PICTURES NOT PLACED.
PENSIONARY JOHN DE WITT.
Black velvet gown. Long hair.
ADMIRAL CORNELIUS DE WITT.
Leather jerkin. Own hair. Holds a truncheon. One arm akimbo.
JOHN DE WITT was born at Dort in 1625. He was educated in the Latin School of Dort, was at Leyden for four years with his brother Cornelius, two years older than himself, travelled with him in France and England, and in 1648 went to study law and mathematics at the Hague.
It may be as well to begin by briefly depicting the political situation of the Dutch Provinces at this period.
They had for some time been divided into two parties. One was headed by the Prince of Orange, composed of the old nobility and of the lower orders both in town and country, and supported by the bulk of the clergy. The other consisted mainly of the higher classes in the large towns. The differences between the two parties were numerous, but may chiefly be described as having reference to War, Trade, and Religion. The House of Orange, by the line it had taken at a critical moment against Philip II., by the indomitable constancy of its Princes, and by their vast political and military talents, had been the principal instrument of the liberation of the Netherlands from the dominion of Spain; but their enemies accused them of continuing the war for the sake of their own aggrandisement much longer than was necessary, and of thus squandering the resources and weakening the energies of the State. They complained of the heavy burdens laid upon commerce, and of the losses sustained by the mercantile interest, owing to the insecure condition of the seas. As to religion, the wealthier burgesses belonged for the most part to the Arminian, or what we may perhaps call the Broad Church party, and were ardently in favour of toleration, while their opponents leaned strongly for support upon the rigid and persecuting Calvinists. In addition to the causes of disagreement which I have mentioned, was the conflict between the authority of the Union, on the one hand, and, on the other, the individual rights of each particular Province. These provincial rights were more especially insisted upon by those who opposed the House of Orange in the Province of Holland itself, for they complained that though Holland paid more towards sustaining the public burdens than all the other Provinces put together, she was constantly outvoted and overruled on the most important subjects of public policy.
This is as full an account as our limits will permit of the subjects of dispute between the party of the House of Orange and the Opposition. The Opposition, we must bear in mind, derived its chief strength from the rich merchants and the magistrates of the large towns. These magistrates were elected by close corporations, and were chosen in each town, generation after generation, from a small number of select families. It was to one of the most considerable of these families in the town of Dort that John de Witt belonged; he had thus the advantages and the disadvantages of having his political party already decided for him by the accident of his birth, and the less doubtful good fortune of finding an open access to public life.
It was while De Witt was studying at the Hague that the struggle between the two parties in the State was brought to a crisis. Peace had at last been made with Spain; but it was expected that the young Prince of Orange, William II., who had just succeeded to his father, would soon break it. Fearing this, the Provincial Government of Holland, which was in the hands of the burgess oligarchy, refused to pay its share of the expenses of the troops, and directed certain numbers to be disbanded. The Prince obtained an order from the States-General of the United Provinces to go with a deputation to the different towns of Holland and forbid the local authorities from obeying the directions of the Provincial Government. At Dort, which was the first place he visited, he was thwarted by Jacob de Witt, John’s father, ex-burgomaster, and one of the principal men in the town. On returning to the Hague, he summoned Jacob de Witt and five or six others of the leading deputies, and put them in prison. Meanwhile, he attempted to seize Amsterdam. The attempt failed; but the municipality of that city, in order to avert a civil war, agreed to abandon all further opposition to the Prince, who was now all-powerful; but at the moment of his triumph he fell ill of the small-pox and died. His only son was not born till a week afterwards.
The rich middle-class oligarchical party now found itself raised by fortune from complete prostration to the supreme direction of affairs. Whether they could maintain their position might well have been doubted. They had many difficulties to contend with; they had against them the large circle of personal adherents of the House of Orange, all the distinguished soldiers, many of the distinguished admirals, the ancient nobility, and the mass of the common people. They were few in number, and none of them had yet shown any particular ability. It is in circumstances like these that the appearance of a remarkable man affects the current of history. Such a man appeared at this moment in John de Witt, who had just received his first official appointment as Pensionary of Dort. Born, as we have seen, in the very centre of the faction which was now dominant, he obtained at once, and without an effort, their full confidence. On the other hand, his just and impartial nature, conspicuous from the very first, the consummate ability which he gradually developed, and, above all, his commanding resolution, raised and sustained the weak party to which he belonged. His influence extended far beyond its narrow circle, and his name is associated with one of the most prosperous times in the history of his country.
