Correspondence in connection with the Negotiations respecting the German Alliance with Austria.
Andrassy writes to Bismarck (neat handwriting in Latin characters): “Schönbrunn, 1st September, 1879. Honoured Prince! Before leaving Gastein I communicated in nuce by telegraph to my most gracious master, who went direct from Prague to Bruck, the tendency and the result so far of our conferences. I laid special stress on the fact that in view of the warlike preparations and the threatening language which was heard alternately, both in Vienna and in Germany, the question we had to deal with was that of a defensive understanding, a sort of guarantee of insurance, between our two sovereigns, in the sense that any attack upon either of the two empires should be repelled by their united forces, and that the casus fœderis should also arise in the event of an attack upon either by a third Power with the co-operation of Russia. I afterwards emphasised the circumstance that I was strongly in favour of this combination, but nevertheless had not in any way pledged his Majesty. Hereupon I received on my arrival a telegram from Prague, in which the Emperor declares that he approves of the tendency and present results of our meeting from the fullest conviction, and invites me to go to see him in camp at Bruck. I was at Bruck yesterday, and had an opportunity of submitting a detailed report on the subject. I found the Emperor so fully convinced of the usefulness and, indeed, necessity of such an arrangement, that further argument in its favour proved to be superfluous. His Majesty sees therein not only no departure from the determination to maintain peace between the three empires, but the only possible way at the present moment of removing the sword of Damocles which constantly hangs over our relations, and of securing peace for the benefit of both States, and, indeed, for the welfare of the third. As a matter of course, my Emperor is always glad to see you here, and will be particularly glad to do so on the present occasion. In the meantime, I am authorised as soon as you are in a position to inform me that you have obtained the approval in principle of the Emperor William to receive your draft text and to prepare one myself. I am to remain in office until this matter is completed, my successor only taking over the conduct of affairs after the understanding has been concluded. Besides, I have initiated him into the question, and he is in perfect agreement.
“Thus far as to what concerns his Majesty. The following is personal and quite confidential. I have not ceased to think over the matter for myself from all points of view, and my conviction has thereby been strengthened. If immediately after a war for which no one in Russia will to-day accept the responsibility and which has weakened the Empire both from a financial and military standpoint, and at a time when the Nihilist movement is momentarily suppressed and there is nothing to force the Government to seek a diversion abroad, Germany is to be threatened with France, and ourselves with an increase of the army, and that in connection with such questions as Merkovitch and the post offices of Eastern Rumelia, what is to be expected when the wounds of war are healed, when internal difficulties again make themselves felt, and when a foreign diversion may seem the only means of escape?
“I must confess that I can have no ease of mind so long as I do not see the torch extinguished which the Emperor Alexander half unconsciously swings about over the European powder barrel, and while I know the peace of Europe to rest in the hands of a Milutin, a Jomini, and doubtless presently of an Ignatieff. I believe that to-day every State (although our own less than others) has enough to do to protect its authority against the subversive elements in its midst. How is that to be done, however, and who will be able to do it if the State is constantly obliged to devote half its power and attention to dangers which are not of an internal but of a foreign character, and which come not from below but from above? I entertain no doubt as to the personal intentions of the Emperor Alexander. I am convinced that he does not wish for war at present. But as the Minister of a neighbouring State I cannot forget that he had also no desire for the war just concluded, and that from the beginning to the end of it he was trying to master the movement which had originated in his immediate entourage. I consider it a European necessity to provide in some way against this danger, and however difficult I find it now to postpone my retirement which is already widely known to be impending, it would be an immense gratification to me, as a servant of my Emperor and country, to be able to join with you, honoured Prince, in signing this guarantee for the future of our two realms. Austria once committed the mistake of declining the overtures of Germany which would have secured our mutual interests. It is a satisfaction to me to be able to state that the same mistake will not be committed by us this time.
“In sincere friendship and genuine respect,
“Your most devoted,
“Andrassy.”
To this Bismarck replied on the 3rd of September: “Honoured Count,—Yesterday evening I received your letter of the 1st instant, which is a source of much pleasure and satisfaction to me. I hasten to send you a provisional answer. And, first, I beg you to convey to his Majesty the Emperor my respectful thanks for the gracious manner in which he has referred to my intention to come to Vienna. I am pleased to see from your letter that his Majesty (unser Herr) has one foot in the stirrup, and do not doubt that our united efforts will succeed in placing him firmly in the saddle. Unfortunately, from the nature of things, geographical and political, my task cannot be so speedily completed as yours. A verbal report has not only the advantage of saving time, but also that of confining the replies to such questions as are actually raised in the most exalted quarter. In a written report I must, as a measure of precaution, discuss all the misunderstandings of which I may apprehend the possibility. It has, therefore, come to pass that I have been obliged to dictate to my son (who, with your kind permission, also writes this letter) sixty pages, the contents of which I was further obliged to expand in detail by telegraphic and other additions. Nevertheless, I have not succeeded, in spite of all my pains, in entirely removing the apprehension that our peaceful scheme may conceal some secret views of an aggressive character. This idea is unwelcome to a gentleman of over eighty-two years of age, but I hope I may be able to dispel it altogether, even if it costs me a somewhat lengthy postscript to those sixty pages. My master’s disinclination to a speedy acceptance of new situations, which is a feature of his character, offers less scope for my activity. For his Majesty, the attitude recently adopted by the Emperor Alexander has for the first time illuminated, as with a lightning flash, a situation which I have been repeatedly obliged to recognise during the past few years. It will be a matter of extreme difficulty for his Majesty to find himself forced into making a choice between the two neighbouring empires, and he will therefore close his mind as long as possible to the conviction that the moment has come for such a course. In our Royal House habit exercises an enormous power, and the instinct of persistence grows stronger with age, and resists the recognition of undoubted changes in the outer world. Besides, the Emperor Alexander (I do not know whether it be due to the influence of others, or to his own determination) now endeavours to force the Jupiter Tonans into the background by a rapid transition to sunshine. In this sense the last threatening utterances were followed within a week by a friendly invitation to send a Prussian officer to Warsaw. This was accepted by my Emperor, who announced the despatch of Field-Marshal Manteuffel and suite, without my previous knowledge of this step, as a military measure. Baron Manteuffel met at Warsaw with very considerable readiness to make advances, in the sincerity and permanence of which however, after all that has passed, I cannot place any confidence. I am not as yet aware whether the meeting which is to take place to-day at Alexandrowo, was suggested by him or by the Russians. The objections on this side against a meeting on Russian soil have been disposed of by a reference to the difficulty of taking with equal promptitude outside of Russia the necessary precautions for the safety of the Emperor Alexander. So far as I know this meeting takes place to-day, our Emperor being accompanied by an aide-de-camp. According to a report of Minister von Bülow it is mainly inspired by a desire to obtain from the Emperor Alexander an explanation of his threatening attitude. Before this has taken place I cannot expect an answer to my report, which was first communicated to the Emperor on the 2nd, and to which I have up to the present only received a telegraphic reply through Bülow. From Bülow’s telegram, however, it appears that even now the Emperor approves of my re-opening at Vienna the conferences with you, upon which I have already reported to him (—At first he was opposed even to Bismarck’s returning home by way of Vienna—), but that nothing must be settled without his approval. Of course that goes without saying and you will not be impatient if my master requires before coming to a decision the time which his years, his habits, and the novelty of the outlook demand. There is also a further circumstance which indeed is favourable to our plans, namely that H.R.H. the Crown Prince was consulted, and therefore that an exchange of ideas must have taken place between the exalted gentlemen. From my experience of my Sovereign for years past I had hardly hoped that, within twenty-four hours after taking cognisance for the first time of such a comprehensive and novel statement of the situation, he would without more ado agree to the continuation of our conferences. As I shall not remain inactive in the meantime I hope before I leave Gastein to obtain fuller powers. Like you, every day’s further consideration confirms my conviction of the usefulness and necessity of the work which we have undertaken, and I trust God will grant us to secure for our two great States the guarantee of external and internal peace towards which our efforts are directed. I have considered it my duty to inform you of the stage at which I have arrived in my work, and I shall continue to do so as soon as I receive the more detailed expression of my master’s views which has been promised. Should his Majesty commit this to paper at Königsberg on the 4th it would come to my hands on the 7th or at latest the 8th instant. I was greatly tempted after your departure to go personally to Berlin in order to plead our cause verbally, but the state of my health and strength was too indifferent to permit of such a strain. Moreover, experience has taught me that in explaining important and difficult matters to my master I attain my object, not more rapidly, it is true, but more certainly, by writing than in verbal intercourse, as, in the latter, difficulties occasionally arise which have no real connection with the matter under consideration. I hope to complete my cure here by the 15th or 16th, and to be then once more equal to the demands of the coming winter. Trusting that we shall soon meet again, I remain, with friendly and cordial respect,
“Your most devoted,
“Bismarck.”
Stolberg writes to Bismarck from Berlin on the 17th of September: “In continuation of my official communication of to-day, I have the honour dutifully to inform your Serene Highness of the following. As the Emperor was almost on the point of giving his approval he suddenly became embarrassed, and said there was still another obstacle, which he had mentioned to you in his last letter, and which obliged him to attach importance to the exclusion of every possibility of our being placed under an obligation to support Austria in a war of aggression against Russia. After some hesitation his Majesty made me pledge my word that, with the exception of your Serene Highness, I would speak to no one on the subject, and then referred to an understanding entered into by the two Emperors at St. Petersburg in 1873 (with your previous knowledge, but without your counter-signature), by which each was bound to render assistance to the other in certain circumstances. This has obviously been the chief stumbling-block, and has given rise to the notion of treachery towards the Emperor Alexander to which Herr von Bülow alluded from Stettin. Although this statement was too vague for me, in ignorance of the matter in question, to thoroughly appreciate the weight of the objection, I considered it my duty, in view of the approaching decision, to seize hold of the statement made by the Emperor, namely, that if the possibility above mentioned were excluded, his objection would cease, and therefore to propose the addition.
“Although this objection would be thus obviated, his Majesty nevertheless wishes to hear what your Serene Highness has to say upon that point, and desires me to inform you to that effect. After giving his sanction the Emperor was somewhat affected, and told me that this decision had cost him a great effort. He believed, however, that he ought to follow the advice of a tried counsellor like your Serene Highness.—I am, with the profoundest respect, &c.”
Stolberg’s suggested addition ran as follows:—
“The sanction of the Emperor William to the signature of the treaty with Austria would be obtained on condition that the Emperor might write to the Emperor Alexander: ‘His Majesty is satisfied with the assurances given in Berlin by Saburoff as to Russia’s love of peace, and desires, as an evidence of his loyalty and frankness, to communicate the fact that he was on the point (underlined in pencil by Bismarck) of concluding a treaty with Austria, in which the careful cultivation of good relations was promised, and mutual assistance was only provided for in cases of attack.’”
The letter from the Emperor to Bismarck, which Stolberg refers to in the above communication, is dated Stettin, September 15th, and runs as follows: “After I had completed my last letter to you, which you will have received to-day, Field-Marshal Manteuffel forwarded to me your telegram to him of the 7th instant, with which I am greatly pleased, as I can see from it that it will be possible to bring about an understanding between us. Fortunately this opinion is confirmed by your fourth report, which reached me yesterday. But an important point has occurred to me in connection with the pourparlers which you will hold in Vienna. That is the Convention dated St. Petersburg, 1873, which was only signed by the two Field-Marshals, Moltke and Barjatinsky, and was ratified by the Emperor Alexander and myself, while you declined to sign. A circumstance which goes to confirm the —— (illegible) which you then and so often raised against binding Conventions, in circumstances where there was as yet no positive object in view, for which reason I found much difficulty in making up my mind to sign the St. Petersburg Convention. How can you now desire to enter into a convention without giving notice of withdrawal from that concluded at St. Petersburg? Both are intended to be defensive conventions. Now, that of St. Petersburg binds Prussia and Russia to render each other assistance in case either should be attacked. The projected Convention is to contain the same stipulation, but against Russia. How are these two to be reconciled? It therefore appears to me that Bülow’s idea (?) of leaving out the ‘against Russia’ would afford us an opportunity of drawing Russia into the new Convention, and thereby fulfilling that of St. Petersburg. As I do not believe Bülow junior to be initiated into the secret of the St. Petersburg Convention, I have not been able to speak of it to him, all the more so as from his silence on the subject when stating his views he seemed to have no knowledge of it.
“William.”
To this was added a postscript of no particular importance: review of troops, inspection of fleet, patriotic reception, &c.
