WISCONSIN TROOPS AT CHICKAMAUGA

There were five infantry regiments from Wisconsin in the battle of Chickamauga, viz.: the First, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-first, and Twenty-fourth. The First and Twenty-first were parts of the Second Brigade, commanded by General John C. Starkweather—formerly Colonel of the First Wisconsin Infantry—of the First Division, commanded by General Absalom Baird, of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General George H. Thomas. They were actively engaged near the extreme left on both days of the battle. When Baird’s division on the morning of the 19th advanced from Kelly’s house on the Lafayette road, Starkweather’s brigade was in reserve behind the other two brigades of the division. His brigade was formed in two lines, the first composed of the First Wisconsin on the right and the Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania on the left, with the Fourth Indiana Battery between the two wings. The Twenty-first Wisconsin Infantry and Twenty-fourth Illinois Infantry formed the rear line. Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Bingham commanded the First, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison C. Hobart the Twenty-first. Having advanced about a mile through the woods, driving the enemy’s skirmishers, Starkweather moved to Thomas’s left by the order of the General, in order to relieve Croxton’s brigade of Brannan’s division, reported to be out of ammunition. General Starkweather seems to have no sooner taken position here than the enemy attacked in such overwhelming numbers as to force him back. He retreated to a ridge in the rear of his left; leaving his battery temporarily in the possession of the enemy. Very soon the enemy was struck on his flank and rear by General Johnson’s division of McCook’s Corps and forced back; the battery was then recovered.

In reforming the lines late in the afternoon, Starkweather’s brigade was placed on the left of Johnson’s division; it took part in the night attack by the Confederate General Cleburne, and was under fire during the whole of the battle of the 19th. On the morning of the 20th it formed the right of Baird’s position in the woods east of the Kelly field, and was in one of the most exposed positions; this brought it again on the left of Johnson’s division. The Fourth Indiana Battery had two guns in the centre of the brigade and two upon the left. General Starkweather in his official report says: “This position was held and retained during the whole day under repeated attacks from the enemy in heavy columns supported with batteries, repulsing and driving the enemy back from time to time; driving the enemy also back from the extreme left with the artillery. * * * While holding this position the ammunition of my first line was expended, and most of the second line, together with all the ammunition of the battery, except three rounds of canister.”[29] He retired with the rest of Baird’s division in the evening of the 20th to Rossville, thence to Chattanooga on the 22nd. In the retirement, Lieutenant-Colonel Hobart, eight other commissioned officers, and 67 men of the Twenty-first Wisconsin were captured by the enemy. The loss of the First Wisconsin was 188 killed, wounded, and missing; the latter being 77. The officers killed were Captains Abner O. Heald, and William S. Mitchell; Lieutenants James S. Richardson, and Charles A. Searles. Of the Twenty-first the loss was 121, of these 76 were missing. The First seems to have gone into the battle with 391, and the Twenty-first with 369 men.

The Tenth Wisconsin Infantry—commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Ely—was in Scribner’s brigade of Baird’s division. The history of its fighting is almost identical with that of the First and Twenty-first. On the 20th the Tenth Wisconsin Infantry was immediately on the left of Starkweather. Colonel Ely, Major McKercher and several other officers, together with a large number of men were captured in falling back (by orders), on the evening of the 20th. They, by mistake, took the wrong direction, going too far to the right, as they faced the rear, and thus ran into the enemy. Its loss was a total of 211, but 145 of these were missing. Captain J. W. Roby, who made the report says: “Monday morning September 21st we numbered three officers and 26 men.” Lieutenant-Colonel Ely’s name appears among those killed; the other officers killed were Captain George M. West and Lieutenant Robert Rennie.

The Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry served in the Third brigade, Davis’s division of the Twentieth Corps. This brigade was commanded by Colonel Hans C. Heg until he was killed on the 19th; and afterwards by Colonel John A. Martin. This regiment fought most gallantly with Davis’s division on the 19th, when, according to their official report, the loss was 7 officers and 59 enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing. It will be remembered that on the 20th General Davis’s division was cut off on the right by the break at Wood’s division, and that it, after some desultory fighting, retired to McFarland’s Gap. The total loss of the Fifteenth Wisconsin Infantry was 111, of which 55 men were captured or missing. The officers killed were Colonel Hans C. Heg, Captains Hans Hanson, Henry Hauff, John M. Johnson, and Lieutenant Oliver Thompson.

The Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Infantry was in General Lytle’s brigade of the First Division of the Twentieth Corps. This regiment, with the brigade to which it was attached, occupied the entrenchments at Lee and Gordon’s Mill on the afternoon of the 19th, where it relieved General Thomas J. Wood’s division; it remained here all afternoon under a little artillery fire from the enemy, which did no harm, however. At 3 a. m. on the 20th it went to a point near General Rosecrans’s headquarters, near the Widow Glenn’s house; at 10:30 a. m. it double quicked—under a terrific fire from the enemy—to the point where General Lytle was killed; it fought here for thirty minutes driving the enemy, but was soon outflanked by Hindman’s troops coming toward its left flank from the celebrated break. The official report of its commander (Major Carl Von Baumbach), from which the foregoing facts are gleaned, says further: “We retreated in some disorder; but quickly reformed on a hill some 400 yards to the rear. Our brave and gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. West, being among the missing, I assumed command.” This regiment bivouaced for the night at Rossville; its loss was 3 officers and 69 men killed and wounded, and 20 missing; Captain Gustavus Goldsmith was killed. The Major in his report makes especial mention of Lieutenant Thomas E. Balding, acting adjutant, for his gallant conduct.

The First Wisconsin Cavalry—under command of Colonel Oscar H. LaGrange—was a part of the Second Brigade, of Colonel Edward M. McCook’s cavalry division. During the campaign, preceding the battle, this regiment performed the usual duties of cavalry in reconnoitering, picketing, leading in advance of the marching column of infantry, and generally acting with the rest of the cavalry, as the eyes of the army. On the 19th it was stationed on the right of the army to watch the enemy’s cavalry, which kept on the east side of the Chickamauga in the movement back to Rossville, and thence into Chattanooga, it protected the trains and rear of the army. Its loss was 2 men wounded and 4 missing.

There were three Wisconsin light batteries with the Army of the Cumberland, in the battle of Chickamauga: the Third, Fifth, and Eighth. The Third Battery—commanded by Lieutenant Courtland Livingston—was attached to Van Cleve’s division of Crittenden’s Corps. Captain L. H. Drury of this battery, was chief of artillery of the division; he was severely wounded in a skirmish several days before the battle. This battery followed the fortunes of its division; but there seems to be no definite report by its commanding officer. Its losses were 2 killed, 12 wounded and 12 missing, out of an aggregate of 119.

The Fifth Wisconsin Battery, commanded by Captain George Q. Gardner was attached to the First Brigade, commanded by Colonel P. Sidney Post of General Jefferson C. Davis’s division of the Twentieth Corps. This brigade was guarding the supply train, and was not engaged in the battle, and this battery had no losses. The brigade commander, in his official report, commends Captain Gardner for great zeal and ability in the management of the battery.

The Eighth Wisconsin Battery—commanded by Lieutenant John D. McLean—was attached to Colonel Heg’s brigade of Davis’s division of McCook’s Twentieth Corps. The chief of artillery of Davis’s division reports, that the movement of the artillery in the Chickamauga woods was not deemed practicable; therefore, this battery did not become engaged, and had no losses.

