Truth, so distract its Attention that it cannot enquire after her. For tho’ the Body does partly occasion this fault, yet the Will no doubt may in good measure Remedy it, by using its Authority to fix the Understanding on such Objects as it wou’d have Contemplated; it has a Rein which will certainly curb this wandring, if it can but be persuaded to make use of it. Indeed Attention and deep Meditation is not so agreeable to our Animal Nature, does not flatter our Pride so well as this agreeable Reverie, which gives us a pretence to Knowledge without taking much Pains to acquire it, and does not choak us with the humbling thoughts of our own Ignorance, with which we must make such ado e’re it can be enlightened. Yet without Attention and strict Examination we are liable to false Judgments on every occasion, to Vanity and Arrogance, to Impertinent Prating of things we don’t understand, are kept from making a Progress, because we fancy our selves to be at the top already, and can never attain to true Wisdom. If then we wou’d hereafter think to purpose, we must suffer our selves to be convinc’d how oft we have already thought to none, suspect our Quickness, and not give our desultory Imagination leave to ramble.

And in order to the restraining it we may consider, what a loss of Time and Study such irregular and useless Thoughts occasion, what a Reproach they are to our Reason, how they cheat us with a shew of Knowledge, which so long as we are under the power of this giddy Temper will inevitably escape us. And if to this we add a serious perusal of such Books as are not loosly writ, but require an Attent and Awakened Mind to apprehend, and to take in the whole force of ’em, obliging our selves to Understand them throughly, so as to be able to give a just account of them to our Selves, or rather to some other Person intelligent enough to take it and to correct our mistakes, it is to be hop’d we shall obtain a due poise of Mind, and be able to direct our Thoughts to the thorow discussion of such Subjects as we wou’d Examine. Such Books I mean as are fuller of Matter than Words, which diffuse a light through every part of their Subject, do not Skim, but Penetrate it to the bottom, yet so as to leave somewhat to be wrought out by the Reader’s own Meditation; such as are writ with Order and Connexion, the Strength of whose Arguments can’t be sufficiently felt unless we remember and compare the whole System. ’Tis impossible to prescribe absolutely, and every one may easily find what Authors are most apt to stay their Attention, and shou’d apply to them. But whenever they Meditate, be it on what Object it may, let ’em fix their Minds stedily on it, not removing till it be throughly Examin’d, at least not until they have seen all that’s necessary to their present purpose.

Doing so we shall prevent Rashness and Precipitation in our Judgments, which is occasion’d by that Volatileness we have been speaking of, together with an over-weaning opinion of our Selves. All the irregularities of our Will proceed from those false Judgments we make, thro want of Consideration, or a partial Examination when we do consider. For did we Consider with any manner of Attention, we cou’d not be so absurd as to call Evil, Good, and Chuse it as such, or prefer a less Good before a greater, a poor Momentary Trifle, before the Purity and Perfection of our Mind, before an Eternal and Immutable Crown of Glory! But we seek no farther than the first Appearances of Truth and Good, here we Stop, allowing neither Time nor Thought to search to the bottom, and to pull off those Disguises which impose on us. This Precipitation is that which gives birth to all our Errors, which are nothing else but a hasty and injudicious Sentence, a mistaking one thing for another, supposing an Agreement or Disparity amongst Ideas and their Relations where in reality there is none, occasion’d by an imperfect and cursory view of ’em. And tho’ there are other things which may be said to lead us into Error, yet they do it only as they seduce us into Rash and Precipitate Judgments. We love Grandeur and every thing that feeds our good Opinion of our Selves, and therefore wou’d Judge off hand, supposing it a disparagement to our Understandings to be long in Examining, so that we greedily embrace whatever seems to carry Evidence enough for a speedy Determination, how slight and superficial soever it be. Whereas did we calmly and deliberately Examine our Evidence, and how far those Motives we are acted by ought to Influence, we shou’d not be liable to this Seduction. For hereby the Impetuosity of a warm Imagination wou’d be cool’d, and the extravagancies of a Disorderly one Regulated; we shou’d not be Deceiv’d by the Report of our Senses; the Prejudices of Education; our own Private Interest, and readiness to receive the Opinions whether True or False of those we Love, or wou’d appear to Love because we think they will serve us in that Interest; our inordinate thirst after a great Reputation, or the Power and Riches, the Grandeurs and Pleasures of this World, these wou’d no longer dissipate our Thoughts and distract our Attention, for then we shou’d be sensible how little Concern is due to them. We shou’d neither mistake in the End and Object by not employing our Understandings at All about such things as they were chiefly made for, or not Enough, or by busying them with such as are out of their reach, or beneath their Application; nor shou’d we be out in the Method of our Meditation, by going a wrong or a round about way. For the GOD of Truth is ready to lead us into all Truth, if we Honestly and Attentively apply our selves to him.

In sum, whatever false Principle we embrace, whatever wrong Conclusion we draw from true ones, is a disparagement to our Thinking Power, a Weakness of Judgment proceeding from a Confuse and Imperfect view of things, as that does from want of attention, and a hasty and partial Examination. It were endless to reckon up all the false Maxims and Reasonings we fall into, nor is it possible to give a List of them, for there are innumerable Errors opposite to one single Truth. The General Causes have been already mention’d, the Particulars are as many as those several Compositions which arise from the various mixtures of the Passions, Interests, Education, Conversation and Reading, &c. of particular Persons. And the best way that I can think of to Improve the Understanding, and to guard it against all Errors proceed they from what Cause they may, is to regulate the Will, whose Office it is to determine the Understanding to such and such Ideas, and to stay it in the Consideration of them so long as is necessary to the Discovery of Truth; for if the Will be right the Understanding can’t be guilty of any Culpable Error. Not to Judge of any thing which we don’t Apprehend, to suspend our Assent till we see just Cause to give it, and to determine nothing till the Strength and Clearness of the Evidence oblige us to it. To withdraw our selves as much as may be from Corporeal things, that pure Reason may be heard the better; to make that use of our Senses for which they are design’d and fitted, the preservation of the Body, but not to depend on their Testimony in our Enquiries after Truth. Particularly to divest our selves of mistaken Self-love, little Ends and mean Designs, and to keep our Inclinations and Passions under Government. Not to engage our selves so far in any Party or Opinion as to make it in a manner necessary that that shou’d be Right, lest from wishing it were, we come at last to persuade our selves it is so. But to be passionately in Love with Truth, as being throughly sensible of her Excellency and Beauty. To embrace her how opposite soever she may sometimes be to our Humours and Designs, to bring these over to her, and never attempt to make her truckle to them. To be so far from disliking a Truth because it touches us home, and lances our tenderest and dearest Corruption, as on the contrary to prize it the more, by how much the more plainly it shews us our Errors and Miscarriages. For indeed it concerns us most to know such Truths as these, it is not material to us what other Peoples Opinions are, any farther than as the Knowlege of their Sentiments may correct Our Mistakes. And the higher our Station is in the World, so much the greater need have we to be curious in this particular.

The mean and inconsiderable often stumble on Truth when they seek not after her, but she is commonly kept out of the way, and industriously conceal’d from the Great and mighty; either out of Design or Envy, for whoever wou’d make a Property of another must by all means conceal the Truth from him; and they who Envy their Neighbours Preeminence in other things, are willing themselves to excel in exactness of Judgment, which they think and very truly, to be the greatest Excellency. And to help forward this deception, the Great instead of being Industrious in finding out the Truth, are generally very impatient when they meet with her. She does not treat them so tenderly and fawningly, with so much Ceremony and Complaisance as their Flatterers do. There’s in her that which us’d to be the Character of our Nation, an honest Plainness and Sincerity, Openness and blunt Familiarity: She cannot mould her self into all Shapes to be rendred agreeable, but standing on her Native Worth is regardless of Out-side and Varnish. But to return from this Digression.

Above all things we must be throughly convinc’d of our entire Dependance on GOD, for what we Know as well as for what we Are, and be warmly affected with the Sense of it, which will both Excite us to Practise, and Enable us to Perform the rest. Tho’ we are Naturally Dark and Ignorant, yet in his Light we may hope to see Light, if with the Son of Syrac we Petition for Wisdom that sits by his Throne to labour with us, and Sigh with David after his Light and Truth. For then he who is The Light that Lightneth every one who comes into the World, the Immutable Truth, and Uncreated Wisdom of His Father, will Teach us in the way of Wisdom and lead us in right Paths, he will instruct us infinitely better by the right use of our own Faculties than the brightest Human Reason can. For in him are all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowlege which he Liberally dispences to all who Humbly, Honestly and Heartily ask ’em of him. To close this Head: Whatever the Notion That we see all things in GOD, may be as to the Truth of it, ’tis certainly very commendable for its Piety, in that it most effectually humbles the most dangerous sort of Pride, the being Proud of our Knowlege, and yet does not slacken our Endeavours after Knowlege but rather Excites them.

Art of Thinking.

§ IV. As to the Method of Thinking, if it be proper for me to say any thing of that, after those better Pens which have treated of it already, it falls in with the Subject I’me now come to, which is, that Natural Logic I wou’d propose. I call it natural because I shall not send you further than your Own Minds to learn it, you may if you please take in the assistance of some well chosen Book, but a good Natural Reason after all, is the best Director, without this you will scarce Argue well, tho you had the Choicest Books and Tutors to Instruct you, but with it you may, tho’ you happen to be destitute of the other. For as a very Judicious Writer on this Subject (to whose Ingenious Remarks and Rules I am much obliged) well observes, “These Operations [of the Mind] proceed meerly from Nature, and that sometimes more perfectly from those who are altogether ignorant of Logic, than from others who have learn’d it.”

That which we propose in all our Meditations and Reasonings is, either to deduce some Truth we are in search of, from such Principles as we’re already acquainted with; or else, to dispose our Thoughts and Reasonings in such a manner, as to be able to Convince others of those Truths which we our selves are Convinc’d of. Other Designs indeed Men may have, such as the Maintenance of their Own Opinions, Actions and Parties without regard to the Truth and Justice of ’em, or the Seduction of their unwary Neighbours, but these are Mean and Base ones, beneath a Man, much more a Christian, who is or Ought to be endow’d with greater Integrity and Ingenuity.

