The History of Sulu

by Najeeb M. Saleeby

Early days of the sultanate, 1480–1635

Successors of Abu Bakr

The dynasty founded by Abu Bakr ruled with a firmer hand and attained considerable power and fame. The new organization establishing law and order, consolidated the forces of the state and increased its influence on the outside world. Islam added a new element of strength and another stimulus to campaign and conquest. The Sulus never exceeded 60,000 in number, yet we learn that, prior to the arrival of Magellan, their power was felt all over Luzon and the Bisayan Islands, the Celebes Sea, Palawan, North Borneo, and the China Sea, and their trade extended from China and Japan, at the one extreme, to Malacca, Sumatra, and Java at the other.

Abu Bakr was succeeded by his second son, Kamalud-Din. Alawad-Din, the elder son, was weak-minded and was evidently not supported by the ministers of the state. The next three sultans who followed were Diraja, Upu, and Digunung. Their full names are, the Sultan Amirul Umara[14] Maharaja Diraja, the Sultan Muʿizzul Mutawadiʿin[15] Maharaja Upu, the Sultan Nasirud-Din Awal[16] Digunung[17] (or Habud[18]).

The sixth sultan was Mohammedul Halim[19] Pangiran Buddiman. During his reign Governor Sandé equipped and directed large expeditions to Borneo and Sulu. The armada sent to Sulu was commanded by Capt. Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa and reached the town of Jolo in June, 1578. It is asserted that Rodriguez defeated Pangiran and exacted tribute from the Sulus. Rodriguez, however, did not occupy Jolo, and no permanent advantage was derived from his victory.

Figueroa’s expedition against Sulu

This invasion marked the beginning of a state of war between Sulu and Spain, which covered a period of three hundred years and caused considerable devastation and loss of life. It cost Spain an immense loss of men and money and finally brought on the decline of Sulu and its end as an independent state. The magnitude of this strife, its far-reaching effects, and its bearing on the Spanish and American occupation of Sulu, invites special attention to the causes of the war and the Sulu character which it depicts.

The expedition to Jolo formed part of and immediately followed the expedition which was directed by Governor Sandé against Borneo. There is no doubt that, besides the reasons Sandé gave for the expedition to Borneo, he was really actuated by jealousy of the Portuguese, whose influence had reached Bruney and the Moluccas, and by a strong desire to conquer Borneo, Sulu, Mindanao, and the Moluccas. His reasons for sending the expedition against Sulu are best given in his letter of instructions to Capt. Rodriguez de Figueroa, which is extremely interesting and is herein quoted in full:[20]

That which you, Capt. Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, shall observe on the expedition which you are about to make, God our Lord helping, is as follows:

From this city and Island of Borneo, God willing, you shall go to the Islands of Sulu, where you shall endeavor to reduce that chief and his people to the obedience of his Majesty. You shall bargain with them as to what tribute they shall pay, which shall be in pearls, as they are wont to give to the King of Bruney. You shall exercise great care and, if possible, much mildness; for it is of importance that those islands should not become depopulated; therefore, in case they receive you peaceably, you shall treat them well. And, in addition to the above, you must order that, besides the tribute that they are to pay in pearls, they shall obtain as many of them as possible, so that we, the Spaniards or Castilians, may buy them; that they must trade with us from now on; that every year Castilians will go to their lands with cloths and merchandise from China, of whatever they shall declare that they may need. You shall inform yourself of their needs; and if they wish to come to our settlements you shall give them permission to go freely to Manila and to come to Borneo, although not to steal.

Item: You shall find out from them the whereabouts of the artillery and anchors of a ship lost there some three years ago; and you shall seek it and see that it be brought you with all haste. You shall keep close watch over the artillery, ammunition, vessels, sails, and other like things pertaining to the armed fleet; and you shall deprive them of those supplies, for it is notorious that those people are common marauders.

And because of my information that the chief who calls himself lord of Sulu is a Bornean, and owns houses in this city of Bruney; that he fought against us in the naval battle, and that he fled to Sulu, where he is now; and since I am told that he took two galleys and three small vessels, artillery and ammunition, you shall exercise the utmost despatch to obtain the said galleys, vessels, artillery, and ammunition. If he acquiesce, you shall give him a passport. You shall see whether he has any children; and if so, you shall take one, and tell him that he must come to see me in Bruney in February.

