SECOND PART
“A writer upon strategy and tactics ought to treat his subjects as national strategy and tactics; for only such teaching can be of real service to his country.”—Von der Goltz, Nation in Arms, p. 143.
Instead of labouring the point as to the rôle of cavalry under these circumstances, perhaps one may be permitted to recall to the reader’s mind that, unless we go back to Napoleonic precedent, there are no actual experiences in modern times of the effect to be obtained by using cavalry in the manner prescribed at present. The whole is pure theory, but we can say from our own experience that the protective cavalry may fail if they attempt to be strong everywhere on the old “pepper-box” system.
The drives in South Africa, in which we were strong nowhere and weak everywhere, proved, as indeed was expected, that a strong and determined enemy can always break through the long weak line unless the latter follows the line of some serious obstacle.
It is also a matter of easy demonstration and universal agreement that the cavalry which dominates in the first great cavalry struggle has already gained an enormous advantage for its side.
What is the logical outcome? It is, that unless (1) our cavalry force is redundant, or (2) there are difficulties in feeding our independent cavalry, or (3) the enemy’s cavalry is very weak, or (4) our cavalry comprises squadrons, which we cannot, from reasons of want of training or armament, oppose to the enemy’s cavalry, we shall see every available squadron taken from the protective cavalry and handed over to the independent cavalry. Intelligence comes before security.[51] Meanwhile the protective rôle will be carried out by divisional mounted troops, cyclists, and infantry detachments (see sec. 92, F.S.R.).
Ceteris paribus, the first advantage will be with the side which can put the greatest number of squadrons into the corps of independent cavalry, and, in view of this, a fact plainly spoken of and counted upon in all strategical conceptions of future campaigns on the Continent, the preponderance of well-trained squadrons is clearly the object to be aimed at.
Generally speaking, the ideas which are promulgated as to the rôle for the weaker cavalry, by which a cavalry, worse trained, worse armed, and proportionately less in numbers will compensate for these shortcomings by superior tactics, are purely Utopian. This “fond thing vainly invented” may interest or beguile the mind of the unfortunate tax-payer, but does not belong to the regions of plain military common sense, which, in its preparation for war, has no place for chance work, and must have no weak link in the chain.
Let those with whom the wish is master of the thought read General von Bernardi’s most recent statement in Cavalry in Peace and War, p. 356, where speaking of the German force of trained cavalry, enormous as it already is, he says:
I have repeatedly stated that I consider our cavalry to be of itself too weak. The more I study modern warfare, the more convinced do I feel that the value of the arm, when handled according to modern ideas, has increased.
Let us remember that cavalry cannot be improvised, and that even squadrons of the best class of mounted rifles, formed entirely of natural horsemen and fairly good shots, are very heavily penalized, apart from their armament and training, unless they have professional brigade, regimental, and squadron leaders, and know how to work with horse artillery. They cannot be expected to face trained and properly organized cavalry brigades on anything like equal terms. At the same time, if reliance is placed on numbers, one is at once faced (i.) by the forage supply and its carriage, (ii.) by the enormous item of expense in remounting, already referred to in the chapter on “The horse.”
The outcome is that one arrives at this plain and simple proposition.[52] Only the most highly trained cavalry soldier is worth a horse and food for his horse when a nation is engaged against an enemy of modern continental type. This point is undoubtedly grasped on the Continent, where the proposal to use cyclists as a reserve of riflemen with cavalry is generally accepted.
Every one, practically, can now ride and look after a bicycle, and given passable roads, cyclists can travel farther and faster than horses, and carry more days’ reserve rations. In war in a civilized and well-roaded country they cannot fail to be a most useful adjunct to cavalry: (1) as a reserve of rifles, (2) as despatch-riders, (3) as an accessory in outpost and reconnoitring duty.
It is not the scheme of this book to enter into the question of training other than regular cavalry, nor to enter into any discussion as to the precise value in war of hastily raised mounted troops; since in doing so one might say something which had the appearance of discouraging the volunteer; whereas there is no question that the spirit, which animated for instance those yeomanry and colonial troops who came out early in the operations in South Africa, 1899–1902, is a great national and imperial asset.
At the same time it is right to make it perfectly plain that the non-professional cavalry soldier has an exceedingly hard task before him, and one requiring very exceptional qualities such as are not usually found in those who do not possess the initial asset of being constantly in the saddle and out in the open. Even these must find it extremely difficult to train to anything but a very mediocre standard, unless they possess (i.) sufficient leisure to prepare themselves amidst the surroundings of regular troops, and (ii.) the large amount of patriotism and right feeling which induces a man voluntarily to place himself under and endure the irksome restraints of discipline.[53] Ten times more does this apply to the officer; purely amateur officers are poison (the virus being in direct proportion to their rank), and entirely out of place in war. To imagine that it is patriotism to wait till war begins, and then aspire to lead others, is an idea that should be crushed once for all. It is not patriotism, it is murder.
Few amateurs would aspire to conduct the operations in a London hospital, and the operations of war are, in their way, no less intricate, and perhaps entail more loss of life and limb when conducted by the unskilled. The amateur who comes out to the war, with the courage of ignorance, and finds how helpless he is, how useless are his best efforts, how complete the disillusionment of those under him as to his power to keep or get them out of trouble, let alone hurt the enemy, will, if he survives, have learnt a very useful and painful lesson, but no nation can afford to give lessons on the field of battle.
The cavalry of an army are a part of a machine, in which reliance must be placed, and in which every nut or screw of doubtful metal is a danger. Cherfils rightly says: “Three-quarters of the strategy of war lies in the method of employment of the cavalry.” Why? Because of the supreme importance to the generalissimo of Liberty of Manœuvre. But this liberty can only be gained by a thrusting forward of masses of cavalry, which must go on and get the greatest share of the terrain intervening between the two armies. As an instance of this, in the Ulm Campaign on the 4th October Napoleon in his orders to Murat makes it plain that he wants him to push aside the enemy’s patrols and make plenty of prisoners; he tells him to take three divisions of cavalry and do so, leaving one division only to watch his left flank, that on which Napoleon was making his main infantry advance. He left the initiative to Murat.