Now Reasoning being nothing else but a Comparison of Ideas, and a deducing of Conclusions from Clear and Evident Principles, it is in the first place requisite that our Ideas be Clear and Just, and our Principles True, else all our Discourse will be Nonsense and Absurdity, Falshood and Error. And that our Idea may be Right, we have no more to do but to look attentively into our own Minds, having as was said above, laid aside all Prejudices and whatever may give a false tincture to our Light, there we shall find a Clear and Lively Representation of what we seek for, unsophisticated with the Dross of false Definitions and unintelligible Expressions. But we must not imagine that a transient view will serve the turn, or that our Eye will be Enlightened if it be not fix’d. For tho’ Truth be exceeding bright, yet since our Prejudices and Passions have darkned our Eye-sight, it requires no little Pains and Application of Mind to find her out, the neglect of which Application is the Reason that we have so little Truth, and that the little we have is almost lost in that Rubbish of Error which is mingled with it. And since Truth is so near at hand, since we are not oblig’d to tumble over many Authors, to hunt after every celebrated Genius, but may have it for enquiring after in our own Breasts, are we not inexcusable if we don’t obtain it? Are we not unworthy of Compassion if we suffer our Understandings to be over-run with Error? Indeed it seems to me most Reasonable and most agreeable to the Wisdom and Equity of the Divine Operations, that every one shou’d have a Teacher in their own Bosoms, who will if they seriously apply themselves to him, immediately Enlighten them so far as that is Necessary, and direct them to such Means as are sufficient for their Instruction both in Humane and Divine Truths; for as to the latter, Reason if it be Right and Solid, will not pretend to be our sole Instructor, but will send us to Divine Revelation when it may be had.

GOD does nothing in vain, he gives no Power or Faculty which he has not allotted to some proportionate use, if therefore he has given to Mankind a Rational Mind, every individual Understanding ought to be employ’d in somewhat worthy of it. The Meanest Person shou’d Think as Justly, tho’ not as Capaciously, as the greatest Philosopher. And if the Understanding be made for the Contemplation of Truth, and I know not what else it can be made for, either there are many Understandings who are never able to attain what they were design’d and fitted for, which is contrary to the Supposition that GOD made nothing in Vain, or else the very meanest must be put in a way of attaining it: Now how can this be if all that which goes to the composition of a Knowing Man in th’account of the World, be necessary to make one so? All have not leisure to Learn Languages and pore on Books, nor Opportunity to Converse with the Learned; but all may Think, may use their own Faculties rightly, and consult the Master who is within them.

By Ideas we sometimes understand in general all that which is the immediate Object of the Mind, whatever it Perceives; and in this large Sense it may take in all Thought, all that we are any ways capable of Discerning: So when we say we have no Idea of a thing, ’tis as much as to say we know nothing of the matter. Again, it is more strictly taken for that which represents to the Mind some Object distinct from it, whether Clearly or Confusedly; when this is its import, our Knowledge is said to be as Clear as our Ideas are. For that Idea which represents a thing so Clearly, that by an Attent and Simple View we may discern its Properties and Modifications, at least so far as they can be Known, is never false; all our Certainty and Evidence depends on it, if we Know not Truly what is thus represented to our Minds we know nothing. Thus the Idea of Equality between 2 and 2 is so evident that it is impossible to doubt of it, no Arguments could convince us of the Contrary, nor be able to persuade us that the same may be found between 2 and 3.

And as such an Idea as this is never False, so neither can any Idea be said to be so, if by False we mean that which has no Existence; our Idea certainly Exists, tho’ there be not any thing in Nature Correspondent to it. For tho’ there be no such thing as a Golden Mountain, yet when I think of one, ’tis certain I have an Idea of it.

But our Ideas are then said to be False, or rather Wrong, when they have no Conformity to the Real Nature of the Thing whose Name they bear. So that properly Speaking it is not the Idea but the judgment that is False; we err in supposing that our Idea is answerable to something without us when it is not. In simple Perceptions we are not often deceiv’d, but we frequently mistake in Compounding them, by Uniting several things which have no Agreement, and Separating others which are Essentially United. Indeed it may happen that our Perceptions are faulty sometimes, thro the Indisposition of the Organs or Faculties, thus a Man who has the Jaundice sees every thing ting’d with Yellow, yet even here the Error is not in the Simple Idea but in the Compos’d one, for we do not mistake when we say the Object appears Yellow to our Sight, tho’ we do, when we affirm that it does, or ought to do so to others. So again, when the Mind does not sufficiently Attend to her Ideas nor Examine them on all sides, ’tis very likely she will Think amiss, but this also is a false Judgment, that which is amiss in the Perception being rather the Inadequateness than the Falshood. Thus in many Cases we enquire no farther than whether an Action be not Directly Forbidden, and if we do not find it Absolutely Unlawful, we think that sufficient to Authorize the Practise of it, not considering it as we ought to do, Cloathed with the Circumstances of Scandal, Temptation, &c. which place it in the same Classes with things unlawful, at least make it so to us.

Rational Creatures shou’d endeavour to have right Ideas of every thing that comes under their Cognizance, but yet our Ideas of Morality, our thoughts about Religion are those which we shou’d with greatest speed and diligence rectifie, because they are of most importance, the Life to come, as well as all the Occurrences of This, depending on them. We shou’d search for Truth in our most abstracted Speculations, but it concerns us nearly to follow her close in what relates to the Conduct of our Lives. For the main thing we are to drive at in all our Studies, and that which is the greatest Improvement of our Understandings is the Art of Prudence, the being all of a Piece, managing all our Words and Actions as it becomes Wise Persons and Good Christians.

Yet in this we are commonly most faulty; for besides the deceits of our Passions, our Ideas of Particular Vertues and Vices, Goods and Evils, being an assemblage of divers simple Perceptions, and including several Judgments are therefore liable to mistake, and much more so considering how we commonly come by them. We hear the Word that Stands for such a Thing, suppose Honor, and then instead of enquiring what it is at the Fountain-head the Oracles of GOD, and our own, or the Impartial Reason of the Wisest and the Best, Custom and the Observations we make on the Practice of such as Pretend to it forms our Idea, which is seldom a Right one, the Opinions and Practices of the World being very fallacious, and many times quite opposite to the Dictates of Reason wou’d we but give ear to them. For what a strange distorted Idea of Honor must they needs have, who can think it Honourable to break a Vow that ought to be Kept, and Dishonourable to get loose from an Engagement that ought to be Broken? Who cannot endure to be tax’d with a Lye, and yet never think fit to keep their Word? What do they think of Greatness who support their Pomp at the Expence of the Groans and Tears of many Injur’d Families? What is their Idea of Heaven, who profess to Believe such a thing, and yet never endeavour to Qualifie themselves for the Enjoyment of it? Have they any Idea at all of these things when they speak of ’em? Or, if they have, is it not a very false one?

Now that we may avoid mistake the better, and because we usually join Words to our Ideas even when we only Meditate, we shou’d free them from all Equivocation, not make use of any Word, which has not a Distinct Idea annex’d to it, and where Custom has join’d many Ideas to one Word, carefully separate and distinguish them. For if our Words are Equivocal, how can we by Pronouncing such and such, excite the same Idea in another that is in our own Mind, which is the End of Speech, and consequently how can we be Understood? And if sometimes we annex one Idea to a Word, and sometimes another, we may for ever wrangle with those who perhaps wou’d be found to agree with us if we Understood each other, but can neither Convince them, nor clear up the Matter to our own Mind. For Instance: Shou’d I dispute Whether Evil were to be Chosen? Without defining what I mean by Evil, which is a Word customarily apply’d to things of different Natures, and shou’d conclude in the Affirmative, meaning at the same time the Evil of Pain, or any Corporal Loss or Punishment, I were not mistaken, tho’ another Person who annexes no other Idea but that of Sin to the word Evil, might Justly contradict me and say that I was. Or if in the Process of my Discourse, I shou’d without giving notice of it, substitute the Idea of Sin instead of that of Pain, when I mention Evil, I shou’d argue falsly. For it is a Maxim that we may Chuse a less Evil to avoid a greater, if both of them be Corporal Evils, or if one of them be so, and we chuse it to avoid a Sin, between which and the Evil of Pain there is no Comparison: But if the two Evils propos’d to our Choice be both of them Sinful, that Principle will not hold, we must Chuse neither, whatever comes on’t, Sin being Eligible no manner of way.

Thus many times our Ideas are thought to be false when the fault is really in our Language, we make use of Words without joyning any, or only loose and indeterminate Ideas to them, Prating like Parrots who can Modify Sounds, and Pronounce Syllables, and sometimes martial them as a Man wou’d, tho without the use of Reason or understanding any thing by them. So that after a long Discourse and many fine Words, our Hearer may justly ask us what we have been saying? And what it is we wou’d be at? And so a great part, of the Good Breeding of the World, many Elegant Complements pass for nothing, they have no meaning, or if they have, ’tis quite contrary to what the Words in other Cases signifie.

From the Companion of two or more Ideas clearly Conceived arises a Judgment, which we may lay down for a Principle, and as we have occasion Argue from. Always observing that those Judgments which we take for Axioms or Principles, be such as carry the highest Evidence and Conviction, such as every one who will but in the least Attend may Clearly see, and be fully convinced of, and which need not another Idea for their Demonstration. Thus from the Agreement which we plainly perceive between the Ideas of GOD and of Goodness singly consider’d, we discern that they may be joyn’d together so as to form this Proposition, That GOD is Good: And from the evident disparity that is between GOD and Injustice, we learn to affirm this other, That he is not Unjust. And so long as we Judge of Nothing but what we see Clearly, we can’t be mistaken in our Judgments, we may indeed in those Reasonings and Deductions we draw from them, if we are Ignorant of the Laws of Argumentation, or Negligent in the Observation of them.