The Chickamauga campaign proper was now ended. It formed the second step in the campaign from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga; the Tullahoma campaign being the first. It is true, the city was now occupied by the Army of the Cumberland, but its possession was not secure as long as the Confederate Army lay within two or three miles, and held the city’s most available lines of supply by the river and the river road, between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Therefore, another conflict was necessary, which would constitute the third step in the great campaign. An account of that struggle will include the coming of reinforcements to the Union Army; the opening of what the men in the ranks called, “the cracker line;” the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland; and an account of the four battles of Wauhatchie, Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge. But before that is attempted, it will be necessary to make some observations on the late battle of Chickamauga.

The Army of the Cumberland—or rather that part of it which now occupied the city—was reduced by the Chickamauga battle to an estimated aggregate of 35,000. This estimate excluded perhaps the cavalry. Its total losses, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the Chickamauga campaign reached 13,615. A large number of sick, besides the wounded, were in hospitals. But the Confederate losses were at least 5,374 more than those of the Union Army. General Longstreet, in his book, From Manassas to Appomatox, claims that the Confederate force at Chickamauga was somewhat less than 60,000 men. The Confederate records are so defective that it is largely an estimate to give their numbers or losses. General H. V. Boynton estimates the number at very much more than 60,000. There is no doubt that Bragg actually outnumbered Rosecrans on the field by several thousand troops, perhaps in the proportion of 60,000 to 50,000.

The Union Army captured 2,003 prisoners, and lost 4,774. Of the latter 2,500 were wounded and left on the field when the army fell back to Rossville. The terrible fighting which took place is shown by the number of killed and wounded on each side. Longstreet says in his book, that Bragg’s killed and wounded amounted to 16,986, but the official returns make them about 1,100 less, or 15,881. The official returns of the army give the Union losses of killed and wounded 11,338. The Confederate loss was greater in killed and wounded than at Gettysburg; and the largest the enemy had in a single battle. Attention is called to the fact, that the numbers engaged at Gettysburg were about 80,000 on each side; and that the battle lasted three days.

The killed and wounded in some battles of the war are shown in the following table:

Union Confederate
Shiloh, Tenn. 10,162 9,735
Second Bull Run 10,199 9,108
Fredericksburg, Va. 10,884 4,664
Chancellorsville, Va. 11,368 10,746
Gettysburg, Pa. 17,567 15,298
Chickamauga, Ga. 11,409 15,881
Stone’s River 9,532 9,239
Antietam, Md. 11,657 11,234

In every one of these battles the Union loss was greater than the Confederate, except at Chickamauga; yet Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Stone’s River are recorded as Union victories. The Confederate loss at Antietam was much smaller than that given above, which includes Harper’s Ferry, South Mountain, Crampton’s Gap, and Shepardstown. The prisoners captured are excluded from the above list, because only the killed and wounded indicate the intensity of the fighting.

The Confederate’s large losses at Chickamauga show plainly the active musketry of the Union troops, their good marksmanship, and the difference (in the number of casualties) between making and receiving attacks. On the second day the Union troops remained in line and received the attacks of the Confederates. At Gettysburg the Union forces did the same thing during the last two days. Those on the left at Chickamauga were protected by breastworks, and suffered but little loss on the 20th; while they inflicted very heavy punishment on the Confederates; for instance, Hill’s Corps of the Confederate right lost 2,990 out of 8,894; Jackson’s brigade of Cheatham’s division lost 35 per cent. of his force, and the losses in Govan’s brigade exceeded 50 per cent. On the Union side Steedman, while attacking the Confederate troops—which had gained an enfilading position and were about to attack the right flank of Brannan—lost in this assault and in the subsequent position which his troops occupied, 1,787 out of 3,700 in about four hours. The loss is fearful, when assaults are made on protected lines, or on points held with difficult approaches. On the Confederate left Benning’s brigade of Hood’s division lost 56.6 per cent.; Gregg’s brigade of B. R. Johnson’s lost 44.4 per cent. Taking Longstreet’s estimate of 16,986 killed and wounded, and adding to it the number of prisoners captured, namely, 2,003, the total Confederate loss aggregates 18,989. It is officially established that the Union loss was 11,338 in killed and wounded; its loss in prisoners was 4,774; but 2,500 of them were wounded and were left on the battlefield. It is reasonable to suppose that these wounded left on the field were reported as wounded by their company officers, and are included in the official returns of the 11,338.

The historian will point out sharply the immense benefit to the Union Army derived from the log works and the compact lines of the four divisions under General Thomas on the 20th. The conclusion is a fair one, that the whole line ought to have been similarly fortified; there was ample supply of timber along the line to provide for such protection. Of the five divisions under General Thomas’s command on the 19th and on the 20th, Brannan’s was the only one which fought both days without works; on the 19th none of them fought behind any entrenchments, yet they fought against six Confederate divisions, viz.: two of Walker’s corps, two of Cheatham’s, Cleburne’s, and Stewart’s. On the 20th Brannan was on the right and did not fight any of the Confederate troops, which Baird’s, Johnson’s, Palmer’s, Reynolds’s, and his own divisions had fought on the 19th. Van Derveer’s brigade of Brannan’s division made one charge, however, along the Kelly field, against two brigades of Breckenridge’s; then returned to the right. But it must be noticed that Breckenridge was not in the fight of the 19th. On the 20th Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds fought behind breastworks all day the same divisions they had fought the day before without breastworks, and also Breckenridge’s in addition. It is true they were assisted a little by two brigades of Negley’s and one of Van Cleve’s on the left of the breastworks. In addition to the Confederate infantry divisions mentioned, there was also Forrest’s cavalry of 3,500, which would more than offset any assistance these four Union divisions had received from other troops on the 20th. The following table will show the losses in killed and wounded of the divisions on both sides, with the exception of prisoners captured during the two days of battle in and around the Kelly field.

The figures are taken from the official returns:

Union Confederate
Brannan—Three Brigades 1,977 Walker—Five Brigades 2,290
Baird—Three Brigades 975 Cheatham—Five Brigades 1,843
Johnson—Three Brigades 1,088 Cleburne—Three Brigades 1,743
Palmer—Three Brigades 1,165 Stewart—Three Brigades 1,674
Reynolds—Two Brigades 778 Breckenridge—Three Brigades 1,075
——— ———
Total 5,983 Total 8,625

There were 14 Union brigades and 19 Confederate. It will be seen that Brannan, who was not protected by works on the 20th, lost about 800 more than the highest loss of any of the Union divisions, which were protected. That is a practical illustration of the value of the precautions thus taken by the protected troops. Estimating Brannan’s loss on the 20th at 900, his loss on the 19th would be 1,077. This would reduce the total loss in the Union column above to 5,083. Considering that the Confederate divisions mentioned above encountered no other Union troops during the battle, except those five divisions mentioned, it will be understood that the five Union divisions by incurring a loss of 5,083 killed and wounded, inflicted a loss on the enemy of 8,625. Forrest’s loss does not appear but should be added to the latter; let this item be offset, however, by the losses to Beatty’s Stanley’s and Barnes’s brigades in their assistance on the left of Baird.