And, as I have said, this must be done if possible gently, in order that no people may be killed. You shall tell him that it will be to their advantage to be vassals of his Majesty and our allies. If they do not act respectfully, and it shall be necessary to punish them in another manner, you shall do so. And inasmuch as the Sulus, as is well known, are open pirates, whose only ambition is to steal, and to assault men in order to sell them elsewhere—especially as they go annually for plunder among all the Pintados[21] Islands, which are under his Majesty’s dominion—you shall try to ascertain the Pintados slaves among them, in order to return such to their homes, especially those who are Christians. And, as I have said, you shall deprive them of such vessels as seem to be used for raids, leaving them their fishing vessels, so that if the said lord of Sulu so desire, he can come to confer reasonably with me. Thus you shall ascertain who has vessels, and who can inflict injuries; and you shall command them expressly to settle down on their land, to cultivate, sow, and harvest, develop the pearl industry, and cease to be pirates. You shall order them to raise fowls and cattle. You shall try to ascertain their number, and bring it to me in writing, in order that I may see it, together with the distance from these islands to the Sulu Islands, information regarding the food, water, and healthfulness of that land, and other things that may occur to you. And you shall tell the people in my name that they shall tame for me a couple of elephants, and that I shall send for those animals and pay for them.

After having finished affairs in Sulu, if time permits, you shall, God willing, go to the Island of Mindanao. There you shall try, by the most convenient methods and with friendliness, to reduce the chief of the river of Mindanao, and the other chiefs of that island, and of those near by, to the obedience of his Majesty, giving him to understand what they will gain in becoming his Majesty’s vassals and our allies, and in having trade with us.

And, in order that the tribute may not prevent them from making peace with us, you shall not ask them for any tribute; but you shall take what they give freely, and nothing more, and in such form as they are willing to give. Thus you shall suit their convenience in everything pertaining to them, and cause them to understand the great expenses of his Majesty in this land. You shall also tell them that the gain therefrom affects them chiefly, since we come to teach them our civilization, and most of all the service of God, our Lord, who created and redeemed them, and of whom they are ignorant; and how to live in accord with natural law, as is their obligation. For this purpose you shall tell them that you are going to their land for two principal reasons:

The first is that they should cease to be pirates, who rob and harry the weak, and enslave wherever and whomsoever they can, selling their captives outside of their own island, and separating them from their wives and children; and that they must cease to commit other like cruelties and thefts, and must become good and virtuous men, who shall grow to merit the second and principal reason for going to their lands. You shall give them to understand that they are ignorant of God, our Lord, who created and redeemed them, so that when they know him they may serve him and become good. It is quite evident that they will gain very much in these things, and therefore it is right that they aid us and give us something. This shall be at their own will, as above said.

Item: You shall order them not to admit any more preachers of the doctrine of Mohammed, since it is evil and false, and that of the Christians alone is good. And because we have been in these regions so short a time, the lord of Mindanao has been deceived by the preachers of Bruney, and the people have become Moros. You shall tell them that our object is that he be converted to Christianity; and that he must allow us freely to preach the law of the Christians, and the natives must be allowed to go to hear the preaching and to be converted, without receiving any harm from the chiefs.

And you shall try to ascertain who are the preachers of the sect of Mohammed, and shall seize and bring them before me and you shall burn or destroy the house where that accursed doctrine has been preached, and you shall order that it be not rebuilt.

Item: You shall order that the Indians[22] shall not go outside of their island to trade; and you shall seize those vessels used for plundering excursions, leaving them those which, in your judgment, are used for trade and fishing. You shall take also what artillery and ammunition they have.

You shall ascertain the harvest seasons and products of the land; the gold mines and the places where they wash gold; the number of inhabitants and their settlements; and their customs. You must especially secure information regarding cinnamon, in order to ascertain if it is found along the river, or if one must go to Cavite for it, and why it is not as good as that which the Portuguese take to Castilla. You shall ascertain how they cut and strip it from the tree, and if it be of importance that it dry on the tree, or in what other manner it should be treated, for I have been told that that obtained from these districts in the past has not been good and has not a good sale in Spain.