The First and Principal thing therefore to be observed in all the Operations of the Mind is, That we determine nothing about those things of which we have not a Clear Idea, and as Distinct as the Nature of the Subject will permit, for we cannot properly be said to Know any thing which does not Clearly and Evidently appear to us. Whatever we see Distinctly we likewise see Clearly, Distinction always including Clearness, tho this does not necessarily include that, there being many Objects Clear to the view of the Mind, which yet can’t be said to be Distinct.

Les Princip. de la Philos. de M. Des Cartes. Pt. I. §. 45.

That (to use the Words of a Celebrated Author) may be said to be “Clear which is Present and Manifest to an attentive Mind; so as we say we see Objects Clearly, when being present to our Eyes they sufficiently Act on ’em, and our Eyes are dispos’d to regard ’em. And that Distinct, which is so Clear, Particular, and Different from all other things, that it contains not any thing in it self which appears not manifestly to him who considers it as he ought.” Thus we may have a Clear, but not a Distinct and Perfect Idea of GOD and of our own Souls; their Existence and some of their Properties and Attributes may be Certainly and Indubitably Known, but we can’t Know the Nature of our Souls Distinctly, for Reasons too long to be mentioned here, and less that of GOD, because he is Infinite. Now where our Knowlege is Distinct, we may boldly deny of a subject, all that which after a careful Examination we find not in it: But where our Knowlege is only Clear, and not Distinct, tho’ we may safely Affirm what we see, yet we can’t without a hardy Presumption Deny of it what we see not. And were it not very common to find People both Talking and Writing of things of which they have no Notion, no Clear Idea; nay and determining Dogmatically concerning the intire Nature of those of which they cannot possibly have an Adequate and Distinct one, it might seem impertinent to desire them to speak no farther than they Apprehend. They will tell you Peremptorily of Contradictions and Absurdities in such matters as they themselves must allow they cannot Comprehend, tho others as Sharp sighted as themselves can see no such thing as they complain of.

As Judgments are form’d by the Comparing of Ideas, so Reasoning or Discourse arises from the Companion or Combination of several Judgments. Nature teaches us when we can’t find out what Relation one Idea bears to another by a Simple view or bare Comparison, to seek for a Common Measure or third Idea, which Relating to the other two, we may by Comparing it with each of ’em, discern wherein they agree or differ. Our Invention discovers it self in proposing readily apt Ideas for this Middle Term, our Judgment in making Choice of such as are Clearest and most to our purpose, and the excellency of our Reasoning consists in our Skill and Dexterity in Applying them.

Invention indeed is the hardest part, when Proofs are found it is not very difficult to manage them. And to know precisely wherein their Nature consists, may help us somewhat in our enquiries after ’em. An Intermediate Idea then which can make out an Agreement between other Ideas, must be Equivalent to, and yet Distinct from those we compare by it. Where Ideas agree it will not be hard to find such an Equivalent, and if after diligent search we cannot meet with any, ’tis a pretty sure Sign that they do not agree. It is not necessary indeed that our Middle Idea be Equivalent in all respects, ’tis enough if it be in such as make the Comparison: And when it is so to one of the Compar’d Ideas but not to the other, that’s a Proof that they do not agree amongst themselves.

All the Commerce and Intercourse of the World is manag’d by Equivalents, Conversation as well as Traffick. Why do we Trust our Friends but because their Truth and Honesty appears to us Equivalent to the Confidence we repose in ’em? Why do we perform Good Offices to others, but because there’s a proportion between them and the Merit of the Person, or our own Circumstances? And as the way to know the Worth of things is to Compare them one with another, so in like manner we come to the Knowlege of the Truth of ’em by an Equal Ballancing. But you will say, Tho I may learn the value of a Spanish Coin by Weighing, or Comparing it with some other Money whose Standard I know, and so discern what proportion it bears to those Goods I wou’d exchange; yet what Scales shall I find to weigh Ideas? What Hand so even as to poize them Justly? Or if that might be done, yet where shall I meet with an Equivalent Idea when I have occasion to use one?

In answer to this Demand I consider, that as Light is always visible to us if we have an Organ to receive it, if we turn our Eyes towards it, and that nothing interpose between it and us; so is Truth, we are surrounded with it, and GOD has given us Faculties to receive it. If it be ask’d, Why then do we so seldom find it? The Reason is, because instead of making right use of our Faculties we employ them in keeping it out; we either shut our Eyes, or if we vouchsafe to open them, we are sure to view it thro such unsuitable Mediums as fail not to misrepresent it to us. As for those few Noble Spirits, who open the Windows of their Souls to let in Truth, and take the Films of Interest, Passion and Prejudice from before their Eyes, they will certainly be Enlighten’d, and cannot miss of obtaining as much Truth as they are capable of Receiving. For, to go on with the Comparison, as we can See no farther than our own Horizon, tho the Light shine never so bright around us; and as we cannot discern every Object even within that Compass Clearly, nor Any Distinctly but what we particularly apply our selves to; So neither are our Capacities large enough to take in All Truth, as has been often said, nor are we capable of attaining Any, without Attention and diligent Examination. But if we carefully Consider those Ideas we already have and Attend to those Truths we are acquainted with, we cannot want Mediums to discover more, if our Enquiries be after that which is within our Reach. He who is the Fountain of Truth is also a GOD of Order, and has so regularly connex’d one Truth with another, that the discovery of one is a step towards a further Progress; so that if we diligently Examine those Truths which, we Know, they will clear the way to what we search after: For it seldom happens but that the Question it self directs us to some Idea that will serve for the Explanation or Proof of it.

There is no Object, no Accident of Life but affords us matter of Instruction. GOD has so dispos’d all the Works of his Hands, all the Actings of his Providence, that every one of ’em ministers to our Improvement, if we will but Observe and Apply them. Indeed this Living Ex Tempore which most of us are guilty of, our making no Reflections, our Gay and Volatile Humour which transports us in an Instant from one thing to another, e’re we have with the Industrious Bee suck’d those Sweets it wou’d afford us, frequently renders his gracious Bounty ineffectual. For as the Diligent-hand maketh Rich, whil’st the Slothful and Prodigal come to nothing, so the Use of our Powers improves and Encreases them, and the most Observing and Considerate is the Wisest Person: For she lays up in her Mind as in a Store-house, ready to produce on all Occasions, a Clear and Simple Idea of every Object that has at any time presented it self. And perhaps the difference between one Womans Reason and anothers may consist only in this, that the one has amass’d a greater number of such Ideas than the other, and dispos’d them more Orderly in her Understanding, so that they are at hand, ready to be apply’d to those Complex Ideas whose Agreement or Disagreement cannot be found out but by the means of some of ’em.

But because Examples are more familiar than Precepts, as condescending to shew us the very manner of Practising them, I shall endeavour to make the matter in Hand as plain as I can by subjoining Instances to the following Rules, which Rules as I have not taken wholly on Trust from others, so neither do I pretend to be the Inventer of ’em.

We have heard already that a Medium is necessary when we can’t discern the Relation that is between two or more Ideas by Intuition or a simple View. Could this alone procure us what we seek after, the addition of other Ideas wou’d be needless, since to make a shew of Wit by tedious Arguings and unnecessary Flourishes, does only Perplex and Incumber the Matter, Intuition being the Simplest, and on that account the best way of Knowing.

Rule I. And therefore we shou’d in the first place, Acquaint our selves throughly with the State of the Question, have a Distinct Notion of our Subject whatever it be, and of the Terms we make use of, knowing precisely what it is we drive at: that so we may in the second.

Rule II. Cut off all needless Ideas and whatever has not a necessary Connexion to the matter under Consideration, which serve only to fill up the Capacity of the Mind, and to Divide and Distract the Attention. From the neglect of this comes those causless Digressions, tedious Parentheses and Impertinent Remarques which we meet with in some Authors. For, as when our Sight is diffus’d and extended to many Objects at once we see none of them Distinctly; so when the Mind grasps at every Idea that presents it self, or rambles after such as relate not to its Present Business, it loses its hold and retains a very feeble Apprehension of that which it shou’d Attend. Some have added another Rule (viz.) That we Reason only on those things of which we have Clear Ideas; but I take it to be a Consequence of the first, and therefore do not make it a distinct one: For we can by no means Understand our Subject, or be well acquainted with the State of the Question, unless we have a Clear Idea of all its Terms.

Rule III. Our Business being stated, the next Rule is To conduct our Thoughts by Order, beginning with the most Simple and Easie Objects, And ascending as by Degrees to the Knowlege of the more Compos’d. I need not tell you, that Order makes every thing, Easie, Strong and Beautiful, and that the Superstructure is neither like to Last or Please unless the Foundation be duly laid, for this is obvious to the most Superficial Reader. Nor are they likely to solve the Difficult, who have neglected or slightly pass’d over the Easie Questions. Our Knowledge is gradual, and by passing Regularly thro Plain things, we arrive in due time at the more Abstruse.

Rule IV. In this Method we are to practise the Fourth Rule which is, Not to leave any part of our Subject unexamin’d, it being as necessary to Consider All that can let in Light, as to shut out what’s Foreign to it. We may stop short of Truth as well as over-run it; and tho we look never so attentively on our proper Object, if we view but half of it, we may be as much mistaken, as if we extended our Sight beyond it. Some Objects agree very well when observ’d on one side, which upon turning the other shew a great disparity. Thus the Right Angle of a Triangle may be like to one part of a Square, but compare the Whole, and you’l find ’em very different Figures. And a Moral Action may in some Circumstance be not only Fit but Necessary, which in others, where Time, Place, and the like have made an alteration, wou’d be most Improper; so that if we venture to Act on the former Judgment, we may easily do amiss, if we wou’d Act as we ought, we must view its New Face, and see with what Aspect that looks on us.