We will make a similar comparison of the losses on the right of the Union, and the left of the Confederate Army:

Union
Steedman 1,174—Two Brigades
Sheridan 1,090
Davis 944—Two Brigades
Wood 876—Two Brigades
Van Cleve 660
Negley 496
Brannan (estimate) 900
———
Total 6,140
Confederate
HoodSix Divisions, 6,881 (estimated)
Hindman
Buckner
Preston

The estimated Confederate loss given above has been made up in the following manner. The official Confederate loss is given by Colonel W. F. Fox in his Regimental Losses in the Civil War as 15,881 killed and wounded at Chickamauga, the Confederate loss of the troops opposed to the above named Union divisions can be found by adding to 8,625—the Confederate losses in the first table given above—the estimated loss of the Confederate cavalry, probably enough to bring the figures to 9,000, and deducting that from 15,881, the total Confederate loss is secured. The result makes 6, 881 killed and wounded—as given in the last table—by the seven Union divisions mentioned above, at a cost to the latter of 6,140 killed and wounded. Longstreet gives in his report his loss at 7,594 killed and wounded; deducting Stewart’s loss from this sum leaves 5,920 as the loss of the above mentioned Confederate forces. This makes the contrast between the two tables still greater.

These figures emphasize the deadly fighting in that great battle, and they are more eloquent of the valor of American soldiers than words of song or oratory. They emphasize also the value of defensive breastworks, in comparison with fighting unprotected.

The Union troops expended 2,650,000 musket cartridges in hitting the 15,881 Confederate killed and wounded; some of them were, however, wounded by artillery. It appears as if it took about 150 infantry cartridges to hit one man. The expenditure was 650,000 more cartridges than at Stone’s River; but then 6,642 more of the Confederates were struck at Chickamauga, which shows that the firing was much more destructive.

General Rosecrans states:[30] “The fight on the left after 2 p. m., was that of the army. Never, in the history of this war at least have troops fought with greater energy and determination. Bayonet charges, often heard of but seldom seen, were repeatedly made by brigades and regiments in several of our divisions.”

At 2 p. m. on September 21, C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, sent a dispatch from Chattanooga to the Secretary of War. It contained the following statements: “Thomas, finding himself cut off from Rosecrans and the right, at once brought his seven divisions into position for independent fighting. Refusing both his right and left, his line assumed the form of a horse-shoe posted along the slope and crest of a partly wooded ridge. He was soon joined by Granger from Rossville, with the brigade of McCook and division of Steedman, and with these forces firmly maintained the fight till after dark. Our troops were as immovable as the rocks they stood on. The enemy hurled against them repeatedly the dense columns which had routed Davis and Sheridan in the morning, but every onset was repulsed with dreadful slaughter. Falling first on one and then another point of our lines, for hours the rebels vainly sought to break them. Thomas seemed to have filled every soldier with his own unconquerable firmness, and Granger, his hat torn by bullets, raged like a lion wherever the contest was hottest with the electrical courage of a Ney. * * * When night fell this body of heroes stood on the same ground they had occupied in the morning their spirit unbroken, but their numbers greatly diminished. * * * The divisions of Wood, Johnson, Brannan, Palmer, Reynolds, and Baird, which never broke at all, have lost very severely.”[31] He should have added that they inflicted greater loss upon the enemy than any of the other divisions. The discouraged spirit of the Confederate Army at the close of the battle was sufficiently apparent when the forces under Thomas’s command were able—after the arrival of General Gordon Granger’s troops—to stop the enemy’s further successes. It is evident that the fighting spirit was gone from Bragg’s army since, although they discovered the falling back, they did not approach Rossville Gap on the 21st with a considerable force, nor seriously interfere in the backward movement to Chattanooga, not even trying to capture a wagon, mule, or horse, although its great cavalry leader, Forrest and his troopers, were in force close to Rossville Gap. It was more paralyzed than the Union Army. General Daniel H. Hill, who commanded a Confederate corps on the right in the battle, states in the article referred to before: “There was no more splendid fighting in ’61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, ’63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga—that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. * * * He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That ‘barren’ victory sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy.”[32]

If the Army of the Cumberland accomplished so much at Chickamauga in spite of certain mistakes, after having penetrated to the centre of the Confederate territory, what might not have been done, if the right of the Union line had been properly placed and protected during the night of the 19th, and if the disastrous order to Wood had not been issued? The withdrawal of Wood from the line—just before Bushrod Johnson advanced against the centre—cost the Union fighting line 10,000 men, and caused the withdrawal, some hours later, of the Union Army to Rossville. Whether Wood interpreted that order correctly, the fact is that the order should never have been issued. The movement of closing in towards the left and of throwing the right further back, should have been done hours before. One of Mitchell’s cavalry divisions should have been placed on the Union left during the night of the 19th.

It must be conceded that Brannan’s division was the most active in the battle. It was well managed, but its loss in killed and wounded was greater than that of any other Union division. Brannan lost in killed and wounded 1,977, with 214 missing. His division fought bravely under his skillful management, yet he was unprotected on both days. Negley’s loss was 496 killed and wounded, the smallest loss of all. The following officers went through the battle with great credit, viz.: Generals Thomas, Granger, Steedman, Brannan, Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds; and Brigade-Commanders Hazen, Harker, Van Derveer, Croxton, Whittaker, John C. Mitchell, Willich, and Turchin.

If a real soldier, like Longstreet, had been in command of the Confederate right and had found upon advancing against the Union line, that two brigades lengths extended beyond the Union left, he would certainly have made more out of such a condition than did Breckenridge or Leonidas Polk.

General D. H. Hill, in his report[33] discusses the situation as follows: “The important results effected by two brigades on the flank proved that, had our army been moved under cover of the woods a mile farther to the right, the whole Yankee position would have been turned and an almost bloodless victory gained. A simple reconnoisance before the battle would have shown the practicability of the movement and the advantage to be gained by it.” Hill was in command on that flank and should have acted in accordance with his understanding of the situation, or at least reported the facts to his superior. This was what Rosecrans was anxious about when he hastened troops from the right to the left. If Sheridan could have reached Thomas before Longstreet cut him off in the act of double-quicking toward the left flank, what would have happened?

General Thomas’s dispositions to protect his left showed military genius of the highest order, and General Baird greatly assisted him in this matter. This was only one instance, however, of General Thomas’s many equally meritorious tactics in this great battle. He rose to the highest point in the estimation of both officers and men.

Both days’ fighting illustrates the fact that when troops are outflanked or attacked in the rear, however brave they may be in other positions relative to the enemy, they will as a rule go to pieces. It was repeatedly shown on both sides, especially on the 19th, during the battle, that the veteran troops as well as the new regiments, would become disheartened and confused in such a position; many of the regiments on the left during the second day, who did not flinch when attacked in flank and rear on the day before, then went to pieces.

The protected troops on the Union left fought through the entire day of the 20th, entirely unconscious that they were frequently surrounded not only in front and rear of their own line, but that the two flanks of the army were only about three-fourths of a mile apart, although in the morning they were two and a half miles apart. At noon the Union right was contracted, and thrown back against the left. The order to retreat late in evening of the 20th came as a surprise and shock to these troops, who had been repulsing the enemy all day with comparative ease. Thousands of musket bearers were so stiff and sore from the two days’ conflict and the marches over the mountains during the preceding days, that when a regiment lying down on the evening of the 20th attempted to rise there was a distinct creaking of bones and an accompanying groan, slight, but perceptible. Many of them while moving back to Rossville at night, took the desperate chance of lying down for a nap in the woods by the roadside, intending to rest for an hour or two and then join their regiments again before daylight; but hundreds of these awoke to find it was already daylight and many were captured by the enemy’s cavalry.