Does any one imagine that these cavalry masses could, solely by means of musketry fire, drive the enemy out of the positions which they will take up, on finding a stronger force of cavalry in front of them? We believe certain people do reckon on this, though it has never occurred in actual combat, and (in the opinion of those who have witnessed attempts at it) will not do so in the immediate future. Across the open plains the weaker, worse armed and equipped cavalry will keep falling back rapidly to the next defensive line. If this is a river or range of hills, experience shows that the stronger cavalry will soon cross it and move forward.
Too much emphasis can hardly be laid on the value of success in the first great cavalry combat, in “initial ascendancy.”[54] Let those who doubt this inquire of any who have been on stricken fields and have learnt the great lessons only taught by defeat.
But these lessons are not to be confused with the tendency to say “A” nation beat “B” nation, therefore “A” nation’s methods are right, and forthwith slavishly follow their methods, even carrying this so far as to follow the fashion of some pelisse or pickelhaube as well.
Occasionally the Boers read us a lesson, and, as Kipling says, “a jolly good lesson too”; at once there is a great rush to imitate their methods, by those impressed by them, as though these were applicable to every possible case. To take one case—they are certainly not suitable for mounted troops who wish to advance. In that case we want the resolute offensive, with a thorough understanding in all ranks that they must be prepared to fight for information and liberty of manœuvre. Now spectators of any large fight in South Africa cannot claim to have seen this resolute offensive on the part of the Boers. They never pushed us back, partly, no doubt, from difficulties of command, but chiefly from defective armament and training, and consequent inability to bring the combat to a hand-to-hand fight. On the other hand, they fell back fighting whenever we attacked resolutely. Exactly what a generalissimo could not permit his cavalry to do. Why? Because he, by doing so, surrenders his share of liberty of manœuvre, of which there is a limited amount between the armies, to his adversary.
Our conclusion is that the trained cavalry masses which have a personal weapon and good support from horse artillery will push back any improvised or worse-armed cavalry with the utmost rapidity across all open ground, and that the moral ascendancy thus established will render the enemy’s defeat in rough ground an easy task.
CHAPTER X
HORSE ARTILLERY AND CAVALRY
“Fundamental principles of action against different arms must be laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular case will not be required. This is needed because the utmost possible independence of leaders down to the squadron commander is desirable. It must not degenerate into selfish wilfulness.”—Von Bernardi.
That modern horse artillery coupled with cavalry and machine guns has almost unlimited opportunities can hardly be gainsaid. Only a madman or an absolute ignoramus would willingly dispense with horse artillery. But can it be said that, without an organization and training in peace-time, which has afforded full opportunity of practising every situation which we can meet, we shall get full co-operation in war?
Arms brought together almost for the first time on the battlefield cannot have mutual confidence in one another. Yet how much depends on a thorough understanding and good feeling between the cavalry leader and his commander of horse artillery. If the battery commander cannot from constant practice and usage actually foretell nine times out of ten what the cavalry brigadier will order at a certain stage of the attack, or if the officer commanding horse artillery of a cavalry division does not know by intuition his divisional general’s views, farewell to any idea of valuable combination between the two arms.
Heretofore this brotherhood of arms has not existed, nor has our organization aimed at effecting it.
Langlois in Lessons from Two Recent Wars, p. 140, puts this very tersely:
Cavalry has need of the support of the other arms in strategical exploration.
And again:
The English took no steps in peace to create and strengthen any union between the arms, and evil overtook them. I cannot insist too much on this point, and we (the French) must profit by the lesson.
A large number of horse artillery officers never have opportunities of working with cavalry. Our horse artillery batteries are too often quartered where such cannot be obtained. But even at places like Aldershot and the Curragh little can be done in this direction, the ground is too cramped and too well known, and there was always the necessity of a good classification at the practice camp haunting the mind of the battery commander, and making him grudge every moment not spent in the direction of attaining that most important item.
Unfortunately it is hard to find concrete examples of cavalry and horse artillery action. For good horse artillery and cavalry, trained to work in conjunction, on modern ideas, have never yet been seen on any battlefield in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 1870? No. In South Africa? No. In Manchuria? A thousand times no. We have to go back to the days of Frederick and Napoleon.
In all cases where the army is on the defensive a great and potent factor is in the energy of the attack, or, as one might put it, in carrying through the whole according to prearrangement and “at one run,” so that the gun and machine-gun fire is directed at that particular portion of the defence which can offer most opposition, and do most damage to the attack.
Let us take an instance of a cavalry attack on dismounted men holding an isolated kopje. Starting from 1200 yards’ distance, and suddenly appearing over a ridge, one squadron of the attacking cavalry riding en fourrageur, supported by another squadron echeloned on the first squadron’s flank, will probably reach the dead ground, which exists in the front of nearly every kopje, when within some 400 yards of the enemy’s firing line; then their leader should give the order “Right turn,” or “Left turn” (never “Right wheel” or “Left wheel” of troops, which would obviously cause them to afford a good mark), and gallop to one flank or the other. He should of course choose the weakest flank. (It may assist him in his decision if he remembers that, in a force rapidly taking up a position on a hill, the greater number of rifles will go to the right side, as they approach it, because there the hill will cover all but a small portion of their body and head as they shoot; but on the left side, unless left-handed, half the body will be shown.) See [Diagram VIII].
Diagram VIII.
Arrived at the flank, whilst the artillery and machine guns of the attack shell that end of the ridge to be attacked from the moment the cavalry leader makes his right or left turn, he halts and dismounts his men (that is, if the ground is unsuitable for mounted action), and sweeps the hill from end to end; the artillery, etc., now firing one hundred yards in front of his line of men. His other squadron should, meanwhile, “go for” the led horses. What time is at the defender’s disposal if this attack is made suddenly? Frederick the Great used to say: “Rapidity is an element of particular importance in the tactical offensive; therefore the sharper attacks are, the fewer men they will cost.”