To this Rule belongs that of Dividing the Subject of our Meditations into as many Parts, as we can, and as shall be requisite to Understand it perfectly. This is indeed most necessary in difficult Questions, which will scarce be unravell’d but in this manner by Pieces: Ever taking care to make Exact Reviews, and to Sum up our Evidence justly e’re we pass Sentence and fix our Judgment.

Rule V. To which purpose we must Always keep our Subject Directly in our Eye, and Closely pursue it thro all our Progress; there being no better Sign of a good Understanding than Thinking Closely and Pertinently, and Reasoning dependently, so as to make the former part of our Discourse a support to the Latter, and This an Illustration of That, carrying Light and Evidence in ev’ry step we take. The neglect of this Rule is the Cause why our Discoveries of Truth are seldom Exact, that so much is often said to so little purpose; and many Intelligent and Industrious Readers when they have Read over a Book are very little wiser than when they began it. And that the two last Rules may be the better observ’d, ’twill be fit very often to look over our Process so far as we have gone, that so by rendring our Subject Familiar, we may the sooner arrive to an Exact Knowlege of it.

Rule VI. All which being done we are in a fair way towards keeping the last Rule, which is, To judge no further than we Perceive, and not to take any thing for Truth which we do not evidently Know to be so. Indeed in some Cases we are forc’d to content our selves with Probability, but ’twere well if we did so only where ’tis plainly Necessary. That is, when the Subject of our Meditation is such as we cannot possibly have a Certain Knowlege of, because we are not furnish’d with Proofs which have a Constant and Immutable Connexion with the Ideas we apply them to, or because we can’t perceive it, which is our Case in such Exigencies as oblige us to Act presently, on a cursory view of the Arguments propos’d to us, when we want time to trace them to the bottom, and to make use of such means as wou’d discover Truth.

I cannot think we are often driven to such straits in any considerable Affair, tho I believe that very many Subjects may be propos’d to us, concerning which we cannot readily pass our Judgment, either because we never consider’d them before, or because we are wanting in some Means that lead to the Knowlege, of ’em. In which Case Reason wills that we suspend our Judgment till we can be better Inform’d; nor wou’d it have us remit our Search after Certainty, even in those very Cases in which we may sometimes be forc’d to Act only on Probable Grounds. For Reason can’t rest satisfy’d with Probabilities where Evidence is possible, our Passions and Interest may, but That does not incline us to leave off Enquiring lest we happen to meet somewhat contrary to our Desires. No, Reason requires us to continue our Enquiries with all the Industry we can, till they’ve put us in Possession of Truth, and when we have found, enjoyns us to follow her, how opposite soever she may cause our Latter Actions to be to our Former. But by this we may learn (and so we may by every thing that such weak and fallible Creatures as we are, perform) to think Candidly of those whose Opinions and Actions differ from our own. Because we do not know the necessity of their Affairs, nor in what ill Circumstances they are plac’d in respect of Truth.

And now to Apply what has been said; The State of the Question being Distinctly known, and certain Ideas fixt to the Terms we make use of, we shall find sometimes that the Difference which was suppos’d to be between the Things themselves, is only in words, in the divers ways we make use of to express the same Idea.

For if upon looking into our selves we discern, that these different Terms have but one and the same Idea, when we have corrected our Expressions the Controversie is at an End, and we need enquire no further. Thus, If we are ask’d Whether GOD is Infinitely Perfect? There needs no Intermediate Idea to compare the Idea of GOD with that of Infinite Perfection, since we may discern them on the very first view to be one and the same Idea differently express’d, which to go about to explain or prove were only to cumber with needless words, and to make what is Clear, Obscure. For we Injure a Cause instead of Defending it, by attempting an Explanation or Proof of things so Clear, that as they do not need, so perhaps they are not Capable of any.

But if it be made a Question Whether there is a GOD, or a Being Infinitely Perfect? We are then to Examin the Agreement between our Idea of GOD and that of Existence. Now this may be discern’d by Intuition, for upon a View of our Ideas we find that Existence is a Perfection, and the Foundation of all other Perfections, since that which has no Being cannot be suppos’d to have any Perfection. And tho the Idea of Existence is not Adequate to that of Perfection, yet the Idea of Perfection Includes that of Existence, and if That Idea were divided into parts, one part of it wou’d exactly agree with This. So that if we will allow that Any Being is Infinite in All Perfections, we cannot deny that that Being Exists; Existence it self being one Perfection, and such an one as all the rest are built upon.

If unreasonable Men will farther demand, Why is it necessary that All Perfection shou’d be Centred in One Being, is’t not enough that it be parcel’d out amongst many? And tho it be true that that Being who has all Perfection must needs Exist, yet where’s the Necessity of an All-Perfect Being? We must then look about for Proofs and Intermediate Ideas, and the Objection it self will furnish us with one. For those Many whose Particular Ideas it wou’d have joyn’d together to make a Compound one of All-Perfection, are no other than Creatures, as will appear if we consider our Idea of Particular Being and of Creature, which are so far from having any thing to distinguish ’em, that in all Points they resemble each other. Now this Idea naturally suggests to us that of Creation, or a Power of giving Being to that which before the exerting of that Power had none, which Idea if we use it as a Medium, will serve to discover to us the necessity of an All-Perfect Being.

For in the first place, what ever has any Perfection or Excellency (for that’s all we mean by Perfection here) must either have it of it self, or derive it from some other Being. Now Creatures cannot have their Perfections from themselves because they have not their Being, for to suppose that they Made themselves is an Absurdity too ridiculous to be seriously refuted, ’tis to suppose them to Be and not to Be at the same time, and that when they were Nothing, they were able to do the greatest Matter. Nor can they derive either Being or Perfection from any other Creature. For tho some Particular Beings may seem to be the Cause of the Perfections of others, as the Watch-maker may be said to be the Cause of the Regular Motions of the Watch, yet trace it a little farther, and you’l find this very Cause shall need another, and so without End, till you come to the Foundation-head, to that All-Perfect Being, who is the last resort of our Thoughts, and in whom they Naturally and Necessarily rest and terminate. If to this it be Objected that we as good as affirm that this All-Perfect Being is his own Maker, by saying he is Self-Existent, and so we fall into the same Absurdity which we imputed to that Opinion which supposes that Creatures were their own Maker. The reply is easie, That we do not say he Made himself, we only affirm that his Nature is such, that tho we can’t sufficiently Explain because we can’t comprehend it, yet thus much we can discern, that if he did not Exist of himself no other Being could ever have Existed. So that either All must be swallow’d up in an Infinite Nothing, if Nothing can properly have that Epithet, and we must suppose, that neither we our selves, nor any of those Creatures about us ever had, or ever can have a Being, which is too ridiculous to imagine, or else we must needs have recourse to a Self-Existing Being, who is the Maker and Lord of all things. And since Self Existence must of necessity be plac’d somewhere, is it not much more Natural and Reasonable to place it in Infinite Perfection, than amongst poor, frail Creatures, whose Origin we may trace, and whose End we see daily hastning?

To Sum up all: Since there are Innumerable Beings in the World, which have each of them their several Excellencies or Perfections; Since these can no more derive their Perfections than their Being from themselves or from any other Creature; Since a Self-Existing Being is the result of our Thoughts; the First and only True Cause, without whom it is impossible that any thing should ever have Existed; since Creatures with their Being receive all that depends on it from him their Maker; Since none can give what he has not, and therefore he who Communicates an innumerable variety of Perfections to his Creatures, even all that they enjoy, must needs contain in himself all those Beauties and Perfections he is pleas’d to Communicate to Inferior Beings; nothing can be more Plain and Evident than that there is a GOD, and that the Existence of an All-Perfect Being is Absolutely necessary.

Perhaps these Arguments are not in Form, I do not oblige my Self to follow servilely the Rules of Art, nor know I what better Judges will think of ’em, but they seem to me to be Clear, Rational and Concluding, which is all I aim at. And I hope the Reader will receive from hence more light into the way of Arguing, than she cou’d have gain’d had I spent as many Pages in prescribing Rules and giving trifling Examples, which when they are known, merit only to be forgot again. But if some are better pleas’d with the usual way of Syllogism, and think an Argument cannot be rightly managed without one, for their Satisfaction we will add another Instance.

Suppose the Question were put Whether a Rich Man is Happy? By a Rich Man understanding one who possesses the Wealth and Good things of this World, and by Happy the Enjoyment of the Proper Good of Man. We compare the two Terms Riches and Happiness together, to discern if they be so much one and the same, that what is affirm’d of the one may be laid of the other; but we find they are not. For if Riches and Happiness were terms Convertible, then all who are Happy must be Rich, and all who are Rich must be Happy, to affirm the last of which is to beg the Question, and the contrary appears by the following Argument, which makes use of Satisfaction with ones own Condition for the middle Idea or Common Measure.

He who is Happy is satisfied with his Condition and free from Anxious Cares and Solicitude (for these proceeding from the want of Good, he who enjoys his proper Good cannot be subject to them.) But Riches do not free us from Anxieties and Solicitude, they many times encrease them, Therefore to be Rich and to be Happy are not one and the same thing.

Again, If there are some who are Happy and yet not Rich, then Riches and Happiness are two distinct things. But a Good Poor Man is Happy (in the Enjoyment of GOD who is better to him than Thousands of Gold and Silver,) therefore Riches and Happiness are to be distinguish’d.

We may further consider, that if the Enjoyment of Riches can make a Man Happy according to our Notion of Happiness, they must be his Proper Good. Now if we compare the Idea of Riches with that which we have of Man, we shall find in the former nothing but what’s Material, External and Adventitious, but our Idea of the latter represents to us somewhat that Thinks, and so is of an Immaterial and more noble Nature, a Nature altogether different from the former, and much more excellent and Superior to it; and by Consequence the less Noble cannot be the Good of the more, nor a Body or an Extended Substance, the Proper Good of the Mind, a Spiritual or Thinking Substance. So that upon the whole matter we find, that we cannot affirm a Man is Happy because he is Rich, neither can we deny it; Riches consider’d absolutely in themselves, neither make a Man Happy nor hinder him from being so. They Contribute to his Happiness or they Obstruct it according to the Use he makes of ’em.