The Confederate Army itself did not advance from the battlefield until the 23rd; only a small part leaving on the 22nd. The fact is that the Confederate Army was much more used up than the Union Army; General Bragg said to General Longstreet on the 20th that his troops upon his right were used up.[34] The same Confederate troops which had penetrated the line and driven Davis, Sheridan, and others from the field, were so roughly handled by Brannan and Granger on Snodgrass Hill that they could not be brought forward for another attack. The slowness with which the Confederate Army moved to their positions around Chattanooga proves that they were practically defeated. At the time the orders were sent to the divisions behind the log works on the left to prepare for withdrawal, their commanders sent word back to General Thomas that there was no reason for them to retreat; they had been, and were at that moment repulsing easily every assault. They did not know of the disaster to the right, caused by Wood’s withdrawal, nor did General Baird and his brigade commanders know of the movements of either Union or Confederate forces until after the retreat. Many writers have expressed the opinion that the Union Army should not have retreated. But to a soldier who was present on the field and knew the facts—such as the absence of the commander of the army; his order sent from the far rear to fall back to Rossville; the absence of ammunition and rations; the utterly exhausted condition of the rank and file by the superhuman exertions of the two days’ fighting and the preceding hard marching; the fear that if the Union Army remained, the Confederate Army might yet wedge its way between it and Chattanooga, the Union commander not being aware at that time of the exhausted and discouraged condition of the Confederate Army—it seems that the falling back in the way and at the time it did was the correct thing. At least it seems as if Thomas had really nothing else to do than to fall back when the order from General Rosecrans was received. Had General Thomas been the commander of the army, it might have been different.

The Union cavalry did not properly cooperate with the other arms of the Union forces. Forrest, with his large Confederate cavalry force, was close to the right of the Confederate Army, and did fine service; the force was equal to the infantry in number. Forrest should have been opposed by a division of the Union cavalry. Only one cavalry brigade was needed at Crawfish Springs; the other cavalry brigade together with Wilder’s mounted infantry which closed up on the right of McCook, should have given better service at a time when it was most needed. This was not the fault of the cavalry commander, for he only obeyed orders from his superiors. In a dispatch to General R. B. Mitchell, the commander of the cavalry, at 7:15 p. m. September 20, General Rosecrans said, “Had you been on our right today you could have charged the enemy’s flank, and done much incalculable mischief.” Why was not his cavalry as close to the Union right flank as Forrest’s was to the Confederate right flank? Mitchell’s cavalry was too far away to be effective, when disaster overtook the wing: it was supposed to be protecting, but it was farther away from Snodgrass Hill on the right than were the forces of Gordon Granger, at McAffee’s church on the left.

CHAPTER III
The Occupation and Battles of Chattanooga

When the Army of the Cumberland fell back from Chickamauga and Rossville to Chattanooga, the first and most important thing to do was to quickly fortify against attack. The troops marched directly to the places assigned them, and when all were in place, the lines half encircled the city, both flanks terminating at the river. McCook was on the right, Thomas next, and Crittenden on the left. The troops began at once the work of throwing up the ordinary entrenchments; these were from time to time strengthened until satisfactory. Two forts had been partially completed by the enemy; these were finished and occupied by both artillery and infantry. The army was drawn in close around the city; the point of Lookout Mountain and its slopes beyond Chattanooga Creek were left to the enemy. This gave the Confederate Army command of the river, the rail and wagon roads (parallel with the river), between Chattanooga, Bridgeport, and Stevenson. The only other practicable road to the bases of supplies was over Walden’s Ridge on the north side of the river, a distance of 60 miles by wagon; thus it became very difficult to furnish more than half or three-quarters rations to the men, and only very little forage could be furnished to the animals. The road mentioned was so steep and bad that a team of four or six mules would consume almost the entire load of feed in bringing the load and in returning for another.

General Bragg deemed the occupancy of his main line along Missionary Ridge—across the valley to Lookout Mountain, thence on the south side of the river by small detachments at different points—to Bridgeport sufficient to starve out the army in Chattanooga. Meanwhile he sent Wheeler’s cavalry to the north side, in order to raid the line of supplies. Wheeler burned 300 wagons in the Sequatchie Valley and went on north doing what damage he could. Fearing that Bragg might follow Longstreet’s advice and cross the river east of Chattanooga with a large part of his army, Rosecrans soon completed an inside works of circumvallation by which ten thousand men might be able to hold the city, while he might be obliged to protect his base of supplies by marching the rest of his army to meet such a situation. That Bragg did not undertake an enterprise of this character was further proof of the used-up condition of his army, the result of the late battle of Chickamauga. Bragg’s reasoning regarding his ability to starve the forces in the city was good only on the supposition that the Government at Washington would fail to send sufficient reinforcements to protect the rear, and to raise “The Siege of Chattanooga;” it was not more than a semi-siege, however, and has been so called by some authors. If Bragg’s army had occupied both sides of the river and practically surrounded the city, as the German troops surrounded Paris in the Franco-German War of 1871, then it could have been called a siege. Of course the situation of the Union Army was critical, not only here in the fortified city, but ever since it crossed the Tennessee River during the campaign preceding the battle of Chickamauga. As before mentioned, General Rosecrans estimated on September 23, 1863, that he had about 35,000 troops in the entrenchments; the cavalry and Wilder’s brigade of mounted infantry were then on the north side of the river and guarded the crossings for a considerable distance, both above and below. Union reinforcements had been ordered both from the east and from the west; but Burnside, who commanded in East Tennessee, was asking at the same time for help at Knoxville, instead of being able to send any succor to Rosecrans. Before the battle of Chickamauga reinforcements had been ordered from the Army of the Tennessee—at that time on or near the Mississippi at Memphis—and from Burnside, but none had arrived. After the great battle and the falling back of Rosecrans, the commander did not need to urge the President and Secretary of War to be convinced, that unless they really desired to lose Tennessee and all that had so far been gained in the department of the Cumberland, other troops must be sent with the greatest celerity. Two corps from the Army of the Potomac were ordered to the battlefield; the Eleventh commanded by General O. O. Howard, and the Twelfth under General H. W. Slocum; both under the command of General Joseph Hooker. General W. T. Sherman was also to reinforce the Union Army with the Fifteenth Corps, and one division of the Seventeenth from the Army of the Tennessee. In the meantime every exertion was made by the troops present to hold the city at all hazards. When Wheeler captured and burned the 300 wagons near Anderson’s cross roads, in the Sequatchie Valley, Colonel E. M. McCook with the First Wisconsin Cavalry, the Second and Fourth Indiana cavalry and a section of artillery started from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley. Retarded by an incessant rain, he was in time to see the smoke only of the burning wagons; he made a charge and drove a detachment of the enemy’s troops past the fire upon their main body. He followed this Confederate division—which was commanded vigorously by Martin and Wheeler—out of the valley, captured a number of soldiers and 800 mules and saved some of the wagons. Wheeler reached McMinnville in time to capture the garrison and burn the supplies. He was off toward Murfreesboro before the arrival of Crook and his command, who had taken up the pursuit. The Union cavalry corps, commanded by R. B. Mitchell, with McCook’s division, joined Crook at Murfreesboro and saved that place from capture. They followed Wheeler so persistently and fought him so successfully that they prevented the destruction of the railroad, but were unable to save the telegraph lines. Wheeler crossed back at Rogersville to the south of the Tennessee; Mitchell followed and captured at that point a large amount of Confederate cotton and destroyed it. Mitchell prevented the Confederate advance to Winchester and Decherd after having heard at Huntsville, Alabama, that Roddey’s Confederate cavalry was moving towards these cities, having been forced to recross the river. Bragg’s intention was to destroy Rosecrans’s communications and to force him to abandon Chattanooga. The maintenance of the railroad back to Nashville was of vital importance to the Union Army. Wheeler’s loss on this raid was according to the estimate of General Crook, 2,000 men and 6 pieces of artillery. These fatalities made the Confederate commander more cautious. Crook’s loss was only 14 killed and 97 wounded. Wheeler’s raid and the Union pursuit, are specimens of the kind of warfare which cavalry are expected to make, showing the terrible destruction of men and horses, the untiring marches, and watchfulness necessary in a field so extensive and difficult as that of the department of Cumberland. It would have been much more economical and effective, if the War Department had previously protected the railway with sufficient infantry, as it now intended to do, than to protect it by an ordinary force of cavalry. The Department did adopt the plan of protecting the railway with infantry, when Hooker came with a division; this mode was most effectively used also in 1864.

