OUR CAVALRY

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO
DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.
TORONTO

BY
MAJOR-GENERAL M. F. RIMINGTON
C.V.O., C.B.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON
1912

COPYRIGHT

PREFACE

In this book no attempt has been made to produce an exhaustive treatise on Cavalry; it has been written principally for junior officers of all arms.

M. F. R.

CONTENTS

[CHAPTER I]
Introductory
Cavalry in past ages—Drawn from horse-lovers, success followed on fixed principles, these are as applicable to-day—Ballistics from horseback—Always a sign and cause of weakening—The charge of good moral—Gunpowder and other improvements notwithstanding—Good scouts always available—Best lessons are learnt in war—Expense of cavalry—Duty of cavalry leader Page 1
[CHAPTER II]
Armament
Constant changes—Cut v. thrust—Gerard’s experience—Point more deadly—The case for the lance—The revolver—Confidence in the arm selected is of highest importance—The rifle—The insistence of continental writers inapplicable to British cavalry Page 10
[CHAPTER III]
The Horse
Colossal bill for horse-flesh in South Africa largely due to national ignorance of horses—The suitable horse, two classes—Chest measurement test for stamina—Small blood horse stands work best—Arabs bred for war—English and Australian horses for size—Care of horse in war—An exception to this Page 18
[CHAPTER IV]
Tactics of Cavalry v. Cavalry
The squadron attack—Cohesion—And its result in moral—Tactics—Cunning—The rally—Cromwell—Supports—Conclusions Page 29
[CHAPTER V]
Cavalry v. Cavalry
Forming to the Flank
I. The squadron—Forming to the front or flank—Defensive or offensive flank.
II. The regiment, advantage of Echelon attack.
III. The Brigade—Training of leaders—Co-operation of R.H.A.—Two forms of attack, when both forces get away from the guns—Formations for moving to a flank—Relative effect of artillery fire on the two formations—Column of masses preferred—Formation for the attack—Time for horse artillery to unlimber—Form of attack must be simple—Conclusions Page 37
[CHAPTER VI]
Fire Action in Tactics of Cavalry v. Cavalry
Not a question to be shirked—Danger of recourse to fire action weakening our leaders’ desire for shock action—An instance of fire versus shock action—Rifle fire against charging horsemen is ineffectual—Contradictory memoranda on the subject—Henderson’s dictum—Dismounted action of cavalry—German regulations—Prince Kraft Page 50
[CHAPTER VII]
Cavalry Brigade in Action
First objects in the attack—Concentric shock of fire and horse—Plan to get a good field of fire by alternate advance of two squadrons—Desiderata in artillery position—Broad principles—Utilization of ground—Deception—Get away from our artillery—An example of attack—The action of the artillery—Moral necessary to leader—Unreasoning hasty advance deprecated—If anticipated by enemy, how we may have to act—Passage of defiles—Dribbling squadrons into a fight—Cure for dissemination Page 59
[CHAPTER VIII]
Action of Cavalry in the General Engagement
Independent cavalry, danger of their detachment at inopportune times—Cavalry and horse artillery at Loigny-Poupry—Unsatisfactory direction of cavalry in 1870–71 followed by peace belief in rifle—Fallacy of tendency to dismounted action shown by South African and Manchurian Wars—The line our training should take—Cavalry instructional rides—Value of initiative—Conclusions—Frederick the Great’s cavalry compared with our South African cavalry—Pursuit—Neglect of, a British failing—The parallel pursuit—Its value—Blücher at Katzbach on cavalry pursuit Page 69
[CHAPTER IX]
The Disposition of Cavalry in a Campaign
[FIRST PART]
Dependence on forage—Principles on which cavalry is placed in the front—Want of direction in 1870—Galliffet’s influence—Service of information separated from that of security—The Napoleonic traditions revived—And generally adopted—French view—The cavalry of exploration—The cavalry of army corps—The divisional cavalry—Generalissimo’s use of his independent cavalry—Movement en bondes—The effect of modern rifle—Difficulties in the attack of protective cavalry and mixed detachments. Page 86
[SECOND PART]
The modern disposition is theoretical—Tendency to increase independent cavalry at the expense of protective, for sake of initial advantages—Difficulty of weaker cavalry rôle—Von Bernhardi on German cavalry strength—Improvisation of cavalry—Dilemma—Cyclists—Difficulty of training for non-professional cavalry—Danger of amateur cavalry officers—The Ulm Campaign—Effect of first success—Boer tactics unsuitable to European war Page 93