As for the Common Rules of Disputation they do more frequently Intangle than Clear a Question, nor is it worth while to know any more of them than may help to guard us from the Sophistry of those who use them, and assist us in the managing an Argument fairly, so long as it is Tenable, and till we are driven from it by the meer dint of Truth. To be able to hold an Argument Right or Wrong may pass with some perhaps for the Character of a Good Disputant, which yet I think it is not, but must by no means be allow’d to be that of a Rational Person; it belongs to such to detect as soon as may be the Fallacies of an ill one, and to establish Truth with the Clearest Evidence. For indeed Truth not Victory is what we shou’d contend for in all Disputes, it being more Glorious to be Overcome by her than to Triumph under the Banners of Error. And therefore we pervert our Reason when we make it the Instrument of an Endless Contention, by seeking after Quirks and Subtilties, abusing Equivocal Terms, and by practising the rest of those little Arts every Sophister is full of, which are of no service in the discovery of Truth, all they can do is to Ward off an Opponents blow, to make a Noise and raise a Dust, that so we may escape in the Hurry, our Foil being undiscover’d.

It were endless to reckon up all the Fallacies we put on our selves and endeavour to obtrude on others. On our selves in the first place, for however we may be pleas’d in the Contemplation of our own Craft or to use those softer Names we are apt to give it, our Acuteness and Ingenuity; who ever attempts to impose on others is first impos’d on himself, he is cheated by some of those grand Deceivers, the World, the Flesh, and the Devil, and made to believe that Vain-glory, Secular Interest, Ambition or perhaps Sensuality or Revenge, or any the like contemptible Appetites are preferable to Integrity and Truth.

Art of Thinking Pt. 3. Ch. 19, 20.

Neither is it necessary to reduce the most usual Sophisms to general Heads, since that’s already very well perform’d in a Book to which I’de rather refer you, than be at the trouble of Transcribing, having nothing to add but this, that if I be not mistaken, all the false Arguings enumerated there, and what others you may happen to meet with may be discover’d and avoided by the Rules already given, and do indeed proceed, so far as they relate to the Understanding, from the Non-observation of some of ’em.

But it is to little purpose to guard our selves against the Sophisms of the Head, if we lie open to those of the Heart. One irregular Passion will put a greater Obstacle between us and Truth, than the brightest Understanding and clearest Reasonings can easily remove. This every one of us is apt to discern in others, but we’re blind to it in our selves. We can readily say that it is Pride or Obstinacy, Interest or Passion or in a word Self-love that keeps our Neighbour from Conviction, but all this while imagine our own Hearts are very clear of ’em, tho’ more Impartial Judges are of another Mind.

I wish there were no Reason to think that there are some who attempt to maintain an Opinion which they know to be false, or at least which they have cause to suspect, and therefore industriously avoid what wou’d manifest their Error. ’Tis hop’d however that the greatest part of the Disputers of the World are not of this number, and that the reason why they offer their Neighbours Sophistical Arguments, is because they are not aware of it themselves; That what makes them so Positive is their firm persuasion that they are acted only by a Zeal for GOD, an honest Constancy and Stanch Integrity, tho at the very same time quite different Motives move them under these Appearances.

And indeed he must be an extraordinary good Man, a Wonder scarce produc’d in an Age, who has no Irregular Passion stirring; Who receives no Manner of Tincture from Pride and Vitious Self-Love, to which all are so prone, and which hide themselves under so many disguises; Who is got above the World its Terrors and Allurements, has laid up his Treasure in Heaven, and is fully Contented with his Present Circumstances, let them be what they will, having made them the boundaries of his Desires; who knows how to live on a Little very happily and therefore receives no Bias from his own Conveniency, nor is weigh’d down by the dead Weight of his Appetites and Interests; which ought to be the Temper of every Person who wou’d find out Truth, and who desires to make a Right Judgment in all things.

We all pretend to this it’s true, and think our selves Injur’d if it be not believ’d that we are Disinteress’d and free from Passion, that no Humour or Private End, nothing but an honest Zeal for Truth gives warmth to our Discourses; and yet it often happens that e’re we Conclude them, we give just occasion to have it thought, that how large soever our Knowlege in other things may be, we are not well acquainted with our own Hearts. All which consider’d, how confidently soever we’re perswaded of our own Integrity, tho we think we have penetrated to the very bottom of our Hearts, it wou’d not be amiss to suspect our selves sometimes, and to fear a Bias, even at the very instant we take care to avoid one.

For Truth being but One, and the Rational Faculties not differing in Kind but in Degree, tho there may be different Measures of Understanding, there could not be such Contradictions in Mens Opinions as we find there are, even in those who examin as well as in those who do not, were they acted only by the Love of Truth, and did not Self-Love perswade them that they shall find their own particular account by such an Opposition. I wou’d not be so understood as if I thought that in all Controversies one side must needs be Criminal, if not by Wilfully Opposing Truth, yet at least by an indulgence of such unmortifi’d Passions as estrange them from her. No, without doubt great allowances are to be made on the score of Education, Capacity, the Leisure, and Opportunity of Information we have had. But this we may venture to say, that had we but a Modest Opinion of our selves, believing it as possible for us as for those who contradict us to be mistaken, did we behave our selves answerable to such a belief; were we seriously convinc’d that nothing is so much our Interest as a readiness to admit of Truth, from what ever Hand it comes, greatest part of our Disputes wou’d have a better Issue than we generally find. At least if we cou’d not be to happy as to Convince one another, our Contests wou’d be manag’d with more Temper and Moderation, wou’d not conclude in such a breach of Charity, or at best in such a Coldness for each other, as they usually do.

If we consider wisely we shall find it to be our Present Interest as well as our Future, to do that in Reality which all of us Pretend to, that is, to Search after and to Follow Truth. And to do it with all that Candor and Ingenuity which becomes a true Philosopher as well as a good Christian, making use of no Arguments but what we really believe, and giving them up contentedly when we meet with stronger. Our Present Interest, which is that which weighs most with the generality, and to which we make all other considerations give place; For what is it we Contend for? They who have such little Souls as to bait at any thing beneath the highest End, make Reputation their Aim, and with it that Authority and Wealth which usually attends it. But now Reputation cannot be acquir’d, at least not a lasting one, by Fallacious Reasonings; we may perhaps for a while get a Name by them amongst unwary Persons, but the World grows too quick-sighted to be long impos’d on. If a Love of Truth do not, yet Envy and Emulation will set other heads a Work to discover our Ignorance or Fraud, they are upon the same Design, and will not suffer us to go away with the Prize undeservedly. And besides, with how ill an Aspect must he needs appear who does not Reason fairly, and by consequence, how unlike is he to gain on those who hear him? There are but three Causes to which false Arguments can be refer’d, Ignorance, Rashness, or Design, and the being suspected for any one of these hinders us very much in acquiring that Reputation, Authority or Preferment we desire. I must confess were we sure the Fallacy wou’d not be detected, and that we shou’d not lie under Suspicion of it, we might gain our point; for provided the Paint do not rub off, good Colouring may serve a present turn as well as a true Complection: But there is little reason to hope for this, because of what was just now mention’d, and for other Reasons that might be added.

Now what can be more provoking than the Idea we have of a Designing Person? of one who thinks his own Intellectuals so strong and ours so weak, that he can make us swallow any thing, and lead us where he pleases? such an one seems to have an Intention to reduce us to the vilest Slavery, the Captivation of our Understandings, which we justly reckon to be the highest Insolence. And since every one puts in for a share of Sense, and thinks he has no reason to complain of the distribution of it, whoever supposes that another has an over-weaning Opinion of his own, must needs think that he undervalues his Neighbours Understanding, and will certainly repay him in his own Coin, and deny him those advantages he seems to arrogate.

The most we can say for our selves when the weakness of our Arguments comes to be discover’d, is that we were mistaken thro Rashness or Ignorance, which tho more pardonable than the former, are no recommending Qualities. If we argue falsly and know not that we do so, we shall be more pittied than when we do, but either way disappointed. And if we have added Rash Censures of those who are not of our Mind, Pride or Positiveness to our Errors as we cannot so handsomely Retreat so neither will so fair a Quarter be allow’d as those who Argue with Meekness, Modesty and Charity may well expect. So that when we have cast up our Account and estimated the Present Advantages that false Arguings bring us, I fear what we have got by a Pretence to Truth, won’t be found to countervail the loss we shall sustain by the Discovery that it was no more. Which may induce us (if other Considerations will not) to be wary in receiving any Proposition ourselves; and restrain us from being forward to impose our Sentiments on others.

After all, ’tis a melancholy reflection that a great part of Mankind stand in need of Arguments drawn from so low a Motive as Worldly Interest, to persuade them to that to which they have much greater inducements. It is strange that we shou’d need any other considerations besides the bare performance of our Duty, and those unspeakable advantages laid up for all such as do it sincerely, hereafter. When we have the Approbation of GOD and the infinite Rewards he has propos’d to those who study to recommend themselves to him, for our Encouragement, how low are we sunk if the Applause of Men and the little Trifles which they can bestow weigh any thing with us! I am therefore almost asham’d of proposing so mean a consideration, but the degeneracy of the Age requir’d it, and they who perhaps at first follow Truth as the Jews did once, for the Loaves only, may at last be attracted by its own Native Beauties.

L’art de Penser, p. 22.

§. V. As Nature teaches us Logic, so does it instruct us in Rhetoric much better than Rules of Art, which if they are good ones are nothing else but those Judicious Observations which Men of Sense have drawn from Nature, and which all who reflect on the Operations of their own Minds will find out ’emselves. The common Precepts of Rhetoric may teach us how to reduce Ingenious ways of speaking to a certain Rule, but they do not teach us how to Invent them, this is Natures work and she does it best; there is as much difference between Natural and Artificial Eloquence as there is between Paint and True Beauty. So that as a good Author well observes, all that’s useful in this Art, “is the avoiding certain evil ways of Writing and Speaking, and above all an Artificial and Rhetorical Stile compos’d of false Thoughts, Hyperboles and forc’d Figures which is the greatest fault in Rhetoric.”