Although the railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was being maintained and supplies were accumulated at the latter city, yet the necessity of hauling supplies by wagons over such an extended and precipitous road as the one over Walden’s Ridge, and the destruction of so many wagons by Wheeler, told heavily on the devoted troops in the entrenched city. The rains were heavy and continuous during the early part of October, making the roads almost impassable in some places. The trips to Bridgeport seemed gradually to lengthen, the mules became thinner, and so the rations had to be reduced from time to time, until men, horses, and mules were in very sore straits. The artillery horses and all extra horses of mounted officers, that had not already died from starvation, were sent back to Bridgeport or Stevenson to be kept there until the strain could be relieved sometime in the indefinite future. Yet no thought of retreat or surrender entered the minds of the devoted soldiers. The fact that the army in the surrounding hills was in a worse condition—too weak to take any advantage of the situation by aggressive movements, except those abortive cavalry raids in the rear—undoubtedly saved the Union Army from destruction.

In the early part of October, General Hooker arrived at Nashville with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps. They were stationed along the railroad to Bridgeport. The corps had come to Nashville by railroad, but were without transportation, therefore did not supply all the relief needed at Chattanooga. What was absolutely necessary was the restoration of rail transportation from Stevenson to Chattanooga, and not exclusively the protection of the railroad from the north to Bridgeport. Sufficient reinforcements were also needed in order to enable the Union Army to attack and destroy or drive back the enemy, who was in too close proximity for safety; and therefore the first thing to be considered, after the Union troops were properly fortified, was to plan means by which the cooperation of these eastern reinforcements could be made available. In preliminary preparation for this, a steamboat which had been captured at Chattanooga, had been repaired and another was being built at Bridgeport. Rosecrans ordered Hooker to bring to Bridgeport all his command, with the exception of what was needed to protect the railroad from Nashville to the Tennessee River. He started also the construction of pontoons for a bridge, at some point over the river below Chattanooga, where his troops might have to cross in order to meet Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, and also in order to shorten the road down the river. General W. F. Smith (“Baldy Smith”) had lately been appointed chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. General Rosecrans ordered him to reconnoiter the river near Williams’s Island, a few miles below the points of Lookout Mountain, expecting to make of that island a steamer landing and supply depot. This last order was issued October 19, and on that same day General Rosecrans was relieved from the command of the Army; and General George H. Thomas assumed command.

Prior to this date, on October 9, a complete reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland had been made. Many of the regiments and brigades had been so reduced in numbers by the late battle and by sickness, that consolidation of brigades became imperative. Besides, in order to maintain efficiency in the army and proper discipline, a weeding out among the general officers became a necessity. Ever since the close of fighting at Chickamauga, there had been an undercurrent of feeling among the majority of the officers, that certain ones, who had failed to meet the emergencies which arose during that battle, could not continue in command, without decided detriment to the future operations of the army. In compliance with the President’s order of September 28, the Twentieth and Twenty-First corps were consolidated and called the Fourth Corps. This new corps was placed under the command of General Gordon Granger who had particularly distinguished himself at Chickamauga. The reserve corps was made a part of the Fourteenth Corps. Each corps was composed of three divisions and each division of three brigades. The following short dispatch sent to the Secretary of War by C. A. Dana, gives a very concise and interesting statement of what was done:

“Fourth Corps: First Division, Palmer; First Brigade, Cruft, nine regiments, 2,044 men; Second Brigade, Whittaker, eight regiments, 2,035 men; Third Brigade, Colonel Grose, eight regiments, 1,968 men. Second Division, Sheridan; First Brigade, F. T. Sherman, ten regiments, 2,385 men; Second Brigade, Wagner, eight regiments, 2,188 men; Third Brigade, Harker, 2,026 men. Third Division, Wood; First Brigade, Willich, nine regiments, 2,069 men; Second Brigade, Hazen, nine regiments, 2,195 men; Third Brigade, Samuel Beatty, eight regiments, 2,222 men.

“Fourteenth Corps: First Division, Rousseau; First Brigade, Carlin, nine regiments, 2,072 men; Second Brigade, King, four regiments of regulars and four regiments of volunteers, 2,070 men; Third Brigade, Starkweather, eight regiments, 2,214 men. Second Division, J. C. Davis; First Brigade, J. D. Morgan, five regiments, 2,214 men [this brigade had been in the reserve and did not take part in the late battle]; Second Brigade, John Beatty, seven regiments, 2,460 men; Third Brigade, Daniel McCook, six regiments, 2,099 men [this brigade had few losses in the late battle]. Third Division, Baird; First Brigade, Turchin, seven regiments, 2,175 men; Second Brigade, Van Derveer, seven regiments, 2,116 men; Third Brigade, Croxton, seven regiments, 2,165 men.”

Those detachments of the reserve corps which still remained along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad beyond Bridgeport, were not included. The garrison at Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Battle Creek, under General J. D. Morgan, as above stated, were however included. The State of Tennessee was divided into two districts, the northern, commanded by General Robert S. Granger with headquarters at Nashville, and the southern under General R. W. Johnson with headquarters at Stevenson.

General L. H. Rousseau superseded General R. S. Granger at Nashville, in November, prior to the battles. General Starkweather relieved Johnson at Stevenson after the battle, the latter having been assigned in Rousseau’s place, as commander of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps.

In the reorganization of the army the Wisconsin troops were distributed as follows: The First and Twenty-First Infantry remained in Starkweather’s Third Brigade of the First Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the Tenth Infantry in the First Brigade of the same division which was commanded by General W. P. Carlin. The Twenty-fourth Infantry was in the First Brigade of Sheridan’s Division, commanded by Colonel F. T. Sherman; the Fifteenth Infantry in Willich’s Brigade of Wood’s Division, of the Fourth Corps. The Fifth Battery was attached to Davis’s Division of the Fourteenth Corps; the Third, Eighth and Tenth, and Company A of the First Wisconsin Heavy Artillery were assigned to the Second Division of the Artillery Reserve. The Eleventh and Twelfth corps were not reorganized prior to the battles; the Third and Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry remained in the same organization in which they were in the Army of the Potomac—viz.: the Third in Ruger’s Third Brigade of the First Division (Williams’s) of the Twelfth Corps; the Twenty-sixth in the Second Brigade of the Third Division of the Eleventh Corps.

When General Thomas became commander of the Army of the Cumberland, General John M. Palmer was made commander in his place of the Fourteenth Corps, and General Charles Cruft was assigned to the command of the First Division of the Fourth Corps, in place of Palmer.

General James A. Garfield, chief of staff, had been elected member of Congress from his district in Ohio; he left in order to assume his duties and General J. J. Reynolds had been appointed chief of staff in his place. General John M. Brannan was made chief of artillery. These, with General W. F. Smith as chief engineer, greatly added to the strength of the headquarters staff.