[CHAPTER X]
Horse Artillery and Cavalry in the General Engagement
Deficiency in peace training—The energy of the attack—An instance—Plan of the attack—In the defence—Value of artillery in the retreat Page 101
[CHAPTER XI]
Co-operation of Horse Artillery and Cavalry
German tendency in 1870 to deprive cavalry of horse artillery—Reversed by 1907 regulations—Effect of modern horse artillery—Probable necessity to allocate horse artillery—Mukden—Arrangement of artillery support in attack on infantry—Sir Douglas Haig on the counter-attack—Principles—Conclusions Page 108
[CHAPTER XII]
Horse Artillery Fire Effect compared with Rifle Fire
Comparative efficacy in bullets—Reasons of Henderson’s advocacy of mounted infantry—Demand for exceptional arrangements—An instance of masked fire—Von Bernhardi’s plan—A suggested alternative Page 117
[CHAPTER XIII]
In Contact with the Enemy
Duties of the Commander—A day in the outposts—At night—The men—The horses—Care of men’s health—Wet weather—Hints for scouts—Moral—Sending out scouts at night—Sniping by nervous sentries—Fireflies—Ruses and duplicity—Value of a knowledge of strategy and tactics—To picket an enemy—Security and information—Instances of picketing the enemy—Practice in peace—Difficulty of instruction—Practice preferred to theory—Honest outpost work—Night work—Regiment’s practice of outposts Page 122
[CHAPTER XIV]
Some Detached Duties of Cavalry
Despatch-riding, value in instruction—An instance of a scheme—Napoleon’s despatches—Tracking, etc.—Value of maintaining interest—Boy scouts—Influence of regimental moral in detached work—Prisoners—Convoy duty Page 139
[CHAPTER XV]
Raids
Diverse views of the value of Stuart’s raid—Japanese raid on railway line—Vulnerability of railways—Boer and British Raids—Country which favours raids—Inopportune raids, Wheeler’s—Futile raids by De Wet and Botha—An exception to them—Mischenko’s raid—Rennenkampf’s reconnaissance—Von Pelet Narbonne—Japanese methods—Conclusions Page 145
[CHAPTER XVI]
The Training of the Cavalry Officer
The cavalry candidate—Causes of scarcity—Work now and thirty years ago—Pay—Duties on joining—Hunting—The sense of duty—Pretence impossible in a regiment—The effect of a slack commanding officer—Counteracted by four or five good officers—Value of drill—Characteristic faults—The practice of possible situations in war—Officer without imagination is a bad trainer—Conclusions Page 154
[CHAPTER XVII]
Training of Officer (continued)
Restless activity—The effect of hardship—Training—Preparation—Cynicism—Desirability of education for senior officers—A rearguard device—Study and discussion—A doctrine—Napoleon’s doctrine—He honoured bravery—Bis dot qui cito dat—The selfish officer—Comradeship—Conclusions Page 167
[CHAPTER XVIII]
Training of a Squadron
Frederick the Great’s stern methods—How a good leader is trained—Description of his squadron at work—Compared with an indifferent leader—Five points in training a squadron: (i.) Efficiency for war of man and horse; (ii.) Avoid samples; (iii.) Use of weapons; (iv.) Self-reliance; (v.) The offensive spirit—The section system—Value of individual instruction—Dismounted work—Holding the balance—Problems as a means of training in resolution—Napoleon’s genius—The Zulu system—Conclusions Page 177
[CHAPTER XIX]
Training of the Horse
Value of a well-trained horse on service—Ill-tempered horses—The ideal of training—Seydlitz’s leap—The mameluke—The aids, how arrived at from nature—Their adaptation to our needs—Progress towards the campaigning horse—A Boer method—Officers training horses—The wrong leg leading in a race—The free-jumping lane—Remount competition—Noisy instructors—Method of teaching horses to walk quickly—Duty of squadron leader—His value if he has ability Page 191
[CHAPTER XX]
Training of the Man
Standard of proficiency—Riding, the old and the new system—Instruction in care of horse—Most difficult to teach or check—Result of a bad system—Napoleon’s cavalry in Russia—The care of horses must be the result of system—Long rides for recruits as a method of instruction—Riding to hounds—Care of horse now more necessary—Shooting—Is good, but fire discipline is essential—The personal weapon—Method of instruction—Mental and muscular development—The handy man—Influence of sports—Swimming—Pioneering—Cooking—Seaside work for a cavalry brigade—Squadron competition—Regular soldiers and colonials—The practical instruction—Theory—Instruction in moral—A Japanese view—Demonstration—Intercourse between officers and men—Grumbling Page 202