It was not, however, for some years that De Witt filled more than a subordinate position. Meanwhile the new Government proved itself both feeble and unfortunate. It was compelled by the fundamental principles of the party to push provincial independence to an extreme that almost disintegrated the Union. The office of Captain-General, which had largely contributed towards holding the Union together, was abolished, for it would assuredly have fallen into the hands of the House of Orange. The provincial office of Stadtholder remained vacant for the same reason. Business had never been rapidly conducted by the Dutch; but now it could hardly be conducted at all. The first result of this state of things was drifting into a war with England, against the wishes and interests of both nations, particularly of the Dutch. Nor was the war carried on in a manner creditable to the authorities at home. The ships were ill-fitted and ill-provisioned, the instructions were confused, and nothing but the genius and conduct of the admirals, Van Tromp and De Ruyter, saved the country from overwhelming calamities. In spite of the most desperate fighting that ever took place at sea, and of some brilliant victories by the Dutch, they were overmatched, blockaded, and very nearly reduced to starvation. The ablest men in the country had for some time seen the folly of the war and the necessity for putting an end to it. But the breakdown in the machinery of government, which made it difficult to carry on the war with vigour, made it almost impossible to conclude a peace. It was now that De Witt, appointed Grand-Pensionary of Holland, began to play a leading part. On the one hand, he commenced building a new fleet of larger and better ships; on the other, he started negotiations with Cromwell, at this time Lord Protector of England. The difficulties in his way, both in prosecuting the war and in making peace, were almost inconceivable. He had no actual power in his hands; nothing but moral influence. Every measure had to be debated in each of the Assemblies of the Seven Provinces. It was then brought before the States-General, whose members had no authority to decide any new point without referring it back to their constituents; even when the States-General had come to a decision, there was no means of binding the dissentient minority. It is an under-statement of the case to say that no diplomacy ever exercised throughout Europe by Cardinal Richelieu, by William III. of England, by Metternich, or by Talleyrand, was vaster or more intricate than that required by De Witt to bring about the end he had in view. His difficulties were the greater that the bulk of the nation thoroughly detested the new Government. The Orange party among the lower classes were almost as violent now as they became later in 1672, and De Witt went about in danger of his life. At last, by incredible exertion and dogged resolution, joined with admirable tact and temper, by impenetrable secrecy, and, it must be confessed, by a certain amount of duplicity, he attained his objects. The new fleet was begun, and shortly afterwards peace was concluded on better terms than might have been expected.
Still greater duplicity was shown in carrying out a secret agreement whereby the State of Holland bound itself to exclude for ever any members of the House of Orange from the office of Stadtholder. Was this really forced upon De Witt by Cromwell? Was his own judgment warped by prejudice? Or was it one of those sacrifices to the passions of a party, which, in a time of excitement, are occasionally demanded even from the most upright Minister? It was accomplished in a most discreditable manner; the storm it raised when it became known shook the Seven Provinces to their very foundation. Its immediate effect, when that storm subsided, was to confirm the power of the class which held the reins of Government; but the measure was pregnant with future mischief.
By the tact and tenacity shown in these proceedings, De Witt had raised himself to so high a position that he never again had quite the same herculean labours to go through in carrying out his measures; but, in order to judge his abilities fairly, we must always remember that on every occasion when it was necessary to act, obstacles somewhat of a similar nature had to be overcome.
A cordial understanding with England lasted till the Restoration in 1660, far more cordial, indeed, than with France.
Up to this time, almost from the commencement of its existence, it had been the policy of the Dutch Republic to maintain an alliance with France. But the French had come to consider this alliance so necessary to the Republic that they had felt themselves able to treat their allies in a most supercilious manner. Their armed ships had for some time been in the habit of seizing and plundering Dutch merchantmen. It had been impossible to obtain redress till, in 1657, Admiral de Ruyter had orders from his Government to make reprisals, and took two of the King’s ships. A French envoy was sent to demand satisfaction. A rupture seemed imminent, but matters were smoothed over, and the United Provinces came out of the difficulty without loss of credit.