This order of the President—which affected these local changes in the Army of the Cumberland—was followed by a much greater consolidation on a very much broader scale. The Army of the Tennessee—then in western Tennessee and northern Mississippi—was placed under command of General W. T. Sherman, who was on his way with a portion of it to Chattanooga in order to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. The Army of the Ohio, under General A. E. Burnside, was at Knoxville. These three armies had not before had a commander in common under whose orders they could be made to cooperate. A commander-in-chief at Washington had so far been unable to accomplish this very necessary cooperation. The Tennessee River ran through the fields of operations of all the three armies—less directly in the field of the Army of the Tennessee—and the preceding lack of unity in movements jeopardized the ultimate object of all their campaigns, namely: the re-establishment of the former relation between the states in rebellion and the general government. On this account the President established the Military Division of the Mississippi, with Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant in command. This was a virtual consolidation of the three armies; their cooperation in that wide field was henceforth perfect. Subsequent events showed the wisdom of this order. The Confederates never won another battle in this department; and in fourteen months after the organization of one command there existed no organized Confederate force in this field, worthy of notice. There were only detachments here and there, like Forrest’s rangers in the early spring of 1865, until General James H. Wilson’s cavalry raid put an end to all resistance.

After its reorganization, the Army of the Cumberland was composed of the Fourth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth corps, and three divisions of cavalry. Had General Sheridan been placed in command of the combined cavalry, his subsequent career shows that its efficiency would have been greatly improved; but all the changes, that might have been beneficial, could not be thought of at once. The pending events in this department developed some pre-eminent officers, who were indeed very much needed; they became masterful factors in the early downfall of the rebellion, both in the east and in the west; Sheridan was one of these; others were Grant, Thomas, and Sherman.

Grant reached his new command by way of Louisville, Kentucky, where he met the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with him the order of October 18, as well as General Grant’s commission. Grant sent from Louisville the following telegram to Thomas, “Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible. Please inform me how long your present supplies will last, and the prospect for keeping them up.” General Thomas answered: “Two hundred and four thousand four hundred and sixty-two rations in storehouses; ninety thousand to arrive tomorrow, and all the trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the 16th—probably three hundred wagons. I will hold the town till we starve.”

On October 19, Thomas ordered General Hooker to carry out the former orders of General Rosecrans, namely to concentrate his forces at Bridgeport, in order to move them to Chattanooga.

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the evening of October 23, one month after the Union troops had taken possession of the city. On the 24th he went to Brown’s Ferry in company with Thomas and W. F. Smith, the chief engineer; at once he recognized the necessity and possibility of the scheme, initiated by General Rosecrans, but conceived and planned by W. F. Smith, of placing a pontoon bridge there and of obtaining a hold on the south side of the river at that point, and he ordered its execution; much had already been done toward preparing for it. General Smith was given full power to complete the plan. The river at Chattanooga runs almost directly west opposite the city, but soon it curves to the north and then it turns to the south with quite a sharp bend at the foot of Lookout Mountain, from where the river runs directly north, forming a narrow and perfect peninsula directly opposite or west of the city. This peninsula widens slightly at its southern end and forms a perfect shape of a human foot; hence it is called “Moccasin Point.” Brown’s Ferry is directly west of the city, on the western point of the neck of this peninsula, some miles below Lookout. It is only about a mile in direct line to Brown’s Ferry from the northern end of the bridge, at the foot of Cameron Hill in the western outskirts of the city. From Brown’s Ferry the river continues north, and passes Williams Island; five or more miles from the ferry, it makes another sharp turn to the south at the foot of Walden’s Ridge; in the course of six or seven miles from this northern bend it flows tortuously past Kelly’s Ferry. The peninsula thus formed, is the northern nose of Raccoon Mountain. From Brown’s to Kelly’s Ferry is about five miles in direct line somewhat to the southwest, and, as said before, it is one mile across to Chattanooga. It is about five miles from Cameron Hill bridge to Brown’s Ferry, but from where the boats for the Brown’s Ferry bridge subsequently started, it is about nine miles, and to Kelly’s Ferry more than fifteen, perhaps twenty miles. These figures show the value to the transportation, of obtaining unobstructed access to Kelly’s Ferry as a landing for steamboats bringing supplies from Bridgeport across Brown’s Ferry, when it should come into possession of the Union Army by the advance of Hooker, until the railroad could be repaired or put into working order from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The movement of troops which accomplished this, also, gave the army a lodgment on the south side of the river, to meet, and assist, Hooker’s forces coming from Bridgeport, thus breaking the Confederate hold upon the river road to Bridgeport. Under General Smith’s orders and supervision, the plans were successfully carried out. Two flatboats and fifty pontoons, with cars, were prepared. In these, 1,500 men under Hazen passed down the river nine miles, and close to the Confederate pickets. They were to land at different points in sections, the places having been pointed out previously to the officers in command. On account of the darkness fires were kept burning opposite these places, so that the different sections could land at the proper points. The remainder of Turchin’s and Hazen’s brigades—from which the men in the boats were taken—and their batteries, were marched across the peninsula, and posted out of sight in the woods, near Brown’s Ferry on the north side of the river.

The infantry troops were to cross in the boats, as soon as the men under Hazen landed on the south side, and recross to the north side. The artillery was to move into position as soon as the boats landed, in order to cover a retreat in case of disaster. The equipment for the pontoon bridge was also in place and ready for use. The boats commenced to float at 3 a. m. October 27, and they were not discovered by the enemy until 5 a. m., when the first section had landed; a portion of the second section, which did not land in the proper place, was fired on by the enemy’s picket, calling forth an attack by the picket-reserve of the enemy. But the Union troops on the north side of the ferry crossed rapidly in the boats, pushed forward to the top of the ridge, and in two hours they protected themselves sufficiently with timber and abatis to hold the tête de pont. On the 27th the bridge was completed at 4:30 p. m.; the work was done under some shelling from Lookout Point. Captain P. V. Fox of the First Michigan Engineers was the skillful superintendent of the bridge building. Twenty beeves, six pontoons, a barge and about 2,000 bushels of corn fell into the hands of the Union troops. The Union loss was 6 killed, 23 wounded, and 9 missing. Six prisoners were taken from the Confederates and 6 were killed; how many were wounded is not known. While the bridge was being laid, General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on a pontoon bridge, and was marching up towards Chattanooga. At 3 p. m. on the 28th, his head of column reached Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley, at the junction of the railroad from Bridgeport, with the branch from Trenton up the valley. The wagon road from here to Brown’s Ferry runs about four miles, along the western base of a ridge, which here and there has deep depressions; through one of these the railroad continued to Chattanooga, around the nose of Lookout, close to the river; through another the wagon road runs. General Hooker had with him Howard’s Eleventh Corps, and Geary’s division of the Twelfth, with the exception of one regiment left at the bridge at Bridgeport, one at Whiteside’s and one at Shellmound; the latter two places being on the railroad between Bridgeport and Chattanooga.

The First Division of the Twelfth Corps, (Williams), had been left to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport. In Ruger’s brigade of this division was the Third Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Colonel William Hawley. This regiment had been mustered into the service on June 29, 1861, and had been serving with the Army of the Potomac since that date until now, when it became a part of the Army of the Cumberland. In the Second Brigade of the Third Division, (Schurz) of the Eleventh Corps was the Twenty-sixth Wisconsin Infantry, commanded by Captain Frederick C. Winkler, who was appointed Major November 17, 1863. It was exclusively a German regiment, and was mustered in at Milwaukee on August 17, 1862. On the following October 6, it left Wisconsin for the Army of the Potomac, in which it served until it became a part of the Eleventh Corps under Howard and Hooker of the Army of the Cumberland.