DIAGRAMS

NO. PAGE
I.Defensive and Offensive Flanks[40]
II.The Two Forms of Attack[43]
III.Column of Regimental Masses compared with Column of Squadrons[45]
IV.The Formation for the Attack[47]
V.Squadrons en bondes[60]
VI.Cavalry Brigade in Action[64]
VII.The Passage of a Defile[67]
VIII.Cavalry Attack on Dismounted Men holding a Kopje[104]

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

“We study the past to foresee the future.”

In these bustling days of headline-up-to-date newspapers, one shrinks from reminding one’s readers that Xenophon gave excellent advice to cavalry trainers and leaders—advice which a cavalryman will recognize is quite as applicable to-day as it was in those distant ages; since details with regard to grooming horses on hard stones, exercising cavalry in rough ground, and so on are by no means out of date. There is every reason to believe that Alexander, and later Rome and Carthage at their zenith as military nations, had proportionately as highly-trained cavalry as is possessed by any nation of to-day. Those who have fought in rearguards and running fights realize that the Parthian method of fighting must have required the highest training and moral. The cavalry of the predominant nations were drawn from those who kept horses for their own sport and amusement, and for the gratification of their pride, and who felt they were better fighting men on a horse. The descendants of the horse-lovers of those ages are with us to-day; they are those who love danger, excitement, and pace, and who find in the blood-horse an animal which shares their love for these, and will generously sacrifice its life or limbs in the co-partnership.

Those who have never felt the sensation of a really good horse bounding and stretching away under them, and the consequent elation, the wonder as to “what could stop us?” cannot grasp what a cavalry soldier’s feelings are in the “Charge.”

Following the centuries which saw the final success of the ordered phalanx of Rome, time after time the more savage races of horsemen—Attila with his Hunnish squadrons or Abdur-Rahman with Moslem hordes—drive all before them, anticipating the flight of peace-loving, easy-going farmers and traders, living on the country and carrying off what pleases them.

Then held sway

The good old rule ... the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can.

Ages roll by, the picture changes. The days of Norman chivalry animate and fire the imagination. The hunter warriors, knights, and squires lead their troops in battle array, throwing them into the combat at the decisive moment.

Broken bones incurred whilst unhorsing a friend, or a shrewd spear-thrust when cleaving to the chine a foe, in single combat, were adventures by no means to be declined or avoided.

Chivalry or enthusiastic religious zeal qualify the rougher side of their devotion to arms and horsemanship.

In all ages the horse-lovers, the best-mounted nations, have carried all before them. Ceteris paribus this is true to-day. Then came the days of “villainous saltpetre,” and many began to doubt and to number the days of cavalry; and always after a time there rises the cavalry leader who, emerging from the dangers of a youth spent in war and sport, sees that pace, weight, moral, and the “àpropos” make up for all the odds, if only leaders, men, and horses are trained, and their weight and pace rightly applied.

Next in order come Gustavus Adolphus; Cromwell, our great cavalry leader, and his Ironsides riding knee to knee, and rallying immediately after the shock; Frederick the Great, and his captains, Ziethen and Seydlitz, and their ordered application of masses of cavalry. Then grand old Blücher,[1] and his antagonists of the Napoleonic era, Murat, Lasalle, Curély.

Certain fixed principles keep cropping up which appear to have guided these heroes in their movements and dispositions. They are:—

The more we are able to read and learn of their views of training, leading, and applying the shock of cavalry, the more we see how little which is new can be written on the subject.

The same view may be taken of the fire action of cavalry. The best cavalry leaders have always recognized its great value, where not put forward as an alternative to the “àpropos” charge, and when not substituted by the “weakening” leader for the dangerous but more decisive shock action—that action in which we must have “no half measures, no irresolution.”[2] But the very fact that they may themselves have at some time weakened to the extent of shooting at the enemy from afar, instead of resolutely going in at the unknown, must have made these leaders recognize that the “charge” must be kept in the front as our ideal.