Picture yourself on the ridge, where ten minutes before the enemy’s cavalry have been reported as moving apparently away from or parallel to the defence. Your men have resumed their avocations; if they have been there some time, some will be cooking, others sleeping. Suddenly some unusually alert individual shouts out, “Hallo! the enemy are galloping straight at us.” Men scramble to the sangars, or are waked up and hustled to their loopholes. They will not be ready to fire under a minute; this will bring the enemy’s cavalry at a gallop over six hundred yards nearer. For two or three hundred yards the attackers will be exposed to magazine fire, but they are certainly not an easy mark, and few would fall, even on a rifle range. But at this moment during the twenty or thirty seconds which elapse before most of them will be in dead ground, a perfect inferno of shell and, still worse, machine-gun fire bursts on the ridge. Many men will now slightly shift their position in order to get more cover and wait for the enemy to come straight on, nearer, where they can see him. But the attack does not come on; instead, it has slipped away to a flank, and the men’s next thought will be for their led horses and so on. They are already beat.
This is no fancy picture of artillery and machine-gun support, but a method which was utilized a score of times in the latter part of the operations of 1899–1902 in South Africa by both cavalry and mounted colonials. It is one which can be made, where the artillery and machine guns are in cool, skilled hands, with comparative safety, but it is not one which the average cavalryman would care to make, supported by rifle fire, unless the latter can be brought up to six hundred or seven hundred yards’ distance, where they can distinguish friend from foe.
Whilst by the above we attempt to show that horse artillery is a most valuable accessory to cavalry in the attack, we believe it is even more efficacious in retreat. An artillery officer sent in advance of the rearguard can select various positions from which horse artillery, practically covered from view, can put a few shells into the mass of the enemy’s troops, as they pass some defile; or it may engage the hostile artillery in order to draw fire off the retreating cavalry, if the former exposes itself unduly. Meantime another section or battery is sent on, thus the action is taken up successively. In every case the ground should be selected so that it is (i.) possible to act in combination with the cavalry, and (ii.) withdraw without the enemy seeing the movement. Nor must it be forgotten that the enemy may engage in the “parallel pursuit,” consequently the wider the front shown by the force covering the retreat the better.
Thus it may happen that, following the rule that in a retreat the most mobile troops should be farthest out to the flanks, a cross fire may be brought by two sections on the enemy’s pursuit. The drill regulations of German cavalry, 1909, impress the point
... that, should the issue of the battle prove unfavourable, the cavalry must strain every nerve to facilitate the retreat of the other arms. It is in just such cases that they must assume a restless offensive. Repeated attacks on the flanks of pursuing troops will produce the best results.
In regard to the many other occasions on which horse artillery can assist cavalry they say:
The horse artillery will often by its fire cause the foe to disclose his strength and thus help reconnaissance. In union with maxims it enables the opposition of the enemy in occupied positions and defiles to be overcome, and thus spares the cavalry a dismounted attack.
Horse artillery and machine guns enable the cavalry to hem in at long range the enemy’s marching columns, to cause these to partially deploy through flank fire to change the direction of their march.
Horse artillery is the one thing that prevents an enemy sitting still and thus preventing the cavalry factor of mobility asserting itself.
CHAPTER XI
CO-OPERATION OF HORSE ARTILLERY WITH CAVALRY IN THE GENERAL ENGAGEMENT
“Cavalry has more need of artillery than infantry, because it cannot reply to fire, but can fight only with the steel.”—Napoleon.
Of close co-operation by the horse artillery in the charges of cavalry against infantry there is practically little or no trace in the battles of 1870. The training of cavalry and horse artillery and the organization of the cavalry division had not proceeded on these lines, as is evident from the fact that there is no mention of it in books such as Von Schmidt before that war, or in Prince Kraft’s Letters on Cavalry after it. The latter writer shows that the tendency was to deprive the cavalry division of its horse artillery when a battle took place, and put it with the corps artillery. It was claimed that by so doing the horse artillery were practically of double use.
The batteries remain as a rule with the corps artillery. If the cavalry division is sent forward, they are attached to it. If a battle takes place during which the cavalry division is held in reserve, then the horse artillery becomes again a part of the corps artillery and considerably augments its fire. The horse artillery of the Guards corps was thus employed in 1870.
For a cavalry division which takes part in a great battle does not require any horse artillery. It is held at first in reserve.
If it is called upon to attack it is obliged to make use of an opportunity of charging broken troops of the enemy. There is thus no need to break up its enemy with artillery fire, and there is, besides, no time to do so.
Compare with the above the 1907 amendments to the German Exerzier Reglement für die Kavallerie 1895, No. 375:
In a general engagement the batteries and machine guns told off to the cavalry will remain with them, because they are indispensable to the cavalry in the fulfilment of their special duties during, and particularly after, the battle.
The cavalry leader must, however, judge whether the general position does not rather demand the employment of his batteries in co-operation with the rest of the artillery. The horse artillery and machine guns will be of the greatest use in a general engagement when the cavalry are operating against the enemy’s flanks and rear. Their sudden appearance from a flank or from the rear is certain to produce a strong moral effect on the enemy.
There could scarcely be a greater volte face than is indicated by these two extracts.
Further, what we read of the use of masses of cavalry at the present date, in both the German and French manœuvres, leads us to the conclusion that their cavalry and horse artillery will be kept together in a general engagement and used for the sledge-hammer blow on both shaken and unshaken infantry.
The reader should study some of the instances given in Colonel Maude’s book, Cavalry: Its Past and Future, chaps. xi. and xii., of the charges by cavalry on infantry in the 1870 war, and picture to himself what would have been the results if these charges had been preluded by even five minutes’ gun fire of one battery of modern horse artillery, say 350 accurately placed shells, containing in all 83,600 projectiles.
A conclusion early arrived at in the consideration of the rôle of the three arms on the modern battlefield is that no artillery and infantry force, however strong, can afford to enter upon a battle unless their flanks are protected by natural obstacles or by masses of cavalry. But battles, except where we adopt the defensive, are not fought where natural obstacles cover our flank. Therefore, we must have sufficient cavalry if only to neutralize the enemy’s cavalry, otherwise they will work round our flank and attack our reserves, and, if they are accompanied by horse artillery, whilst our horse and field artillery is already engaged in the great battle, they possess a marked advantage over us.
