CHAPTER VIII. SOLDIER AND SECRETARY
After their disaster at Trenton, the English forces suspended hostilities for a long time. Paine, maintaining his place on General Greene's staff, complied with the wish of all the generals by wielding his pen during the truce of arms. He sat himself down in Philadelphia, "Second Street, opposite the Quaker meeting,"—as he writes the address. The Quakers regarded him as Antichrist pursuing them into close quarters. Untaught by castigation, the leaders of the Society, and chiefly one John Pemberton, disguised allies of the Howes, had put forth, November 20, 1776, a second and more dangerous "testimony." In it they counsel Friends to refuse obedience to whatever "instructions or ordinances" may be published, not warranted by "that happy constitution under which they and others long enjoyed tranquillity and peace." In his second Crisis (January 13, 1777) Paine refers to this document, and a memorial, from "a meeting of a reputable number of the inhabitants of the city of Philadelphia," called attention of the Board of Safety to its treasonable character. The Board, however, not having acted, Paine devoted his next three months to a treatment of that and all other moral and political problems which had been developed by the course of the Revolution, and must be practically dealt with. In reading this third Crisis, one feels in every sentence its writer's increased sense of responsibility. Events had given him the seat of a lawgiver. His first pamphlet had dictated the Declaration of Independence, his second had largely won its first victory, his third had demonstrated the impossibility of subjugation, and offered England peace on the only possible terms. The American heart had responded without a dissonant note; he held it in his hand; he knew that what he was writing in that room "opposite the Quaker meeting" were Acts of Congress. So it proved. The third Crisis was dated April 19, 1777, the second anniversary of the first collision (Lexington). It was as effective in dealing with the internal enemies of the country as the first had been in checking its avowed foes. It was written in a city still largely, if not preponderantly, "tory," and he deals with them in all their varieties, not arraigning the Friends as a Society. Having carefully shown that independence, from being a natural right, had become a political and moral necessity, and the war one "on which a world is staked," he says that "Tories" endeavoring to insure their property with the enemy should be made to fear still more losing it on the other side. Paine proposes an "oath or affirmation" renouncing allegiance to the King, pledging support to the United States. At the same time let a tax of ten, fifteen, or twenty per cent be levied on all property. Each who takes the oath may exempt his property by holding himself ready to do what service he can for the cause; they who refuse the oath will be paying a tax on their insurance with the enemy. "It would not only be good policy but strict justice to raise fifty or one hundred thousand pounds, or more, if it is necessary, out of the estates and property of the King of England's votaries, resident in Philadelphia, to be distributed as a reward to those inhabitants of the city and State who should turn out and repulse the enemy should they attempt to march this way."
These words were written at a moment when a vigorous opposition, in and out of Congress, was offered to Washington's Proclamation (Morris-town, January 25, 1777,) demanding that an oath of allegiance to the United States should be required of all who had taken such an oath to the King, non-jurors to remove within the enemy's lines, or be treated as enemies. Paine's proposal was partly followed on June 13th, when Pennsylvania exacted an oath of allegiance to the State from all over eighteen years of age.
Paine was really the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. His election had not been without opposition, and, according to John Adams, there was a suggestion that some of his earlier writings had been unfavorable to this country. What the reference was I cannot understand unless it was to his anti-slavery essay, in which he asked Americans with what consistency they could protest against being enslaved while they were enslaving others. That essay, I have long believed, caused a secret, silent, hostility to the author by which he suffered much without suspecting it. But he was an indefatigable secretary. An example of the care with which foreign representatives were kept informed appears in a letter to William Bingham, agent of Congress at Martinique.
"Philadelphia, July 16th, 1777.—Sir,—A very sudden opportunity offers of sending you the News-papers, from which you will collect the situation of our Affairs. The Enemy finding their attempt of marching thro' the Jersies to this City impracticable, have retreated to Staten Island seemingly discontented and dispirited and quite at a loss what step next to pursue. Our Army is now well recruited and formidable. Our Militia in the several States ready at a day's notice to turn out and support the Army when occasion requires; and tho' we cannot, in the course of a Campaign, expect everything in the several Parts of the Continent, to go just as we wish it; yet the general face of our Affairs assures us of final success.
"In the Papers of June 18th & 25 and July 2d you will find Genl. Washington and Arnold's Letters of the Enemy's movement in, and retreat from the Jersies. We are under some apprehensions for Ticonderoga, as we find the Enemy are unexpectedly come into that Quarter. The Congress have several times had it in contemplation to remove the Garrison from that Place—as by Experience we find that Men shut up in Forts are not of so much use as in the field, especially in the highlands where every hill is a natural fortification.
"I am Sir
"Your Obt. Humble Servt.
"Thomas Paine.
"Secretry to the Committee for Foreign Affairs."'
* MS., for which I am indebted to Mr. Simon Gratz, Philadelphia.