And, since it might happen that the people will not make peace, and may offer fight, and show disrespect, then you shall punish them as you deem best, taking special care not to trust them; for it is evident that before all else they will, if possible, commit some treachery. You must not await such an occasion, for we know already their treachery against his Majesty’s fleet commanded by Villalobos, certain of whose men they killed under assurances of safety; and they seized a boat. In that treachery all the inhabitants of the islands were participants; for four or five thousand of the said natives attacked one small boat, which contained four or five Spaniards. Likewise many people took part in the killing of the said Villalobos’s master-of-camp, and other soldiers, in that same year. You shall remind them of these things, and warn them; for, from now on, we shall destroy them and their generation.

And, since it might happen that, without any occasion of war or peace, the said natives flee to the mountains, you shall order that certain of the said natives summon them; and, when they have come, you shall discuss the matter with them. If they refuse to come, you shall, in conformity with your orders, remain there a given time. And if they continue to refuse to come down, you shall leave them, and shall return, without permitting their houses to be burned or their palm trees to be cut down. Neither shall anything be stolen from them; but you shall take only what is absolutely necessary for food and the food and other things necessary to provision your vessels for the return trip.

You shall try to secure information of the Island of Linboton, as well as of Batachina and Celebes, so as to advise me thereof; and you shall do this in accord with the time limit I have set for you to make this exploration, and you shall observe the same rule as in that of Mindanao.

In order that we may allot in encomiendas[23] whatever people are found in these districts, you shall bring me a signed notarial writ. Thus, as those lands have no other owner, the natives thereof may be reduced to the obedience of his Majesty, according to his will—and by war, if the natives begin it, so that war on our part may be just, and that the same justice may continue, so that we can compel them to obey, and impose tributes upon them. You shall exercise much diligence in this and see to it that these orders be carried out carefully and intelligently.

God willing, I shall be in Bruney by the end of the month of January next—or, at the latest, by the eighth of February—with the fleet and all the necessaries that must be brought from Manila, and that which is here. And at that time your grace shall come to Bruney with the fleet that you have, and with all the people that you have or shall have in the Pintados, so that we may do here whatever is proper for the service of his Majesty, to which we are bound. These instructions must not be disregarded in any point, unless I advise you to the contrary by letter. And to this end you shall see that all who live and dwell there be commissioned for the above, in addition to their own duties. Given at Bruney, May twenty-three, one thousand five hundred and seventy-eight.

If the natives of Mindanao or of any other place shall give tribute according to the above, you shall act according to the usual custom in these islands—namely, you shall take one-half and place it to the account of his Majesty, while the other half shall be distributed among the soldiers. Given ut supra.

Doctor Francisco de Sandé.

Before me:
Alonso Beltran,
His Majesty’s notary.

Reasons for hostilities

The above shows clearly that Governor Sandé intended, first, to reduce Sulu to a vassal state; second, to exact tribute in pearls; third, to secure the trade of Sulu for the Spaniards; fourth, to punish the Sultan of Sulu for the help he rendered the Sultan of Bruney against the Spanish forces; fifth, to rescue the Christian slaves in Sulu; sixth, to deprive the Sulus of their artillery and ammunition and of all vessels except fishing vessels, in order to stop their piracy; seventh, to compel the Sulus to become peaceful agriculturists; eighth, to uproot the “accursed doctrine” of Mohammed and to convert the Sulus to the Christian religion.

The leader of the expedition was directed to carry out these instructions as carefully and as gently as possible; and there is no reason to think that he failed to comply with his orders to the letter. But no matter how careful and faithful Captain Rodriguez could have been, it was not difficult for the Sulus to understand the purpose of the expedition and the motives of the Spanish Government, and it does not stand to reason that such people would yield to vassalage and receive a direct insult to their religion without resentment and without a struggle. Governor Sandé knew the reputation of the Sulus, but he must have underestimated their strength and failed to provide garrisons for the occupation of the conquered territory and the protection of peaceful natives.

