THE CONFEDERATE LINE ON SEPTEMBER 20
The Confederate line was in admirable formation on the morning of the 20th, at a distance of 400 to 1,000 yards east of the Lafayette road. From its right to its left it may be described as follows: General Leonidas Polk commanded the right wing which was formed as follows: Forrest’s cavalry on the extreme right, 3,500 strong, a large part of it dismounted; and next to him Breckenridge’s division. The cavalry and two infantry brigades of Breckenridge’s extended beyond Baird’s left; next in line came Cleburne’s division, in reserve behind Breckenridge was Walker’s two divisions of five brigades.
General Longstreet commanded the left wing of the Confederate Army. This began at Cleburne’s left with Stewart’s division opposite Palmer’s and Reynolds’s; then came B. R. Johnson’s opposite Brannan’s and Wood’s; next in line came Hindman’s, just opposite to Davis, and Sheridan’s, and in reserve behind Hindman’s was Preston’s. In reserve behind B. R. Johnson’s were Law’s or Hood’s—until Hood was wounded—and Kershaw’s five brigades in both. Cheatham’s five brigades were in reserve behind Stewart’s right, but fought only the Union left, both on the 19th and 20th. At 3:30 p. m. Cheatham went to the extreme right of the Confederate Army. The strength of the whole Confederate formation lay in its reserves; they were used with consummate ability. The only reserves on the right wing of the Union Army at the time of the Confederate assault was Van Cleve’s division—which as an organized division did not fight on the 20th—and Wilder’s mounted brigade.
Longstreet had brought with him from Virginia two divisions of Hood’s Corps—McLaws’s and Law’s. Of McLaws’s division only Kershaw’s and Humphreys’s brigades arrived in time to take part in the battle of Chickamauga. Law had three brigades in his division. These were Robertson’s, Benning’s, and another, later commanded by Colonel James L. Sheffield.
Bushrod R. Johnson’s division belonged to Buckner’s Corps from East Tennessee. Buckner’s Corps included also Stewart’s and Preston’s divisions. These were not together during the battle, but were presumably under direct command of General Longstreet. The condition of Leonidas Polk’s old corps, was almost similar. Cheatham’s division of five brigades, and Hindman’s of three brigades—of Polk’s former corps—were separated, and operated in different parts of the field. Daniel H. Hill’s Corps consisted of Cleburne’s and Breckenridge’s divisions; these acted together, commanded by Hill in person. General W. H. T. Walker’s Corps was composed of his old division, commanded by General State Rights Gist, and Liddell’s division consisting of two brigades—Govan’s and Walthall’s.
Chickamauga, morning of September 20, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, p. 268
It will be understood that the Confederate forces were large, strongly organized, well officered, and extremely well placed on the field. Since falling back from Tullahoma the following reinforcements had joined Bragg: Walker’s five brigades from Mississippi, Buckner’s six brigades from East Tennessee, and Hood’s five brigades from Virginia, besides a large amount of artillery. The coming of General Longstreet from Virginia was a distinct assistance to the Confederate Army. He was a genuine soldier of great ability, and capable of commanding his soldiers, clearly shown when he handled the left Confederate wing on the 20th. The contrast between him and Leonidas Polk was very much in evidence on the 20th. Longstreet was exceedingly strong, while Polk was very weak. The Confederate right overlapped the Union left and had the Union right been as compactly drawn towards its left as it should have been, the Confederate left would also have overlapped that flank. The Confederate Army facing the Union forces on the morning of the 20th was made up of eleven divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry. General Rosecrans had no cavalry on his left, and Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry was at first on the east side of the Chickamauga and afterwards on the west side, watching Mitchell’s Union horsemen near Crawfish Springs.
General Rosecrans had 141 regiments of infantry, 18 of cavalry, and 36 batteries. Bragg had 173 infantry regiments, 11 of cavalry—which were dismounted and fought as infantry—28 cavalry regiments, and 50 batteries.