Hooker’s advance troops, under General Howard, camped that night within a mile or so of Brown’s Ferry, where they opened communication with the troops there. Geary’s division was in the rear and camped near Wauhatchie, three miles from Howard’s troops; thus the road from Wauhatchie to Kelly’s Ferry—three miles to the northwest of Wauhatchie—was controlled. About 1 a. m. on the 29th, Geary was heavily attacked by a part of Longstreet’s troops, but not before he had his division in line for defense. Howard was ordered to double quick his nearest division, under command of General Carl Schurz, to Geary’s relief. Before proceeding far, it was fired upon from the near hills on the division’s left, but at long range. The firing produced no great injury to Schurz’s troops. Howard detached one brigade to deploy on these hills, and pushed on with the other; in the meantime Steinwehr’s division, also of Howard’s, came up. Then it was discovered that another hill, in the rear of Schurz was also occupied by the enemy. Smith’s brigade charged it and carried it with the bayonet against three times its number.

Hooker says, “No troops ever rendered more brilliant service. The name of their valiant commander is Colonel Orlando Smith of the Seventy-third Ohio Infantry. * * * For almost three hours, without assistance Geary repelled the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers, and in the end drove them ingloriously from the field.” Thus the Lookout Valley was secured, and new communications were opened. The loss to General Hooker’s command was 416. Longstreet practically conceded that the Union commander had succeeded in opening this new line of communication, but spoke lightly of it. Whittaker’s and John G. Mitchell’s brigades were subsequently moved over to this region. The steamboat at Chattanooga passed down on the night of the 28th; thereafter two steamboats (one had been built at Bridgeport), made regular trips with supplies from Bridgeport to Kelly’s Ferry. Good roads were made from Chattanooga via Brown’s to Kelly’s Ferry and the railroad from Bridgeport towards the east was being repaired. There was no shortage of rations or forage after these rapid preparations were commenced to attack the enemy in his strong positions around the city. Hope and confidence had always inspired the Army of the Cumberland; the rank and file had never despaired; now, they took the lead in anticipating that the end was in sight; success in battle depends very much on the condition of the human body and the enthusiasm of the spirit.

The feeble and ineffectual efforts of Longstreet to prevent the opening of the river, and the advance of Hooker’s troops, opened the eyes of all the general officers of the Army of the Cumberland to the weakness of the Confederate Army, both in the ranks and among the officers. General Longstreet, in his official report of the battle of Wauhatchie, attributes his defeat to the jealousy of brigade officers.[35] The Confederate troops, making the attack on General Geary, were withdrawn from the east side of Lookout, but they returned immediately before daylight on the night of the attack. General Longstreet gave reasons for this action; he showed that it was not good military tactics to keep a large force on that side of the mountain, where its only line of retreat was around the slope of Lookout; if it were defeated, it would be exposed to the fire of the Union troops at and opposite Chattanooga. These reasons were sound and foreshadowed the ease with which Hooker’s forces, on November 24, drove the enemy so easily and captured Lookout Mountain. It was after this defeat, that Bragg (for reasons unknown), sent Longstreet’s Corps toward Knoxville to assist in defeating Burnside. Bragg hoped that it could be returned in time to assist in the battle, that he knew must be fought at Chattanooga. Longstreet took with him the two divisions of McLaws and Hood, and Alexander’s cavalry. Wheeler’s cavalry passed him on the road; it was supposed to do certain things that it failed to do. Longstreet recommended that Bragg’s army should be drawn back in a strong position behind the Chickamauga, after the departure of Longstreet’s troops in November; his reason for this recommendation was, that in its present position it could be reached in twenty minutes by the Union Army. Bragg seemed to be blind, however, to the events so rapidly transpiring in Chattanooga; he did not seem to realize that the troops Longstreet had fought at Wauhatchie, were reinforcements from the East to the Union Army.

In the meantime the Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge sent an occasional artillery shot into the Union lines. The pickets of the two armies held their lines close to each other in the valley and watched each other’s movements, firing whenever a soldier on his beat became visible. There being no good reason for this desultory and ineffectual warfare, an agreement was finally reached, that the pickets should fire only when advances of troops became apparent; henceforth, an officer could with impunity ride along the picket line in plain view of the opposite pickets.

As soon as Grant became aware of Longstreet’s departure for East Tennessee, he prepared for an attack on Bragg’s army in order to keep him from detaching more troops against Burnside and to compel him to return those already sent. He ordered General Thomas to assault the north end of Missionary Ridge; the order was given November 7; but on account of the utter lack of animals—caused not only by the great loss in the recent battles, but also by the death of a large number from starvation since the occupation of the city—it was finally decided by Grant, Thomas, and Smith, that nothing but a defensive attitude would be feasible until General Sherman’s forces could arrive. The necessity for aggressive operations, on account of Bragg’s boldness in taking such a desperate chance as to send a large force commanded by his ablest general away from his weak little army, increased the activity of the Union Army in its preparation for battle, and thus was opened a way for the relief of Burnside; the hope was that he could hold out until help arrived.

It is to be presumed, that Bragg had implicit confidence that the Union Army would not dare to attack such a strong position as Bragg’s army then held. General Grant at once wrote the facts of the situation to Burnside and urged him to maintain his attitude at Knoxville, until a battle could be fought at Chattanooga and a detachment sent to his assistance. Not waiting for Sherman, he formulated his plans; and thus knew before the latter’s arrival, just where he should place Sherman, what his part of the attack should be, and that he should march immediately on his approach directly to the north end of Missionary Ridge. Grant planned furthermore that Hooker should attack Lookout Mountain from his position in Lookout Valley; the one should attack the right of the Confederate Army and the other the left. Sherman arrived at Bridgeport, with his leading division, on November 15. Arriving at Chattanooga ahead of his troops, he with Grant, Thomas, and Smith, looked over the entire situation and learned how, and by what route, he could reach his point of attack. It had become apparent to the Union commanders, that Bragg’s line did not reach the immediate river hills, at the north end of Missionary Ridge, but was deflected to the east, along the third hill to the south of the river, with a deep depression between it and the next hill to the north. This made necessary a much stronger position than the supposed location at Bragg’s right flank, and stronger forces and dispositions were needed. Grant announced his plan to his generals on the 18th and expected the attacks could be made on the 21st; a rain storm delayed, however, the arrival of Sherman’s troops. When they did arrive at Brown’s Ferry the high water had broken the bridge, which delayed the crossing. When the bridge was repaired, Sherman crossed it in plain view of the enemy’s signal station on the point of Lookout Mountain; he marched into the woods behind a series of hills on the north side of the river; these hills concealed his march all the way to the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, where Davis’s division of the Fourteenth Corps had been placed to cover his movement, and to protect the bridge there, after Sherman’s troops had again crossed to the south side. The crossing at the Chickamauga was also protected by artillery, placed on the heights north of the river. After crossing at the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman was to follow Missionary Ridge as far as the railroad tunnel. This seemed to be the principal point of attack; the plan further contemplated that all the forces available should be converged toward General Sherman’s position. Therefore Howard’s Eleventh Corps was taken from Hooker’s position and replaced by Whittaker’s and Grose’s brigades of the Fourth Corps; the Eleventh Corps was placed on the left of the Army of the Cumberland south of the river, looking towards Sherman’s position perhaps four miles further east. Thomas was to cooperate by moving his troops to his left, so that he could join with Sherman’s right, when the latter should push the Confederate forces back to the tunnel. The combined forces should then advance against the enemy, with the object in view of sweeping the Confederate Army into the south Chickamauga Creek, which runs on the opposite side of Missionary Ridge. General Hooker was to hold Lookout Valley with Geary’s division and the two brigades of Whittaker and Grose, and Howard’s corps was to be in readiness to act with either Sherman or Thomas, as circumstances should dictate. The plan was a fine one, because, if that flank could be defeated, the Confederate line of retreat could be easily cut off.