Bismarck to Andrassy from Gastein, on the 20th of September: “Honoured Count,—In continuation of my humble communication of the 3rd instant, I have the honour now to complete the answer therein begun to your Excellency’s kind letter of the 1st instant. I have, in accordance with our conferences here, sent repeated and detailed reports on the situation to the Emperor, my most gracious master. The conformity between my views, which are known to your Excellency, and those of my colleagues who represent me, have made it possible for me to overcome the difficulties which were created by distance and opposing influences from other quarters in so far that I am now in a position to state that the Emperor agrees in principle with the views by which I was guided at our recent conferences. According to an official communication from my substitute, Count Stolberg-Wernigerode, the Emperor is prepared to sanction an agreement under which both Powers mutually undertake to continue to promote the maintenance of peace, and in particular to cultivate peaceful relations between both States and Russia, but, in the event of either of them being attacked by one or more Powers, to jointly repel such attack with their entire united strength. According to this I am empowered by my most gracious master to propose an unconditional defensive alliance between Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, either with or without a limit of time. I humbly beg your Excellency to enter upon a verbal discussion of this proposal. I shall have to submit the result of our negotiations to my most gracious master for approval. I entertain no doubt as to my being able to obtain this sanction, if your Excellency be in a position to agree in the name of the Emperor Francis Joseph to the proposal made on our side, in the same simple and general terms in which it is submitted. In any case I shall consider myself fortunate if our conferences lead to this or other results calculated to promote the mutual interests of both Empires and the peace of Europe.
“With friendly and cordial respect,
“I remain your most devoted,
“v. Bismarck.”
Letter from the King to Bismarck, dated Baden-Baden, October 2nd, 1879: “I regret to see from your letter of the 24th ultimo, as also from the memorandum enclosed therewith, from the protocols of your negotiations in Vienna, and from the draft treaty which has been based upon them, that my views with regard to the latter have not found acceptance on any side. As I expressed these views in my letters from Danzig and Stettin of the 10th and 12th ultimo as clearly as it was possible for me to do, you can see for yourself how far they differ from the results arrived at, so that there is no necessity for me to repeat them. Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, I return herewith your letter of the 24th in order that you may form an idea from my marginal notes (which, I regret to say, are only in pencil) of the impression which it has made upon me.
“Germany and Austria are desirous of attaining the same end—security against unprovoked attacks by foreign foes. But owing to the special mention of Russia as the foe in question, I cannot agree to the present proposals nor to the immediate conclusion of a treaty. After again extending the hand in friendship to the Emperor Alexander after the removal of misunderstandings (at Alexandrowo), am I now to conclude an alliance against him, even of a defensive character, in which he alone is referred to as the presumable aggressor, and keep this intention a secret from him? I cannot be guilty of such an act of disloyalty. In mitigation of this objection it has been urged that, le cas échéant, Russia would be informed of the existence of an alliance, if indications of a war against us became evident. This very uncertain expression is so elastic that the notice would either come too late or would only cause still greater irritation. It was further argued that in the state of ferment now prevailing in the internal affairs of Russia the knowledge of the alliance in question would give her the leverage and self-command necessary to master that ferment. But surely for that purpose official knowledge of that honourable intention is necessary. And yet it is of course impossible to give official knowledge of the fact that Russia is regarded as the sole enemy. Therefore in order that it may be possible to communicate the treaty to Russia, the reference to her must be omitted from it, and the enemy be only described in general terms, while it must be incidentally mentioned that in entering upon it the parties have this honourable intention in view. That is what I desire. I am opposed to an immediate ratification of the treaty, because there is at the present moment absolutely nothing which could lead to a war against Germany and Austria, and it is notorious that binding treaties entered into without urgent necessity are double-edged weapons. Austria urges the immediate ratification on the ground that the favourable situation which for the moment exists in France may be endangered, and that the intimacy between Austria and England may cool down. I cannot conceive how such far-reaching political combinations can possibly be made to depend upon the hazard of a Minister of the French Republic who is on the point of being overthrown. The Anglo-Austrian intimacy must after all be very shaky if it depends upon the date of the ratification of a treaty. In view of the consideration shown by Austria for the susceptibilities of France and her apprehensions as to a coolness with England, Milutin’s opinion as to the possibility of a Triple Alliance may after all not be entirely unfounded.
“Now, another circumstance has arisen which may open a way out of the dilemma in which I find myself between my conscience and honour so far as Russia is concerned, and the objections raised to my views on the Austrian side. In reply to my telegraphic inquiry, you have informed me by wire of what Saburoff told you under instructions from the Emperor. You infer from these communications that Russia has already got wind of our Austrian negotiations (as is quite natural), and you wish to conclude from the defensive attitude, which, according to Saburoff’s assurance, Russia intends in future to maintain that this assurance must have been a consequence of the knowledge obtained respecting our negotiations. In these circumstances it might be possible to immediately carry out the suggestion made by me on page 3 as to the manner of communicating our proposed arrangement with Austria, and to give the treaty a general character, not only by omitting the name of Russia, but by inviting her to join in the treaty. You yourself have said to Saburoff that you are thoroughly in favour of the maintenance of the Three Emperors’ Alliance; and the same idea occurs in the memorandum, the protocol, and the treaty. What, then, could be simpler than to confirm in a real written treaty the Drei Kaiser Bündniss which has hitherto been merely verbal, or, at most, only had a written basis in the St. Petersburg-Vienna arrangement? You yourself have further told Saburoff that you would not be able to co-operate in any policy by which Austria would be endangered. It is as right as it is important that Russia should thus receive the first official intimation of that of which it has already got wind. Inasmuch as our Ambassador at St. Petersburg will have informed Minister Giers of your interview with Saburoff, I would ask whether his assurance that Russia would henceforth only pursue a defensive policy based on the Treaty of Berlin is authentic, and whether it signifies a defensive policy as against Germany and Austria. If a satisfactory answer were received, and this were immediately communicated to Austria, there would be no further obstacle in the way of ourselves and Austria acquainting the Emperor Alexander in the manner above mentioned (page 3) with the projected treaty, and inviting his adhesion.
“This would render necessary a modification of section 1; section 2 would drop out entirely; section 4 would be redrafted in accordance with my marginal notes, should it be considered desirable that the draft itself should constitute the first invitation to Russia to join in the treaty, as the whole treaty would be submitted as an instrument affecting so far only Germany and Austria. I consider the omission of section 2 to be necessary, because it is directed exclusively against Russia; and furthermore because it is specially stated in your letter of the 24th ultimo that in case of an attack by France upon Germany, Austria would be dispensed from supporting the latter, and only bound to observe a benevolent neutrality. That is as much as to say that we should support Austria against Russia with our whole power (section 1), while Austria is dispensed from rendering a like service if France should attack us. But the latter eventuality is unquestionably more possible and indeed more probable than a Russian attack, at least up to the present, since there the desire for the revanche is only slumbering, has never been abandoned, and will show itself again directly a suitable opportunity arises. With regard to our—Germany’s—position in a war with France I differ from Field-Marshal Moltke, inasmuch as I cannot endorse his view that our forces are sufficient to enable us to carry on such a war without allies. In that event we should find ourselves in presence of an army entirely different to that of 1870, as the progress which it has made is undeniable. Besides, there is a further consideration, namely, the almost hermetically sealed French frontier, extending from the Swiss to the Belgian frontiers, a continuous line of fortresses and forts, which—even if broken through—would render it impossible to send reinforcements to the front, and would, moreover, enormously hamper the strategic advance of our forces. It is on this restricted field that, according to Field-Marshal Moltke, we are to deliver battle. If we are victorious we cannot pursue the defeated enemy as we did in 1870, being stopped by this girdle of fortresses, to which, instead of engaging in a pursuit, we should immediately have to lay siege. Months might pass before we could capture any of them, and this would give the defeated army time to refit at its leisure behind this line and to meet us well prepared in the event of our breaking through it at the risk of our communications with our base. But if the German army is defeated in the first battle then the left bank of the Rhine is immediately lost and we must withdraw across the river.
“For this reason Austria ought not to remain neutral in such a war, but, on the contrary, must be bound by treaty to support us with her whole power, in the same way as the treaty binds us to do with regard to Russia.”
Continuation of this Imperial communication to the Chancellor, dated Baden, October 4th: “I had not finished the enclosed letter to you yesterday when your long telegram arrived, so that I had still to add the last three-quarters of a page. The standpoint taken by me in this letter has not been affected by my resolve to approve conditionally of the Vienna proposal. But I again ask you what are we to reply if, in reference to the Memorandum to be communicated to him, the Emperor Alexander should ask: ‘What, then, have you decided to do in connection with this Memorandum? most probably concluded an agreement? Until I am acquainted with it, I can come to no decision, therefore show me this agreement.’ But as the agreement in its present form cannot be shown to Russia, we must decline to produce it; and what impression must this refusal make upon the Emperor Alexander? Certainly the very worst. The wording of section 2 is, to my mind, so very strange that I merely wanted to sum up the enclosure by proposing that the neutrality of Austria in case of our being attacked by France be struck out, and Austria be called upon to assume the same obligation to stand by us with her entire strength that we undertake towards Austria in section 1, in case of a Russian attack. Otherwise the conditions are not equal. Strongly impress this upon Andrassy once more.
“William.”
Letter from Andrassy to Bismarck, dated 3rd October, 1879: “I have received your much esteemed letter of the 29th of September, for which I return my warmest thanks. I have since then received through Prince Reuss some communications referring to the position of the negotiations. I enclose them herewith in the form in which they were written down by Prince Reuss himself. I am in a position to declare myself in agreement with the intention manifested in this proposal, but I have nevertheless some scruples as to two points. The first is that a treaty is spoken of, and the second that the conclusion of the treaty is described as impending in the future. My objection to the first is that, if the intention to conclude a treaty is expressly emphasised in the letter of his Majesty the Emperor William, it follows necessarily that they will ask for the text at St. Petersburg, and this will afford the Russian Cabinet, before things are settled between us, an opportunity to commence negotiations à trois from which I do not anticipate a satisfactory result for any of the parties. For this reason I venture to submit a counter, or, more correctly, a parallel proposal, the adoption of which would, it seems to me, be of advantage to both sides. This is:—
“After having sanctioned the signature of the Treaty (underlined by Bismarck in pencil) his Majesty the Emperor William can communicate the entire contents (underlined in pencil by Bismarck) of the Memorandum agreed upon and signed by us, which, of course, implies an agreement, adding on his own part the explanation that this agreement at the same time involves a tacit understanding by both Governments that an attack upon either Empire will be regarded as directed against both, and will also be construed by his Majesty in that sense. His Majesty, satisfied with the statement made by Saburoff, respecting Russia’s love of peace, makes this communication as a proof of his loyalty and frankness. His Majesty may, perhaps, add that this understanding is of an entirely defensive character, and that there is nothing to prevent Russia from removing any antagonistic tendency by herself adhering to the principles laid down in the Memorandum. (Pencil-marked in the margin by Bismarck.) By this means the object of the Emperor William would be fully attained, namely, to communicate the significance of our understanding, while, on the other hand, no mention would be made of the existence of a more precise agreement, and, therefore, the necessity of communicating it would be avoided.
“Such a communication of the text would have among other things the disadvantage, first, that the adhesion of Russia to this text is inconceivable; secondly, that the passage in it referring to France and Italy would become known there almost immediately, and would, at the present time, give rise to quite unnecessary combinations; and, thirdly, that the affair might transpire in Parliament, and lead to undesirable discussions. These considerations commend my proposal. Should you not be able to secure its acceptance in the competent quarter, I could agree to any other method, including the suggestion made by Stolberg, my most gracious master having before his departure declared that he would not make a conditio sine quâ non of preserving secrecy as to the Treaty after signature.
“There is, on the other hand, one point which I would regard as entirely out of the question, namely, any communication of the existence and contents of the Treaty before the sanction of his Majesty, the Emperor William, is actually given or is assured. (Bismarck added in pencil: ‘Quite right.’) Without desiring to forestall the decision upon this point of my most gracious master, I should prefer to renounce altogether the conclusion of an agreement, and in any case I should be obliged to forego for my own part any further share in the negotiations upon such basis. Pray excuse, dear Prince, the somewhat abrupt tone of this statement, but as the matter appeared to me to be pressing, I desired to let Prince Reuss have the letter to-day. Begging you to present my respects to the Princess, I remain, with unalterable and cordial respect,
“Your sincerely devoted,
“Andrassy.”
The Crown Prince writes to Bismarck (quite confidentially) from Baden-Baden, on the 4th of October, 1879: “Count Stolberg will have already informed you prior to the receipt of these lines of the course of affairs up to the signing of the draft Treaty by the Emperor. I therefore say nothing more about this very exciting crisis, the result of which I confidently anticipate will be of far-reaching importance for the position of Germany. I must point out, however, that his Majesty is quite miserable, and keeps on repeating that he has dishonoured himself by his decision, and has been disloyal to his friend the Tsar; so that one clearly sees how fearfully difficult the decision was for him, with his extreme conscientiousness.”
Draft (dated Varzin, October 30th, 1879) of a verbal answer to be made to the Emperor Alexander in reply to any question which he might ultimately put: “An institution which arose under the influence of Alexander I. and which preserved the peace of central Europe for half a century, had to be sacrificed in 1866 to irresistible necessity. The German Confederation was an excessive burden to us Prussians, while it did not satisfy the aspirations of the other Germans. The discontent thus created was utilised by the revolutionary party, for the purpose of threatening every German Prince. It was necessary to deprive them of this weapon, and to satisfy the national sentiment. This was done at the expense of the security which the Confederation afforded, almost without cost, to its weaker members.