Those who cannot understand the predilection of the most advanced and thoughtful cavalry soldiers for l’arme blanche should ponder on the success of the Zulu dynasty. Its founder insisted that his men should be armed only with the stabbing assegai and would not allow them to throw their assegais. He knew what shock tactics meant and the moral inspired by their successful adoption.

A study of history shows the advocacy of ballistics from the horse at a charging enemy to have been periodic during the last 2000 years in peace time, and also that failure has invariably followed its adoption in war. It is not now seriously considered by any nation.

Whatever the cost, whatever the method, he who tries first to “handle” his enemy is the one with whom “moral,” that incalculable factor, will rest. Hear what a great trainer of cavalry, writing probably over fifty years ago, said:—[3]

It cannot be too often repeated that the main thing is to carry out the mission at any price. If possible this should be done mounted and with the arme blanche, but should that not be feasible, then we must dismount and force a road with the carbine. I am convinced that cavalry would not be up to the requirements of to-day if they were not able under certain circumstances to fight on foot, nor would it be worth the sacrifice that it costs the state.

But if the croakers were alarmed at a sputtering rifle fire, what will the faint-hearted of our time say to the new and alarming factor which has now been introduced. Batteries of horse artillery, firing up to sixty or more low trajectory shells per minute, must now be reckoned with. These shells contain 236 bullets, weighing 41 to the pound.

If the de Blochs and other theorists paused and wondered what would happen to cavalry when magazine rifles were invented, what will be their attitude now? Let them be reassured. But the words of those who reassure them must ring true and be purified from the dross of the first thought, “How can we do this and save our own skins?” Let them be born of the stern resolve, “At all costs we will kill, capture, or put to flight our enemies.” We must evolve tactics which will enable us to use every new factor and to deny them to the foe.[4]

Leave them to judge whether the plan of those tactics will be dashed off by the pen of the ready-writer as a result of experiences gained during a Whitsun-week holiday on some suburban training ground, or whether the soldier who has felt the sharp stress of an enemy’s victory, the heavy hand of adversity and the rough lessons of retreat, who has seen the barometer of his men’s fate rise and fall under cyclonic conditions, will painfully and doubtfully elaborate it.

Cromwell, Frederick, Galliffet, these with bitter experience of the everyday imperfections of human nature, and a well-weighed determination to insist on tactics which will override those weaknesses, did not attempt to avoid or shirk the difficulty of losses. A cool contempt for the contingencies is the primary qualification in the search for successful methods in cavalry tactics, as well as in the encounter itself.

Turning now to the detached duties of cavalry, of security and information, no less do we see the recurrence of the same ideas. The Curélys and de Bracks, the Mosbys, the cavalry who, “like a heavy shower of rain, can get through anywhere,” such come right down to us from ancient history.

The daring hearts who, trusting in a good horse and a knowledge of woodcraft, torment the enemy, whether in camp, bivouac, on the march, or on the line of communication, are a product of all campaigns, ready to the hand of those who know where to find them, and how to inspire them aright so as to get the very best out of them. And what will good men not dare and undergo for a word of praise or encouragement from one whose soul is in what he says?

Again and again, what is learnt in the hard school of campaigning, and generally where that campaign has been lost, carries the best lesson. Has any nation set itself more resolutely to correct the faults of its cavalry[5] than the French nation after the 1870 war?

Conversely, the nation that wins, learns little or nothing; no lesson is worse than that of easy success in small wars. Witness the Russian successes in Central Asia for a series of years, followed by the débâcle of their cavalry action in the Manchurian War when pitted against an enemy whose cavalry was scarcely “in being,”[6] and the erroneous conclusions arrived at in regard to cavalry by those who only saw the first portion of the operations in South Africa 1899–1902.

Von Moltke is credited with saying: “People say one must learn by experience; I have always endeavoured to learn by the experience of others.”

The real lessons learnt from war are extremely difficult to impress on the taxpayer, who, in modern Great Britain, only reads of them in the newspaper, and who at best does not wish to pay for one more cavalry soldier than is absolutely necessary.

The cavalry leader must recognize that the arm is expensive, therefore it cannot afford to be inactive; it is the hardest arm to replace, therefore it must be used to the full.

In all ages cavalry[7] have been expensive, and one may well wonder if the frugal mind of the taxpayer balances them against who can say what pictures of dead and wounded, indemnity, pillage, lost trade, and damaged prestige, or whether he looks at one side of the balance-sheet only, and forgets that from which they may save him.

