Appendix H to Part III—Korea

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA AND PROPOSED MILITARY AID

Military Situation

In September, 1945, United States Army Forces, pursuant to instructions contained in General Order Number 1 of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, occupied Korea south of the 38° North parallel and accepted the surrender of Japanese troops south of that line. This arbitrary line of demarcation between the United States and Soviet Union occupation areas rapidly became a complete barrier to free movement between agricultural South Korea and the more industrialized North Korea. Numerous disputes and incidents, mostly political or economic, continue to take place even after two years of occupation.

The Commander in Chief, Far East, has delegated military responsibility and authority for occupation of South Korea to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the XXIV Corps. This Corps of two divisions totals 41,000 United States troops and constitutes the American Occupational Force in Korea.

There are no South Korean Armed Forces to augment these American occupational troops. There are, however, three authorized Korean uniformed elements or quasi-military forces: the National Police with a strength of 28,000, the Constabulary with 16,000, and the Korean Coast Guard with 3,000. These forces may be expected to remain loyal to the United States Military Government in the event of emergency. The National Police Force is the agency for enforcing law and order in Korea and is organized into district and subdistrict headquarters with police stations in principal towns and villages.

The Constabulary is similar in purpose to the National Guard of the United States in that it is used to back up the police in event of major disorders. At present, the Constabulary is also being utilized to augment American guards on United States Army installations. It is armed with captured Japanese rifles and small arms, and its efficiency is low by American standards.

North of the 38° North parallel, the estimated Soviet troop strength in Korea is approximately 45,000. These forces are organized into two major units, the 40th Rifle Division and the 19th Mechanized Division, plus complementary air, naval, and service support. There is evidence of further Soviet withdrawal now underway. An accurate figure denoting the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean People’s (Communist) Army in its overall structure has not yet been obtained but the figure of 125,000 troops has been generally accepted. These forces assist Soviets in control of the border, maintain liaison with Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and constitute a potential military threat to South Korea.

Current political and economic unrest in Southern Korea is aggravated by Communistic terrorism, and by Communist-inspired riots and revolutionary activities in the occupied area. Such disorders impose additional military burdens on the police, the constabulary, and the American Occupation Forces. In addition, there is a possibility, however remote, of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea by troops of the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army. Recent reports from Manchuria indicate that sizable elements of Korean troops are operating with Chinese Communists, possibly to acquire battle conditioning. Furthermore there is evidence that Soviet officers and equipment are being used to groom the Korean Army.

Although it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets or their North Korean satellites would invade South Korea in the near future, infiltration of Communists and of large numbers of the North Korean Army, in connection with large-scale Communist-inspired or abetted riots or revolts in the South, is always a dangerous threat. Should this occur, the forces available should be adequate for maintaining order under any circumstances except for an outright Soviet directed or controlled invasion.

Strategic Importance

The political, social, economic, and military situations in South Korea are inextricably mingled. A Soviet-dominated Korea would constitute a serious political and psychological threat to Manchuria, North China, the Ryukyus, and Japan, and hence to United States strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore in the best interest of the United States to ensure the permanent military neutralization of Korea. Neutralization can only be assured by its occupation until its future independence as a buffer state is assured.

So long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of North Korea, the United States must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the world an “ideological retreat.” The military standing of the United States would decline accordingly; not only throughout the Far East, but throughout the world. Withdrawal of United States Occupation Forces from Korea would result in a growing unrest among the Japanese people because of their uncertainty regarding future United States policy in the Far East, and their consequent fears of expanding Soviet influence. This might well increase occupational requirements for Japan.

Except as indicated above, and the fact that its occupation denies a potential enemy the use of warm-water ports and the opportunity to establish strong air and naval bases in the peninsula, the United States has little military interest in maintaining troops or bases in Korea. In the event of major hostilities in the Far East, present forces in Korea would most likely be a military liability as they could not be maintained there within our present military capabilities.