“That the breach caused by the secession of Austria, which extended from the Carpathians to the Lake of Constance, would have to be filled up was recognised even in the Paulskirche. Later on, after the war of 1866, attempts were unceasingly made to bind Austria to the States, with which it had been formerly united in the German Confederation, so as to prevent her from allying herself with France against them. This object has now been attained without any obligation on our part to defend Trient, Trieste, or, indeed, Bosnia, against Italians, or Turks, or Southern Slavs. Our agreement with Austria no more involves anything in the nature of a threat to our neighbours than would do the erection of a fortress on the frontier, which, of course, has never been regarded in that light, and it is even less of a menace for instance, than the construction of strategic railways. It has, indeed, the character of a mutual assurance society, which every one having similar interests is at liberty to join.”
Report of the Emperor William to Bismarck of his interview at Alexandrowo, from a copy made for the Crown Prince:—
1. September 5th.—“The Emperor Alexander began the conversation by an explanation of his letter to me. Nobody knew anything of it.” (Marginal note by Bismarck: “Gortschakoff revised it.”) (1) He had shown it to no one before it was despatched, and after it had been sent he only communicated it verbally without naming the persons. If, therefore, I had found anything offensive in the letter, as he saw from my answer, he alone was to blame, and he recognised that it was possible for me to have misunderstood him. (2) He was very sorry for that, and since it had had such a serious result as to cause me personal offence, he wished it to be regarded as if it had never been written. Nothing was farther from his intention than the idea of a threat. He had only wished to call my attention to the fact, which was perfectly true, that if the press of both countries continued to rail at each other it must lead in the course of time to a feeling of hostility between the two States, and his sole object was to avoid that. (3) He considered that the preservation of the peace of Europe was only possible in the future, as it had been in the past, so long as good relations between Prussia and Russia were maintained under all circumstances. (3A) The votes given, mostly against Russia, by my Commissioners in the proceedings of the European Commissions in the East had betrayed a hostile attitude on the part of Germany towards Russia, which had caused great irritation in the latter country, and gave rise to the excited comments of the press. (4) In these Commissions Russia was pursuing the object which she had had exclusively in view during the war, namely, to improve and render more assured the fate of the Christian populations, but not to make conquests. If opposition were now offered thereto in the delimitation of the frontier, and more or more Christians were restored against his wish to Turkish sovereignty, the Commissioners must have received instructions to that effect. (5) The German votes had already produced a bad effect in Turkey also, inasmuch as the disagreement which was there seen to exist between Germany and Russia rendered the Turks more obstinate, and caused work to drag on interminably. (6) Prince Bismarck, whom he had hitherto known only as the friend of the Russo-Prussian relations, seemed unable to forget Prince Gortschakoff’s—stupid—circular of 1875. He had strongly advised Prince Gortschakoff against sending this circular, and pointed out to him the evil consequences (of his vanity, en parenthese) because if there actually were anything to smooth over, that was not the way to set about it. Prince Gortschakoff had his way, however. Bismarck’s grudge, and his inability to forget, which began with this irritation against Gortschakoff, appeared to him to have been transferred to Russia, and it was to this that he referred in his letter to me when he said that he could not reconcile such conduct with the character of so eminent a statesman. This expression of his in the letter to me did not refer to the instructions given to the Commissioners with respect to Eastern affairs. Moreover (7), Prince Gortschakoff is a man who has outlived his usefulness, and whom he hardly ever consults now. “In reply to No. 1, I said I could not deny that I had been painfully affected by his letter, particularly because I had considered that his remarks referred only to the votes in question, and they seemed to me a matter of such slight consequence that I could not understand his irritation on that score. It was only through his declaration to the effect that his expression referred to the subject dealt with in No. 7 (doubtless No. 6 is meant) that I now for the first time understood it. I could assure him that Prince Bismarck still regards the relations between Prussia, Germany, and Russia as he always did, but that he saw a feeling gaining ground in Russia, chiefly owing to the press, which he could not understand, in view of the existing laws there, especially as semi-official organs contributed to this detrimental state of feeling. I added that I was prepared to admit that our press was also guilty of similar excesses, but, after all, these were mainly in self-defence against the Russian attacks. We are so tied by our press laws that we can only intervene in the way of personal appeal to the editors of the newspapers, but not legally unless a state of siege were proclaimed in certain districts. Nos. 2 and 3. If the words in question were to be understood as containing no threat I should feel reassured, as the interpretation which the Emperor gave to this passage of his letter was in perfect accord with my own convictions. As his Government had quite recently issued a serious reprimand with regard to improper articles in the newspapers, it was to be expected and hoped, from the power with which the Governor-General was invested, that energetic action would be taken. I, on my part, had caused certain advice to be given to the editors, the law did not permit any more. 3A. Our instructions to the Commissioners in question had remained the same from the very beginning: if Russia and Austria were in agreement always to vote with them; when points arose where that was not the case to vote with the majority, where the Russian proposal was not flagrantly untenable. That had been the case in the matter of Silistria, where I was entirely in favour of the Russian proposal to appoint a Commission to inquire into the question of the bridge on the spot, and also with regard to the military road through Eastern Rumelia. 4. This view was quite new to me, as nothing of the kind had previously been brought to my notice. At the same time, these little frontier details were after all so trifling that they could hardly affect the question of the Christians to any important extent. Unfortunately, the Greek frontier question had only been mentioned at the Congress as the expression of a desire, and not as a demand, and I foresaw, from the first, how it would be, mais pendant le congrès je n’avais pas voix au chapitre. I regarded in the same way the Jewish question in Rumania, the broader solution desired being, to my mind, impracticable, and therefore I wished to see the Greek modification adopted.”
Continuation of this report, dated September 12th, 1879:—
“Nos. 6 and 7. I had never noticed that Prince Bismarck was inspired by particularly hostile feelings towards Prince Gortschakoff on account of the latter’s circular of 1875. My opinion and his upon that note was exactly the same as that of the Emperor Alexander himself; but at the Berlin Congress the same view with regard to Prince Gortschakoff was manifested as was expressed above by the Emperor, and I therefore understood the peculiar position which was now assigned to him. I believe that in my answer to the Emperor I adequately emphasised how little change there has been in Prince Bismarck’s political views so far as Russia is concerned. He had always agreed with me that, remembering the attitude adopted by Russia towards us in 1870, we for two whole years, 1876 and 1877, tried to manifest our gratitude to the Emperor by our neutralité bienveillante, and actually succeeded in preventing a coalition of the Western Powers, including Austria. This seemed to me to disprove the suspicion of the Emperor that Prince Bismarck had out of spite against Prince Gortschakoff changed his political views, and on that account had adopted towards Russia an attitude to which expression had been given in such trifling questions. Up to the present Prince Bismarck’s sentiments towards Russia remained unaltered.
“On the forenoon of the 4th the Emperor came to see me again in order to take leave of me after lunch. He had received a telegram from Jugenheim, from the Empress Marie, who desired to be remembered to me, and was very pleased at our meeting at Alexandrowo. He added: ‘C’est à elle que j’ai communiqué la première ma lettre à Vous dont le brouillon était par differentes correctures presque illisible. I afterwards showed my letter and your answer to Adlerberg, Milutin and Giers; they know exactly what my political opinions are concerning Prussia and Germany, and being in perfect agreement with me on this subject, they are pleased that erroneous impressions will be dispelled by our meeting.’ The Emperor then read me a letter from the Russian envoy reporting a conversation which he had had at Kissingen with Prince Bismarck on the political situation; and a great deal had in particular been said about Prussia and Russia acting together. The envoy found that Prince Bismarck’s former view of the Three Emperors’ Alliance had remained entirely unchanged. The Emperor repeated, en aperçu, the views which we had exchanged, and was heartily glad the misunderstandings had been cleared up and that the old friendship would be maintained between the two States in association with Austria. As to the latter, he now added for the first time: ‘Certainly I had reason to be dissatisfied with her, as her attitude towards me during the war was louche as usual. Without firing a shot she occupied two Turkish provinces, of course never to surrender them again, as the English will never give up Cyprus, respecting which they entered into a separate treaty during the Congress without making any communication to the Great Powers.’ I interrupted him here, saying I believed there had been negotiations at Reichstadt respecting the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. ‘Yes,’ said the Emperor, ‘but under quite different conditions, that Austria should take part in the war in some way or other. All the same, the main point is that we should hold together à trois.’ Of course I could only confirm that view as my own conviction.
“On the same morning I spoke to General Count Adlerberg, Minister Giers, and Minister of War Milutin, one after the other. The first two spoke with equal warmth in favour of the old relations. They were aware of the Emperor’s letter and of my answer, which I mentioned as entrée de conversation, and they were at one with the Emperor in his satisfaction at the removal of the misunderstandings which they would have thought to be impossible, knowing, as they did, exactly the views to which the Emperor desired to give expression in his letter. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of these sentiments. I nevertheless told them quite plainly that it was the press that led to an estrangement between our countries. As a strongly worded rescript had now been issued in Russia decidedly disapproving of the hostile attitude adopted by the press towards Germany, an improvement was to be anticipated, that is, if the Governors by whom a state of siege had been proclaimed throughout almost all Russia—a measure to which I could only wish every success—made use of their power to immediately seize all newspapers, pamphlets, &c., which published inflammatory matter. If that were not done the dangerous consequences which the Emperor had foreseen would certainly follow, namely, discord between the two States. In dealing with our own free press, my hands were tied by the law and our representative Constitution, and hence the defensive attitude against the Russian press taken up in our newspaper articles. I had, however, given orders that the editors should be advised to exercise greater restraint themselves, should an improvement take place in the Russian press. The gentlemen in question agreed with me in all this, and hoped for an improvement.
“The conversation with General Milutin began with the subject described above. I then expressed my appreciation of the new organisation introduced during the war, and said I could not understand where the money was found for it. But all Europe had been alarmed at seeing the efforts and the monetary sacrifices made for carrying on the war suddenly retained on a peace footing. He replied: ‘It was precisely the war which proved that the Russian army was not strong enough even to overcome the power of Turkey, its enormous forces being dispersed over the whole empire from Siberia to the Vistula. Therefore a nucleus must be maintained which shall be equal to European requirements. This cost can be met out of Russian resources that are unknown to other countries. We have war frontiers against China, against the countries on the Indian border, against Persia and against Turkey. We have received news that a coalition is being formed between Austria, England, and perhaps France. That points to a new conflict in the East. England is organising and arming Asia Minor, which is being inundated with State officials, generals, and officers in the guise of consuls, a sure indication of hostile intentions upon our position in the Caucasus. The Eastern conflict is near at hand.’ I demurred to the latter statement, and asserted that if once the decisions of the Berlin Congress were carried out in their entirety, no fresh war was to be anticipated there, as Turkey required peace above everything else.
“(Signed) William, 9/9/79.”
“While the Emperor was with me on the 4th a telegram from London was brought to him, according to which England declared that, although not in favour of the appointment of a technical commission ad hoc for the settlement of the bridge question at Silistria, she would be pleased to see the Servian Frontier Commission entrusted with that task. The Emperor said he could agree to that, and that only technical members should be appointed to the Commission.”
These papers also include the letter from the Emperor William to Bismarck, dated 10/9/79, which accompanied the foregoing report: “Herewith I send you the conclusion of the notes of my conversation with the Emperor Alexander. My letter from Berlin, which crossed your memorandum No. 1, showed you that your views, which you now repeat with more detail in No. 2, are in contradiction—first in principle, and then that an answer could not be given until I had spoken with the Emperor Alexander. Your premises in the memoranda could be transformed into truth for me only after I had spoken to the Emperor, and—as I wrote you through Minister von Bülow—after light had been thrown upon the correspondence. Up to that time I regarded your memoranda comme non avenus. For me my notes have brought this light. The Emperor regrets having written the letter, as it has given rise to misunderstandings; as the words ‘ce qui doit avoir des suites fâcheuses et dangereuses’ should absolutely not be regarded as threatening a rupture, but only as directing my attention to the fact that if some restraint were not placed upon the press, ill feeling might arise between our two countries, which neither of us desired, and therefore that measures should be taken accordingly. That being as true as anything in this world can be, I could only express my complete approval, all the more so as the Russian Government had already taken such steps, and I had ordered similar measures prior to my departure. As you will see from the notes, I corrected the view taken by the Emperor Alexander of the votes given by my Commissioners in the East, and he fully understood this, although he stated that he had already received news of the unfavourable consequences of these votes, which was quite new to me, but which explained the Emperor’s dissatisfaction on that score. You will also read how I defended you against the passage in the Emperor’s letter. He fully agreed that our policy during the war in the East was of the greatest benefit to Russia, which involves the highest recognition for yourself. I could assure him that till now you had maintained your old sentiments towards Russia, as was sufficiently proved in 1877 and 1878. On this occasion the Emperor expressed his conviction that peace could only be preserved for Europe by our holding together à trois, as we had done since the meeting in Berlin in 1872. Having hitherto held the same conviction myself, I could only agree with him. As the three persons, Adlerberg, Giers, and Milutin, spoke in exactly the same sense, the light which I looked for at this meeting at Alexandrowo respecting the sentiments of the Emperor and those persons who stand highest in his confidence has been forthcoming so far as I am concerned. None of them has the slightest wish to wage war upon us. The great additions to the Russian army which were raised as a reserve during the Turkish war, are retained as a permanent increase because they believe themselves to be threatened by a European coalition, and therefore must be in a state of preparation which would enable them to meet this alone.