I shall not therefore recommend under the name of Rhetoric an Art of speaking floridly on all Subjects, and of dressing up Error and Impertinence in a quaint and taking garb; any more than I did that Wrangling which goes by the name of Logic, and which teaches to dispute for and against all Propositions indefinitely whether they are True or False. It is an abuse both of Reason and Address to press’em into the Service of a Trifle or an Untruth; and a mistake to think that any Argument can be rightly made, or any Discourse truly Eloquent that does not illustrate and inforce Truth. For the design of Rhetoric is to remove those Prejudices that lie in the way of Truth, to Reduce the Passions to the Government of Reason; to place our Subject in a Right Light, and excite our Hearers to a due consideration of it. And I know not what exactness of Method, pure and proper Language, Figures, insinuating ways of Address and the like signify, any farther than as they contribute to the Service of Truth by rendring our Discourse Intelligible, Agreeable and Convincing. They are indeed very serviceable to it when they are duly managed, for Good Sense loses much of its efficacy by being ill express’d, and an ill stile is nothing else but the neglect of some of these, or over doing others of ’em.

Obscurity, one of the greatest faults in Writing, does commonly proceed from a want of Meditation, for when we pretend to teach others what we do not understand our selves, no wonder that we do it at a sorry rate. ’Tis true, Obscurity is sometimes design’d, to conceal an erroneous opinion which an Author dares not openly own, or which if it be discover’d he has a mind to evade. And sometimes even an honest and good Writer who studies to avoid may insensibly fall into it, by reason that his Ideas being become familiar to himself by frequent Meditation, a long train of ’em are readily excited in his mind, by a word or two which he’s us’d to annex to them; but it is not so with his Readers who are perhaps strangers to his Meditations, and yet ought to have the very same Idea rais’d in theirs that was in the Authors mind, or else they cannot understand him. If therefore we desire to be intelligible to every body, our Expressions must be more plain and explicit than they needed to be if we writ only for our selves, or for those to whom frequent Discourse has made our Ideas familiar.

Not that it is necessary to express at length all the Process our Mind goes thro in resolving a Question, this wou’d spin out our Discourse to an unprofitable tediousness, the Operations of the Mind being much more speedy than those of the Tongue or Pen. But we shou’d fold up our Thoughts so closely and neatly, expressing them in such significant tho few words, as that the Readers Mind may easily open and enlarge them. And if this can be done with facility we are Perspicuous as well as Strong, if with difficulty or not at all, we’re then perplext and Obscure Writers.

Scarce any thing conduces more to Clearness, the great Beauty of writing, than Exactness of Method; nor perhaps to Persuasion, for by putting every thing in its proper place with due Order and Connexion, the Readers Mind is gently led where the Writer wou’d have it. Such a Stile is Easy without Softness, Copious as that signifies the omission of nothing necessary, yet not Wordy and Tedious; nor stuft with Nauseous Repetitions, which they who do not Think before they Write and dispose their Matter duly, can scarce avoid. The Method of Thinking has been already shewn, and the same is to be observ’d in Writing, which if it be what it ought; is nothing else but the communicating to others the result of our frequent and deep Meditations, in such a manner as we judge most effectual to convince them of those Truths which we believe. Always remembring that the most natural Order is ever best; that we must first prepare their minds by removing those Prejudices and Passions which are in our way, and then propose our Reasons with all the Clearness and Force, with all the Tenderness and Good-Nature we can.

Lock of Hum. Und. B. 3. Ch. 7.

And since the Clearness and Connexion as well as the Emphasis and Beauty of a Discourse depends in a great measure on a right use of the Particles, whoever wou’d Write well ought to inform themselves nicely in their Proprieties. an And, a The, a But, a For, &c. do very much perplex the Sense when they are misplac’d, and make the Reader take it many times quite otherwise than the Writer meant it. But this is not a place to say all that this Subject deserves; they who wou’d have much in a little, may consult an Ingenious Author who has touch’d upon’t, and from thence take hints to observe how these little words are applied in good Authors, and how themselves may best use them to express the several Postures of their own Minds.

In a word, I know not a more compendious way to good Speaking and Writing, than to chuse out the most excellent in either as a Model on which to form our selves. Or rather to imitate the Perfections of all, and avoid their mistakes; for few are so perfect as to be without fault, and few so bad as to have nothing good in them. A true Judgment distinguishes, and neither rejects the Good for the sake of the Bad, nor admits the Bad because of the Good that is mingled with it. No sort of Style but has its excellency and is liable to defect: If care be not taken the Sublime which subdues us with Nobleness of Thought and Grandeur of Expression, will fly out of sight and by being Empty and Bombast become contemptible. The Plain and Simple will grow Dull and Abject; the Severe dry and Rugged, the Florid vain and impertinent. The Strong instead of rousing the Mind will distract and intangle it by being Obscure; even the Easy and Perspicuous if it be too diffuse, or ever delicate tires us instead of pleasing. Good Sense is the principal thing without which all our polishing is of little Worth, and yet if Ornament be wholly neglected very few will regard us. Studied and artificial periods are not natural enough to please, they shew too much solicitude about what does not deserve it, and a loose and careless Style declares too much contempt of the Public. Neither Reason nor Wit entertain us if they are driven beyond a certain pitch, and Pleasure it self is offensive if it be not judiciously dispenc’d.

Every Author almost has some beauty or blemish remarkable in his Style from whence it takes its name; and every Reader has a peculiar tast of Books as well as Meats. One wou’d have the Subject exhausted, another is not pleas’d if somewhat be not left to enlarge on in his own Meditations. This affects a Grave that a Florid Style; One is for Easiness, a second for Plainness, a third for Strength, and a fourth for Politeness. And perhaps the great secret of Writing is the mixing all these in so just a proportion that every one may tast what he likes without being disgusted by its contrary. And may find at once that by the Solidity of the Reason, the purity and propriety of Expression, and insinuating agreeableness of Address, his Understanding is Enlightned, his Affections subdued and his Will duly regulated.

This is indeed the true End of Writing, and it wou’d not be hard for every one to judge how well they had answer’d it, wou’d they but lay aside Self-Love, so much of it at least, as makes them partial to their own Productions. Did we consider our own with the same Severity, or but Indifferency that we do anothers Writing, we might pass a due Censure on it, might discern what Thought was Crude or ill exprest, what Reasoning weak, what passage superfluous, where we were flat and dull, where extravagant and vain, and by Criticizing on our selves do a greater kindness to the World than we can in making our Remarques on others. Nor shou’d we be at a loss, if we were Impartial, in finding out Methods to Inform, Persuade and Please; for Human Nature is for the most part much alike in all, and that which has a good effect on us, will generally speaking have the same on others. So that to guess what success we are like to have, we need only suppose our selves in the place of those we Address to, and consider how such a Discourse wou’d operate on us, if we had their Infirmities and Thoughts about us.

And if we do so I believe we shall find, there’s nothing more improper than Pride and Positiveness, nor any thing more prevalent than an innocent compliance with their weakness: Such as pretends not to dictate to their Ignorance, but only to explain and illustrate what they did or might have known before if they had consider’d it, and supposes that their Minds being employ’d about some other things was the reason why they did not discern it as well as we. For Human Nature is not willing to own its Ignorance; Truth is so very attractive, there’s such a natural agreement between our Minds and it, that we care not to be thought so dull as not to be able to find out by our selves such obvious matters. We shou’d therefore be careful that nothing pass from us which upbraids our Neighbours Ignorance, but study to remove’t without appearing to take notice of it, and permit’em to fancy if they please, that we believe them as Wise and Good as we endeavour to make them. By this we gain their Affections which is the hardest part of our Work, excite their Industry and infuse a new Life into all Generous Tempers, who conclude there’s great hopes they may with a little pains attain what others think they Know already, and are asham’d to fall short of the good Opinion we have entertain’d of ’em.

And since many wou’d yield to the Clear Light of Truth were’t not for the shame of being overcome, we shou’d Convince but not Triumph, and rather Conceal our Conquest than Publish it. We doubly oblige our Neighbours when we reduce them into the Right Way, and keep it from being taken notice of that they were once in the Wrong, which is certainly a much greater satisfaction than that blaze of Glory which is quickly out, that noise of Applause which will soon be over. For the gaining of our Neighbour, at least the having honestly endeavour’d it, and the leading our own Vanity in Triumph are Real Goods and such as we shall always have the Comfort of. It is to be wish’d that such Propositions as are not attended with the Clearest Evidence were deliver’d only by way of Enquiry, since even the brightest Truth when Dogmatically dictated is apt to offend our Readers, and make them imagine their Liberty’s impos’d on, so far is Positiveness from bringing any body over to our Sentiments. And besides, we’re all of us liable to mistake, and few have Humility enough to confess themselves Deceiv’d in what they have confidently asserted, but think they’re obliged in Honour to maintain an Opinion they’ve once been Zealous for, how desirous soever they may be to get rid on’t, cou’d they do it handsomely. Now a Modest way of delivering our Sentiments assists us in this, and leaves us at liberty to take either side of the Question as Reason and Riper Consideration shall determine.

In short, as Thinking conformably to the Nature of Things is True Knowledge, so th’ expressing our Thoughts in such a way, as most readily, and with the greatest Clearness and Life, excites in others the very same Idea that was in us, is the best Eloquence. For if our Idea be conformable to the Nature of the thing it represents, and its Relations duly stated, this is the most effectual way both to Inform and Perswade, since Truth being always amiable, cannot fail of attracting when she’s plac’d in a Right Light, and those to whom we offer her, are made Able and Willing to discern her Beauties. If therefore we throughly understand our Subject and are Zealously affected with it, we shall neither want suitable words to explain, nor perswasive Methods to recommend it.