In January, 1579, Governor Sandé sent an expedition to Mindanao, commanded by Capt. Gabriel de Ribera, under instructions similar to those given to Captain Rodriguez. Ribera had additional orders to visit Jolo and collect the tribute for that year, and special stress was laid on procuring from the Sultan of Sulu “two or three tame elephants.” Ribera accomplished nothing in Mindanao; the natives abandoned their villages and fled to the interior. On his return to Kawite or Caldera, he met a deputation from Jolo, which brought insignificant tribute and informed him of the existence of famine in Sulu and the extreme distress of the people. He returned their tribute, receiving in its place a cannon, which the Sulus had obtained from a wrecked Portuguese galley. Ribera then returned to Cebu, without producing any significant effect on conditions in Sulu.

In April, 1580, Governor Sandé was relieved by Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo, who did not take the same interest in Borneo and Sulu. In the same year the kingdom of Portugal and its rich eastern colonies were annexed to the Spanish domain. No danger could then be expected from the direction of Borneo and Sulu, and the ambitious new Governor-General turned his attention to more desirable fields of conquest.

Piracy was not the primary cause of this invasion of Sulu. Public sentiment was not so strong against slavery in those days as it is now; for the Spaniards and other leading civilized nations were then diligently pursuing a profitable trade in it between the west coast of Africa and the West Indies and America. Piracy is always a crime among nations, but it can not be urged as the principal and leading cause of this war or as sufficient reason in itself for the early precipitation of such a deadly conflict between Sulu and Spain. Religion, on the other hand, was declared by Governor Sandé to be the “principal reason for going to their lands.” He ordered the Sulus not to admit any more preachers of Islam, but to allow the Spanish priests to preach Christianity to them. The Mohammedan preachers he directed to be arrested and brought to him, and the mosques to be burned or destroyed and not to be rebuilt.

Part of the instructions the Adelantado[24] Miguel Lopez de Legaspi received before embarking on his expedition to the Philippines read as follows:

And you shall have especial care that, in all your negotiations with the natives of those regions some of the religious accompanying you be present, both in order to avail yourself of their good counsel and advice, and so that the natives may see and understand your high estimation of them; for seeing this, and the great reverence of the soldiers toward them, they themselves will hold the religious in great respect. This will be of great moment, so that, when the religious shall understand their language, or have interpreters through whom they may make them understand our holy Catholic faith, the Indians shall put entire faith in them; since you are aware that the chief thing sought after by his Majesty is the increase of our holy Catholic faith, and the salvation of the souls of those infidels.[25]

In 1566, a petition was sent from Cebu to the King of Spain, bearing the signatures of Martin de Goiti, Guido de Labezari, and the other leading officers under Legaspi, setting forth, among other requests, the following:

That the Moros, “because they try to prevent our trade with the natives and preach to them the religion of Mohammed,” may be enslaved and lose their property. That slave traffic be allowed, “that the Spaniards may make use of them, as do the chiefs and natives of those regions, both in mines and other works that offer themselves.”[26]

In a letter addressed to Legaspi King Philip II said:

We have also been petitioned in your behalf concerning the Moro Islands in that land, and how those men come to trade and carry on commerce, hindering the preaching of the holy gospel and disturbing you. We give you permission to make such Moros slaves and to seize their property. You are warned that you can make them slaves only if the said Moros are such by birth and choice, and if they come to preach their Mohammedan doctrine or to make war against you or against the Indians, who are our subjects and in our royal service.

In a letter addressed to King Philip II Bishop Salazar writes, June 27, 1588, as follows:

The second point is that, in the Island of Mindanao, which is subject to your Majesty, and for many years has paid you tribute, the law of Mohammed has been publicly proclaimed, for somewhat more than three years, by preachers from Bruney and Ternate who have come there—some of them even, it is believed, having come from Mecca. They have erected and are now building mosques, and the boys are being circumcised, and there is a school where they are taught the Quran. I was promptly informed of this, and urged the president to supply a remedy therefor at once, in order that that pestilential fire should not spread in these islands. I could not persuade them to go, and thus the hatred of Christianity is there; and we are striving no more to remedy this than if the matter did not concern us. Such are the calamities and miseries to which we have come, and the punishments which God inflicts upon us.[27]