The latest instance of the need of cavalry and horse artillery is furnished by Captain Spaits, who himself went through the retreat with the Russians after Mukden, in his book, With Cossacks through Manchuria.
He “and many others who realized the panic-stricken frame of mind of the masses of men who were pouring back without arms and without discipline” are of opinion that a “couple of good cavalry divisions, energetically led and provided with artillery and machine guns, could have turned the retreat into a complete annihilation of the army.”
The above inference is obvious when one considers the impression made on the flying troops by a few hundred indifferent horsemen.[55]
Having, it is hoped, to the reader’s satisfaction, demonstrated that cavalry with horse artillery have a great rôle on the battlefield against infantry, if (i.) the conditions are favourable, (ii.) the attack is à propos, and (iii.) properly supported by horse artillery and machine-gun fire, we turn to the form which the attack against infantry should take. Cavalry Training indicates that it should be made in a succession of lines; and it may be added that it is of the highest importance that these attacks should not be made without sufficient preliminary reconnaissance on the part of the cavalry leader accompanied by the commander of his artillery, and that subsequently the action of the infantry should be decided upon in conjunction with the infantry commander in that portion of the field.
That the infantry should not stand open-mouthed, but should press in at the right moment, is of the highest importance. As far as the troops are concerned, the formation is a simple one; but there are two points which demand forethought and arrangement. The first is the best position for the supporting fire; the second is the rallying-point. In these circumstances it appears best to have in one’s mind an ideal, as a guide, and endeavour in the actual fight to approximate to it—and we may turn to the memoirs of Napoleon for the solution. He says: “A flanking battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely is capable of deciding victory in itself.”
The ideal then appears to be: “A,” when the fire effect is delivered at right angles to the direction of the successive lines of cavalry; and “B,” when the rallying-point is fixed on the flank away from the general engagement and under cover from the enemy’s fire; “C,” when we utilize surprise. It is usually in the return from such enterprises after rallying that nine-tenths of the loss takes place. A good instance is that of Michel’s brigade at the battle of Woerth; see page 203, Maude’s Cavalry: Its Past and Future.
Suddenly the wreck of the ten squadrons of Michel’s Brigade, now making the best of their way back at full speed, but still preserving some attempt at formation, appeared right in rear of the Prussians. The latter at once wheeled troops about and charged at full gallop from the halt. Owing to the suddenness of the attack there was no time to deploy, though the outer troops attempted to gallop up into line; but the shock was sufficient to discomfort the French. There was a short mêlée, and then the Prussians, promptly rallying, swept up the debris of the French, and brought in some sixty prisoners and many riderless horses. The prompt resolution to attack and the rapid rally both deserve very high commendation.
Many writers of recent date, and especially those who are impressed with an exaggerated idea of the accuracy of rifle fire, those, in fact, of the De Bloch School, are under the impression that cavalry will not charge infantry. It is probable that, never having ridden in a force of cavalry passing through a fire-swept zone, they are unaware how much simpler it is than the attack on cavalry or artillery, and how much less resolution is needed.
In the case of cavalry there is the apparently inevitable concussion which is seen to be nearing; in the former a few men or horses drop almost unnoticed by their comrades, but most of them “carry on” for a long way after being hit. As the enemy are reached, the desire for slaughter overrides all other thoughts; cavalry should then be taught to go straight on, taking with the point what comes to them and riding their horses at speed in the direction of the rallying-point.
An example of the “counter-attack by a cavalry division on hostile infantry in order to gain time for reserves to come up” is given in General Sir D. Haig’s 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride, p. 40:
The problem here presented is one of considerably more danger and difficulty than that of completing the rout of beaten troops and reaping the fruits of victory. The enemy’s infantry, far from having lost their moral, are pressing victoriously to the attack, and, though the leading echelons may have sustained heavy losses from the fire of the defence, there are troops in reserve and support which retain their cohesion and steadiness. The responsibility for ordering an attack of this nature ... rests with the commander-in-chief. Against such an objective it is useless to send regiments at the gallop. It is necessary to (1) prepare the attack, concentrate the means for it, and bring a converging fire of guns, machine guns, and infantry upon the objective; (2) make a definite plan. This must be based on what can be seen of the enemy and his position, the use of ground, the most opportune moment; (3) dispose the troops methodically by the execution of the plan, and assign to them, if possible, their objectives; (4) give the signal for the attack at the right moment.
In the Manual of Infantry Training, 1905, under “Formations Applicable to Savage Warfare,” is found S. No. 118, which contains an instruction for “Meeting an Attack by Cavalry or Swordsmen.”
When a battalion in line is threatened by cavalry or swordsmen in force, it may sometimes be desirable to dress back the threatened flank and to dress up the unmenaced flank, the battalion commander giving the command, “Back, No. ——, up, No. ——.”
Such a formation if adopted in ordinary warfare against cavalry would favour the fire of artillery and machine guns, if the latter are placed at right angles to the attack as indicated above.
May, writing in 1896, Guns and Cavalry, says:
True, there may be opportunities when cavalry and horse artillery moving rapidly, even during the progress of a great battle, may anticipate the foe at some decisive point, and may make or prevent a telling flank movement. But for such occasions special arrangements could no doubt be made as the exigencies of the moment might dictate, and we need not legislate for them beforehand.
It is evident from the German regulations quoted above that they have no intention of trusting to the “Special arrangements” for “Exigencies.”
Their reasons no doubt are somewhat as follows:
1st. Horse artillery is an integral part of the cavalry.
2nd. Attacks on unshaken infantry depend upon horse artillery for such a preparation as will speedily reduce infantry to shaken infantry.
3rd. In order to get freedom of manœuvre for our squadrons to a flank, cavalry are bound to meet an enemy’s cavalry force, possibly belonging to an enemy whose cavalry does not leave its horse artillery behind with the corps artillery in a great general engagement.
On which side wins will depend the subsequent course of events on that flank.
4th. A cavalry force of three regiments and one battery of horse artillery is quite equal, or more than equal, to one of four regiments without horse artillery.