And since Piety and Vertue shou’d in spite of the mistaken Customs of the Age be the principal Theme of a Christians Conversation; that which those who bear that Sacred Name ought always to regard some way or other, even when it might be unseasonable to speak of it directly, the way to be good Orators is to be good Christians, the Practice of Religion will both instruct us in the Theory, and most powerfully inforce what we say of it. Did we truly relish the Delights of GOD’s Service, we cou’d neither refrain from talking of the Pleasure, nor be so ill-natur’d as not to strive to Communicate it; and were we duly warm’d with a Zeal for his Glory and concern for our Neighbours Soul, no Figures of Rhetoric, no Art of Perswasion wou’d be wanting to us. We shou’d diligently watch for Opportunities, and carefully improve them, accommodating our Discourse to the Understanding and Genius of all we cou’d hope to do good to.

Besides, by being True Christians we have Really that Love for others which all who desire to perswade must pretend to; we’ve that Probity and Prudence, that Civility and Modesty which the Masters of this Art say a good Orator must be endow’d with; and have pluck’d up those Vicious Inclinations from whence the most distastful faults of Writing proceed. For why do we chuse to be Obscure but because we intend to Deceive, or wou’d be thought to see much farther than our Neighbours? One sort of Vanity prompts us to be Rugged and Severe, and so possess’d with the imagin’d Worth and Solidity of our Discourse, that we think it beneath us to Polish it: Another disposes us to Elaborate and Affected ways of Writing, to Pompous and improper Ornaments; and why are we tediously Copious but that we fancy every Thought of ours is extraordinary? Contradiction is indeed for our advantage as tending to make us wiser, yet our Pride makes us impatient under it, because it seems to Lessen that Esteem and Deference we desire shou’d be paid us. Whence come those sharp Reflections, those imagin’d strains of Wit, not to be endur’d amongst Christians, and which serve not to Convince but to Provoke, whence come they but from Ill-nature or Revenge, from a Contempt of others and a desire to set forth our own Wit? Did we write less for our selves we should sooner gain our Readers, who are many times disgusted at a well writ Discourse if it carries a tang of Ostentation: And were our Temper as Christian as it ought to be, our Zeal wou’d be spent on the most Weighty things, not on little differences of Opinions.

I have made no distinction in what has been said between Speaking and Writing, because tho they are talents which do not always meet, yet there is no material difference between ’em. They Write best perhaps who do’t with the gentile and easy air of Conversation; and they Talk best who mingle Solidity of Thought with th’ agreableness of a ready Wit. As for Pronunciation, tho it takes more with some Auditors many times than Good Sense, there needs little be said of it here, since Women have no business with the Pulpit, the Bar or St. Stephens Chappel: And Nature does for the most part furnish ’em with such a Musical Tone, Perswasive Air and winning Address as renders their Discourse sufficiently agreeable in Private Conversation. And as to spelling which they’re said to be defective in, if they don’t believe as they’re usually told, that it’s fit for ’em to be so, and that to write exactly is too Pedantic, they may soon correct that fault, by Pronouncing their words aright and Spelling ’em accordingly. I know this Rule won’t always hold because of an Imperfection in our Language which has been oft complain’d of but is not yet amended; But in this case a little Observation or recourse to Books will assist us; and if at any time we happen to mistake by Spelling as we Pronounce, the fault will be very Venial, and Custom rather to blame than we.

I’ve said nothing of Grammar tho we can’t Write properly if we transgress its Rules, supposing that Custom and the reading of English Books are sufficient to teach us the Grammar of our own Tongue, If we do but in any measure attend to them. And tho Women are generally accus’d of Writing false English, if I may speak my own Experience, their Mistakes are not so common as is pretended, nor are they the only Persons guilty. What they most commonly fail in is the Particles and Connexion, and that generally thro a Briskness of temper which make them forget, or Hast which will not suffer ’em to read over again what went before. And indeed, those who Speak true Grammar unless they ’re very Careless cannot write false, since they need only peruse what they’ve Writ, and consider whether they wou’d express ’emselves thus in Conversation.

Art of speaking.

But for this and for Figures, &c. and indeed for all that relates to this Subject, I must refer you to an Ingenious Treatise which handles it fully, and to which I’me oblig’d in great measure for what little skill I have. Observing only, that whatever it is we Treat of, our Stile shou’d be such as may keep our Readers Attent, and induce them to go to the End. Now Attention is usually fixt by Admiration, which is excited by somewhat uncommon either in the Thought or way of Expression. We fall a sleep over an Author who tells us in an ordinary manner no more than we knew before: He who wou’d Take must be Sublime in his Sense, and must cloath it after a Noble way. His Thoughts must not be superficial, such as every one may fall into at the first glance, but the very Spirits and Essence of Thinking, the sum of many hours Meditation folded up in one handsome and comprehensive Period, whose Language is Intelligible and Easy that the Readers may not lose the pleasure of the Kernel, by the pain they find in cracking the Shell. The most difficult Subject must be made easy by his way of handling it; tho his Matter may deserve a Meditation, yet his Expressions must be so Clear that he needs not be read twice to be Understood; these are to be Natural and Familiar, condiscending to the meanest Capacity, whilst his Thoughts are Great enough to entertain the highest. He Discourses always on a Useful Subject in a manner agreeable to it, and pleases that he may Instruct; Nothing seems Studied in his whole Composition, yet every thing is Extraordinary, a Beautiful Harmony shining thro all its parts. No Sentence is Doubtful, no word Equivocal, his Arguments are Clear and his Images Lively; all the Ideas he excites in your Mind, as nearly resemble the thing they represent as Words can make them. Whilst th’ exactness of his Method, and Force of his Reason Enlighten and Convince the Mind; the Vivacity of his Imagination and insinuating Address, gain the Affections and Conquer the Will. By the weight and closeness of the former you wou’d take him for an Angel, and the tender and affable sweetness of the last bespeaks him a Friend. He considers that as mere Florish and Rhetorick are good for nothing, so neither will bare Reason dull and heavily express’d perform any great matter, at least not on those who need it most, whose Palates being deprav’d their Medicines must be administred in a pleasing Vehicle. Since Mankind are averse to their Real Happiness, he does not only tell ’em their Duty but Interesses them in it; and thinking it not enough to run ’em down with the strength of Reason, he draws ’em over to a Voluntary Submission by th’ attractives of his Eloquence. For he has a peculiar Turn and Air which animates every Period, so that the very same Truth which was dry and Unaffecting in a vulgar Authors words, Charms and Subdues you when cloath’d in his. He shews no more warmth than may convince his Readers that he’s heartily persuaded of the Truths he offers them; and if it is necessary at any time to make use of Figures to give a more Lively Representation than plain Expressions cou’d, to discribe his own Passions and excite the same in others upon a just occasion, in a word to awaken a Stupid and Clear the Mind of a Prejudic’d Reader, his Figures are duly chosen and discreetly us’d. For he knows that scarce any thing speaks a greater want of Judgment than the shewing concern where there needs none, or is a worse fault in Oratory than the polishing a Wrong or a Trifling Thought, the neatness of whose dress may strike with Admiration perhaps at first sight, but upon a review it will certainly appear Contemptible. And therefore as he does not abound in Superfluous Ornaments, so neither does he reject any thing that can promote his End, which is not his own Reputation, but the Glory of his GOD and his Neighbours Edification. He considers the narrowness of the Humane Mind, and says all that is necessary but no more; Understands it so well as to know what will move and Please, and has so much command of himself as to give over when he has done enough. Yet he can exhaust the most fruitful Subject without making the Reader weary; for when he enlarges it is in Things not Words, and he mingles Variety without Confusion. All the divers excellencies of different Stiles meet in his to make up a perfect one, Strength and Ease, Solidity and Liveliness, the Sublime and the Plain. He’s neither so Lofty as to fly out of Sight, nor so humble as to become Creeping and Contemptible. His Strength does not make him Rugged and Perplext nor his Smoothness Weak and Nice; tho every thing is Neat, there’s not a grain of Affectation; he is gratefull to the Ear, but far remov’d from jingling Cadence. Brief when there is occasion without Dryness or Obscurity, and Florid enough to entertain th’ Imagination without Distracting the Mind. There’s not an Antiquated or Barbarous Word to be found in him, all is Decent, Just and Natural; no peculiar or Affected Phrases, whether Courtly or Clownish, Grave or Burlesque. For Plain and Significant Language is ever best, we have a mistaken Idea of Learning if we think to pretend to’t by sending our Reader every minute to the Dictionary. Words out of the common way are only allowable when they express our Sense with greater Force than Ordinary ones cou’d, or when they are so significant as to ease us of Circumlocutions, a hard word which I cou’d not avoid without using half a dozen words.

After all, it may not be amiss to take notice that Ornaments are common to Falshood and Truth, but Clearness and strength of Reasoning are not. They who wou’d propagate Error usually disguise it in Equivocal Terms and Obscure Phrases; they strive to engage our Passions, rather than to Convince our Reason, and carry us away in the torrent of a warm Imagination. They endeavour to refute, or if they can’t do that, to Ridicule the contrary opinion, and think this Sufficient to establish their own. Being much better skill’d in pulling down former Systems than in building new ones, for it requires no great skill to Object, and there are many Truths which we’re very Certain of, and yet not able to answer every Impertinent Enquiry concerning ’em. Their greatest Art is in confounding things, in giving a probable Air to what they write, in pretending to Demonstration where the nature of the Truth does not require’t, and in evading it where it does. An Immoral or Heretical Discourse therefore may be Cunningly but not well writ, for we can never plead for Error and Vice with true Eloquence. We may trick’em up in a handsom Garb, adorn’em with quaint Expressions, and give them such a plausible turn as may enable them to do very much Mischief; but this is only a fulsom Carcass, the substance and Life are not there if Vertue and Truth are wanting.