Ignoring these mundane views, it is still the duty of the cavalry leader who has patriotism in his soul, to keep his heart young and his muscles trained, and to leave no stone unturned in peace time in his preparation, as a sacred duty, for war; just as in war it is his duty to sacrifice his men, his reputation, his horses, everything, in order to turn the tide of battle or render the victory decisive.

Let officers of cavalry remember that he who in peace time cannot sacrifice his pleasures to his duty, will in war find it much harder to give up his life or aggrandisement, possibly in accordance with an idea or order with which he does not agree, or in which he sees no sense.

This is the serious side; mercifully there is a lighter side to war, and it is well known that the hair-breadth escapes of themselves or others, and the “hard tack” form the most amusing and abiding recollections of a war to those who have participated in it.

Against ill chances men are ever merry.

Withal no cavalry leader is likely to succeed unless there is something of the gambler’s spirit in him, the gambler who can coolly and calmly put down his everything on the cards:—

He either fears his fate too much,
Or his deserts are small,
That dares not put it to the touch,
To gain or lose it all.

CHAPTER II
ARMAMENT

“Quot homines tot sententiae.”

Armament also figures largely amongst conditions of success.... There can certainly never be complete disparity between the armament and the moral of an army, since the latter includes intelligence which takes care to provide good weapons. The want of good armament immediately reacts upon the confidence of the soldier. Defeat would thus appear excusable, and success cannot have a worse enemy than this feeling.—Von der Goltz, Nation in Arms, p. 147.

The many changes through which regiments of cavalry go in this respect are hardly credible, although in our case allowance must be made for the many different enemies which a British cavalry regiment meets. The lance will be adopted instead of or in addition to the sword, and six or seven years later the sword alone, or perhaps even rifle alone, will be carried.[8] It may be regarded as a certainty now that for some years to come, as in the past, the Germans will arm both ranks with the lance. One has hardly written this before one reads that the bayonet may be substituted for the sword in the armament of German cavalry regiments, for use in night attacks and in the attack of unturnable small positions, or when occasion may arise.

The bayonet on trial is straight, 14 inches long, with one cutting edge, the back being flat. All under-officers and one-tenth of the troops will carry a bayonet furnished with a saw edge.

History repeats itself. In 1805, Napoleon organized dragoons who carried a bayonet as well as a sword. There may have been a reason for this, as their usual fate was to be dismounted and their horses given to remount more highly-trained cavalry.

Von Bernhardi[9] sums up the question of this new armament of the German cavalry as follows: “The hand-to-hand fight on foot must be exceptional. To injure the efficiency of the troops for their daily rôle for the sake of such isolated occurrences I hold to be a great mistake,” etc.

When we come to the pattern of swords, the purely cutting sword has its strenuous advocates, whilst as many more will beseech one to trust to no personal weapon except the pointing sword. Authoritative quotations will be given from well-known leaders advocating one or other form of sword.

It seems to be allowed that a scimitar or tulwar pattern, with its curved blade, is unsuitable for pointing,[10] and also that the best patterns of rapier-pointing sword are difficult to cut with. One may read in Sir Montague Gerard’s book how he killed several Afghans. He says:—

“One had but to make a feint of employing the obsolete cut No. 7, and up would fly their guard over the face, when dropping your point you went clean through your man.... The fourth man I tackled fired at me just as I closed, and I felt a blow on my side, but next moment my sword went through something hard, and the weapon was twisted out of my hand and hung by the sword-knot. The blade, which was a straight rapier, one by Wilkinson, got a slight but permanent wave in it, and I can only account for receiving such a wrench by having taken my opponent through the headpiece as he crouched and tried to stab the horse from below.”

Pages 255–256: “We counted sixty odd bodies, whilst our casualties amounted to six men and seven horses.” And on page 257 he adds: “The lance giving our Sowars a preponderating advantage.”[11]

Perhaps of all those who have given their opinion on this subject, that one to whom we would give most credence is a swordsman of the 11th Hussars of Marlborough’s time, who fought many duels and lived by his prowess with the sword. His final dictum is: “One point with the smallsword is as deadly as forty cuts with the broadsword.”

Verdy du Vernois[12] says: “Experience has proved that a sword-cut seldom, but a point with the sword always, throws a man off his horse. The latter should therefore be chiefly practised at sword drill.”