“Since therefore, for me, the premises in your memoranda fall to the ground, namely, that owing to the danger threatened from Russia we should give up the policy we have hitherto pursued in our relations with that country and not only seek but actually conclude a European coalition of a defensive nature against Russia, I cannot lend myself to this project in its present extension. In view of the explanation given by the Emperor Alexander of his letter to me, which I originally did not regard as a threat but only as a desire to see the existing good relations between our States maintained by means of restrictions upon the press, it could only be a source of satisfaction to me to see the milder tone which prevailed in your answer sent by me to the Emperor, the moderate pressure and the truths which it contained being sufficiently intelligible and also understood. The words ‘une entente séculaire, les legs de nos pères de glorieuse mémoire’ were written according to my own heart, and went to the heart of the Emperor, so that he repeated them to me twice. I could not therefore understand your hostility to Russia, which increases with each memorandum, nor could I see how the expressions quoted above could be interpreted as a mere empty phrase! I was just as deeply affected by the words that we should outwardly maintain a friendly attitude towards Russia while at the same time concluding a coalition against her with Austria, with England, and perhaps with France. And you have its conclusion already so fixedly in view that you have not only communicated your whole project to Count Andrassy, but have also permitted him to speak of it to his Emperor (seinem Kaiser), who also immediately accepts it. Then you invite me to send you instructions, on your way back through Vienna, to conclude a defensive alliance there with Austria against Russia, which would be followed by the larger coalition. Put yourself in my place for a moment. I am in presence of a personal friend, a near relative and an ally, in order to come to an understanding as to some hasty and indeed misunderstood passages in a letter, and our interview leads to a satisfactory result. Shall I now at the same time join a hostile coalition against this sovereign, that is to say, act behind his back in a manner contrary to that in which I spoke to him?
“I will not absolutely deny that the dangers set forth in your memoranda may arise one day, particularly on a change of rulers in St. Petersburg. I am, however, utterly unable to see that there is any imminent danger. How often have you warned me against treaties with other Powers, which tied one’s hands, when there is no positive object in view, and there is only room for conjecture as to an uncertain future. My brother and Minister Manteuffel in particular burnt their fingers over the Three Years’ Treaty with Austria which was concluded after Olmütz, and impatiently awaited the expiry of that term. The present case is quite similar. It is against my political convictions and my conscience to bind my hands for the sake of a possible eventuality.
“At the same time, I must not disavow you and the steps which you have already taken in dealing with Andrassy and his master. Therefore in Vienna, whither all the newspapers already say you are going, you may speak of the eventuality of disagreement with Russia developing into a possible breach, and enter into pourparlers respecting the joint measures to be then taken with Austria. But, following my conscience, I do not authorise you to conclude a convention, to say nothing of a treaty.
“In this way I hope our views will again agree. If it be God’s will that this should be the case, I can look forward with confidence to the future, which would otherwise for me be very dark, and anticipate a genuine continuance of the relations with Russia, which are growing more friendly. I cannot tell you how painful the episode has been to me, when it seemed, for the first time in seventeen years, as if we could not come to an understanding. I impatiently await your answer to the above authorisation, and am convinced that we shall be able to come to an agreement. God grant that it may be so!
“Your faithful and devoted,
“William.
“Finished at Stettin, 12/9/79.”
“As Herr von Bülow, after taking a copy of my additions to the Alexandrowo notes, had the original immediately despatched to you, there is a corresponding change in the opening words of this letter.”
Letter from Bismarck to Prince Reuss, dated Varzin, 28th January 1880 (on the left top corner, the note: “Copied a second time in the interest of history”—doubtless in Holstein’s handwriting):—
“In connection with your report, No. 11 of the 10th, I take the liberty to send your Serene Highness a few words confidentially, and only for your personal information, on the relations between Austria and Italy.
“I consider it natural that Baron Haymerle should have made no official complaint respecting Urezzana, and furthermore, that he was tactically right in taking that course. I should not regard it as good policy however to adopt a purely passive attitude towards similar permanent threats. Such a course would, I fear, only encourage Italian Chauvinism, and the semi-complicity of the Government therewith. According to my political convictions a purely defensive attitude, i.e., one of mere complaint, is not an effective weapon against such permanent threats or incitement. It is open to Austria to parry such attacks, by assuming the offensive, on similar lines to the Italian demonstrations. It is not the Italian Government which adopts a threatening attitude. It only suffers Italian subjects to do so. Now I am convinced that there are elements and movements in Austria that favour the restoration of the Papal States, and of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, just as the Irredentists work for the acquisition of the Trentino. If these elements in the press and public life of Austria were to come or to be drawn into greater prominence, that would involve a counteraction against the Irredenta, which would compel the Italians to fall back upon the defensive, without being able to make any complaint. Even the plea that Austria, in view of such threatening movements, requires a better line of defence than that which she now possesses would be quite as legitimate as a craving for the Trentino, Trieste, and Dalmatia. Italy by herself would scarcely venture to attack Austria, but her present attitude is a constant encouragement to the war party in Russia. For about twelve months I have had the impression that Italy is inclined to place herself at the disposal of a Russian policy of war if in return she were offered an accession of territory and a stretch of the Adriatic coast. The relations which it has been sought to establish between the two armies, the Italian and the Russian, and the shifting of the centre of gravity of the Italian army towards the north support this impression, not less than the indications furnished by various votes which the Great Powers have respectively given. This whole attitude shows that Italy must not be numbered to-day among the peace-loving and conservative Powers, who must reckon with this fact. I beg your Serene Highness also to think over this matter for yourself, and to kindly send me your views in an autograph private letter. Of course any initiative in opening up this subject must be carefully avoided, but Baron Haymerle, or Count Andrassy when he comes to Vienna, can hardly fail to bring it up in conversation with your Serene Highness, and thus give you an opportunity of introducing observations in the sense of the foregoing remarks, not as the expression of German policy, but as your own opinion in the character of a friendly expert. In certain circumstances the Nuncio also might afford an opportunity for an expression of opinion in this sense which would excite no suspicion. It would in any case be of interest to assure one’s self of the present feelings of the Italian Prelacy with regard to strategic moves of this description.
“I cannot deny that, to my mind, the Italy of to-day offers Germany small prospect of useful co-operation with us in the possible crises of the future. On the contrary, we have much more ground to fear that Italy will join our adversaries than to hope that she will unite with us, seeing that we have no more inducements to offer her. Every encouragement to Italian policy to join the bellicose and predatory Powers in Europe is contrary to German interests, and in the present instance still more contrary to those of Austria. For the protection of the latter it would, I think, be useful to call the attention of the English Cabinet to the encouragement to breaches of the peace which the attitude of Italy involves. Perhaps your Serene Highness can ascertain whether anything has been done or is intended in this direction.
“Bismarck.”
The Emperor William to the Imperial Chancellor, Berlin, November 13th, 1885: “Enclosed I return you brevi manu, your two extremely important and interesting letters, with my observations. I beg you to excuse me for selecting this method of answering them, but you know how badly I write long explanations, and from the marginal notes you will see my complete agreement with your views, so that I believe I may adopt this shorter form of answer. I may mention to you at the same time that I consider the moment has now come to lay before my son the views with which it was all along intended to acquaint him, as to the utter inexpediency, now no less than formerly, of the marriage in question, which, of course, he himself has also always held to be impossible. Now, however, that Prince Alexander has come forward as a rebel against the peace of Paris (doubtless Berlin was meant), and the signatories thereto, whether he remains in Bulgaria or not, a marriage of this kind has become more than ever impossible. Your political explanations are quite to the point.
“Your grateful
“William.”
I left for Hamburg at 12.20 on the 29th of October, shortly after the Emperor passed through that city. On the evening of the 30th I returned to Friedrichsruh, where I arrived about 5.30 P.M. At dinner, the Prince, who was in excellent spirits, said that the most gracious Master had in all taken up five hours of his time. Afterwards, over our coffee, he observed to me: “This afternoon he let me talk to him for three hours on end. I stood as if in the pulpit, and I am tired out.” Everybody said that the Emperor was extremely unaffected and amiable, and the Princess noticed in particular that he could laugh most heartily. I heard that Minister Mittnacht would arrive next day. By 12 o’clock on the day of my journey to Hamburg I had read through the last of the Bismarck papers, which went as far as the year 1887 and concluded with No. 735. Among the most recent of the papers are three letters of the year 1880 from King Lewis of Bavaria, full of recognition for Bismarck, the second expressing regret at his wish to retire, and the hope that he would remain. A letter from the Emperor William to the Chief dated May 31, 1886, on the “horrifying news from Munich,” says towards the close that there is little to be hoped from Prince Luitpold, while King Lewis is credited with having “shown more good will ... for the German cause.” Then two autograph letters from the Crown Princess (the present Dowager Empress). One is dated December 23, 1885, and accompanied a present of Moselle wine which he had liked at her table; while the other, dated from Villa Zivio, November 22, 1887, deals with the illness of her consort, and reports the unanimous opinion of the German doctors. Finally, a letter of November 23, 1887, from the Emperor William, which is very illegibly written and runs somewhat as follows: “Enclosed I send you the nomination of your son as Wirklicher Geheimrath with the title of Excellency, in order that you may hand it to him, a pleasure which I would not deny you. I imagine that this pleasure will be threefold, for yourself, for your son, and for me! I take this opportunity (to explain) to you the silence which I have observed up to the present respecting your proposal, in view of the sad condition of health of my son the Crown Prince, to initiate my grandson, Prince William, more fully into State affairs. In principle I entirely agree with you that this must be done, but it is a very difficult matter to carry into execution. You will of course know that the very natural decision, which I took on your advice, that, in case of my being prevented, my grandson William should sign the current Cabinet rescripts in civil and military affairs with the superscription ‘By Order of his Majesty’ greatly irritated the Crown Prince, as if, in Berlin, a substitute were already being thought of. On considering the matter quietly my son will doubtless have reassured himself. But such reflection would be more difficult if he ascertained that his son were allowed a still greater insight into State affairs, and were even given a Civil aide-de-camp as I used to call my Vortragende Räthe. Things were, however, quite (different) then. As there was nothing that could induce my Royal father to appoint a substitute for the then Crown Prince (although my succession to the throne could be anticipated long beforehand), my introduction to State affairs was put off till I was forty-four years old, when my brother suddenly nominated me a member of the Ministry of State with the title of Prince of Prussia. It was necessary in this position that an experienced man of business should be appointed to prepare me for each sitting of the Council of Ministers. At the same time I received the diplomatic despatches every day, after they had passed through four, five, or six hands—according to the seals! A mere conversation, such as you propose, the appointment of a statesman in attendance on my grandson, would not have the character of a preparation, as in my case, for a specific object, and would certainly still further irritate my son, a thing which must absolutely be avoided. I would therefore suggest that the course of occupation hitherto followed—learning the manner of dealing with State affairs—should be continued, that is to say that (my grandson) should be attached to single Ministries or perhaps to two at a time, as during this winter, when my grandson was attached in a voluntary capacity to the Foreign Office as well as to the Ministry of Finance. This voluntary course should cease with the New Year, and perhaps (be replaced) by the Ministry of the Interior, my grandson being permitted in special cases to obtain information at the Foreign Office. This continuation of the course hitherto followed may cause my son less irritation, although you will remember that he was strongly opposed even to this. I therefore beg you to let me have your opinion on the matter. Wishing you all a pleasant festival,
“Your grateful
“William.”[18]
On Thursday, November 1st, I told the Prince, at lunch, that I would either immediately or next morning return him the papers, sorted and arranged. He replied, however, that he had found some more which belonged to the collection. He took me with him to his study, and handed them to me for arrangement, adding that there were very many more at Varzin, a whole box full, including private letters of historic significance. I should also go through these later on, and put them into chronological order.
On the morning of Friday, the 2nd of November, I read, sorted, and numbered new documents, which were afterwards put into a fresh envelope. Among these was the announcement of March, 1877, by the Emperor William, that he had appointed Bismarck Hereditary Grand Huntsman of Pomerania, reports respecting the illness of the Crown Prince, afterwards Emperor Frederick, from San Remo, Charlottenburg, and Potsdam, a letter from the Emperor William II. to Bismarck, transferring him to the second regiment of Guards, a telegram from the same, dated October 21, 1888, expressing his satisfaction at his journey to South Germany, Vienna, and Rome, whence he had just returned, and his thanks for the Chief’s counsels, which had been justified by his experience while away, and, finally, the letter already alluded to from the Empress Augusta. Nothing of importance among them.