In the meantime much alarm had been created in Holland by the ambition of Charles Gustavus of Sweden, who had engaged in a successful war with Poland, and afterwards attacked Denmark. Denmark was in alliance with the United Provinces, and, moreover, it was necessary for the trade of Holland in the Baltic, which was very considerable, that the balance of power in the North should be preserved. After many negotiations, and an abortive attempt to make a treaty with Sweden, the Dutch assisted Denmark with a powerful fleet and a small body of troops. They had an obstinate naval engagement, by which Copenhagen was saved, and in the following year they destroyed some of the largest of the Swedish men-of-war, which they succeeded in surprising and outnumbering. Charles Gustavus died suddenly, and peace was soon afterwards made.
A desultory war had all this time been going on with Portugal, in order to obtain compensation for losses sustained by the Dutch in Brazil, which does not come within our limits to describe. This war was chiefly carried on in the East Indies, where the Dutch conquered the rich island of Ceylon. Peace was finally made with Portugal in 1661, Portugal paying a heavy indemnity for the Brazil losses.
In all these matters De Witt had become more and more the principal mover. As to home affairs, his reputation, and the power which was derived from it, were not confined to his own province of Holland, for we find him about this period chosen by the nobility, first of Friesland, and then of Overyssel, to settle their internal disputes.
The office of Grand-Pensionary was a five years’ appointment. It had been renewed to De Witt in 1658, and in 1663 it had become such a matter of course that he should fill it, that even his opponents gave a tacit consent to his remaining. Having proved himself necessary, it was impossible that he should not continue to hold the most honourable place in the Government. Not that his place as Grand-Pensionary gave him any real power. I have already remarked, and it is important to bear in mind, that by the strange system now prevailing, no official whatever possessed more than a moral influence. Whenever anything of importance was to be done, some person was appointed for that particular purpose, and this person was now almost always either De Witt or his brother, generally the former. For instance, there was at this time a dispute between the Prince of East Friesland and his subjects, which threatened to be serious. John de Witt was at once appointed to go at the head of a deputation to mediate between the contending parties. I need hardly add that his mediation was at once successful; and there was soon to be a still greater scope for the display of his abilities, as a war with England was impending.
Charles II. was now on the throne of England, and there was a natural antagonism between him, as uncle to the Prince of Orange, and the party which now governed Holland. Besides this, the English nation had always been jealous of the commercial prosperity of the Dutch, and they had not yet become sufficiently aware of the extent to which the power of France was increasing, or the necessity for a Dutch alliance in order to check it.
We cannot be surprised, therefore, that this war should have broken out; it began on the coast of Africa, and soon became general. De Witt was, of course, at once appointed Chief Commissioner for the direction of the navy, and by his personal exertions at Amsterdam and other places he succeeded in fitting out a considerable fleet, very differently equipped and provisioned to what had been the case in the war with Cromwell. This fleet, however, under the command of Opdam, engaged the English in the beginning of June 1665, and suffered a tremendous and most disastrous defeat. Opdam was killed, and the other admirals were at daggers drawn with each other. Such was the general confusion and discouragement, and such the general instinct to turn to De Witt in any great emergency, that though he had never yet had any military or naval experience whatever, the chief command was at once thrust upon him. He knew well how invidious his position would be, and it was in spite of the earnest persuasion of his personal friends to the contrary, that, at the call of duty, he accepted the office.
The fleet had been driven into the Texel, and was shut in there by a contrary wind. To Holland, who depended for her very existence upon supplies from abroad, and whose East Indian ships at this very moment required protection for their safe passage, it was absolutely necessary that the fleet should at once put to sea. But the seamen unanimously represented that as the wind then stood this was impossible. De Witt, though no sailor, was a great mathematician. He had read deeply and written ably on the subject, and he was now to put his knowledge to practical use. He proved by calculation that it was just possible, even with this adverse wind, to sail out by one passage, then called the Spaniards’ Gat. The pilots now declared that in the Spaniards’ Gat there was not more than ten feet of water, and that this was not sufficient. De Witt took a boat, personally sounded it, and found everywhere a depth of at least twenty feet. He himself superintended the carrying out of the largest ship in the fleet, and was followed by all the rest.