In drawing a contract with Capt. Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, in 1591, for the pacification and conquest of Mindanao, the Governor and Captain-General Gomez Perez Dasmariñas makes the following declarations:

His Majesty orders and charges me, by his royal instructions and decrees, as the most worthy and important thing in these islands, to strive for the propagation of our holy faith among the natives herein, their conversion to the knowledge of the true God, and their reduction to the obedience of His holy church and of the king, our sovereign. * * *

Moreover, the Island of Mindanao is so fertile and well inhabited, and teeming with Indian settlements, wherein to plant the faith, * * * and is rich in gold mines and placers, and in wax, cinnamon, and other valuable drugs. And although the said island has been seen, discussed, and explored, * * * no effort has been made to enter and reduce it, nor has it been pacified or furnished with instruction or justice—quite to the contrary being, at the present time, hostile and refusing obedience to his Majesty; and no tribute, or very little, is being collected. * * *

Besides the above facts, by delaying the pacification of the said island greater wrongs, to the offense and displeasure of God and of his Majesty, are resulting daily; for I am informed that the king of that island has made all who were paying tribute to his Majesty tributary to himself by force of arms, and after putting many of them to death while doing it; so that now each Indian pays him one tae[28] of gold. I am also told that he destroyed and broke into pieces, with many insults, a cross that he found, when told that it was adored by the Christians; and that in Magindanao, the capital and residence of the said king, are Bornean Indians who teach and preach publicly the false doctrine of Mohammed, and have mosques; besides these, there are also people from Ternate—gunners, armorers, and powder-makers, all engaged in their trades—who at divers times have killed many Spaniards when the latter were going to collect the tribute, * * * without our being able to mete out punishment, because of lack of troops. By reason of the facts above recited, and because all of the said wrongs and troubles will cease with the said pacification; and, when it is made, we are sure that the surrounding kingdoms of Bruney, Sulu, Java, and other provinces, will become obedient to his Majesty: therefore, in order that the said island may be pacified, subdued, and settled, and the gospel preached to the natives; and that justice may be established among them, and they be taught to live in a civilized manner, and to recognize God and His holy law, I have tried to entrust the said pacification to a person of such character that he may be entrusted with it.[29]

It is plain, therefore, that the sentiment of the times justified war on the Moros for the cause of religion alone, and that, though the primary object was conquest, no doubt the religious motives of the Spaniards were stronger than their desire to check piracy. But, of all the Christian nations, the Spaniards should have been most aware of the tenacity, determination, and courage with which the Mohammedans defend their faith, and the Sulus were no exception to the rule, for they had been born and reared in that religion for more than four generations.

A wiser policy on the part of Governor Sandé would have either let the Moros of Sulu and Mindanao alone, or effected a complete reduction of the state of Sulu and immediate occupation of the coasts of Mindanao with strong forces; for it appears from all accounts that neither the Sulus nor the Magindanaos were as strongly organized then as they were a generation later, and either alliance or war should have been easier then than afterwards.

The Spaniards at that time were excellent warriors. Their conquests of the Bisayan Islands and Luzon were rapid and brilliant, but it appears that the system of government which they inaugurated there met with distinct failure the minute it was extended to the more organized communities and the greater forces they encountered in the south. The Sulus, on the other hand, fought in the defense of their national independence and religion, and never found life too dear to sacrifice in that cause. They resented the treatment of Spain, and in their rage and desire for revenge built stronger forts and fleets and became fiercer pirates.

Rule of Batara Shah Tangah

Pangiran must have died about 1579 and was followed by Sultan Batara Shah Tangah, who is in all probability the Paquian or Paguian Tindig of the Spanish writers. Tangah’s claim to the sultanate was strongly contested by his cousin, Abdasaolan[30] who ruled over Basilan. The latter attacked Jolo with a strong force, but failed to reduce its forts. Tangah, however, felt insecure and went to Manila to request Governor Sandé’s aid and returned to Sulu with two Spanish armed boats (caracoas).[31] Abdasaolan, whose power had in the meantime increased, prepared for defense and watched for the advance of the Sultan’s boat. Finding that the caracoas were at a considerable distance from the Sultan’s boat he manned two light salisipans[32] with a strong force and dispatched them, with speed to intercept Tangah. The Sultan’s party was completely surprised, and in the fight that resulted Tangah was killed. On reaching Jolo the Spanish forces attacked the town. The Sulus fought valiantly, but their fort was reduced. The officers in command of the caracoas assembled the people and had Raja Bungsu, who was wounded in the fight, elected sultan to succeed Tangah. The full title of Bungsu was “The Sultan Muwallil Wasit Bungsu.”[33]

Figueroa’s expedition against Mindanao

In 1596 Capt. Esteban Rodriguez led an expedition into Mindanao, for its conquest and pacification.