At midday, before lunch, I personally handed over to the Chief the envelopes containing the papers. He appeared to have looked through them in the afternoon, as, when he was passing by in the evening, before dinner, as usual, with his two dogs, he gave me his hand and thanked me, expressing his surprise that I had been able to deal with such a mass of letters and papers in so short a time. I said if he wished to have those at Varzin also arranged, and could find no more suitable person to do it, I should be glad if he would let me know when he was next going to his estate in Further Pomerania, so that I might come there and complete my task. I should be delighted to serve him and learn something for myself at the same time. Rottenburg was absent from dinner. He had gone to Hamburg to meet some relatives. During dinner there was some talk of a Herr von Bülow, who had been the Chief’s guest at lunch. I ascertained that in this gentleman I had had before me the famous leader of the Lauenburg nobility, to whom Bismarck had clearly explained his standpoint, first on the Ratzeburg Lake, and again on taking the oath of allegiance in the church there. He is much more harmless than I had fancied him. The Chief said: “I should have invited him to remain to dinner, and he doubtless expected it, but he is so tedious that I did not know what to do with him during the five hours before dinner.” Then, after referring to the letters of the Crown Prince in 1863, which I had arranged, and to his own pencil notes, he came to speak of the Crown Prince himself. I said: “Absalom! And from what you wrote on the back you doubtless wrote him in reply that you did not intend to be ever included among his Ministers.” “Yes,” he rejoined, and the quotation Leicht fertig ist die Jugend mit dem Wort! (Youth is hasty in its judgments). He then gave a survey of the various phases of the Crown Prince’s attitude towards himself in the course of his life. “First, in 1848 or 1849. At that time he was still very thin and lanky. He showed great attachment to me, and, when they forbade him to do so at Potsdam, he used to try to meet me in the dusk of the evening and shake hands with me. Then the rude letter of 1863; afterwards, since 1864, in Flensburg, better. Then again Liberal counsels, Augustenburg sympathies, the Geffcken and Friedberg introductions, and his siding with Cumberland.” I said: “The Englishwoman, the Guelph.” We then spoke of the latter, also over our coffee, when the Princess said she could be very amiable when she liked, as she herself had experienced; a statement which the Chief also confirmed from his own experience. (...)
On Saturday I took leave of the Prince and Princess in the dining-room, after I had fulfilled my promise to the little Rantzaus to go with them to see a “house” that they had begun to build on the roadside leading to Dassendorf. I suggested some architectural improvements, and the eldest one, with childlike politeness, thanked me for the “good advice I had given them,” and hoped I would soon come back again. A prospect of doing so was held out to me on my taking leave at the house. The Chief said, as he was shaking hands: “Adieu, Büschlein, perhaps we shall resume our business soon at Varzin. But I must first return to Berlin.” The Princess asked me to present her compliments to Bucher, and the Countess came down to accompany me to the station with her children. But first she showed me the handsome clock and writing-table presented to her father by the German manufacturers, and gave me a porcelain penholder from one of the drawers as a souvenir.
On Sunday, the 10th of February, 1889, I received through a Chancery attendant an appointment to call upon the Chief at 3 P.M. I appeared punctually at the hour named, in his antechamber. Minister Bötticher was called into the Prince before me, and I talked to Rottenburg until my turn came. On entering the room I found the Prince in uniform. He asked about my health, and I inquired as to his. He complained of insomnia, and said he could no longer get any sleep without artificial means. On his then asking me what I had been doing in the interval, I mentioned the Grenzboten article on his attitude and that of the Crown Prince at the Versailles negotiations with the Bavarians, and he expressed a wish to see it, and said: “I should like you to add something to it, and to return to Geffcken’s extracts from the diary of the Crown Prince, or more correctly from one of the three or four diaries of the war, and of later years. A diary is a series of daily notes in which one writes down immediately afterwards what he has ascertained and experienced, just as a tourist does; and that too is the character of the first original diary. It is short, and as was natural enough in war time, it deals mainly with military affairs, and contains scarcely any political considerations. The others are interpolated later, from conversations which he had with good friends, or those whom he considered to be such—Geffcken, Roggenbach, &c. Thus he imagined that he had thought of all these things himself, as far back as 1870. English letters and influences will also have affected him. I say he imagined that and believed it, because he was a man who was very devoted to the truth. The good friends were malcontents, ambitious place hunters, and intriguers, people who felt that they had a vocation for great things, who knew more and could do better than the Government, and who would very willingly have lent a hand if they had only been allowed to do so. They were men of unappreciated talent, the wallflowers, the pettifogging attorneys and quacks of politics. He showed them the diary, and they made their observations upon it, which he then inserted. They found that in this shape it would come in usefully in the future. That accounts for the various transformations it underwent. The Crown Prince, like all mediocrities, liked copying, and other occupations of the same sort, such as sealing letters, &c. And he had time enough for it, as the King kept him apart from almost all political work, seldom or never spoke to him on such matters, and would not allow me to make any communication to him on subjects of the kind. From 1863 onward there was an uninterrupted struggle between the two, in the course of which there were several violent scenes when the Crown Prince was pulled up sharply, and he (imitating the gesture) cast up his eyes and raised his hands in despair. It was the same at Versailles in connection with the Emperor question, where the most gracious Master would not at first hear a word of our proposals, and got so angry on one occasion that he brought down his fist violently upon the table and the inkstand nearly flew out of the window. And here you may supplement the report in the diary as to this incident. Fragmentary and incomplete in every respect, it leaves out the first act in the negotiations, in which I had to wean the Crown Prince of the notion, which doubtless originated at Baden, that the Emperor idea was un-German and would damage the country. He was thinking only of the mediæval emperors, the Roman expeditions, and Charles V. For that reason he wished to have only a King of Germany or of the Germans, while the other three kings were to resume the title of Dukes—Duke of Bavaria, of Suabia and of Saxony. And to this he added the idea of coercion—they should be invited to Versailles and once we had got him there it was to be a case of needs must when the devil drives (jetzt friss Vogel oder stirb). I replied to him that that would be treacherous, disloyal and ungrateful, and that I would not lend myself to it, as, moreover, it would have no permanency. No friendly persuasion could possibly induce the Kings to submit to this degradation. I then pointed out to him the advantages of the Emperor idea, somewhat in the same way as I did afterwards in my letter to the King of Bavaria. The Kings would prefer to subordinate themselves to a fellow-countryman, who bore the title of German Emperor and to grant him certain rights in war and peace, than to a King of Prussia, who would only be a somewhat more powerful neighbour. Among the people, however, the Emperors had left a deeper impression than had the few princes, who, after the time of Charlemagne, called themselves, like Henry the Fowler, German Kings. In the restoration of the Empire they looked forward to the Emperor as the keystone of the arch. The Emperor still sits enthroned in Kyffhäuser in North Germany, and in the South German Untersberge. This idea should not be connected with that of a Roman Emperor, Roman expeditions or any pretensions to universal sovereignty would be against the true interests of the nation. It was, on the contrary, a purely national idea which the Emperor would represent and which we also had in view, the idea of unification after discord and decay, of new power and security through unity, of the concentration of the whole people upon the same objects. As far back as 1818 such ideas were held by the students’ associations, and in 1848 they found expression in the Paulskirche. In 1863 Austria had something similar in view with her draft constitution to be laid before the Congress of Princes, only her first thought was for her own interests.” “Later, on the foundation of the North German Confederation there was some talk of an Emperor of the Confederation, and the idea was only dropped because it would have led to a division and because in such circumstances Bavaria and Würtemberg would certainly not have joined us then, nor probably later on. For similar reasons I declined Lasker’s suggestion, in February, 1870, to admit Baden into the Confederation, because that would have been an attempt to exercise pressure upon her South German neighbours. The excessive number of Kings gradually convinced him, and he was then in favour of the Emperor idea. In the diary he has forgotten this whole first act. He writes as if he had discovered the idea and had been the first to put it forward, while it had long been kept alive, as a hope among the people, and he himself at first would not hear of it. Then came the second act, when it is true we acted together at the Prefecture in order to win over the old Master to our view. He at first vehemently rejected our proposal, and fell into a rage when we insisted. I asked if he wished to remain a neuter for ever. ‘What do you mean?’ he said crossly, ‘what sort of a neuter?’ ‘Why, the Presidency’ (Nun das Präsidium), I replied. But that also was of no avail. Then he agreed to it up to a certain point, if he were allowed to bear the title of Emperor of Germany. I explained to him that this would be opposed to the treaties, and would express territorial sovereignty over all Germany. He said the Tsar called himself Emperor of Russia. I denied this, and stated that his title was Russian Emperor. (He quoted the Russian term.) He maintained his opinion, however, until he asked Schneider, who was obliged to acknowledge that I was right.” On one occasion he mentioned in a report that Schleinitz had been present at these negotiations. I now asked: “What was he doing there? In what capacity was he present, as Minister of the Household, or as former chief of the Foreign Office, or in what other capacity?” He smiled and said: “As confidant of the Queen, who had sent him to oppose the bombardment and to persuade the King against it. He had nothing to do with the Emperor question. He had always been Augusta’s favourite, and while he was still a poor man she had on several occasions sent him money, 300 thalers, in order to enable him to visit her at Coblenz. It was solely through her favour that he became Minister.”
We then spoke of Sybel’s “Die deutsche Nation und das Kaiserreich” (The German Nation and the Empire), which he gave me; of Morier’s rude letter to Count Herbert, which was quite uncalled for, as there had been no charge made against that gentleman of having given direct information to Bazaine respecting the movements of the German troops; then of the wretched attitude of the German Liberal press, which in this—as in the Mackenzie, Geffcken, and other questions—took the side of every enemy of Germany and of German interests, whose hand was against him too; and finally about Samoa, in which connection the Chief censured the arbitrary conduct of the German Consul there. The conversation had lasted for about half an hour, and the Chancellor said as I was leaving that he would now try to get a little sleep. The article desired by him was written in the course of the following week, and was to appear in No. 8 of the Grenzboten under the title “The Emperor Question and Geffcken’s Diary Extracts.” I, however, first submitted a proof to the Chancellor for revision, and he made a number of alterations which Rottenburg dictated to me in his bureau in order that I might reproduce them in my copy. Thereupon I despatched the latter to Grunow (Saturday, February 16th), but a few hours later Rottenburg, with whom I had dined at Professor Scheibler’s, came back there with a message from the Chief requesting me to telegraph that the article should be returned for the present. Even after it had been toned down it was too dangerous for publication.
At noon on Sunday, the 17th of February, a Chancery attendant brought me a note from Rottenburg (begging me to call upon him at 3 o’clock at the Imperial Chancellerie. He had important instructions to give me).
On my going to see him at 3 o’clock he told me that the Chief now wished to have the article printed, but with a further slight change. We therefore telegraphed to Grunow to forward me that evening the proofs I had sent him, which I would return to him immediately. They arrived at 10 o’clock, when I at once took them to Rottenburg. We then inserted the last alterations of the Chief, and sent back the proofs to Grunow in a registered letter so that the article should appear in No. 8. Per tot discrimina rerum.
CHAPTER V
SIGNS OF FRICTION BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND THE YOUNG EMPEROR—WITH THE CHIEF DURING THE CRISIS—HIS ANXIETY ABOUT HIS PAPERS—HOW TO GET THEM AWAY—HIS RETIREMENT A FACT—THE EMPEROR WANTS TO BE RID OF HIM IN ORDER TO GOVERN ALONE WITH HIS OWN GENIUS—COURT FLUNKEYISM—HIS RETIREMENT IS NOT DUE TO HIS HEALTH, NOR IS IT IN ANY SENSE VOLUNTARY—LETTERS FROM BISMARCK TO WILLIAM I.—THE CHIEF ON THE INITIATION OF PRINCE WILLIAM INTO PUBLIC AFFAIRS—THE GRAND DUKE OF BADEN’S ADVICE TO THE EMPEROR FREDERICK—THE CHIEF TALKS OF WRITING HIS OWN MEMOIRS—BUREAUCRATIC INGRATITUDE—FOREIGN OFFICE APOSTATES—ACCORDING TO BUCHER THE NOTES DICTATED FOR THE MEMOIRS ARE MERE FRAGMENTS, SOMETIMES ERRONEOUS—THE CHIEF’S LIFE AT FRIEDRICHSRUH—SCHWENINGER’S APPREHENSIONS.
In February, 1890, a few days after the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on the labour question, Bucher had already pointed out to me in conversation the difficulties in the way of an international settlement of the question, and said he imagined the Emperor was going further in this matter than the Chancellor could approve of.