He now had to exercise his diplomatic abilities in order to reconcile the two admirals under his command—De Ruyter and the younger Van Tromp. He succeeded in smoothing down their mutual animosities, and in attaching them both personally to himself. But the sailors still grumbled, not unnaturally, at being commanded by an unknown and inexperienced landsman, and it was not till a violent storm arose that he had an opportunity of winning their esteem. For two days and two nights, without food and without rest, he remained on deck, infusing courage into others, as only a really brave man can do, working himself, and, what seems to have been unusual, forcing his officers also by his example to work with their own hands. He gradually became the idol of the men, showing particular concern for their comfort and welfare, while, at the same time, by his tact and good management, he avoided giving any offence to the officers.
This expedition, however, does not seem on the whole to have been very successful, probably on account of the roughness of the weather. On his return he found the people violently irritated by false reports of the intermeddling of himself and the other deputies whom he had taken with him. He was particularly supposed to have thwarted De Ruyter, but, unfortunately for his enemies, De Ruyter happened at this time to come to the Hague, and to choose for his lodgings the house of the very man who was reported to have behaved so ill. De Ruyter wrote a letter to the States, not only vindicating, but warmly praising him. De Witt also wrote an elaborate account of all his proceedings; the tide of opinion changed. He received an enthusiastic vote of thanks, and the offer of a large present, which he declined.
De Witt only left the fleet in order to plunge deep into the tangled thicket of negotiation. Louis XIV. was indeed nominally an ally, but he was very slack and very procrastinating; delighted to see his two neighbours tearing each other to pieces, and not anxious to help the Dutch more than he was obliged. Denmark was making perfidious overtures, first to England, and then to Holland. De Witt eventually succeeded in forming an alliance with her, and also with Brandenburg, but for a long time she required watching with constant attention. Meanwhile Charles II. had induced the Bishop of Münster to invade the United Provinces with 8000 men. The Bishop proved to be a bad general, was threatened by Brandenburg in his rear, and was induced by De Witt to leave the country before he had done much harm. But Holland had received a warning to which she ought to have attended. The army was evidently no longer the same as in the old days of Maurice and Frederick Henry. There were ugly stories of incompetent officers, and of men unwilling to expose themselves to the fire of the enemy. But peace was made with the Bishop; men’s minds were diverted by the fierce fighting which was going on at sea; and all this was hushed up, and forgotten for a time.
All parties in the State were now united in a vigorous prosecution of the war. De Witt, who, as I have said, seems to have been the one man besides his brother who looked after everything, had taken care that the education of the young Prince of Orange should not be neglected. Though he opposed with all his might intrusting him with the offices held by his ancestors, he was magnanimous enough to provide that, if he did obtain them, he should be qualified to fill them. The two factions seemed now, in the face of a common danger, to have been for the moment reconciled. A large and well-furnished fleet took the sea in the summer of 1666 under De Ruyter and the younger Van Tromp; on June I they met the English, under Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle. One of those desperate sea-battles took place which form the peculiar feature of the period of which we are writing. The English were outnumbered, but not more so than they have been in many of the most decisive of their victories over other nations. For four days the desperate struggle continued, and it ended in what the Dutch called a victory, and the English a drawn battle. On July 25 another engagement took place. The English, who had by this time been reinforced, were now successful, but only after the most desperate fighting. Van Tromp had become separated from De Ruyter, either from accident or by design; but De Ruyter kept his station till night against overwhelming numbers, and next morning moved sullenly away, frequently exclaiming, ‘My God! is there not one among all these bullets which will put an end to my miserable life?’
Not only were the Dutch defeated, but dissension of the most violent nature broke out between the two admirals, and among all the officers of the fleet. The Provinces were in consternation; De Witt was sent out to endeavour to put things straight. Van Tromp’s commission was taken from him, and some of the captains were punished; but the most guilty are said to have escaped on account of their family connections.