After the occupation of Philadelphia by the British (September 26, 1777), Paine had many adventures, as we shall presently see. He seems to have been with Washington at Valley Forge when the Pennsylvania Assembly and President (Thomas Wharton, Jr.,) confided to him the delicate and arduous task assigned by the following from Timothy Matlack, Secretary of the Assembly:
"Lancaster, Oct. 10, 1777. Sir,—The Hon'ble house of As'y have proposed and Council have adopted a plan of obtaining more regular and constant intelligence of the proceeding of Gen. Washington's army than has hitherto been had. Everyone agrees that you are the proper person for this purpose, and I am directed by his Exc'y, the pr't, to write to you hereon (the Prs't being engaged in writing to the Gen'l, and the Express in waiting).
"The Assembly have agreed to make you a reasonable compensation for your services in this business, if you think proper to engage in it, which I hope you will; as it is a duty of importance that there are few, however well disposed, who are capable of doing in a manner that will answer all the intentions of it—perhaps a correspondence of this kind may be the fairest opportunity of giving to Council some important hints that may occur to you on interesting subjects.
"Proper expresses will be engaged in this business. If the expresses which pass from headquarters to Congress can be made use of so much the better;—of this you must be judge.
"I expect Mr. Rittenhouse will send you a copy of the testimony of the late Y. M. by this opp'y, if time will admit it to be copied—'t is a poor thing.—Yours, &c, T. M."*
* Pa. Arch., 1779, p. 659. Paine at once set to work: p.
693, 694.
What with this service, and his correspondence with foreign agents, Paine had his hands pretty full. But at the same time he wrote important letters to leading members of Congress, then in session at York, Pennsylvania.
The subjoined letter sheds fresh light on a somewhat obscure point in our revolutionary history,—the obscurity being due to the evasions of American historians on an episode of which we have little reason to be proud. An article of Burgoyne's capitulation (October 17th) was as follows:
"A free passage to be granted to the army under General Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest: and the port of Boston to be assigned for entry of transports to receive the troops whenever General Howe shall so order."
A letter was written by Paine to Hon. Richard Henry Lee, dated at "Headquarters, fourteen miles from Philadelphia," October 30th, 1777.
"I wrote you last Tuesday 21st Inst., including a Copy of the King's speech, since which nothing material has happened at Camp. Genl. McDougal was sent last Wednesday night 22d. to attack a Party of the Enemy who lay over the Schuylkill at Grey's Ferry where they have a Bridge. Genls. Greene & Sullivan went down to make a diversion below German Town at the same Time. I was with this last Party, but as the Enemy withdrew their Detachment We had only our Labor for our Pains.
"No Particulars of the Northern Affair have yet come to head Qrs., the want of which has caused much Speculation. A copy, said to be the Articles of Capitulation was recd. 3 or 4 days ago, but they rather appear to be some proposals made by Burgoyne, than the Capitulation itself. By those Articles it appears to me that Burgoyne has capitulated upon Terms, which we have a right to doubt the full performance of, Vizt., 'That the Offrs. and Men shall be Transported to England and not serve in or against North America during the present War'—or words to this effect.
"I remark, that this Capitulation, if true, has the air of a National treaty; it is binding, not only on Burgoyne as a General, but on England as a Nation; because the Troops are to be subject to the conditions of the Treaty after they return to England and are out of his Command. It regards England and America as Separate Sovereign States, and puts them on an equal footing by staking the faith and honor of the former for the performance of a Contract entered into with the latter.
"What in the Capitulation is stiled the 'Present War' England affects to call a 'Rebellion,' and while she holds this Idea and denies any knowledge of America as a Separate Sovereign Power, she will not conceive herself bound by any Capitulation or Treaty entered into by her Generals which is to bind her as a Nation, and more especially in those Cases where both Pride and present Advantage tempt her to a Violation. She will deny Burgoyne's Right and Authority for making such a Treaty, and will, very possibly, show her insult by first censuring him for entering into it, and then immediately sending the Troops back.
"I think we ought to be exceedingly cautious how we trust her with the power of abusing our Credulity. We have no authority for believing she will perform that part of the Contract which subjects her not to send the Troops to America during the War. The insolent Answer given to the Commissrs. by Ld. Stormont, 'that the King's Ambassadors reed, no Letters from Rebels but when they came to crave Mercy? sufficiently instructs us not to entrust them with the power of insulting Treaties of Capitulation.
"Query, Whether it wd. not be proper to detain the Troops at Boston & direct the Commissioners at Paris to present the Treaty of Capitulation to the English Court thro' the hands of Ld. Stormont, to know whether it be the intention of that Court to abide strictly by the Conditions and Obligations thereof, and if no assurance be obtained to keep the Troops until they can be exchanged here.
"Tho' we have no immediate knowledge of any alliance formed by our Commissioners with France or Spain, yet we have no assurance there is not, and our immediate release of those prisoners, by sending them to England, may operate to the injury of such Allied Powers, and be perhaps directly contrary to some contract subsisting between us and them prior to the Capitulation. I think we ought to know this first.—Query, ought we not (knowing the infidelity they have already acted) to suspect they will evade the Treaty by putting back into New York under pretence of distress.—I would not trust them an inch farther than I could see them in the present state of things.