It is maintained that he proceeded up the Mindanao River as far as Bwayan, the capital of the upper Mindanao Valley.

Don Esteban Rodriguez prepared men and ships, and what else was necessary for the enterprise, and with some galleys, galleots, frigates, vireys,[34] barangays,[34] and lapis,[35] set out with two hundred and fourteen Spaniards for the Island of Mindanao, in February of the same year, of 1596. He took Capt. Juan de la Xara as his master-of-camp, and some religious of the Society of Jesus to give instruction, as well as many natives for the service of the camp and fleet.

He reached Mindanao River after a good voyage, where the first settlements, named Tampakan and Lumakan, both hostile to the people of Bwayan, received him peacefully and in a friendly manner, and joined his fleet. They were altogether about six thousand men. Without delay they advanced about 8 leagues farther up the river against Bwayan, the principal settlement of the island, where its greatest chief had fortified himself on many sides. Arrived at the settlement, the fleet cast anchor and immediately landed a large proportion of the troops with their arms. But before reaching the houses and fort, and while going through some thickets [cacatal][36] near the shore, they encountered some of the men of Bwayan, who were coming to meet them with their kampilan,[37] carazas[38] and other weapons, and who attacked them on various sides. The latter [i.e., the Spaniards and their allies], on account of the swampiness of the place and the denseness of the thickets [cacatal], could not act unitedly as the occasion demanded, although the master-of-camp and the captains that led them exerted themselves to keep the troops together and to encourage them to face the natives. Meanwhile Governor Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa was watching events from his flagship, but not being able to endure the confusion of his men, seized his weapons and hastened ashore with three or four companions and a servant who carried his helmet in order that he might be less impeded in his movements. But as he was crossing a part of the thickets [cacatal] where the fight was waging, a hostile Indian stepped out unseen from one side and dealt the governor a blow on the head with his kampilan that stretched him on the ground badly wounded.[39] The governor’s followers cut the Mindanao to pieces and carried the governor back to the camp. Shortly after the master-of-camp, Juan de la Xara, withdrew his troops to the fleet, leaving behind several Spaniards who had fallen in the encounter. The governor did not regain consciousness, for the wound was very severe, and died next day. The fleet after that loss and failure left that place, and descended the river to Tampakan, where it anchored among the friendly inhabitants and their settlements.

The master-of-camp, Juan de la Xara, had himself chosen by the fleet as successor in the government and enterprise. He built a fort with arigues[40] and palms near Tampakan, and founded a Spanish settlement to which he gave the name of Murcia. He began to make what arrangements he deemed best, in order to establish himself and run things independently of, and without acknowledging the governor of Manila, without whose intervention and assistance this enterprise could not be continued.[41]

Bwayan was 30 miles up the river and 25 miles above Magindanao or Kotabato where Bwisan, the Sultan of Magindanao, was strongly fortified. It is difficult to believe that Rodriguez could advance so far even with a small scouting party. A careful review of the Spanish reports referring to these early campaigns in Mindanao indicates that Bwayan has been erroneously used in place of Magindanao, the ancient capital of the sultanate of Magindanao.