Having in view the above consideration, cavalry should not be prepared to forgo their horse artillery in a great general engagement, since it foredooms them to the inaction of the French and German cavalry divisions of the war of 1870, or perhaps to their comparative failure and losses, when, unsupported by horse artillery fire, they attacked infantry columns to cover the retreat of their own infantry.
Special arrangements of this kind are not made, and we know also, too well, that “No man can serve two masters.”
The latest German regulations appear, therefore, to have been formulated on sound reasoning.
CHAPTER XII
HORSE ARTILLERY FIRE EFFECT COMPARED WITH RIFLE FIRE
Henderson in Science of War, written in 1893–1902, asked the question, whether the necessary fire power should be found by the cavalry itself or by a body of mounted riflemen attached to the brigade or the division? and answered it by proposing trained mounted infantry. To the view that this fire power had better be supplied by the horse artillery he gives little or no consideration. Machine guns are also more or less ignored, and yet these in common with horse artillery are what the cavalry attack requires most in support.
Those who have frequently had to rely on fire to cover a mounted advance will agree that the fire of two hundred riflemen at eight rounds a minute for five minutes is not to be compared in efficacy with the shells of a Q.F. horse artillery battery. Their comparative value would work out in projectiles as follows:
| Guns. | Rounds. | Bullets. | Minutes. | Bullets. | |||
| 6 | × | 10 | × | 236 | × | 5 | = 70,800. |
| Rifles. | Rounds. | Minutes. | Bullets. | ||||
| 200 | × | 8 | ... | × | 5 | = 8000. |
That is, the riflemen fire less than 1/8 of the number of projectiles fired by a battery, or 1770 riflemen shoot as many projectiles as a battery in five minutes.
It is superfluous to remark on the range attained by the Q.F. gun compared with the rifle, but it is to the point to bring to notice that a Q.F. battery is controlled by one individual who is furnished with good glasses, and that the guns have telescopic sights. At a mile he will distinguish his own side. Again the battery’s front is 100 yards compared to the mile of front required by 1770 riflemen. The battery is in action within one minute and thirty seconds, whereas from the time the order is given a brigade of mounted riflemen will not be in action under five minutes at least, and will not be shooting with any degree of accuracy under eight minutes. Further, the fire of a big line of one mile in length cannot be directed, whereas a battery can be switched on and off, or so many degrees to a flank, and so on, by a simple command.
It is obvious, then, that in the attack of infantry, whether unshaken or shaken, the extended line of charging cavalry will find their most reliable support in horse artillery and machine-gun fire and not in the fire of dismounted men.
Henderson would therefore appear to have written at this time under the influence of the then accepted theory that the horse artillery would not be available to assist cavalry in a general engagement. He was also much impressed by the view that mounted infantry should supply the fire power for cavalry and prevent cavalry having recourse to fire action as much as possible; since he considered that the élan of the cavalryman would soon disappear, if once accustomed to dismount and fire as an alternative to shock action when the latter was feasible.
To sum up, present-day opinion is not in favour of mounted infantry being attached to cavalry brigades, but on the other hand horse artillery and machine guns will remain with cavalry in the general engagement, ready for any opportunity.
In order once more to emphasize the opinion that these charges of cavalry on infantry demand exceptional arrangements on the part of the general commanding the cavalry and his artillery commander, the case quoted by Prince Kraft in Letters on Cavalry, page 64, may be cited. Speaking of a French cavalry charge on Prussian infantry at Woerth, a Prussian infantry officer told him that:
At the moment our infantry were falling back down a slope from an attack which had failed, a hail of Chassepot and Mitrailleuse bullets followed them, and every one felt that he would never reach the cover of the wood which lay below them.
Tired to death and resigned to their fate, the whole of the infantry were slowly crawling towards the wood. Suddenly the murderous fire ceased. Every one stopped, astonished, to see what had saved them from the fate which seemed certain to them. Then they saw the French cuirassiers who, as they pushed forward, masked the fire of their infantry and artillery. These cuirassiers appeared to them like guardian angels. With the most perfect calm every man halted on the spot where he stood and fired at the cuirassiers, who were soon swept away by the rapid fire.
He adds at p. 67:
We see, moreover, that cavalry charges, if they break out from the front of their own infantry and mask the fire of the latter, enable the infantry which is charged to gain time, owing to the cessation of this fire, to recover their formation.
The above is one more argument in favour of constantly training our cavalry leaders till it is a second nature to apply shock at right angles to fire effect, and on no account whatever to mask the fire of their own artillery and infantry, and thus become the “guardian angels” of the infantry whom they are attacking.
Von Bernardi appears to lose sight of this, when he says, p. 208, Cavalry in Peace and War:
It is obvious that not only the preliminary deployment, but the formation, for the attack, must take place beyond the effective range of the enemy’s fire ... and nothing else can be done but to gallop straight to the front. As, however, our infantry will have to be ridden through in the charge, it is impossible in such a case to attack in close order.
This is what we consider should be avoided in the dispositions of the cavalry leader.
Again, p. 200, Von Bernardi says: “The attack will best take place from the flank.” To this there is the objection that there is not likely to be a good rallying-point in the middle of the enemy’s line.
Our conclusion is that these attacks will be least costly if they break out from our line in valleys running at right angles to it, or round the contour of a hill, and sweep the enemy by a charge parallel to our front, and that the rallying-point should be outside the flank or within our own line.
On the occasions when our infantry or dismounted riflemen made one of their regular attacks in extended order on the positions taken up by the Boers, there were almost invariably not only critical moments, but also opportunities afforded by the lie of the ground which invited a leader at the head of three or four squadrons of lancers to issue from cover in or near the Boer lines at a gallop in open order, and to sweep over the widely extended men. Three to four minutes at most would have covered the time during which these lancers would have been exposed to fire; then they could have reached a rallying-point in their own lines.
There are good grounds for the belief that such an attack is extremely demoralizing, especially if the troops have not been accustomed in peace-time to undergo it.
CHAPTER XIII
IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY
“The most arduous, while at the same time the most important, duties that devolve upon soldiers in the field are those of outposts ... all concerned should feel that the safety of the army and the honour of the country depend upon their untiring vigilance and activity.”—Lord Wolseley.