Monday, February 24th, he said to me: “I have a commission for you which I must carry out before the Chancellor of State arrives. The ‘dragon’ sent for me to-day and asked if I still had any connection with English newspapers, as he wished to get them to insert an article on the elections. I was sorry that I had no longer any such connection, but I thought perhaps you might write to the Daily Telegraph and get it to publish the desired article. He said: ‘Busch! Why, how is he getting on? I understand he has had an apoplectic attack.’ I replied: ‘Oh! no, he only caught a bad cold last Whitsuntide, and suffered in particular from great hoarseness, but he is quite well again now.’ You will observe that the apoplectic attack comes from friend Holstein.” (Probably reached the Chief’s ears in quite a harmless way from Scheibler through Rottenburg.) I replied: “As a matter of fact I have not written for that paper for years, but they still send it to me daily, and Kingston, one of their editorial staff and a leader writer, has translated my book Unser Reichskanzler into English. I fancy, therefore, they would take an article from me on the subject suggested by the Prince.” He then drew an envelope from his pocket and said: “I have here jotted down our conversation on the subject. They are for the main part his own words, pointing out the chief cause of the way in which the elections turned out, the result of which he attributes chiefly to the Rescript. Work them up into an article and see that you get it published in London. He attaches great importance to it and would like to see a copy when it appears.” I promised to write and send off the article next morning, and if it were accepted, to hand in a copy of it personally to the Chief, when I should ask him whether I could be of any further use in the matter. He then mentioned to me that the Prince was not at all satisfied with the Rescript, nor was he pleased in other respects with the intentions of the young Majesty, who had become very self-confident and arbitrary, and that he had only remained in office up to the present because he had hoped that the Emperor would appoint Herbert to be his successor. He knew already, however, that this desire would not be fulfilled, as the Emperor objects to Herbert on personal grounds. (...)
“By the way, when you next visit the Chief, you should speak in a loud clear voice, as his hearing is not so good as it was. You should also avoid contradicting him in any way, as, according to Rottenburg, he is now very short-tempered and irritable.” Bucher’s notes (the original of which I have retained) ran as follows: “Explain the influence of the Imperial Rescript on the elections. The old Social Democrats (Republicans) acted as if the Rescript were a victory for their efforts. Many malcontents—and who in this world is contented?—who were hitherto deterred from joining the Social Democracy by their monarchical sentiments (and at bottom the bulk of our people are monarchical), now believe that they can vote for them with an easy conscience. The Emperor has offended the bourgeoisie, and has actually embittered the large manufacturers who regard the Rescript as an incitement to their workmen. The lower middle classes, middlemen and shopkeepers, do not see that their own interests are directly threatened, as they know how to shift from their own shoulders any increase in the price of goods, but they see their political position threatened by the fourth estate. Many of them have therefore fallen away from the cartel candidates who were in favour of the Government, and for whom they had formerly voted, and took up with the Progressists, whose leaders are double faced. The experience obtained during the period of conflict showed the importance of the sentiments entertained by the bourgeoisie. At that time they wished to seize the reins of power, à la Louis Philippe. The masses did not care, or did not see, yet repeated elections always yielded the same results. The Emperor does not understand that, he has had no experience of it; and it is difficult to make him recognise it as he is surrounded by too many servile flatterers (Byzantinern) who confirm his self-confidence. Among the ‘Sunday’ polling cards in the eastern provinces there were a great number with the name of the Emperor William. Conclusion: Had it not been for the Rescript the elections would have turned out much as they did three years ago.” I worked this up into an article for the Daily Telegraph, and forwarded it to the office in Fleet Street on the 26th of February.
It was not accepted, however, probably because they considered themselves to be better informed by their regular correspondent, or did not think themselves justified in taking sides against the Emperor.
On reaching home on the evening of the 15th of March I found waiting for me an invitation to do Prince Bismarck the honour of visiting him on the following morning at 11.30. (Original retained.) I went to the palace, No. 77 Wilhelmstrasse, at the time appointed, and was speedily shown in. The Chief, who was in undress uniform, was sitting in the front study. He shook hands with me: “Good morning, Büschlein,” and added with a smile, “you still keep your fine beard.” Proceeding to the large back room he called me in to him. There were several boxes and also a big trunk with papers, while a large cupboard containing documents was half emptied. He drew out one drawer of the writing-table and took out a dark green portfolio in which the correspondence with Andrassy had been kept at Friedrichsruh, as also the envelopes containing the papers which I had sorted for him, and said: “I wish you would look through these for me, first glance through those from Friedrichsruh once more, and then those from Varzin and other new ones; there is still a great number of them. I said to you at the time that we would resume the business. Do you still care to do so?”
I: “Most certainly, Serene Highness; I am only too happy to have the opportunity. I thought several times of reminding you, but I did not like to appear importunate and so preferred to wait for your invitation.”
He: “Well, there are others (pointing to the trunk) and here in the green portfolio are more recent ones. You should look through these from Friedrichsruh once more and make a note of those that are of importance from an historical standpoint, then number all the rest in chronological order and add a list of the important ones. I now want to write my memoirs, and you can help me with them. That means I am going to retire. You see I am already packing. My papers are going to be sent off immediately, for if they remain here much longer, it will end in his seizing them.” I expressed my amazement.
He: “Yes, I cannot remain here any longer and the sooner I go the better.”
I: “But surely not immediately, Serene Highness?”
He: “It is a question of three days, perhaps of three weeks, but I am going for certain. I cannot stand him any longer. He wants even to know whom I see, and has spies set to watch those who come in and go out. For that reason, too, I do not well see how I am to get the papers away. They might be sent to you, but how?” I replied: “I could take the more important ones away with me, a few small packets at a time, carrying them in the first place to Hehn’s and then perhaps to Leipzig.”
He: “Hehn? Who is he?”
I told him, and that he was perfectly trustworthy.
He: “I could also have sent them to Schönhausen, and you could go there from Friedrichsruh to fetch them. I want you to have the most important of them copied and to keep the copies for the present.”
I: “But if a stranger were to copy them he might betray the contents to others.”
He: “Ah, I am not afraid of that. Of course he might, but I have no secrets among them—none whatever. Come to Friedrichsruh when I am there and we will work together. But I should like you first to get a letter from Frederick William IV. into the press. I saw it at the end of a new book, of which I do not remember the title, but it was a fabricated version, inaccurate in form and full of impossibilities and absurdities. I have a correct copy of the original, but I cannot find it in your envelopes. (Searched in that for 1852.) Ah, yes, here it is. Take it with you, copy it, and then return me the original.”
I suggested that it should be printed in the Grenzboten.
He: “All right, but it must be given as coming from Vienna, and the publication of the false version must serve as a reason for publishing it.”
While I was helping him to pack the papers in one of the boxes he came to speak about the Rescript, and said: “It comes of an over-estimate of himself, and of his inexperience of affairs, and that can lead to no good. He is much too conceited, however, to believe me that it will merely cause confusion and do harm.”
I: “It is the disgusting —— of the press and of the Court menials that are to blame for his self-deception.” He laughed. I told him that the article on the influence exercised by the Rescript on the elections had been written and sent off, but was not published by the Daily Telegraph.
He: “It was quite correct, however, as reports reached us from all sides as to the bad effect which the Rescript produced on the electors.” He then asked how old I was.
I: “Sixty-nine, but my father was eighty-six and my mother eighty-four.”
He: “Well, I should not mind living till I am eighty, out in the country.” He promised when I left to send me the latest papers (those in the green portfolio) to look through, arrange in chronological order, and copy. I thanked him for his great confidence in me, which was justified, for as I had already said to him on one occasion in 1870, he was my Master, and my Messiah.
He: “Blasphemy! But you have deserved my confidence.”
At 11 A.M. on the 17th of March a Chancery attendant arrived in a cab with a message that the Prince requested me to come to him immediately. On my entering the antechamber, Bleichröder was with him, and afterwards Herbert, and so I had to wait. At length Rottenburg, who had already declared that he, too, would retire, told me that they had gone upstairs to lunch, but that he would immediately again announce my arrival to the Prince. He returned in a few minutes with an invitation from the Chief to take lunch with him. At table upstairs I met a nephew or cousin of the Prince, to whom I was introduced as “Büschlein,” and who remembered having seen me at dinner in Versailles—doubtless the then lieutenant of dragoons with the red collar. The Princess and Count Herbert came in later. The conversation first turned on a foreign diplomatist, who would have married Countess Marie if her father had not been warned against him as a spendthrift. “Besides, I am altogether against marriages with foreigners,” said the Chief, “and particularly in the case of diplomatists.” He then spoke of the alleged second visit of Windthorst. It had displeased the Emperor, but it was merely a newspaper invention and ought to be contradicted. “Such intercourse, however, is useful,” he said. “It is well that I should in that way keep in touch with the parties, and for that reason I have always been accessible to them. Every member of Parliament could come to me at any time, day or night, and be received immediately. But they have taken little advantage of this. They do not want to be considered by their party as having Government sympathies, and prefer to be able to abuse me for having no relations with them. It is only the Ultramontanes who come sometimes, such as Windthorst, Schorlemer and Hüne, also Frankenstein, who is now dead. The cartel parties hardly ever put in an appearance.” He recommended me to try the caviar. “It has been sent to me by the Minister of the Imperial Household at St. Petersburg, and I take it that it is the same as that which is served to the Emperor Alexander. It is the best I have ever had.” He also praised the Moselle and Yquem. On Herbert coming in he laid before the Chief a portfolio connected with the negotiations in progress respecting a partition of East Africa, and the latter gave his opinion as to the frontiers. I accompanied him downstairs, and he handed me out of the green portfolio on the table in the large room nine or ten copies in his own handwriting of letters addressed by him to the Emperor William I., during the years 1872 to 1887. “Copy these and keep the copies by you, and bring me back the originals, as well as that of the letter of introduction of 1852.”
He also gave me a large envelope containing more recent letters and reports to be arranged in chronological order, with dockets on the more important ones for the purpose of the memoirs. “Return me these to-morrow or the day after,” he said; and I promised to bring them back on Thursday. We then went into the other study, and I said that even now I could not bring myself to realise that he was retiring; it seemed to me utterly impossible. He: “Impossible? It is now a fact. Things have gone more rapidly than I imagined they would. I thought he would be thankful if I were to remain with him for a few years, but I find that, on the contrary, he is simply longing with his whole heart to be rid of me in order that he may govern alone—with his own genius—and be able to cover himself with glory. He does not want the old mentor any longer, but only docile tools. But I cannot make genuflexions (Ich aber kann nicht mit Proskynesis dienen), nor crouch under the table like a dog. He wants to break with Russia, and yet he has not the courage to demand the increase of the army from the Liberals in the Reichstag. I have succeeded in winning their confidence at St. Petersburg, and obtain proofs of it every day. Their Emperor is guided by my wishes in what he does and in what he refrains from doing. What will they think there now? And also other expectations which I cannot fulfil, together with the intrigues of Courtiers, rudeness and spying, watching with whom I hold intercourse! My retirement is certain. I cannot tack on as a tail to my career the failures of arbitrary and inexperienced self-conceit for which I should be responsible.”
I: “When he falls into distress and difficulty he will himself come and fetch you back, Serene Highness! He will have to beg and implore you.”
He: “No, he is too proud for that. But he would like to keep Herbert, only that would not do—that would be a sort of mixed goods train, and I should always have to bear part of the responsibility. Moreover, although Herbert would doubtless stand being lectured and censured by me, he would not stand it from Imperial Chancellor Bötticher.” (He therefore seemed to think that the latter had been selected as his successor, and knew nothing as yet of the choice of Caprivi). “Besides they have treated his father badly.” I said: “The Emperor William seems to have the same notion as King Frederick William IV. had, according to Sybel, namely, that Kings in virtue of their office know everything better than their best servants.” He: “Yes, obedient Ministers! He has altogether a great deal in common with him.”... I proposed to publish the letters of William I., or at least a few of them, and mentioned the Grenzboten as a paper from which they would be largely quoted. He seemed to like the idea. “I will see about it when you bring me back the originals. If you do not then see me, report yourself at Friedrichsruh in a short time. I shall now go out riding for a while.” As I was leaving the room, he clapped me on the shoulder in a friendly way. In the antechamber, Rottenburg again said he would also retire. His nerves could no longer stand it. Very nice of him, but we shall see how the cat jumps.
On Thursday, March 20th, I took back to the Chief the originals of his letters to William I. He looked through them and sanctioned the publication in the Grenzboten of the first three, adding at the same time: “We shall first publish these which refer to family matters, and see what impression they make. Then we can let the others follow, and perhaps later on still more from the collection.”
I: “Perhaps articles also?”
He (smiling): “Yes, perhaps. Hamburg newspapers would also accept something of the kind. I have recommended the Norddeutsche Allgemeine, which the company that owns it placed at my disposal, to the Conservatives (doubtless those belonging to the Free Conservative wing) as their organ.”
