SPANISH POLICY IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER THE TREATY OF SAN LORENZO.
By Franklin L. Riley, Ph. D.
October 16, 1795,[1] Thomas Pinckney, in behalf of the United States and the Prince of Peace, representing His Catholic Majesty, signed at San Lorenzo el Real, a treaty which contained among other things, the following stipulations:
"The southern boundary of the United States, which divides their territory from the Spanish colonies of East and West Florida, shall be designated by a line beginning on the River Mississippi at the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of latitude north of the equator, which from thence shall be drawn due east to the River Apalachicola," etc.
"If there should be any troops, garrisons or settlements of either party in the territory of the other according to the above-mentioned boundaries, they shall be withdrawn from the said territory within the term of six months after the ratification of this treaty, or sooner if possible."
"One Commissioner and one Surveyor shall be appointed by each of the contracting parties, who shall meet at the Natchez on the left side of the River Mississippi before the expiration of six months from the ratification of this convention and they shall proceed to run and mark this boundary according to the stipulations."
"The navigation of the said (Mississippi) River, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean shall be free only to his (Catholic Majesty) subjects and the citizens of the United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the subjects of other Powers by special convention."
"The two high contracting parties shall____maintain peace and harmony among the several Indian nations who inhabit the country adjacent to____the boundaries of the two Floridas." "No treaty of alliance or other whatever (except treaties of peace) shall be made by either party with the Indians living within the boundary of the other."
These terms, so favorable to the United States and so destructive of Spanish interests, had long been the rock upon which all plans for an adjustment of the differences between the two powers had been stranded.[2] Nor were they finally extorted from Spain until a concurrence of unfavorable events had precipitated a diplomatic crisis. Even then his Catholic Majesty seemed to consider such stipulations as only a temporary expedient, the fulfillment of which he hoped eventually to be able to evade. The Prince of Peace himself admits that political circumstances forced Spain to consent to the treaty and intimates further that he would have made even greater concessions if they had been demanded by the United States. In writing of these negotiations, he says:
"I had taken to heart the treaty (Jay's), which unknown to us the English cabinet had negotiated with the United States of America; this treaty afforded great latitude to evil designs; it was possible to injure Spain in an indirect manner and without risk, in her distant possessions.
"I endeavored to conclude another treaty with the same states, and had the satisfaction to succeed in my object; I obtained unexpected advantages, and met with sympathy, loyalty, and generous sentiments in that nation of Republicans."
Subsequent events proved, however, that Godoy had overestimated the probabilities of a consolidation of interests between the United States and Great Britain, and that Spain had also failed to gain that ascendency over the affairs of this "nation of republicans," which she hoped to do through this treaty.[3] She was therefore no longer interested in fulfilling its stipulations. These facts are substantiated by a letter which Stoddard[4] claims was written by Governor Gayoso in June, 1796, to a confidential friend, and which came to light several years afterward. In this communication Gayoso claims that:
"The object of Great Britain in her treaty with the United States about this period, was to attach them to her interests, and even render them dependent on her, and, therefore, the Spanish treaty of limits was made to counterbalance it; but as Great Britain had totally failed in her object it was not the policy of Spain to regard her stipulations."[5]
In order to evade the treaty, she now returned to a line of policy which she had adopted several years previous[6] and which had also been tried by more than one foreign power[7] since the combined efforts of England, France and Spain to "coop up" the United States between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic, at the close of the Revolutionary War.[8] This was nothing less than a dismemberment of the United States. But the accomplishment of this bold project required time. She, therefore, resorted to her historic policy of procrastination, hoping ultimately to evade the treaty and thus regain what had been wrested from her in diplomacy. She was fully aware of the dissatisfaction the western states had expressed over the tardiness and at times the apparent indifference of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi[9] and she also realized that the publication of the treaty "would bring her project of dismemberment to a crisis and in a manner to compel the western people to make a decided election to adhere to the Atlantic states or to embrace the splendid advantages held out to them on the Mississippi."[10] Hence, upon the announcement of the treaty in New Orleans, a Spanish emissary was immediately dispatched from that place to Tennessee and Kentucky, with authority to engage the services of the principal inhabitants in a scheme to disaffect the people towards the United States by the free use of money and promises of independence and free trade.[11] In Gayoso's letter of June, 1796, referred to above, the assertion was made that,
"It was expected that several states would separate from the union, which would absolve Spain from her engagements; because, as her contract was made with the union, it would be no longer obligatory than while the union lasted. That Spain, contrary to her expectations, was not likely to derive any advantages from the treaty, and that her views and policy would be changed, particularly if an alteration took place in the political existence of the United States. He therefore concluded, that all things considered, nothing more would result from the treaty than the free navigation of the Mississippi."[12]
A second line of policy for evading the treaty was then opened up. This was to postpone an execution of its stipulations awaiting the development of certain international complications which seemed to be inevitable. There had been a rupture in the diplomatic relation of the United States and France and hostilities between these two countries seemed to be near at hand. Mr. Pickering, who was Secretary of State from 1795 to 1800, considered this the real cause for delay on the part of Spain, after contending that the other reasons given by the Spanish authorities were "merely ostensible," he says:
"The true reason is doubtless developed by the Baron (de Corondelet)[13] in his proclamation of the 31st of May (1797). The expectation of an immediate rupture between France, the intimate ally of Spain, and the United States."[14]
By making common cause with France, in case of such a rupture, Spain evidently thought that she could recover some of the concessions she had made in the treaty, if compliance with its stipulations should not be too far effected.