The Union front of battle on the morning of the 20th, was about two and a half miles in length. Although Bragg had ordered the attack to be commenced on his right at daylight, and to be continued towards the left, yet it was 9:30 o’clock before Breckenridge advanced his three brigades, Adams’s, Stovall’s, and Helm’s against the left of Baird’s and John Beatty’s thin line beyond. Adams’s brigade on the right crossed the Lafayette road, and Stovall struck Beatty. The latter had to give way, but inflicted terrible punishment on the enemy.
Part of Stovall’s brigade came against the regular brigade, but made no impression. Helm, the left of Breckenridge’s line, attacked the right of the regulars’, Scribner’s line. The Confederate line was shattered and went to pieces. Helm, in bravely trying to rally his men was killed; two of Helm’s colonels were also killed, and two others wounded.
Adams’s brigade was gaining the rear of King, when Stanley’s brigade of Negley’s long delayed division came into the Kelly field, and formed at right angles with the road and the Union line swept to the north, past King’s left, charged into the woods upon Adams’s brigade, and drove it away. Sometime during their attacks Adams was wounded and taken prisoner. Breckenridge’s attack was a failure, but the firing by the infantry and the artillery was terrific while it lasted. Cleburne’s division advanced while Breckenridge was still in the fight; his attack covered part of Baird’s and Johnson’s. Cleburne was a very capable officer; brave to the utmost; still his attack completely failed. Polk’s brigade of that division assaulted Starkweather. With regard to this attack Polk states in his official report[20] “My line from right to left, soon became furiously engaged, the enemy pouring a most destructive fire of canister and musketry into my advancing line—so terrible indeed, that my line could not advance in face of it, but lying down, partially protected by the crest of the hill, we continued the fight for an hour and a half.”
Cleburne states in his report[21] “Polk’s brigade and the right of Wood’s encountered the heaviest artillery fire I have ever experienced. I was now within short canister range of a line of log breastworks, and a hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods from the unseen enemy in my front.” This charge was also a failure, but most destructive to the Confederates. Wood reported[22] a loss in his brigade of 96 killed and 680 wounded. The great disparity of the wounded, in comparison with the killed, showed that the Confederate lines did not get very close to the Union boys. The Union forces were so pleased with having repulsed so forceful an attack, that they sent forward a strong skirmish line. General Hill—who was forming from the reserves a stronger second attack—paused, and concluded he would have to resist an attack from the Union line.
Walker’s reserve corps of two divisions of five brigades was therefore moved forward and distributed along the broken points of the first line. During the day successive charges were made from Palmer’s position to the Union left, by ten Confederate brigades along the Union line, which, however, they could not penetrate, nor could they get very close to the breastworks. Colquitt, commander of one of these brigades, fell as well as several of his officers, and General Deshler of Cleburne’s division was killed. Govan of Walker’s troops gained the rear of Baird’s division by marching around Baird’s left and driving away the thin unprotected Union line at that point. This second advance—which was actually another phase of the continuous attack from 9:30 to nearly noon—had extended its right much further beyond the Union left, and by a wide left wheel it had straddled the Lafayette road. One brigade on the right of the road, another on the left, boldly threw out skirmishers and advanced towards General Reynolds’s rear, beyond the Kelly house. It was a very threatening and dangerous situation. The Confederate line in front—from Baird around to Brannan—opened a heavy fire upon the barricades. It looked for a while, as if the movement would succeed in destroying the heretofore invincible line of General Thomas’s troops; but Thomas saw every movement and knew the weakness of the left beyond Baird. Brannan had a reserve brigade—Fred Van Derveer’s—and this arrived just in time to form in front of the Confederate brigades in the Kelly field. It changed front under fire, charged the Confederate line, broke it, and finally drove it clear of the Union left. Then the reserve brigade returned to a point near the Kelly house. Van Derveer’s brigade had come, at this time, with an order from General Rosecrans to Brannan, to report his whole division to General Thomas. It was under the supposition that Brannan had done so, that Rosecrans soon after issued the fatal order to Wood to close up on Reynolds. But the enemy had gained the line, where Beatty had before stood. Palmer sent his reserve brigade (Grose’s), in accordance with General Thomas’s order; his brigade formed double lines, and with cheers they charged into the woods and the enemy was driven away. Then Barnes, of Van Cleve’s division, was placed on or near the left; the Union left was henceforth safe.