"The Army was to have marched yesterday about 2 or 3 Miles but the weather has been so exceedingly bad for three days past as to prevent any kind of movement, the waters are so much out and the rivulets so high there is no passing from one part of ye Camp to another.
"I wish the Northern Army was down here. I am apt to think that nothing materially offensive will take place on our part at present. Some Means must be taken to fill up the Army this winter. I look upon the recruiting service at an end and that some other plan must be adopted. Suppose the Service be by draft—and that those who are not drawn should contribute a Dollar or two Dollars a Man to him on whom the lot falls.—something of this kind would proportion the Burthen, and those who are drawn would have something either to encourage them to go, or to provide a substitute with—After closing this Letter I shall go again to Fort Mifflin; all was safe there on the 27th, but from some preparations of the Enemy they expect another attack somewhere.
"The enclosed return of provision and Stores is taken from an account signed by Burgoyne and sent to Ld. George Germain. I have not time to Copy the whole. Burgoyne closes his Letter as follows, 'By a written account found in the Commissary's House at Ticonderoga Six thousand odd hundred Persons were fed from the Magazine the day before the evacuation.'
"I am Dear Sir, Yr. Affectionate Hble. Servt.
"T. Paine. "Respectful Compts. to Friends.
"If the Congress has the Capitulation and Particulars of ye Surrender, they do an exceeding wrong thing by not publishing ym. because they subject the whole Affair to Suspicion."'
* I am indebted for this letter to Dr. John S. H. Fogg of
Boston. It bears the superscription: "Honbl. Richd. Henry
Lee Esq. (in Congress) York Town. Forwarded by yr humble
Servt. T. Matlack, Nov. 1, 1777." Endorsed in handwriting of
Lee: "Oct: 1777. Mr. Paine, Author of 'Common Sense.'"
Had this proposal of Paine, with regard to Bur-goyne's capitulation, been followed at once, a blot on the history of our Revolution might have been prevented. The time required to march the prisoners to Boston and prepare the transports would have given England opportunity to ratify the articles of capitulation. Washington, with characteristic inability to see injustice in anything advantageous to America, desired Congress to delay in every possible way the return of the prisoners to England, "since the most virtuous adhesion to the articles would not prevent their replacing in garrison an equal number of soldiers who might be sent against us." The troops were therefore delayed on one pretext and another until Burgoyne declared that "the publick faith is broke." Congress seized on this remark to resolve that the embarkation should be suspended until an "explicit ratification of the Convention of Saratoga shall be properly ratified by the Court of Great Britain." This resolution, passed January 8, 1778, was not communicated to Burgoyne until February 4th. If any one should have suffered because of a remark made in a moment of irritation it should have been Burgoyne himself; but he was presently allowed to proceed to England, while his troops were retained,—a confession that Burgoyne's casual complaint was a mere pretext for further delay. It may be added that the English government behaved to its surrendered soldiers worse than Congress. The question of ratifying the Saratoga Convention was involved in a partisan conflict in Parliament, the suffering prisoners in America were forgotten, and they were not released until the peace,—five years after they had marched "with the honours of war," under a pledge of departure conceded by Gen. Gates in reply to a declaration that unless conceded they would "to a man proceed to any act of desperation sooner than submit."
Concerning this ugly business there is a significant silence in Paine's public writings. He would not have failed to discuss the matter in his Crisis had he felt that anything honorable to the American name or cause could be made out of it.*
* Professor Fiske ("Am. Revolution," i., p. 341) has a
ferocious attack on Congress for breaking faith in this
matter, but no doubt he has by this time read, in Ford's
"Writings of Washington," (vol. vi.) the letters which bring
his attack on the great commander's own haloed head.
In his letter to Hon. R. H. Lee (October 30, 1777) Paine mentions that he is about leaving the head-quarters near Philadelphia for Fort Mifflin. Mr. Asa Bird Gardener, of New York, who has closely studied Paine's military career, writes me some account of it.
"Major-Gen. Greene was charged with the defence of the Delaware, and part of Brig.-Gen. Varnum's brigade was placed in garrison at Fort Mercer, Red Bank, and at Fort Mifflin, Mud Island. A bloody and unsuccessful assault was made by Count Donop and 1,200 Hessians on Fort Mercer, defended by the 1 st and 2d Reg'ts. R. I. Continental Inf'y. The entire British fleet was then brought up opposite Fort Mifflin, and the most furious cannonade, and most desperate but finally unsuccessful defence of the place was made. The entire works were demolished, and most of the garrison killed and wounded. Major-Gen. Greene being anxious for the garrison and desirous of knowing its ability to resist sent Mr. Paine to ascertain. He accordingly went to Fort Mercer, and from thence, on Nov. 9 (1777) went with Col. Christopher Greene, commanding Fort Mercer, in an open boat to Fort Mifflin, during the cannonade, and were there when the enemy opened with two-gun batteries and a mortar battery. This very gallant act shows what a fearless man Mr. Paine was, and entitles him to the same credit for service in the Revolution as any Continental could claim."