The art of maintaining himself and his command in the outpost line is a question of vigilance, imagination, and forethought on the part of the commander, and cunning on the part of his men. Let us place ourselves in the position of an officer commanding a hundred to two hundred men, and detached some ten miles out to the flank and front of a force.
The commander must take it for granted that he may be attacked at any moment, and so he must run through in his mind what he intends to do. It is his business to look ahead and foresee dangers and misfortunes—and by his preparations to rob them of their bad effect.[56] If he has left his bivouac a couple of hours before dawn and moved, carefully feeling his way, in the direction of the enemy, and has perhaps driven in one of their outposts, he need not feel it incumbent on him to hold the ground gained à outrance. He has seen into their outpost line, gained certain information, and come to certain conclusions; therefore when the enemy attack him, as they certainly will do, he should have made all preparations to fall back to the bit of good ground previously selected, where he can see and where his movements cannot be seen. Here he can make a good show, and ten to one they will let him stay there. But instead of staying there with 100 men all day, which would fatigue his men and horses without result, he places some Cossack posts and a small picket or two and retires all the rest of his men, without the enemy’s knowledge, to his bivouac, and is at breakfast by 9 or 10 A.M., his horses watered and fed. At 4 P.M. he canters out to his posts, spends the remaining daylight in observation of the enemy’s movements, relief of posts, etc., and withdraws his Cossack posts and picket at dark, leaving the picket fires well stoked up; one or two men only are left to feed these fires at intervals through the night. His real line of night outposts is placed on the possible lines of advance to his bivouac. But if his bivouac can be observed, or is likely to be reported upon to the enemy, he may change it after dark. His men should have been practised so constantly in alarm posts at night that they know exactly where to go, and what to do in case of a night alarm, and how to do so in absolute silence. Only the C.O. may make a few uncomplimentary remarks about the enemy in a stentorian voice, and invite them to “come on,” which goes far to cool the ardour of a night attack and hearten up his own men.
Next morning up again at two hours before dawn by the sound of a long-drawn-out whistle, upsaddle and off again, and get into your outpost line before dawn or, if preferred, take up a fresh line.
During the day there is plenty to do, but it is well to have an hour or so during which the men get a sleep; though with most men, after a time, it becomes a habit to sleep whenever they have nothing to do or think about, and, if they go to sleep directly it is dark, and do not sit up and talk, they get enough sleep, and are alert before dawn. All talking should be stopped a quarter of an hour after dark in every part of the lines.
The men soon learn the routine, and know how to take care of themselves, sleeping, bathing, washing, and feeding when they get a chance, and forming into small messes of four or five, who co-operate in all their food, messing, and fuel arrangements. In a very short time everything begins to go smoothly. The kits are packed, horses saddled, waggons inspanned, and coffee drunk in twenty minutes to half an hour (considerably less if there is an alarm) from the time the men are roused, whether in the dark or not. It is only when they have attained a fair degree of celerity that their C.O. can feel any confidence in them in the outpost line.
The officers, except the quarter-master and adjutant, must attend every stable hour, see the horses finished before the men leave stables, and one officer per squadron must also go to water. One glance is enough to tell an experienced eye if all is right with a horse or not. They cannot speak, but they are very full of expression if anything is wrong. The good troop and squadron leader is for ever solicitous about his horses, and woe betide the unlucky stable-guard whom he catches resting his back against a bale of hay when there is a horse loose. Once it is understood that each man stands or falls in the squadron leader’s estimation, and is noted for punishment or a light reprimand when brought up before him, according to the care of his horse, everything will go well. Nothing less will make some of them always keep up to the mark.
Nor must you forget the magpie instinct in some men, which leads them to collect all sorts of rubbish and carry it on their horses. So, on some favourable occasion on the march, halt near a deep river or pond, hold a kit and saddlery inspection, and hurl far into the water all unauthorized articles. Let the leader set the example himself of walking and leading his horse a great deal, especially down hills, when the loaded saddle slips forward on to the shoulder-blades. This is the merest routine, but a hundred things will occupy the C.O.’s mind. First, forage and water in plenty for his horses. Second, food and firing for his men. It is essential to keep the men well fed, dry,[57] if possible, and that they should always have their coffee and tea, and in trying times their glass of rum twice a week or so. Soap and tobacco are the other main essentials. If you can give them half their ration in flour and half in biscuit, it will preserve their health. There are at least twenty reasons why, if you requisition anything, you should never permit the slightest waste or prodigality. De Brack says truly: “In peace wastefulness is a wrong; in war it is a crime.” Always see a receipt is given in due form.
Detached, or in the outpost line, you are more likely to get shelter in rainy weather for your horses and men than in a big camp. Take advantage of this, but recollect that it entails extra vigilance as a rule in your outposts, and that to get out of a farm and into a fighting formation requires forethought, prearrangement, and test practice, and usually entails the improvement of existing exits, and the blocking of all approaches, etc.
One of the rules, in all contact with the enemy, is always to do the opposite to what you appear to him to be about to do, e.g. never go straight to the point for which you are really making. Never come straight back to your support. Mystify him as much as you can. Never do the same thing two days running. Always come back from a patrol by a different way from that by which you went out. When alone go across country rather than on the tracks. Patrols should go across open country in the dark and be in observation and concealed before dawn. Cunning rather than audacity is required, and should be rewarded when it has good results.
Scouts have a hard time, and it is most important to have relays of them and not to let them go out too many nights running. They must also learn to put up with or remain impervious to that foolish and abominable remark of Tommy Knowall, the young and inexperienced staff or intelligence officer: “WE knew all that before.” If chased in by superior numbers, double as a buck or fox does directly you are out of sight.
If you are scouting near the enemy’s lines do not take cover on your side of rocks, bushes, etc., but on theirs, and turn your horses and pretend to look back at your own side. They will hesitate to fire on you at 700 yards or upwards, as they will think you are their own scouts riding in. But never permit a party of your own scouts to ride in to your line without sending one of their number to gallop on and tell you who they are. A shot “across the bows” of one of your own parties which is coming into a line of videttes or bivouac, without taking this precaution, will soon teach them all to do so. À propos of this, “punishments should fit the crime,” they are more easily remembered; after all, punishments are for the prevention of similar conduct in others and not retaliatory.