Both nations were now beginning to be desirous of peace. Holland had been reduced to great distress, and Charles had found the war attended with little glory and much expense. De Witt, afraid of the intrigues of the Orange party, refused to receive an Ambassador at the Hague, but negotiations were begun at Paris. It was agreed as a basis that each country should retain whatever possessions they at the moment had. This was, on the whole, favourable to England, but some trifling matters remained to be adjusted, and England meanwhile proposed immediate disarmament. De Witt, knowing the character of King Charles, and seeing his opportunity, persuaded the States to refuse. Charles, as he expected, thinking the matter virtually settled, and wanting his money for other purposes, made no preparations for the coming year. De Witt, however, equipped a large fleet, which he despatched, early in the summer, under the command of his brother Cornelius, straight to the Thames. Sheerness was taken, and the Dutch sailed up the river. The Medway was guarded by a chain drawn across it, and by three ships of war; the chain was broken, and the ships burnt. Three more ships were burnt at Chatham; the Dutch guns were heard in London, and there was general consternation. Charles immediately sent orders to give way upon all the points still insisted on by the Dutch, and peace was signed at Breda.
Thus ended the war between England and Holland. We may console our national pride by feeling that our ill success was as much owing to our own imbecile Government as to the merits of our enemy, but it will be impossible to refuse a tribute of admiration to the latter. We have grown so accustomed since, in reading of our many glorious wars, to look with pride upon the map, and to compare our own small island with the large proportions of our various opponents, that it almost amuses us, now that it is so long ago, for once to observe the contrary, and to remember that we were formerly defied and held at bay by a country of almost exactly the same size as Wales.
I have said that it was some time before England and Holland recognised the fact, to us so obvious, that it was the common interest of both countries to join together against France. The rising power of that country, and the ambition displayed by her King, now began to open the eyes of her neighbours. Even Charles II. was for a few years persuaded to adopt the course required by reason; after some preliminary negotiation, Sir William Temple was sent to the Hague, where, with a celerity quite unexampled in anything at that time dependent on the movements of the Dutch Government, he concluded a Triple Alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden. This was carried out by De Witt. He had for some time been convinced of the necessity for it, but he had great difficulties in his way, as some of the Provinces were in favour of the suicidal policy of an agreement with France for the division of the Spanish territory in Flanders; De Witt only carried his point by a breach of the Constitution. He persuaded the States-General to sign the treaty at once, instead of referring it back to the local Assemblies, as they were in strictness bound to do. Had he not felt sure of his position with the people, he could only have done this at the risk of his head; but there was no danger. He was at this moment at the very height of popularity and fame. There is some interest in contemplating a great man at such a moment, particularly when there is in the background a dark shadow of impending fate. The interest is in this instance increased by the modest dignity of the hero; there is something very striking in the picture drawn by Temple of the life and habits of one who at this period shone prominently among the most conspicuous figures in Europe,—his simple dress, his frugal house-keeping, and his single servant. He lived upon a salary of £300 a year, shortly to be increased to £700; and he steadily refused all presents from the State; accepting with difficulty a small one of £1500 from the rich families of his own Province. His third term of office now expired: he was again elected for a fourth period of five years; it was to be the last time.
We are now to witness first the decline, and then the sudden close, of this memorable career. De Witt’s popularity with the multitude was never more than a temporary matter; the Prince of Orange was now growing up, and had already displayed more than ordinary ability. He was admitted into the Council, and he gathered round him a considerable party—not large enough to assume the management of affairs, but sufficiently so to cause division and weakness. On the other hand, the party of burgomasters and rich citizens—the burgess oligarchy, as we have called it—to which De Witt properly belonged, and which had brought him into power, became divided within itself, one portion only giving him undeviating support. De Witt had ceased, to a certain extent, to be a party man, and every Minister in a Constitutional Government who does this runs the risk of being deserted by his followers. We have seen that, even in the height of his power, he was unable to procure the punishment of the aristocratic sea-captains who had misbehaved, and he was now equally unsuccessful in his attempts to remodel and reorganise the army, which was largely officered from the same class. But perhaps he did not push his attempts in this direction with as much vigour as he ought, for he relied largely upon diplomacy for preventing the necessity of employing any army at all.