On Saturday, March 22nd, I returned to him in an envelope the thirty-nine new papers chronologically arranged and numbered, the most important ones being specially docketed. The latter were: No. 14, letter written by William I. in 1884; on the Battenberger and his projected marriage, 16, 18, 21, 31, and 33; a letter to the Chief from the Crown Prince Frederick at Portofino, describing his eldest son as inexperienced, extremely boastful and self-conceited; a letter from Crown Prince William to Bismarck in 1888 on the “Battenberger” business and Albedyll’s plan for “nailing down” Prince Alexander by a written declaration; a letter of the Battenberger from Sofia to the Queen of England, sent to the Chancellor with a letter from the Crown Princess Victoria (two copies); a report by Professor von Bergmann on the illness of the Emperor Frederick; a letter from the Grand Duke of Baden respecting an interview with the sick monarch, which had taken place according to arrangement with him alone (without the Englishwoman) when the Emperor listened with deep seriousness to the statement made to him by the Grand Duke: “You cannot govern without Prince Bismarck (Ohne Fürst Bismarck kannst Du nicht regieren).” The Chief looked through the particulars of the contents which I had written on the envelope, and observed: “Those are really important papers, but take them back with you and keep them at your house for the present.” He then reflected, however, and said: “I am being watched, and you also, and if you are seen coming and going with a large envelope—this will be better. Come here!” He then went into the back study to a large trunk standing in the middle of the room. I followed him, and he raised the cover of a green portfolio which was packed up in it under a round box. “Those are maps,” he said. “Lay these papers between them, and remember where they are in case I should forget it, when we proceed with the Memoirs at Friedrichsruh. I am sending about 300 cases and other things away, and 13,000 bottles of wine. That is a great deal, but it includes many presents. Besides, while I still had money I bought several lots of good sherry, which will come in for my children. Write to me a fortnight after I reach Friedrichsruh and ask when you can come on a long visit and help me with the Memoirs. I must have a private secretary so that I may be able to dictate and dispose of minor affairs by letter. That is not for you, however, as I intend to employ you on something better. I have accordingly asked Schweninger to find a young doctor for this purpose, who would also be at hand in case of indisposition and accident, as, for instance, if I were to hurt myself out riding. It would be something for him, too, as it would in any case bring him in a couple of thousand marks. Keep yourself free for our business.” I replied that I would arrange for the present to remain with him for six months, and if necessary for a further period later on, after a short holiday. We then returned to the front room and sat down, when he said: “There is one thing I would ask you to do now if you still have any influence in the press, that is, to correct a mistake which I have repeatedly noticed in newspaper articles within the last few days, as also in communications from exalted places, as, for instance, from England—with suppositions and reproaches—namely, that I had sent in my resignation owing to my apprehension of great crises, and left the Emperor in the lurch through fear of the increased Opposition in the new Reichstag. A glance at my past history and character ought to have discredited that notion, and a remembrance of the conflict of 1866, when the Opposition was much stronger, and more dangerous, and of my loyalty to my royal master, which I likewise showed and proved on later occasions. But, as a matter of fact, it is quite wrong. On the contrary, I did not want to retire until the summer, and, in the meantime, offered to defend the Imperial policy in the Reichstag, and to take up the struggle with the Opposition. I was not permitted to do so however.... He wants to do everything himself, and he fancies that he can.” He then spoke once more of spying, and of the Emperor setting a watch upon him to see with whom he held intercourse. (Probably Windthorst’s visit.) “That is one of the final reasons that have induced me to tender my resignation.” He stood up, bent across the table, resting on his two hands, and smiling as he looked me straight in the face, said: “But, tell me, do you drink much wine?” I replied: “During the daytime no spirituous liquors whatever, not even at table. In the evening two pints of thin, sour Moselle.” “So!” he rejoined. “You certainly gave me the impression of having stowed away a bottle of Burgundy, and yet a short time ago you had some little trouble. (Apoplectic attack?) Otherwise I do not in the least disapprove of it, as I myself drink my share. But take care of yourself, for I wish to keep you with us for a long time yet.” It was then arranged once more that I should write to him a fortnight after his arrival at Friedrichsruh, but in the first only to arrange for a shorter visit, during which we should talk over and settle about a longer stay later on.
On Monday, March 24th, the Chief again sent, by a Chancery attendant, to fetch me in a cab. I had to wait in the antechamber from 11.45 to 1 P.M. as Caprivi was taking lunch upstairs with the Prince. I then saw the new Imperial Chancellor, as he was going away. Scheibler congratulated Rottenburg on a second quality Red Eagle and oakleaf, which may possibly soothe his nerves. On being called in I found the Chief seated in a causeuse before his writing-table. I handed him to-day’s Post, which Rottenburg had given me for him. He read out to me the short leader of the 23rd (which I have kept), and said: “They, too, want to curry favour. That comes from gentlemen at Court, who want to hush up things. Please say something against that! Could the Liberals themselves abuse me worse? Not the worst, but, on the contrary, the best service that could be done to me would be to give a correct answer to the question whether my retirement has been voluntary or involuntary; and that answer is: involuntary. It is a patriotic duty not to maintain the utmost reserve, but, on the contrary, to tell the truth. The young man would, however, like to have it hushed up. Indeed, he has gone so far as to summon Schweninger, and to try to make him believe that it was due to considerations of health. Yes, there is a great deal of flunkeyism (Byzantinerthum) here, and they all crawl on their bellies before him, in order to attract one gracious look upon themselves.” I asked if he would stay on much longer. He said: “No, to-morrow or the next day.”
I: “Then I am to write to your Serene Highness in fourteen or fifteen days about my visit?”
He: “You can write even earlier, and come very soon.”
The desired article was despatched to the Grenzboten as an appendix to that recently ordered. It appeared in No. 14, immediately following a longer article (probably by Kayser) which preached from the same text as the Post. The first three letters from Bismarck to William I. appeared at the head of No. 14. They ran as follows:—
1.
“Varzin, August 1st, 1872.
“Your Majesty has given my wife and myself great pleasure by sharing in our family festival, and we beg your Majesty graciously to accept our respectful thanks. Your Majesty is right in giving the first place among the blessings for which I have to thank God to my domestic happiness, but happily in my house that happiness both for my wife and for myself includes the consciousness of your Majesty’s satisfaction; and the extremely gracious and friendly words of recognition contained in your Majesty’s letter do more to soothe disordered nerves than all the art of the physician. In looking back upon my life I have had such inexhaustible reasons to thank God for His unmerited mercies that I often fear I cannot remain so fortunate to the end. I regard it as a particularly happy dispensation of Providence that my vocation on earth should be the service of a master for whom I can work with pleasure and affection, as—under your Majesty’s guidance—the inborn loyalty of the subject need never fear to find itself in opposition to a hearty devotion to the honour and welfare of the Fatherland. May God continue to grant me strength, as well as will, to serve your Majesty in such a manner that I may preserve your Majesty’s satisfaction with my efforts, of which such a gracious evidence now lies before me in the shape of the letter of the 26th. The vase, which arrived in good time, is a truly monumental expression of royal favour, and is at the same time so substantial that I may hope that not the ‘fragments’ only, but the whole, will go down to my descendants as a proof of your Majesty’s gracious participation in our silver wedding.
“The officers of the 54th Regiment, in a spirit of comradeship and friendliness, sent their band from Kolberg. Otherwise, as usually happens in the country, we were restricted to the more intimate family circle, with the exception that Motley, the former American Minister in London, a friend of my youth, chanced to be here on a visit. In addition to her Majesty the Empress, his Majesty the King of Bavaria and their Royal Highnesses Prince Charles and Frederick Charles, and H.I.H. the Crown Prince have honoured me with telegraphic congratulations.
“My health is slowly improving. It is true I have done no work whatever, yet I hope to be able to report myself to your Majesty as fit for service in time for the Imperial visit.
“v. Bismarck.”
2.
“Varzin, November 13, 1872.
“Most gracious King and Master,
“I am greatly depressed at being unable, on receipt of your Majesty’s gracious communication of the 9th instant, to proceed to Berlin at once and place myself at your Majesty’s disposal in the present crisis, all the more so as towards the end of last month I believed I should soon be sufficiently restored to do so. Since my return from Berlin I found my strength constantly increasing, and for that reason and also through my interest in the matter, I allowed myself to be tempted, in opposition to the urgent warnings of the doctor, to yield to Count Eulenburg’s frequent appeals, and endeavour to influence the course of affairs by communications to your Majesty, and correspondence with the Ministers and with Members of the Upper House. That is certainly very hazardous to proceed in such a fashion, and at such a distance, in the absence of discussions which might throw light upon the questions at issue, without knowledge of the opposing views, and also without sufficient assistance. I had hoped, however, that it would only last a few days and that things would soon again enter upon a more peaceful course. Unfortunately, this attempt only too speedily convinced me that my doctor was right, and that my store of newly-recovered strength was very slight. I am greatly discouraged, as my intervention will have exercised rather a disturbing influence than otherwise, while the few days’ work and excitement, with the nervous irritability which it involves, have sufficed once more to prove to me clearly the lassitude of my intellectual powers. I fear I am more exhausted than I should like to confess to myself. This anxiety, as well as the feeling of shame that I am unable to be at my post and at your Majesty’s service at such an important moment, is a source of great depression, even when I say to myself that I must humbly submit to the will of God, who does not require my co-operation and puts limits to my strength. My uneasiness is counterbalanced by the confidence which your Majesty expresses at the close of your letter, and which I fully share, that the grace of God which has hitherto blessed your Majesty’s Government will continue to assist it. The course which your Majesty has sanctioned in Council can lead to the same ends just as well as that proposed by me, provided there is no breach with the present Parliament and my colleagues remain united among themselves. They will do that for your Majesty’s sake, although up to the present there have been many indications of differences. I fear that my correspondence with some of them individually, in reply to questions addressed to me, may have sometimes increased the elements of discord, and that misunderstandings may have arisen with respect to myself owing to the fact that the contents of my reports were fully known only to those to whom they were addressed. I have therefore requested Roon only to consult me at your Majesty’s express command, and I have informed him that I shall no longer correspond with my colleagues individually.
“In this manner my co-operation, so long as God does not give me better strength, will rest in your Majesty’s gracious and considerate hands. My hope and my prayer to God is that it may be soon granted to me once more to do my duty in person under your Majesty’s eyes, and to again find that peace which lies in work.
“v. Bismarck.”
3.
“Berlin, December 24, 1872.
“I thank your Majesty respectfully and heartily for the beautiful Christmas present, conferring fresh distinction upon me.
“My father entered the regiment of Carabineers of the Life Guard in 1783, and also had the honour, at the review, of being presented to Frederick the Great as a Junker, on which occasion the great king condescended in gracious recognition to hold up to him as a model his grandfather, Major von Bismarck (of the Schulenberg, afterwards Bayreuth, Dragoons), who fell at Czaslau.
“This and many other impressive reminiscences, which my father handed down to me from the time of Frederick the Great, as reproduced in the work of art now standing before me, and which I can supplement with a well-preserved series of letters from my grandfather in the field during the Seven Years’ War, form the permanent impressions of my childhood. I have always regretted that, by the will of my parents, I was not allowed to prove my devotion to the Royal House and my enthusiasm for the greatness and renown of the Fatherland in the fighting ranks of the army, rather than behind the writing desk. Even to-day, after your Majesty has raised me to the highest honours as a statesman, I cannot entirely suppress my regret at not having been able to win similar advancement as a soldier. I beg your Majesty, as it is Christmas Eve, to forgive this expression of personal feelings in a man who is accustomed on Christian festivals to look back upon his past. I might have been, perhaps, a worthless general, but I should have preferred to win battles for your Majesty, like those generals who adorn the monument, rather than diplomatic campaigns. By the will of God, and your Majesty’s favour, I have a prospect of seeing my name recorded in books and in bronze when posterity immortalises the memory of your Majesty’s glorious reign. But, independently of the loyalty of every honourable nobleman to his sovereign, the cordial attachment which I entertain for your Majesty’s person, and the pain and anxiety which I feel at not being always able to serve your Majesty as I wish, and no longer with my whole strength, can find expression in no monument. Yet in the last resort it is only this personal feeling which makes the servant follow his monarch and the soldier his leader with uncalculating devotion on such paths as under Divine Providence Frederick II. and your Majesty have entered upon. My strength for work is no longer equal to my will, but up to my last breath the latter shall be devoted to your Majesty.
“von Bismarck.”
The letter from Frederick William IV. was also published, in No. 13, and all were reproduced by numerous other papers.
I insert here, first the remaining letters from Bismarck to William I. which I copied at his desire, and then some of the more important papers in the new batch.
Further Letters from Bismarck to Emperor William I.
4.
“Varzin, August 13, 1875.