Bent on the conquest of Mindanao, Governor Tello prepared another expedition under Gen. Juan Ronquillo[42] and dispatched it by the way of Cebu. At Caldera, it was joined by the fleet of Mindanao and the whole force proceeded east in the direction of the Mindanao River, on the 6th of February, 1597. Captain Chaves arrived with his frigates at the river on the 8th of January. In a battle fought at Simway to capture Moro vessels going to seek aid from Ternate he had a leg cut off and received a shot in the helmet above the ear. Ronquillo arrived at the mouth of the river on February 21, and on the 17th of April he engaged a Moro fleet with 40 arquebusiers and defeated them, killing a number of their brave men and some Ternatans without losing any of his men except 5 Bisayans. Leaving a guard of 34 men under Chaves at the fort of Tampakan he advanced up the river with a force of 230 sailors and gunners. The enemy retired behind some parapets as soon as the artillery opened upon them, and brought some artillery to bear on the flagship (one of the galleys), but could not retard the Spanish advance.

“I answered their fire with so great readiness,” said Ronquillo in his report, “that I forced them to withdraw their artillery. But, as if they were goblins, they remained here behind a bush or a tree, firing at us without being seen.” Reinforced by the chief of the hill tribes, Lumakan, with 500 natives, Ronquillo resumed the fighting after the delay of a few days. “Finally,” continued Ronquillo, “I planted my battery of eight pieces somewhat over 100 paces from the fort. Although I battered the fort hotly, I could not effect a breach through which to make an assault. All the damage that I did them by day, they repaired by night. * * *

“I was very short of ammunition, for I had only 3,000 arquebus bullets left, and very few cannon balls; and both would be spent in one day’s fighting, during which, should we not gain the fort, we would be lost—and with no power to defend ourselves while withdrawing our artillery and camp. * * *

“I reconnoitered the fort and its situation, for it is located at the entrance of a lagoon, thus having only water at the back, and swampy and marshy ground at the sides. It has a frontage of more than 1,000 paces, is furnished with very good transversals, and is well supplied with artillery and arquebuses. Moreover it has a ditch of water more than 4 brazas[43] wide and 2 deep, and thus there was a space of dry ground of only 15 paces where it was possible to attack; and this space was bravely defended, and with the greatest force of the enemy. The inner parts were water, where they sailed in vessels, while we had no footing at all.”

“Again, I reflected that those who had awaited us so long, had waited with the determination to die in defense of the fort; and if they should see the contest ending unfavorably for them, no one would prevent their flight. Further, if they awaited the assault it would cost me the greater part of my remaining ammunition, and my best men; while, if the enemy fled, nothing would be accomplished, but on the contrary a long, tedious, and costly war would be entered upon. Hence, with the opinion and advice of the captains, I negotiated for peace, and told them that I would admit them to friendship under the following conditions:

“First, that first and foremost they must offer homage to his Majesty, and pay something as recognition” (a gold chain). Second, “that all the natives who had been taken from the Pintados Islands [Bisayan Islands] last year, must be restored.” Third, “that they must break the peace and confederation made with the people of Ternate, and must not admit the latter into their country.” Fourth, “that they must be friends with Danganlibor and Lumakan, * * * and must not make war on their vassals.” Fifth, “that all the chiefs must go to live in their old villages.”[44]

Ronquillo later reported the place indefensible and was authorized to retire to Caldera.

Ronquillo must have advanced as far as the settlement of Kalangnan or possibly Magindanao (Kotabato), the capital of Sultan Bwisan. The report he rendered relative to the country, its people and chiefs, is very interesting and an excerpt of the same is herewith quoted because of its bearing on conditions throughout Moroland:

The leading chiefs collect tribute from their vassals. * * * These Indians are not like those in Luzon, but are accustomed to power and sovereignty. Some collect five or six thousand tributes. * * *

Hitherto it has not been possible to tell your lordship anything certain of this country except that it will be of but little advantage to his Majesty, but a source of great expense. It has far fewer inhabitants than was reported, and all are very poor, so that their breakfast consists only in cleaning their arms, and their work in using them, and not in cultivating the land, which is low and swampy in this river. There is no chief who can raise 20 taes of gold. Rice is very scarce; in the hills is found a small amount, which is used for food by the chiefs only. There are some swine, and a few fowls that are very cunning, and less fruit.[45]

These early expeditions of the Spaniards against the Moros undoubtedly aroused in the latter a great desire for vengeance. The forces the Spaniards sent to conquer Mindanao and Sulu were very small. Such forces would have been strong enough to reduce any island of the Bisayan group, or even Luzon, but against the Moros they proved insufficient and inadequate. They however succeeded in provoking bitter hostilities and marked the beginning of a long period of terror and bloodshed.