Colonel Long with his brigade of cavalry moved to Sherman’s left. When Sherman should sweep the ridge, he was ordered to cross the Chickamauga and raid the rear of the Confederate Army. This attack was to begin on the 22nd, but was postponed on account of the fact that two of Sherman’s divisions had not been able to cross Brown’s Ferry bridge, on account of a break. To avoid any further delay, Thomas suggested that Howard’s Corps be sent to General Sherman in place of the two delayed divisions, and that the latter be ordered to report to General Hooker, whose combined forces should immediately attack Lookout Mountain in order to divert the attention of the enemy from Sherman’s contemplated attack; this suggestion was in part approved by General Grant.

A singular thing happened on November 22. General Ewing’s division of Sherman’s troops had come into Lookout Valley at Trenton from Bridgeport; Bragg’s rear was thus threatened. The movement of some of Bragg’s troops to avert this calamity together with the former withdrawal of Longstreet’s Corps for Knoxville, produced the impression in the Confederate Army, that the whole was going to fall back. Deserters who came into the Union line reported this impression. Bragg also notified the Union commander to remove all non-combatants from the city; this was on the 20th. General Grant ordered Thomas to make a reconnoisance in front of Chattanooga in order to test the truth of this report, and to find out whether Bragg was really falling back, and if so, Thomas should prevent him from doing it undisturbed. The Army of the Cumberland was nearest to the enemy and in readiness to do this with the most celerity. It seems that General Bragg had such confidence in the strength of his position on the top of Missionary Ridge, about 500 feet high, that he was willing not only to send away Longstreet, but actually started other forces to follow him. The latter he recalled, however, in time to take part in the battle. He supposed, and with good reason, that Missionary Ridge could not be taken by assault; and even if Lookout should become untenable on account of the capture of the valley of Chattanooga, he would be safe in his entrenchments on Missionary Ridge. This must have been his conclusion, and he must have known that the Army of the Cumberland was receiving considerable reinforcements. Bragg’s lines were altogether too long. When the object of holding Lookout Mountain no longer existed, after the reopening of the river and railroad route to Bridgeport, he should have withdrawn from there and from Chattanooga Valley; he should either have concentrated on Missionary Ridge or taken Longstreet’s advice and fallen back to Dalton, behind the second ridge, southeast of Chattanooga, where he was finally driven.

Fortunately for the success of the Union movements, Bragg did not do the things that an abler general would have done. He stood stolidly in his original line along its whole length until the opening of the battle of Missionary Ridge. It has been stated, that Bragg expected Grant when he discovered the departure of Longstreet for East Tennessee, would send forces to support Burnside.

In pursuance of the order to make a reconnoisance, Thomas ordered Granger, who commanded the Fourth Corps, to advance a division of his corps towards Orchard Knob November 23, about noon. This elevation of land is located about half way between the city and Missionary Ridge, at the left of Thomas’s line. Between the Union line and this knob was a growth of trees and bushes. These concealed the formation of the troops for a while only from the enemy. Wood’s division was deployed in front of Fort Wood. Sheridan’s division formed next on the right and rear of Wood. Howard’s Corps was massed in the rear of these two divisions. General Baird’s division fell, in echelon, at the right of Sheridan. General Johnson’s division (formerly Rousseau’s) of the Fourteenth Corps stood with arms in the entrenchments, ready to move in any direction. This really placed the latter in echelon with Baird. It is said the enemy looked upon these movements as a parade for display or to obtain wood for fires, when seeing them from the top of Missionary Ridge. The Confederates had a line of rifle-pits along the base of Orchard Knob, following Citico Creek for a mile or more.

With Willich’s and Hazen’s brigades in front and Beatty’s in reserve, General Wood moved forward about 2 p. m. His troops pushed back easily whatever was in their front. Willich struck Orchard Knob squarely on his front, and soon captured it, clearing it of the enemy’s lines. Hazen met more resistance from the Confederates who were perhaps more numerous or better fighters, although the hill he attacked was not so high as Orchard Knob. He carried the hill, however, and captured the Twenty-eighth Alabama Regiment and its flag. This advanced line gave a good position for further advances, and was held; the rest of the troops on the right moving up to and extending the line far to the right. General Wood fortified his line over Orchard Knob, and General Howard formed his corps on its left. The summit of this Knob gave a splendid outlook over the field between it and Missionary Ridge, and gave a fine view of the ridge itself. It afforded an opportunity for Grant and Thomas to view later on the whole subsequent movements against the enemy. General Wood lost 125 men killed and wounded in this battle of Orchard Knob. The Fifteenth Wisconsin of Willich’s brigade took part in this engagement; its losses were not reported until after the battle of the 25th, when its commander reported 6 men slightly wounded in both engagements. Wood occupied this position until 3:15 p. m. on the 25th, when he moved forward with the rest of the army to the assault on Missionary Ridge. Bridge’s Illinois Battery occupied an epaulment in Wood’s line on Orchard Knob.

The taking of Orchard Knob had a most important bearing on the attack that General Hooker made on Lookout Mountain the next day. It caused Bragg to withdraw Walker’s division from that point to strengthen his right, which Bragg thought to be menaced by this advance to Orchard Knob. These troops prolonged Bragg’s line towards Sherman’s front but did not reach it. The Confederate general, Stevenson, signalled from the top of Lookout to Bragg that night that if an attack was intended by Grant, it would be delivered on Lookout Mountain. This is what actually occurred. Another of Sherman’s divisions crossed Brown’s Ferry on the 23rd; the bridge was again broken, however, leaving Osterhaus’s division still on the left bank. This gave General Sherman only three divisions besides General Davis’s of the Fourteenth Corps, with which to operate at the designated place on Missionary Ridge. General Thomas informed General Hooker of the proximity of Osterhaus’s troops and directed, that if they did not get over to Sherman, he should have them join him and “take the point of Lookout Mountain.” This division was at that time in command of General Charles R. Woods, one of its brigade commanders. How sagacious was General Thomas in seeing immediately the advantage that should be taken of a mere accident, like the breaking of a pontoon bridge! It looks as though Thomas had made this suggestion to Hooker, without having beforehand a distinct understanding with General Grant; for he told General Hooker later, that Grant still hoped Woods’s (Osterhaus’s) division could cross in time to participate in Sherman’s movement, but if it could not the mountain should be taken if practicable. Hooker, finding that there was little possibility of the bridge being quickly repaired, made preparations for the advance against the mountain. It will be observed further on, that this accident resulted in modifying the original plans very materially, as the taking of Orchard Knob had already done. The left of Bragg’s line was turned, but not his right; this movement was a result of the accidents to the Brown’s Ferry pontoon bridge. General Grant showed his broad mind in this affair as well as in other changes he made in his original plan, at a later date.

Chattanooga and Vicinity, November, 1863
Adapted from Fiske’s The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, p. 288