“I have received with respectful thanks your Majesty’s gracious letter of the 8th instant, and am pleased above all things to see that the cure has agreed with your Majesty in spite of the run of bad weather in the Alps. With respect to the letter from Queen Victoria I have the honour to add again that it would have been very interesting if her Majesty had expressed herself more fully as to the origin of the rumours of war circulated at that time. The sources must have been regarded as very trustworthy by that exalted lady, as otherwise her Majesty would not have again referred to them, and the English Government would also not have taken in connection with them measures of such an important character and such an unfriendly nature towards us. I do not know whether your Majesty considers it possible to take Queen Victoria at her word when her Majesty asserts that ‘it is an easy matter for her to prove that her apprehensions were not exaggerated.’ It would also be doubtless of importance to ascertain from what quarter such ‘serious errors’ could have been despatched to Windsor. The hints as to persons who must be regarded as ‘representatives’ of your Majesty’s Government would appear to refer to Count Münster. He, like Count Moltke, may very well have spoken academically of the usefulness of a timely attack upon France, although I do not know that he has, and he was never instructed to do so. It may indeed be said that it is not calculated to promote the maintenance of peace for France to have the assurance that she will never be attacked under any circumstances, do what she may. Now, as in 1867 in the Luxemburg question, I would never advise your Majesty to begin hostilities at once, merely because it was probable that the enemy would shortly enter upon them. One can never foresee the ways of Providence with sufficient clearness to do that. But it is also of no use to give the opponent the assurance that one will wait for his attack under all circumstances. I should therefore not blame Münster if he had spoken in that sense occasionally, and the English Government would have no right to take official steps upon non-official remarks of our Ambassador, and, sans vous dire gare, to invite the other Powers to bring pressure to bear. Such a serious and unfriendly course of action gives reason to suspect that Queen Victoria had yet other grounds for believing in warlike intentions than incidental remarks by Count Münster, the authenticity of which I do not even credit. Lord (Odo) Russell declares he has always reported his firm belief in our peaceful intentions. On the other hand, all the Ultramontanes and their friends have charged us secretly, and openly in the press, with wishing to bring on war in a short time, and the French Ambassador, who moves in these circles, sent these lies to Paris as trustworthy information. But at bottom that too would not be sufficient to inspire Queen Victoria with such trust and confidence in falsehoods that had been denied by your Majesty in person, as she still expresses in her letter of the 20th of June. I am too little acquainted with the idiosyncrasies of the Queen to be able to form an opinion as to whether the phrase about its being ‘easy to prove’ may possibly be intended merely to conceal, instead of openly confessing, a hastiness of action which could no longer be recalled. I beg your Majesty to excuse me if my ‘professional’ interest has led me, after three months’ forbearance, to dwell at such length upon an incident which has already been settled.
“The Turkish question can hardly assume large proportions if the three Imperial Courts remain united; and that end can be promoted most successfully by your Majesty, because we are the only Power that has now, and for a long time to come will have, no direct interests at stake. Moreover, it can only be of advantage to us if public attention and the policy of other Powers should, for a while, be directed elsewhere than to the Franco-German question.
“As your Majesty has been gracious enough to mention my health, I beg respectfully to report that the six weeks’ cure at Kissingen has affected me more than that of last year. I feel very exhausted, can walk little, and cannot ride at all as yet. This is now to be remedied by a course of malt and brine baths, and, as a matter of fact, the first four have had a good effect. I therefore hope that the next six weeks will render me more fit for work, though I fear that I must rely upon your Majesty’s consideration more largely than my sense of duty would fain allow. My wife and daughter thank your Majesty respectfully for your gracious remembrance of them, and commend themselves to your Majesty’s favour.
“v. Bismarck.”
5.
“Friedrichsruh, December 3, 1878.
“I am deeply afflicted at not being in a position to offer my respectful greetings to your Majesty the day after to-morrow, in common with my colleagues. I can only lay before your Majesty’s feet, in writing, the heartfelt wish that, in resuming the reins of Government your Majesty may find, in God’s blessing, consolation and satisfaction for the crime and ingratitude of mankind, which must have cut as deeply into your Majesty’s heart as the wound externally inflicted.
“The sudden transition from the cure at Gastein to the work in the Reichstag appears to have hindered my recovery, so that even to-day I am not as well as I was in September. But if your Majesty will be gracious enough to allow me four to six weeks’ further leave of absence and forest air, I may hope, with the help of God, that in January I can, with fresh strength, place myself at your Majesty’s disposal for the preparing the work in the Reichstag. This year, owing to the necessity for far-reaching financial and economic reforms, the proceedings in the Reichstag will be particularly laborious; and it is to be foreseen that they will be accompanied by severe struggles between the parties themselves, and against your Majesty’s Government. I do not, however, doubt that, in the financial and economic questions, the result will ultimately be favourable, if concord can be maintained in the Ministry of State and with the more important Federal Governments, and if the Ministry preserves that firmness and decision which your Majesty’s leadership has secured to us in all difficult situations, and to which, next to God, we owe all our great success.
“v. Bismarck.”
6.
“Friedrichsruh, December 25, 1883.
“I thank your Majesty respectfully and cordially for the gracious Christmas present, and in particular for the gracious wishes that accompanied it. They afford me that full gratification which I should have felt in the Niederwald, had I been able to attend the festival. For me your Majesty’s satisfaction has a higher value than the approval of all others. I thank God that He has so disposed my heart that I have been able to secure your Majesty’s commendation, while I seldom obtain the approval of others, and then only temporarily. I also thank your Majesty for the immutable confidence always reposed in me for the long period of over twenty years, and for your Majesty’s constant graciousness to me as a master, in spite of the attacks of my opponents and my own well-known failings, in the most arduous as well as in quiet times. I require nothing more in this world, in addition to peace with my own conscience before God. God’s blessing has rested upon your Majesty’s rule, and has favoured your Majesty above other monarchs who have achieved great things, in so far as your Majesty’s servants can look back on their service with gratitude to your Majesty. The loyalty of the ruler generates and maintains the loyalty of his servants.[19]
“My wife returns her respectful thanks for your Majesty’s gracious greetings in the gracious letter of the 21st instant, to which I send a separate reply. She is slowly improving in health after a few weeks during which I was very anxious as to her condition. She requests me to lay her most humble respects and good wishes for the new year at your Majesty’s feet. At the present moment I myself am physically stronger than I have been for many years, and yesterday was able to take a ride of several hours in the woods with my two sons, who are staying here on a holiday. Although I may not as yet strain my nerves in intellectual work to the extent demanded by my position, I hope for a further improvement in this direction also if your Majesty will graciously permit me to remain here until the end of next month. God grant your Majesty a happy Christmas, health, and contentment.
“v. Bismarck.”
7.
“Varzin, September 2, 1884.
“Your Majesty has made the anniversary of Sedan a day of exceptional joy and honour to me by graciously investing me with the Order Pour le Mérite, at the same time increasing the significance of the distinction by the exceedingly gracious words which accompanied it yesterday. I am happy to see from this, and to realise on looking backwards over a long series of years, that your Majesty’s favour and confidence have been my constant and unalterable support, and that your Majesty’s consideration also compensates for my failing strength. Your Majesty’s recognition and good will is in itself the highest satisfaction to which I aspire in this world, but it is also a pleasure to me when the world ascertains that I have always been, and still am, in possession of the boon for which I have ever striven, viz., the favour of my earthly master. I will always faithfully and zealously endeavour to deserve it, so that your Majesty, as the highest and most competent authority, may recognise in me the heart and sentiments of a Prussian soldier. I desire no higher praise than that contained in those words, when they bear your Majesty’s signature.
“On the 11th I hope to lay my renewed thanks personally at your Majesty’s feet, and to see your Majesty in good health.
“v. Bismarck.”
8.
“Berlin, December 25, 1884.
“I respectfully thank your Majesty for the beautiful Christmas present. The work of art reminds me to some extent of my own position. While the centaur has both hands engaged in lifting the huge horn to his shoulder, the woman hangs on to his beard with her whole weight. So it is with me! While I have my hands full in the service of your Majesty and the country, the Opposition in Parliament pulls and drags at me, at the risk of overthrowing me while bearing the burden of affairs. Moreover, the Opposition is unfortunately much uglier than the female form that clings to the centaur’s beard. I will not, however, allow this to prevent me from gladly and firmly carrying the burden on my shoulders, so long as God gives me strength to do so, and I enjoy your Majesty’s favour. With the heartiest and most respectful wishes for your Majesty’s Christmas, I unite those for the coming year, reserving to myself the pleasure of reiterating them verbally.
“v. Bismarck.”
9.
“Friedrichsruh, September 26, 1887.
“I thank your Majesty respectfully for the gracious letter of the 23rd instant, and for the gracious present of the picture of the palace, in which I had the honour for so many years to make my reports to, and to receive my orders from, your Majesty. For me the day received a special consecration, through the greeting with which I was honoured at your Majesty’s bidding, by their Royal Highnesses Prince William and Prince Henry. But even without this further evidence of favour, the feeling with which I greeted the twenty-fifth anniversary of my appointment as Minister was one of the heartiest and most respectful gratitude towards your Majesty. Every monarch appoints Ministers, but there is scarcely an instance in recent times of a monarch retaining and protecting his Prime Minister, against every kind of hostility and intrigue, during twenty-five long years of vicissitudes, when not every measure succeeds. During this lapse of time, I have seen many former friends change into opponents, but your Majesty’s favour and confidence in me has remained immutably the same. In this thought I find a rich reward for all my work and consolation in sickness and solitude. I love my Fatherland, the German as well as the Prussian, but I could not have served it joyfully if it had not been granted to me to do so to the satisfaction of my King. The foundation and the indestructible core of the high position which I owe to the favour of your Majesty is the Brandenburg liegeman and the Prussian officer, and therefore your Majesty’s satisfaction is a source of happiness to me, without which every form of popularity would be worthless and distressing. In addition to numerous telegrams and letters received by me on the 23rd, from Germany and abroad, I have had very gracious greetings and congratulations from their Majesties of Saxony and Würtemberg, H.R.H. the Regent of Bavaria, the Grand Dukes of Weimar, Baden and Oldenburg, and other reigning personages, as also from his Majesty the King of Italy, and Minister Crispi. The two latter communications touched on politics, and were difficult to answer. As your Majesty may perhaps be interested in the text, I have instructed the Foreign Office to submit them.
“I pray God to grant me the pleasure of continuing my service to your Majesty’s satisfaction.
“v. Bismarck.”
10.
“Friedrichsruh, December 30, 1887.
“I thank your Majesty respectfully for the gracious letter of the 23rd, and for the evidence of favour with which it was accompanied, and first for the drinking horn with the hunting trophies, which I regard as intended for your Majesty’s Grand Huntsman of Pomerania, and shall keep at Varzin. But my chief happiness arises from the recognition accorded to my son by his official promotion, which shows me that your Majesty is satisfied with his work, and therefore that he fulfils the end for which I have educated him. I crave your Majesty’s further indulgence towards him, feeling certain that he will deserve it by his attachment even in those matters in which he still lacks experience.
“With reference to my most humble suggestion respecting the further preparation of H.R.H. Prince William for State affairs, I appreciate and share the anxiety with which your Majesty is inspired by your solicitude for the health of his Imperial Highness (the Crown Prince). I considered it my duty to raise the question, but I do not venture to urge it any further, not wishing to make myself responsible for the consequences upon the health of H.I.H. which any irritation might produce. Perhaps the object which it is sought to attain in the interests of the State may be approached in a manner less calculated to attract attention; and this would not be difficult if the Prince resided in Berlin instead of at Potsdam. I therefore respectfully beg your Majesty’s permission to submit my views on the subject when I return to Berlin, which I hope to do next month. In the meantime, I humbly beg your Majesty to allow me to try and move H.I.H. to submit to your Majesty, on his own initiative, the proposed scheme for a Civil Adlatus to be attached to the Prince. Count Radolinski, who called upon me to-day, thinks there is some prospect of this attempt being successful, as the Crown Prince’s irritation in the matter was connected with the question whether his parental authority would be taken into consideration or not. If H.I.H. could be moved himself to propose the object in view, which would be of advantage to the State, the entire difficulty would be at an end. Should the attempt fail, no great harm would be done, as the Crown Prince could easily give me a negative answer, which he could not give to your Majesty. Meanwhile, the present system of giving the Prince occupation at some of the Ministries may be continued as heretofore, in accordance with your Majesty’s intention.
“I have ascertained through Count Stolberg that H.I.H. has suggested the promotion of Count Radolinski to the title of Excellency. I beg respectfully to recommend this proposal of the Crown Prince, in the first place because granting it would have a favourable, and refusing it an unfavourable, effect upon the sentiments and health of H.I.H.; and then furthermore because Count Radolinski is worthy of such a distinction. With a large fortune and very considerable private interests, he has given up an easy position in the diplomatic service, and, solely in obedience to your Majesty’s wishes, has willingly undertaken his present duties, which, often very onerous, are rendered specially difficult by the rivalries to which they expose him; and it is desirable that a nobleman of his prestige and uprightness should continue to discharge them. Moreover, he is one of the few Polish noblemen who, like the deceased Count Raczinski, may be relied upon with perfect safety by your Majesty and the Prussian State, and in my opinion this attribute alone deserves to be recognised by a distinction. Indeed, custom alone would have secured him such a distinction even if, without being a Court official, he had lived on his estates in Posen as a magnate loyal to the Government.
“I beg your Majesty graciously to accept my hearty and respectful good wishes for the New Year. I hope to renew them verbally in the course of January, and to be permitted to report myself to your Majesty, at the same time as the Reichstag, in as good health as I have any prospect of enjoying in this life.
“v. Bismarck.”