A high standard of conduct, zeal, and bravery comes from the example set in the first few encounters of coolness and light-heartedness. A C.O. whose men were under a wearing fire was sent a message by a troop leader, who did not quite enjoy the situation, asking, “What shall I do?” The reply was, “Give your men the second lecture on musketry.”
No one likes to be out of the fashion, and it is desirable to lay stress on not coming off second best to the enemy; to give him more than you get; to make him pay for his audacity heavily, and so on. To do so distracts the men’s minds from your own losses in dead or wounded men, etc., of which you must make little.[58] Much mourning for the dead makes men sorry for themselves too, and has a bad effect. Shakespeare tells us:
Wise men ne’er sit and wail their loss,
But cheerly seek how to redress their harms.
(3 Henry VI. v. 4.)
Deceiving the enemy by ruses, and killing or taking him prisoner, is very desirable, and plans for doing so should be thought over and deliberately carried out. Henderson, Science of War, p. 101, says:
To sustain the moral of his own men; to break down the moral of his enemy—these are the great objects which, if he be ambitious of success, the leader must always keep in view.
Shaikh Sadi says:
If thou art harsh the foe will fight shy of thee; if thou art lenient they will be audacious and forward.
If the force to which you belong suffers reverses early in the war, “traitors,” “spies,” etc., are words which one may hear, and they will be applied ungenerously, indiscriminately, and invariably wrongly. Any talk of this sort should be sternly repressed; it is due to a craven desire to blame others for their own cowardice, which some men, curs and runaways themselves, are base enough to indulge in. This will certainly not help them to be brave on future occasions, whilst it serves to disintegrate a force. It will be found that on those men who are practised frequently in going up to the enemy’s pickets before dawn, and retiring gradually, there is not, even in a severe retreat, the same bad moral effect which there is on unpractised men.
A very important point to impress on your men is the following. No horseman should believe that he cannot escape capture, or that a bullet will hit him. Let it be clearly understood by all that, as the saying goes, “A horseman and a heavy shower of rain can get through anything.” Snap-shots fired by men in haste, or when excited, never do hit any one who is mounted and moving, especially if the firer is being “peppered” himself. A very good reason this for arranging for covering fire, if only by one rifle, when riding up to ground likely to be held by the enemy’s pickets. Another point to be remembered by scouts is that when they get into the dead ground, which is almost always to be found in front of a hill, they should always change both their pace and direction, and arrive at the top of the hill both sooner and at a different point from where they might be reasonably expected to arrive. Again, scouts in their advance should invariably look out for an alternative line of retreat, especially if they cross an obstacle such as a brook, ditch, or strong fence. They should not expect to see the enemy’s picket or videttes if they deliberately dismount in view and look for them. But if they ride back over a hill, disappear, and then creep back at another point, they are pretty sure to see some heads coming up.
In all the arrangements to be made for sending out scouts, never neglect the value of darkness for getting near the enemy’s lines, or through their line of pickets. What can be done with ease then, is impossible in daytime for the cleverest scout in the world, and it is foolish and unfair to scouts to ask them to do this; in fact, it is seldom asked for except by officers unacquainted with their business. All who have attempted to shoot big game, even in a fair moonlight, are aware how uncertain their aim is then. Consequently, if a scout stumbles on a sentry or picket at night, it is twenty chances to one that he gets off without a bullet in him. This fact it is well to remember when posting your own pickets, whom you should protect from being rushed by wires and ropes stretched a foot from the ground, some ten yards or so from their post, rather than trust to their rifle fire, for the “bullet is a fool.”
As will be seen from the above, pickets, Cossack posts, and observing parties should be in position, halted and invisible to the enemy before dawn, and should not, as a rule, be withdrawn till dusk covers them from the enemy’s observation. It seems puerile to urge these obviously common-sense precautions, and they would be omitted were it not that experience shows that they are most studiously neglected by our regular and irregular troops till bitter experience teaches their necessity.[59]
Sniping by nervous sentries, which will always take place the first few nights on which untrained or unseasoned troops are, or think they are, in contact with the enemy (note the Dogger Bank episode with Rozhestvenski’s fleet), must, and can be, at once firmly put a stop to. To do so, give orders that the C.O., adjutant, and regimental sergeant-major of the corps, in whose section of outposts it occurs, are at once to go and spend a couple of hours in the outposts, and then on their return to report whether “all is quiet in the outpost line.”
Young men, especially, are apt to get “rattled” when “on sentry go,” and to imagine small bushes and so on are the enemy’s scouts. Even fireflies are known to have been mistaken for the enemy’s lanterns and subjected to a heavy fire. When the fire had ceased, and it became evident that they were fireflies and not the enemy with lanterns, the commander of the picket was much annoyed at receiving an order to “Push in now and kill the remainder with the bayonet.” Sentries had far better rouse the rest of the group quietly in case of the enemy really being on the move towards their picket, and then all may fire a volley at “point blank” range only.
It is frequently desirable to impress the enemy with a mistaken estimate of your strength. This might be done by sending a detachment out some hours before dawn towards your base, then before it is light they turn round and march in to your bivouac in full daylight and in sight of the enemy as reinforcements.
There are obviously many plans by which an enemy can be deceived as to the strength of your force, if you can work behind cover, by first showing a number of men in one place and then in another. It is well to remember that even if an enemy sees you acting with duplicity the effect is by no means a bad one, as next time he sees you moving in your real direction he may think the action is for his benefit, and covers a movement from an entirely different direction.
In the outposts a knowledge of strategy and battle tactics is most necessary, and every officer should try to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the terrain, geography, and strategical issues of the campaign, otherwise he may miss great chances, and his extracts from the information, which he will get first of all, may be valueless instead of being such as will bring him to the favourable notice of his superiors. Nor should his superiors forget the late Admiral Makarov’s opinion, that “a sub-lieutenant acting intelligently and sensibly was more useful to the state than a flag officer who was carrying out to the letter an order which he did not clearly understand.”
In regard to terrain, if, as is most probable, the map is on a very small scale, the general direction of the watershed is one of the best general helps in finding the way.