Moro raids[46]

In 1599 combined Moro fleets invaded and plundered the coasts of the Bisayan Islands, Cebu, Negros, and Panay.

Captain Paches, who was in command of the fort of Caldera, attacked the northern coast of the Island of Sulu. After landing at some point, it was observed by the Sulus that his fuses were wet and that his guns could not fire well. They then rushed his position, killed him, and dispersed his forces.

The following year saw the return of a larger and still more dreadful expedition. The people of Panay abandoned their towns and fled into the mountains under the belief that these terrible attacks had been inspired by the Spaniards. To check these pirates, Juan Gallinato, with a force of 200 Spaniards, was sent against Sulu, but like so many expeditions that followed his, he accomplished nothing. * * * “From this time until the present day” (about the year 1800), wrote Zuñiga, “these Moros have not ceased to infest our colonies; innumerable are the Indians they have captured, the towns they have looted, the rancherias they have destroyed, and the vessels they have taken. It seems as if God has preserved them for vengeance on the Spaniards that they have not been able to subject them in two hundred years, in spite of the expeditions sent against them, the armaments sent almost every year to pursue them. In a very little while we conquered all the islands of the Philippines, but the little Island of Sulu, a part of Mindanao, and the other islands nearby, we have not been able to subjugate to this day.”[47]

Gallinatos’s expedition occurred in 1602.[48] After three months of protracted fighting at Jolo, he was unable to reduce the fortifications of the town and retired to Panay.

In 1616 a large Sulu fleet destroyed Pantao in the Camarines and the shipyards of Cavite and exacted large sums for the ransom of Spanish prisoners. Moro fleets in 1625 sacked Katbalogan in Samar.

In 1628 Governor Tavora sent an expedition to Sulu under Cristobol de Lugo. Cristobol disembarked half of his infantry, sacked the town of Jolo, set part of it on fire and sailed back to Cebu.

In 1629 the Moros raided Samar and Leyte. In 1630 an armada composed of 70 vessels and having 350 Spanish and 2,000 native soldiers, under Lorenzo de Olaso Ochotegui, arrived at Jolo. Olaso misdirected his forces and, advancing too near to the wall of the fort, was wounded in his side and fell. He was rescued by the officers who followed him, but the troops were demoralized and retired. The expedition, however, landed at various points on the coast and burned and pillaged small settlements.[49]

In the same year P. Gutierrez came to Mindanao on a mission to Corralat.[50] On his return he met Tuan Baluka, wife of Raja Bungsu, at Zamboanga. Baluka urged P. Gutierrez to delay his departure from Zamboanga and warned him of the danger of meeting the Sulu expedition under Datu Ache. He, however, continued on his way and was overtaken by Datu Ache’s force, but on account of the message and flag he delivered to Ache from Tuan Baluka, he was allowed to proceed safely.

For some time the Jesuits had been urging upon the Philippine Government the occupation of the southern coast of Mindanao. This meant an advance into the enemy’s camp and a bloody struggle for supremacy in the southern seas. The consequences of such a step were foreseen by the Government and very few governors would have dared undertake such a grave responsibility. In 1635, Governor Juan Cerezo de Salamanca was petitioned by the Jesuits to establish an advance post of the Spanish forces at Zamboanga for the protection of missionaries and the Christians who had to navigate in the southern seas. Salamanca granted their request and sent Capt. Juan de Chaves, who disembarked at Zamboanga on the 6th of April, 1635. The force under Captain Chaves consisted of 300 Spanish and 1,000 native soldiers. In June they began the construction of a stone fort on a plan designed by the Jesuit missionary P. Melchor de Vera, who was an expert engineer.

The advantages to be derived from the position of this garrison were demonstrated before the year was over. As a piratical fleet was returning from Cuyo, Mindoro, and the Kalamian Islands, the favorable opportunity was watched for, and as the two divisions of the fleet separated, the Spanish forces pursued Corralat’s pirates and dealt them a deadly blow in the neighborhood of Point Flechas, killing about 300 Moros and saving 120 Christian captives.[51]