2

It follows, therefore, that when a General Election has pronounced the sentence of condemnation on the existing Government, and men of another Party are called to the service of the country, selection for office is restricted mainly to those who have won distinction as debaters in Opposition. On the benches to the left of Mr. Speaker are always numbers of young men ambitious of office, eagerly pushing themselves to the front on that conspicuous field of political activity, under the eyes of the Reporters’ Gallery, most constant in their attendance, ever watching for an opportunity to strike a blow at once for their Party and their own reputation, in the hope that in the day of victory they shall have the proper reward of their services. Some of them are capable of talking well upon any subject. These aspire to be Secretaries of State. Others, not so remarkable for general ability or so glib of tongue, confine themselves to particular departments of administration. It is the endeavour of each to obtain a mastery of the business details of some special office—Foreign, Home, Treasury, Colonial, Army, Navy, Post Office, Pensions, Trade, Transport, or Agriculture—looking for an Under-Secretaryship, in the expectation of ultimately attaining, after some years of diligent and capable service, to Cabinet rank. Yet the qualities needed for success in office are often entirely different from those that bring fame and renown in Opposition. Gladstone said of Robert Lowe, whom he appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in his first Administration on the strength of the reputation which that slashing debater had made in Opposition, that he was “splendid in attack, but most weak in defence”; “that he was capable of tearing anything to pieces, but of constructing nothing.” But it is only after the brilliant swashbuckler of Opposition has been tried in office that his incapacity and weakness in the true gifts of statesmanship are discovered.

Besides the pushful young men in the ranks on the back benches, with their abounding sense of fitness for office, there are the veterans of the Front Opposition Bench, survivors of the Ministry of the Party when it was last in power. Some of these, it often happens, are men who have grown old and worn in the service, as their wrinkled faces, bald heads, and stooped forms testify; but their interest in public affairs has not in the least abated, and they still crave to be placed at the head of Departments. It might be supposed that the weighty responsibility of office is a burden to be avoided rather than coveted by old parliamentarians; the world has such pleasant delights, apart from politics, with which they might occupy the leisure of the close of their day. But that is an idle supposition. It is true that in the Senate of Rome, to which election was for life, there was a special law providing that no senator over sixty should be summoned to its meetings. Did any Roman ever willingly acquiesce in it except the physically incapable? In modern England human nature is exactly what it was in ancient Rome. The grievance of the Front Bench man approaching seventy would be, not that he should be dragged from seclusion and quiet to sit for hours of a morning in a room at Whitehall, reading documents, and attend at the House of Commons till late at night, but that he should be set aside in the distribution of offices when his Party has again triumphed at the polls. And he has tradition and custom at his back, in support of his desire, as well as his past services. It is held that a member of either House of Parliament who has already been in the Cabinet is entitled to high office again whenever his Party comes back to power; and that, should he be passed over, should he be put on the retired list, he has every reason to feel affronted.

These are the two classes—the old but the tried, the able but the untrained young—from which the Prime Minister draws the members of his Administration. As I have indicated, he has not an absolutely free choice. He may not sit down in his study and, surveying the most prominent members of his Party in both Houses, select for office those who have proved themselves possessed of the qualities of character, ability, experience, and training. His task it is to satisfy, as far as possible, claims as conflicting as they are strong, and, at the same time, give to his Administration that weight and authority which is necessary to win and hold, in some measure, the confidence of the country. It is said that Gladstone, who formed no fewer than four Administrations—an almost unprecedented record in constitutional history—used to draw up on separate slips of paper a list of the various offices, placing opposite each the names of three or four more or less eligible men as alternatives, and then, by a process of sifting, evolve the definite list. But this method, which no doubt most Prime Ministers adopt more or less, is not at all the simple matter it looks. It has to be followed out with exceeding care and circumspection. For every post in the Ministry there are at least three or four influential aspirants, old or young, each of whom thinks the office on which his mind is set is his by every title of personal fitness and devotion to the Party. To adjust these rival claims is, as I have said, no easy thing for the Prime Minister. Some of the office-seekers, those especially who know there are strong rivals in the field, insist upon personal interviews, in order to set forth their pretensions fully and unanswerably, and the serious loss the Party, if not the nation, would suffer were it not to have the advantage of their services. Every post brings shoals of letters from Members of Parliament, and leading Party men in the country, strongly urging the appointment of this person or that to a post in the Ministry, or his inclusion in the Cabinet.

Another important consideration of which the Prime Minister is obliged to take heed is the distribution of the offices of the Administration between the House of Lords and the House of Commons. It was provided by the Government of India Act, 1858—creating a fifth Secretary of State, that for India, the others being for Foreign Affairs, Home, the Colonies, and War—that four Secretaries of State and four Under-Secretaries may sit as members of the House of Commons at the same time.[1] In 1864 notice was taken that five Under-Secretaries were sitting in the House of Commons in violation of this statutory provision, and a motion was made that the seat of the fifth Under-Secretary was thereby vacated. The House referred the matter to a Committee, who reported that the seat of the Under-Secretary last appointed was not vacated, but as the law had been inadvertently infringed, it was thought necessary to pass a Bill of Indemnity. By the Air Force Act, 1917, a sixth Secretary of State, that for Air, was created, and the number of Principal Secretaries of State and Under-Secretaries capable of sitting in the House of Commons was increased to five. The Chancellor of the Exchequer must be in the representative Chamber, as the hereditary House cannot impose taxation. The holders of all the other prominent offices may be in one House or the other, as the Prime Minister thinks most convenient. But it has now become a rule, from which probably there will never be a departure, of placing the Home Secretary—the Minister whose department comes most closely into touch with the ordinary life of the citizen—and his Under-Secretary in the House of Commons. The Foreign Secretary, whose duties are most delicate and responsible, has usually been given the greater freedom and leisure of the House of Lords. Arthur Balfour declared in the House of Commons, during the Session of 1905, that the Foreign Secretary would never again be seen in that Chamber, unless the House was prepared to release him from the ordinary obligations of a Minister. “Because, if you ask him,” continued the Prime Minister, “to come down to answer questions, or when his own office is under discussion; if you require him to come down, as my other right hon. friends are required to come down, whenever there is a Government division or an important Government debate; if you require him to be here throughout the whole night, and at the same time to carry on the work of such an office as the Foreign Office—he cannot do it. I respectfully say it with full knowledge both of what the House of Commons requires and what is required of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.” Sir Edward Grey subsequently sat in the House of Commons for ten years, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but concessions in regard to answering questions and general attendance were granted him of the kind indicated by Balfour. The other Secretaries of State—War, Colonies, India—may be in either the House of Lords or the House of Commons, subject to the statutory provisions I have mentioned, but in whatever Chamber the Principal Secretary may be, the Under-Secretary of the same department must be in the other. The religion of aspirants to office must also be taken into account by the Prime Minister.

There are two positions in the Government for which Roman Catholics are ineligible—the Lord Chancellorship of England and the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland. In 1891 Gladstone brought in a Bill “for the removal of the religious disabilities of Roman Catholics to hold the offices of Lord Chancellor of England and Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.” It was opposed by the Unionist Government then in power, and was defeated by 256 votes to 223. It was known as “The Ripon and Russell Relief Bill,” as it was well understood that if the Bill were carried Gladstone, on his return to office, intended to make the then Lord Ripon, who was a Catholic, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland; and Sir Charles Russell, also a Catholic, Lord Chancellor of England.