Louis meanwhile applied all his energy and skill to dissolve the Triple Alliance. He certainly succeeded in persuading the Dutch to enter into negotiations, but to this De Witt only consented with the utmost reluctance, evidently because he could not help himself; or we may feel pretty sure that he would have succeeded in keeping his country firm to its true interest. In England, however, things were very different: it was the time of the Cabal—the worst and most profligate Ministry we have ever had. By bribery of the Ministers, by the promise of a large subsidy to the King, and with the help of the beautiful Duchess of Portsmouth, whom he sent over for the purpose, Louis persuaded our Government suddenly to reverse their whole policy, to break all their engagements, and to declare war against the United Provinces.
The French were already prepared. An army of 130,000 men, commanded, under the King, by Condé, Turenne, Luxembourg, and all the most distinguished generals of France, advanced upon the frontier. The Dutch troops were panicstricken and demoralised; the army had, as we know, been allowed to get into a very unsatisfactory condition. De Witt had relied chiefly upon the navy for maintaining the greatness of his country; but he had not been insensible to the deficiencies of the other branch of the service. He had, as I have said, tried hard, but not hard enough, to remedy them. His party had always been pledged to the reduction of the troops in order to keep down the taxation; the adherents of the House of Orange, who comprised the best officers of the country, had been unwilling to serve under the present Government, and the Government had been equally unwilling to employ them. On the other hand, the rich citizens, whose political support was the main prop of the Administration, had insisted upon all the best commands being conferred upon their sons and other relations, who were too often utterly incompetent. The French passed the Rhine with only a faint show of opposition, and, scattering their enemies before them, marched almost to the very suburbs of Amsterdam. In the meantime the Prince of Orange had been made, first Captain-General of the United Provinces, and then Stadtholder of Holland and Zealand; his partisans were everywhere triumphant, and his opponents, particularly after a gallant but indecisive naval engagement, and a vain effort by De Witt to make peace, were utterly crushed and discredited. Now comes the tragic termination of our story. Cornelius de Witt had just distinguished himself highly in the sea-fight of Solebay, but, on the testimony of one of the most infamous of mankind, he was accused of the preposterous charge of attempting to poison the Prince of Orange. He was put to the torture, which he endured with heroic constancy, and nothing could be wrung from him. But he was sentenced to be banished. John de Witt, whose assassination had already been attempted a short time before, went to convey his brother out of prison, and start him on his journey. The prison was besieged by an armed mob, who blockaded the door, and eventually broke into the room, where they found the two brothers—Cornelius in bed, shattered by the torture which he had recently undergone, and John, sitting upon the foot of the bed, calmly reading his Bible. Cornelius, whose fiery and impetuous nature formed a contrast to the composure and self-control of John, rose, in spite of his weakness, and angrily bade the intruders begone. John, having tried in vain to reason with them, put his arm round his brother, and assisted him to descend the stairs. In the courtyard they were hustled by the crowd, separated, and eventually murdered,—John, as he fell, covering his face, like Cæsar, with his cloak.
The end of De Witt’s political career was disastrous, and it is not easy to assign to him his proper place among the statesmen of the world. I think, however, it should be on the whole a high one; as to actual work done, he merely showed that Holland could maintain her proud position independently of the House of Orange. The great men of that House, who came before and after him, under whom the United Provinces were created a nation, and obtained a world-wide renown, under whom, in a death-struggle with first one and then the other, they successfully resisted all the strength of the two mightiest monarchies in the world—those Princes, William the Silent, Maurice, and William III., have thrown De Witt rather into the shade. It is only when we take into account the difficulties he had to contend with that his rare abilities become fully apparent. One of his biographers has invidiously compared his character with that of Cromwell, who led a rival Republic at about the same time. But it seems to me that there are no materials for a comparison; what De Witt might have done as the all-powerful chief of a large and well-disciplined army is an unknown quantity. On the other hand, how would the great Protector, with his irritable temper and his unintelligible speeches, have succeeded in doing the work of De Witt? We must remember that Cromwell at the most critical period only saved himself and his country by turning out half his Parliament into the street. He cut the Gordian knot; while De Witt was compelled to be continually untying it. There is a good simile, supposed to have been used by an illustrious statesman of the present day as regards his own position, but far less applicable to him than to the Pensionary: ‘De Witt was like a man out hunting upon a mule.’
C.
INDEX OF PORTRAITS.
