UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1832.
The exact period in Mississippi legal history extends from 1832 to 1869, and embraces the period during which the constitution adopted in 1832 remained in force. This, the second state constitution, was adopted October 26, 1832; its provisions on the subject of suffrage are as follows: "Every free white male person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, who shall be a citizen of the United States, and shall have resided in this state one year next preceding an election, and the last four months within the county, city or town in which he offers to vote, shall be deemed a qualified elector." * * * * * "Every person shall be disqualified from holding an office or place of honor or profit under the authority of this state, who shall be convicted of having given or offered any bribe to procure his election. Laws shall be made to exclude from office and from suffrage those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors." * * The second of the sections above quoted was acted upon by the law-making power March 2, 1833, and the following piece of legislation then became operative:
"No person shall vote at any election whatever in this state, who shall have been convicted by the verdict of a jury and the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, unless the person so convicted shall have received a full pardon for such offense."
It will be noted that the conviction must have been by the verdict of a jury and the judgment of the court both conjunctively. What was the effect if the criminal plead guilty does not seem to have been considered. Of course the general legislation of the state on the subject of state and county elections, conformed to the constitution, and we are again led to examine the acts incorporating municipalities within the period, and providing who should be voters therein, in order to obtain light on the thought of the times relative to our subject.
A great many cities and towns were incorporated during this period; in a large majority of charters it was simply provided that the "qualified voters" should exercise the right of suffrage, thus recognizing the constitutional rule. In many instances additional qualifications to those named in the constitution were imposed, thus, residence for a specified time within the corporate limits was required in 1833 for Columbus, Amsterdam, Manchester (now Yazoo City), Jackson, Sartartia, Liberty, Woodville, and in 1836 for Plymouth. But by no means did the legislatures of the period conceive that they were bound to require all the constitutional qualifications as essential for municipal suffrage. A favorite idea was to authorize "every free white male inhabitant of the town" who had resided therein for a specified time, to vote in municipal elections. This was the case in Raymond, by act passed in 1833; Salem, Starkville and Sharon, 1837; Cotton Gin Port, Farmington and Philadelphia, 1838; Cooksville and Emory in 1839; Hernando, 1840; Gainesville, 1846; Shongole and Camargo, 1850; Sarepta, Hermans, Eastport and Benela, 1852; Columbus and Aberdeen, 1854 (in the latter, however, non-resident freeholders were allowed to vote by the act); Bonner, 1860; Wesson, Beauregard, Hickory and Hazlehurst, 1865; Lodi, Batesville and Sardis, 1866; Crystal Springs and Winona, 1867. In addition to the ordinary qualifications the payment of a town tax was required for Grand Gulf, 1833; Vicksburg, 1833 and 1839; Rodney, 1844; Yazoo City, 1846; Natchez, 1865. During this period, too, a few municipal charters pursued the language which was so frequently used at an earlier day—"freeholders, landowners and householders." This was the case in the acts for Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis), 1838 and 1850; Pass Christian and Biloxi, 1838, and Rodney, 1844. In a few instances every adult resident person was allowed to vote, without reference to race, color, sex or anything else if the laws were administered as they are written. This was the case in Macon, 1836; Paulding, 1837, and Raleigh, 1838, and in Brandon, by act of 1833, resident persons were not excluded by law because of infancy. For liberality of sentiment on the subject of universal suffrage, Brandon's charter of 1833 is without an equal, but whether this liberality of expression proceeded from a liberality of feeling or from ignorance in the forms of expression doth not appear. Registration of voters was first required in this state by act passed in 1839, and it applied to municipal elections at Vicksburg only; in 1861 a similar provision was enacted for Canton, and in 1865 for Natchez. Of late years a municipal registration is quite common, as we shall see hereafter.