§. VI. For it is to little purpose to Think well and speak well, unless we Live well, this is our Great Affair and truest Excellency, the other are no further to be regarded than as they may assist us in this. She who does not draw this Inference from her Studies has Thought in vain, her notions are Erroneous and Mistaken. And all her Eloquence is but an empty noise, who employs it in any other design than in gaining Proselytes to Heaven. I am therefore far from designing to put Women on a vain pursuit after unnecessary and useless Learning, nor wou’d by any means persuade them to endeavour after Knowledge cou’d I be convinc’d that it is improper for ’em. Because I know very well that tho a thing be never so excellent in it self, it has but an ill grace if it be not suitable to the Person and Condition it is apply’d to. Fine Cloaths and Equipage do not become a Beggar, and a Mechanic who must work for daily bread for his Family, wou’d be wickedly Employ’d shou’d he suffer ’em to starve whilest he’s solving Mathematical Problems. If therefore Women have another Duty incumbent on ’em, and such as is inconsistent with what we here advise, we do ill to take them from it: But to affirm this is to beg the Question, and is what I will never grant till it be better prov’d than as yet it appears to be. For if the Grand Business that Women as well as Men have to do in this World be to prepare for the next, ought not all their Care and Industry to Centre here? and since the matter is of Infinite Consequence is it equitable to deny ’em the use of any help? If therefore Knowledge were but any ways Instrumental, tho at the remotest distance, to the Salvation of our Souls, it were fit to apply our selves to it; and how much more when it is so necessary, that without it we can’t do any thing that’s Excellent, or Practise Vertue in the most Perfect manner. For unless we Understand our Duty and the Principles of Religion, we don’t perform a Rational Service, it is but by Chance that we are Good or so much as Christians. We are their Property into whose hands we fall, and are led by those who with greatest Confidence impose their Opinions on us; Are as moveable as the different Circumstances that befall us; or if we happen to be Constant in our first way, it is not Reason but Obstinacy that makes us so. A great deal of Good will be omitted, and very much Evil, or Imperfection at least, stick to us, if we are not throughly acquainted with the Law of God and the secret springs and windings of our Hearts, which is scarce to be obtain’d without much Meditation and the helps that study affords.

And as when a rash young Traveller is about to run into dangerous places beset with Thieves and full of Precipices, if you have any hearty concern for his safety, you’l not think it enough barely to shew him his way, or even to tell him of the Danger, especially if the entrance seems fair and inviting and treacherous Companions are upon the watch to decoy him into it: But you’l expose it in all its frightful Circumstances, endeavour to quicken his vigilance and excite his Passions, and all little enough for his Security. So it cannot be thought sufficient that Women shou’d but just know whats Commanded and what Forbid, without being inform’d of the Reasons why, since this is not like to secure them in their Duty. For we find a Natural Liberty within us which checks at an Injunction that has nothing but Authority to back it; And tho Religion is indeed supported by the Strongest Reasons, and inforc’d by the most powerful Motives, yet if we are not acquainted with ’em, ’tis all one to us as if it were not. But having spoke of this in the first part we shall not farther enlarge on it here.

Perhaps it will be objected that we’ve said the great Truths of Religion carry a force and Evidence suited to the very Vulgar, and that GOD has not design’d All for Philosophers. And therefore if the way to the most necessary Knowlege be so very plain, and all Capacities are not fitted for higher attainments, what needs this ado about th’ Improvement of our minds? the only thing necessary is to be good Christians, and we may be that without being Philosophers. Suppose we may: This will Justify such as want Time and Capacity, but can never excuse the Sloth and Stupidity of those who have both.

For unless we have very strange Notions of the Divine Wisdom we must needs allow that every one is placed in such a Station as they are fitted for. And if the necessity of the world requires that some Persons shou’d Labour for others, it likewise requires that others shou’d Think for them. Our Powers and Faculties were not given us for nothing, and the only advantage one Woman has above another, is the being allotted to the more noble employment. No body is plac’d without their own fault, in such unhappy Circumstances as to be incapable of Salvation, but some are plac’d in such happy ones as to be capable of attaining much greater degrees of Happiness than others if they do not neglect them: And shou’d these last do no more than the very utmost that is expected from the former, I know not how they wou’d acquit themselves, or what account they cou’d give of their great Advantages. And therefore tho no body shall be condemn’d because they Cou’d not, yet we have reason to fear if our Case be such as that we Might but Wou’d not receive Instruction. She then who makes this Objection must not take it amiss if we Judge of her in other Cases according to what she Pleads in this: She must never set up for a Wit, or a censurer of her Neighbours, must not pretend to be a fine Lady or any thing extraordinary: but be content to herd amongst the Drudges of the World who eat Their Bread in the Sweat of their Brows, if she says she wants Leisure; or in a less acceptable rank amongst the Fools and Ideots, or but one degree above them, if she says she wants Capacity for this Employment. It is one thing to be content with Ignorance, or rather with a less degree of Knowledge, on account of the Station that GOD has plac’d us in, and Another to Chuse and Delight in’t thro a Stupid Carelesness, a fear of Trouble, or an Inordinate pursuit of the Cares and Pleasures of this Mortal Life. This last only shews our Disesteem of our Souls, our Contempt of GOD and the Talents he has given us, and exposes us to all the dreadful consequences of such a neglect; to Punishments to which not only those who misemploy their Lord’s Talent, but even they who don’t employ it at all, are Obnoxious.

And indeed as unnecessary as it is thought for Women to have Knowledge, she who is truly good finds very great use of it, not only in the Conduct of her own Soul but in the management of her Family, in the Conversation of her Neighbours and in all the Concerns of Life. Education of Children is a most necessary Employment, perhaps the chief of those who have any; But it is as Difficult as it is Excellent when well perform’d; and I question not but that the mistakes which are made in it, are a principal Cause of that Folly and Vice, which is so much complain’d of and so little mended. Now this, at least the foundation of it, on which in a great measure the success of all depends, shou’d be laid by the Mother, for Fathers find other Business, they will not be confin’d to such a laborious work, they have not such opportunities of observing a Childs Temper, nor are the greatest part of ’em like to do much good, since Precepts contradicted by Example seldom prove effectual. Neither are Strangers so proper for it, because hardly any thing besides Paternal Affection can sufficiently quicken the Care of performing, and sweeten the labour of such a task. But Tenderness alone will never discharge it well, she who wou’d do it to purpose must throughly understand Human nature, know how to manage different Tempers Prudently, be Mistress of her own, and able to bear with all the little humours and follies of Youth, neither Severity nor Lenity are to be always us’d, it wou’d ruin some to be treated in that manner which is fit for others. As Mildness makes some ungovernable, and as there is a stupor in many from which nothing but Terrors can rouse them, so sharp Reproofs and Solemn Lectures serve to no purpose but to harden others, in faults from which they might be won by an agreeable Address and tender application. GOD himself waits to be gracious and administers his Medicines in the most proper season, and Parents shou’d imitate him in this, for the want of observing it, and of accommodating their Methods to the several Dispositions they have to deal with, is perhaps the reason that many Pious Persons lose the fruit of their Pains and Care.

Nor will Knowledge lie dead upon their hands who have no Children to Instruct; the whole World is a single Ladys Family, her opportunities of doing good are not lessen’d but encreas’d by her being unconfin’d. Particular Obligations do not contract her Mind, but her Beneficence moves in the largest Sphere. And perhaps the Glory of Reforming this Prophane and Profligate Age is reserv’d for you Ladies, and that the natural and unprejudic’d Sentiments of your Minds being handsomly express’d, may carry a more strong conviction than the Elaborate Arguments of the Learned. Such as fence themselves against the Cannon they bring down, may lie open to an Ambuscade from you. And whilst the strong arguings of the Schools like the Wind in the Fable, seems but to harden these Sturdy Sinners, your Persuasions like the Suns mild and powerful rays, may oblige them to cast off that Cloak of Maliciousness in which they are so much intangled. And surely it is worth your while to fit your selves for this: ’Tis a Godlike thing to relieve even the Temporal wants of our Fellow Creatures, to keep a Body from perishing, but it is much more Divine, to Save a Soul from Death! A Soul which in his estimate who best knows the value of it, is worth more than all the World. They who are thus wise shall shine as the brightness of the Firmament, and they who turn many to Righteousness as the Stars for ever; which is a Glory we may honestly Contend for, a Beauty we may lawfully Covet; O that we had but Ambition enough to aspire after it! O that we had but so much at least as we see daily thrown away on a poor transitory Earthly Diadem, which sets uneasy on his head who wears it, and which a longer arm may wrest from his Brows! But alas it was in our fore-fathers days that the Kingdom of Heav’n was took by violence; they thought nothing, and we think every thing too much to Do or Suffer to obtain it! Not but that it is still as bright and glorious, as truly attractive, but we are dull and stupid we shut our eyes and won’t behold its Charms. Were we but duly sensible of this we shou’d think no Posterity so desireable as the Offspring of our Minds, nor any state so great as the carrying a large Train of Followers with us to the Court of Heaven! So much Knowledge therefore as is necessary to engage and keep us firm in our Christian Course, to fit us to help others in theirs, to stir us up to pursue, and direct us in our endeavours after one of the brightest Crowns of Glory, does very well become us; and more than this I do not contend for, being far from desiring that any one shou’d neglect her Necessary Affairs to amuse her self with nice Speculations. No; She who has a Family is discharging part of her Christian Calling whilst She’s taking care for its Support and Government, and wou’d be very much out, if she lock’d her self in her Study, when her Domesticks had need of her direction. But there are few of those to whom I write, who have not a good deal of time to spare, if you reckon whats thrown away on fantastic Impertinencies, and ’tis this I wou’d have better employ’d: Were not a Morning more advantageously spent at a Book than at a Looking-Glass, and an Evening in Meditation than in Gaming? Were not Pertinent and Ingenious Discourse more becoming in a visit, than Idle twattle and uncharitable Remarks? than a Nauseous repetition of a set of fine words which no body believes or cares for? And is not the fitting our selves to do Real Services to our Neighbours, a better expression of our Civility than the formal performance of a thousand ridiculous Ceremonies, which every one condemns and yet none has the Courage to break thro?

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