It is absolutely necessary for any cavalry scout moving at night to know enough of the stars to orient himself and to guess correctly the time. British troops serve in so many parts of the world that no special instructions can be given, but Orion is one of the constellations which may prove useful, and which is quite unmistakable.
To establish a system by which you “picket the enemy,” which may be defined as placing observers round him so that he can make no movement without your knowledge, is the acme of good work in the outpost line: it is almost a counsel of perfection. But there are two points which deserve consideration in this connection: the first is that the mounted men whom you employ for this purpose must know, or have time to learn, the country thoroughly; and the second is that, however thoroughly you may imagine that you have picketed the enemy, he will be able to move out of his environment at night, and if your safety is based on knowledge of his movements he will, as likely as not, upset your calculations. This deduction is drawn from facts. The Boers habitually picketed our garrison towns and columns, but our columns, taking the ordinary precautions of moving by night and off the main tracks or roads, constantly surprised and captured their laagers of waggons. The “desultory operations for two or three years in South Africa,” 1899–1902, contain no unusual circumstances, we are told, but one is tempted to consider whether the outpost system evolved out of their own consciousness by the Boers was not better than that so laboriously studied by us in former days at Sandhurst. Our system was almost entirely directed towards “security,” and largely neglected “information.” Theirs studied information of the enemy first, a desire for security being a secondary consideration.[60]
As regards a service of information, certainly an idea of using contact squadrons had long been known and considered by us. Had we not long ago read the fascinating account of Curély’s adventures in De Brack, and also the “Conduct of a Contact Squadron,” translated from the German? But it soon became evident in South Africa that it was not very easy to carry out; every native was of assistance to the Boers, and afraid to serve us, even if we understood their language and could interrogate them. In this respect the Russians in Manchuria were almost similarly handicapped. It will usually be the same in war; one side can go anywhere, the other finds every man’s hand against it. Under these circumstances, to lay down one law for both sides is obviously folly. Every report on the Peninsular War shows the extent to which the French were handicapped by the guerrillas, and how our troops were assisted.
De Brack and many other writers make it plain that whilst from 1805 up to, perhaps, 1812 information was easily gained by the French cavalry for Napoleon, later a complete change came over the scene, and the Cossacks, overrunning the country, picketed the French columns. Perhaps the natives were weary of French exactions, but in any case the result is said to have been that “the genius of the Emperor was paralysed by the activity of the Cossacks.”
We have at least four or five instances where one side’s light cavalry or guerrillas “paralysed the genius” of the other’s generals by gaining superiority in the outposts, or, rather, anywhere outside their opponent’s outposts: (a) in 1812, 1813, 1814; (b) in the Peninsular War; (c) in the early part of the American Civil War; (d) in the South African War; and (e) in the Manchurian War.
With these examples before us it must become a serious factor in taking thought for a campaign, how far the cavalry will be able to effect this. Our training must be such as to enable us to play this part, of picketing the enemy, if possible; certainly we should do so in a friendly country.[61] We know it is usually only done by the side which has a knowledge of the country; but may not the almost universal knowledge of map-reading in the cavalry and a good supply of maps obviate this? But let us remember above all things that nothing will be done in war which has not by constant practice become a second nature in peace. Let us then practise not only our officers, but our men, in picketing every large body of troops which train within fifty miles of us.
Often C.O.’s, shortsightedly we think, do not welcome the attention of cavalry thus picketing them; but even if this is the case, it may still be practised by our cavalry, but in a way which does not draw attention to the fact—the training will be none the worse, and (though perhaps hardly in this sense) the “offensive spirit” must be second nature to us.[62]
The instruction of cavalry in outpost work is difficult, because in the first place many parts of the duty make great demands on the instructor’s imagination, powers of explanation, and what we may call ability for stage management.
In teaching recruits, it is far better, instead of saying “You will imagine the enemy are in that direction,” to say, “Those red flags carried by horsemen, or those men in the white caps are the enemy.” Farther, the parties carrying the red flags should, in order to show that they are enemies, take some action, such as to come within about 800 to 600 yards, and shoot with blank at the parties of recruits, retiring when the latter return the fire, etc., etc. Beginning from this point the recruit may be asked by the instructor how they would suggest that the duties of a vedette, or, better, “look-out man”[63] should be carried out, and he will then gradually impart to them the accepted mode of outpost duty, which is, after all is said and done, only common sense. For it is certain that, under active service conditions, men learn very quickly by their own mother-wit in real dangers and difficulties what precautions are necessary. These services are consequently ill taught by theoretical instruction in the barrack-room, and well taught if the work is done from the start in the open, and, for choice, in unknown ground and with a represented enemy. The ground also must be changed constantly, and this, certainly in the United Kingdom, is difficult, and makes considerable demands on horse-flesh and on the instructor’s time. But it is the one thing for which horse-flesh must not be grudged, even though the work is thankless from the point of view of immediate reward or recognition, for it is work which presents more difficulties in regard to inspection than any other; consequently, a careful instructor gets little or no credit for his work till war begins. It is only then that the immense difference between the cavalry or infantry, who are well grounded and thoroughly honest in their outpost work and those who are not so, comes to light in so-called “regrettable incidents.”
A cunning enemy will soon discriminate between those who do their outpost work well and those who do it carelessly, and will attack the latter. It may be of interest to state that a very close union soon grows up between regiments of cavalry and infantry in a column, where there is a mutual recognition of honest work in the outposts, whilst there is a wholesome detestation for slack regiments. A most important point is to train men in the duty of night outposts, whilst the subordinate leaders should have it dinned into their minds that there is always a definite point beyond which no one is to retire. It has been very truly said that sentries always think of retiring on groups, groups on pickets, pickets on supports, and supports on reserves, with the result that the enemy is in camp before you know where you are.
The training of regiments in the duties of outpost work cannot be carried out really satisfactorily and thoroughly unless the regiment goes into camp for a few days. Otherwise, many of the real difficulties, such as the cooking and supplies of food, the off-saddling, watering, reliefs of sentries and pickets, lighting of fires, arrangements for men to get a good sleep, are never grasped.