There are three possible courses of action with reference to United States Occupation Forces in Korea:

They may be withdrawn immediately, which would abandon South Korea to the Soviet Union through pressures which could be exerted by the North Korea People’s (Communist) Army and is therefore an unacceptable course from the strategic viewpoint.

They may remain in occupation indefinitely, which course would be unacceptable to the American public after Soviet withdrawal, and would subject United States to international censure.

They may be withdrawn concurrently with Soviet occupation forces.

Soviet forces in Northern Korea will not be withdrawn until the North Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops. One of these Soviet objectives will undoubtedly be to obtain control of South Korea by utilization of Communist Korean armed forces as a means of pressure after withdrawal of United States forces, as was done in the cases of Poland, Outer Mongolia, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

There appears to be a strong possibility that Soviet Russia will withdraw its occupational forces when such conditions are favorable and thus induce our own withdrawal.

Military Aid to Korea

The Military Government in Korea, which is currently being turned over to American and Korean civilians, is the only government in South Korea. The immediate and primary objectives of the American Military Commander in Korea are to maintain law and order in the face of subversive uprisings in the American zone, to care for and safeguard American noncombatants and property, and to operate a military government which looks toward the future political independence of Korea together with its economic and social rehabilitation. In view of these objectives, the immediate purpose of any American military aid to Korea should be to facilitate their realization.

The long-term purpose of military aid to Korea should be to enable South Korea, and later all Korea, to engage in a holding operation against the progressive expansion of militaristic Communism. Minimum military aid to Southern Korea therefore should envisage the support of the uniformed elements of Korean military and quasi-military forces through the furnishing of United States equipment including carbines and some light machine guns as well as furnishing vehicles, telephone and radio communications, etc., and training advice.

Consideration was given by the Mission to the organization, training, and equipping of a strong Korean military force along the lines of the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the control of the United States Military Commander, initially should be officered throughout by Americans, but with a program for replacement and understudy by Korean officers, and should be of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the north. Such a force will become truly effective only if the United States Commander in Korea is given clear-cut authority to establish and control it.

Because of its occupation by two nations of radically differing ideologies and policies, and the corresponding separation into two parts economically, there is little that Korea, even as a liberated nation, can do to improve its situation. South Korea lacks the experience and industrial potential to create or support its own armed forces.

An American organized and equipped Korean military force would serve to counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army when the American and the Soviet forces are withdrawn from Korea. It might possibly preclude the forceful establishment of a Communist Government, and thus contribute to a situation favorable for the establishment of a free and independent Korea.

Conclusions

United States-Soviet Union troop strengths in South and North Korea are approximately equal but the Soviets, assisted by a Soviet-controlled, equipped, and trained North Korean People’s (Communist) Army of 125,000 men, and geographically supported by a contiguous Soviet Siberia, are in an infinitely stronger military position.

There is considerable unrest in South Korea but forces available to General Hodge are adequate to cope with it and to maintain order, though completely inadequate, even with maximum assistance from General MacArthur, to meet Soviet-controlled invasion of North Korean forces.

A United States withdrawal which permitted the Soviet Union to dominate Korea would result in a serious political and psychological threat to China, including Manchuria, and Japan.

The United States has a strong strategic interest in insuring permanent military neutralization of Korea and its denial as a base to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces just as soon as they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created will be strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

United States withdrawal from Korea be based upon agreements with the Soviet Union to effect proportional withdrawals, with as many guarantees as possible to safeguard Korean freedom and independence.

Military aid be furnished to South Korea which would support the achievement of such adequate safeguards and which would envisage:

Continuing to furnish arms and equipment to Korean National

Police and Korean Coast Guard.

The creation of an American-officered Korean Scout Force to replace the present Constabulary of sufficient strength to cope with the threat from the North.

Continued interim occupation by United States Army forces in Korea.

Advice in training of technical specialists and tactical units.

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Index