In order to find time for the operation of these schemes, the Spanish officials produced, from time to time, such excuses as either the treaty or the circumstances rendered plausible. After months of fruitless delay, they determined to rest their final action upon the results of another effort to detach the western states from the Union. An emissary was again sent to Tennessee and Kentucky to confer with certain men who were former correspondents of the governors of Louisiana. He found, however, that the people were less disposed towards a change than they were ten years previous, especially since they were likely to secure the navigation of the Mississippi,—the real cause of their former disaffection—without resorting to a hazardous enterprise. After an eventful sojourn in this region, he returned to New Orleans in January, 1798, bearing the unwelcome report which convinced the Governor General that Spain had lost all hope of political prestige in the territory north of the 31st degree and east of the Mississippi.[15] Arrangements were then perfected for the execution of the treaty.
In the light of the Spanish policy as presented above, local events may be easily interpreted. As time was an indispensable condition upon which the success of this policy depended, it was gained by various pretexts. Don Yrujo, the Spanish minister, intrigued at Philadelphia, and his efforts were ably seconded by Carondelet, Gayoso[16] and a host of subordinate officials on the Mississippi.
In accordance with a stipulation of the treaty, President Washington appointed the Honorable Andrew Ellicott[17] as Commissioner to run the boundary line in behalf of the United States. He left Philadelphia for Natchez by way of the Ohio and the Mississippi, September 16, 1796. But his descent of the Mississippi had been anticipated by the Spaniards, who had prepared obstructive measures in advance of his coming. So that whenever he came in contact with Spanish officials they evinced a disposition to hinder his descent of the river, if not prevent it altogether.[18] Some of them affected ignorance of the treaty, others appeared embarrassed at the presence of the Americans, while none of them had made or were making, so far as the Commissioner could observe, any preparations to evacuate the posts according to the terms of the treaty.
Before reaching his destination, Ellicott received a communication from Governor Gayoso, expressing his gratification at the arrival of the Commissioner in those waters and requesting that the military escort accompanying him should be left at the mouth of the Bayou Pierre, sixty miles above Natchez, in order to prevent an "unforeseen misunderstanding" between the troops of the two nations. Since the treaty had provided for such an escort, this request was deemed improper by Ellicott. He yielded the point, however, for the time being, out of deference to the wishes of the Governor.[19]
Upon his arrival at Natchez, February 24, 1797, ten months after the ratification of the treaty, he found no one ready to co-operate with him in the performance of the duty assigned. To the contrary, he learned through private sources that the Baron de Carondelet, the Governor General of Louisiana, had declared that the treaty was never intended to be carried into effect, that as Commissioner on the part of Spain, he would evade or delay from one pretense or another, the running of the boundary line until the treaty would become "a dead letter," and that Louisiana either had been, or would soon be ceded to France.[20]
About this time a suggestive and characteristic event occurred which gives an insight into the temper of both the Spanish Governor and the American Commissioner. About two hours after the flag of the United States had been hoisted over the Commissioner's camp, Gayoso requested that it be lowered. This request met with a flat refusal, and though there were rumors of parties being formed to cut it down, "the flag wore out upon the staff."[21] Gayoso explained, a fortnight later, that his objection to the flag was not prompted by a desire to show a discourtesy to the United States, but to prevent any unbecoming conduct on the part of the Indians.[22] This explanation, however, seems to have been an after-thought. Suffice it to say, when it was offered the Indians had become so troublesome that Ellicott had determined to send for his escort. The Governor, after declaring that he would construe their descent as an insult to his master,[23] and then suggesting that they might with propriety join the Commissioner at Loftus Cliffs, near Clarksville, finally consented that they go into camp at Bacon's Landing, a few miles below town.[24] This put an end to the efforts of the Spaniards to draw Ellicott away from Natchez, the place designated by the treaty for the meeting of the commissioners.[25]
After the lapse of a fortnight from the time of his arrival, Ellicott was informed that the Spanish Commissioner, the Baron de Carondelet, was detained in New Orleans in the discharge of duties incident to the war then waging between Spain and Great Britain, and that in his absence the business of the survey would devolve upon Governor Gayoso.[26] March 19, had been settled upon as the time when the commissioners would begin operation, but with this change of commissioner, Gayoso gave notice that it would be impossible to proceed at the time appointed. He promised, however, to be ready at an early day. But, before these preparations were perfected, Spanish finesse had discovered a new reason for delay. This in turn was followed by others until May 11, when Ellicott was finally informed that the business upon which he had come was postponed indefinitely, awaiting further orders from the ministers of the two powers concerned.[27] These pretexts having varied from time to time, it would be well to present them in one view.[28]