From the bolas of the South American to the tomahawk of the Red Indian or the revolver of the cowboy every weapon has had its advocates.

Royal Artillery Mounted Rifles were seen charging on horseback with fixed bayonets[13] a few days after joining a South African column; thus imitating the Australian contingent in the column, who invariably did so—and very formidable they looked.

A conclusion which experience forces upon us, as regards both the armament and tactics of horsemen, is that when they attain a high standard of horsemanship or when they are good horsemen from youth, such as many Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, and Canadians undoubtedly are, a short training will bring them almost level with the regular cavalry and enable them to employ shock tactics. Then they should be armed in addition to their rifle with sword or lance, as the rifle and bayonet are not the best weapons for this purpose. As trained cavalry thus armed they are equal in value to twice if not three times their number of mounted rifles on the battlefield, if they have trained troop, squadron, and regimental leaders in command of them.

The oft-advanced theory that it is not the nature of such and such a race to use the point is quite unfounded. It has been conclusively proved that a recruit who has been allowed only to point with a sword, can hardly be induced to cut, even if a good opportunity offers.

The lance is undoubtedly the “queen of weapons,” but it has its drawbacks. But first its great advantage is that it is formidable, and so much so that lancers claim that regiments armed with the sword will not face those armed with the lance. It is undoubtedly easier to use against crouching men on foot. The Inniskilling Dragoons after a charge at Zulus, who crouched down under their shields, sent for all available tent-pegging spears.

On the other hand, the lance’s shaft is difficult to withdraw from the body of a man, and a lancer may have to leave it there. Then he will draw his sword. But that entails another weapon. In a close mêlée the lance is a clumsy weapon.[14] In the mêlées which occur after a charge, men and horses are so intermingled that even the use of the sword is difficult. But obviously the cure for this is to teach the men to rally instantaneously and not to indulge in mêlées. The officers of the 9th Lancers in the Afghan War had a short spike put into the hilt of their swords, so that a blow from the hilt in the face was decisive.

The weapon which (1) entails least weight and is easiest to carry, and (2) is deadly, and (3) is most likely to be useful on all occasions, is the straight sword or rapier.

But this obviously must be made of the best steel, whereas a quite serviceable cutting sword can be made of inferior iron. That the cutting sword has been so much used is most probably because good steel was difficult to obtain. Napier says to arm cavalry sepoys with heavy English swords of one weight, one length, one shape is a mistake. The cutting sword is not a deadly weapon, often it does not penetrate clothes or accoutrements. The mamelukes, formidable antagonists to Napoleon’s regular cavalry in Egypt, 1798–1801, carried a cutting sword very considerably curved back, with which weapon they are said to have inflicted terrible wounds; in addition they carried a poniard and two pistols in their sash and another pair of pistols in their holsters. A syce carrying a lance for them followed on foot.

In the Peninsular War, whereas the English cavalry used the sword almost exclusively as a cutting weapon, the French dragoons on the contrary used only the point, which, with their straight sword, nearly always caused a mortal wound. This made the English cavalry say that the French fighting “was not fair.”

Some amateurs talk of the revolver as a weapon with which to arm the ranks in place of a sword or lance. They appear to ignore the fact that a bullet once fired off in a mêlée may hit friend or foe. Very fine horsemen, such as Arizona cowboys, who break the insulators of the telegraph wire as they gallop along with a weapon, which they have been accustomed to handle from their youth up, would probably do well in a pursuit with such a weapon, but it is not, we believe, seriously contemplated by any nation as a weapon for use in the ranks. For officers, scouts, farriers, trumpeters, and possibly others it is most useful, as it takes the place of a rifle and is light.

If any particular personal weapon is carried habitually, that weapon should be adopted; but failing that, there must be a long apprenticeship to lance or sword. Perhaps the point to which most attention should be given is that the man must be taught to have implicit confidence in his weapon; this can be attained best with the lance or with the pointing sword. A man appreciates the fact that with either of these weapons the point goes through easily; whilst with the cutting sword only the most expert can make any impression on, say, a leg of mutton covered with a sack and a leather strap or two.

In the German cavalry, stress is laid on teaching the trooper that the sight of the lance is sure to make the enemy turn and fly. In our own cavalry greater attention is now paid to practising the man in riding at a gallop at a rebounding dummy, offering resistance equal to the weight of a man. Without such practice the men sprain their wrists and lose their grip of the sword, and do not understand how simple it is to run a man through.