The History of Sulu

by Najeeb M. Saleeby

Expedition against Jolo

The fearlessness of the Moros in battle, their determination, persistence, and fortitude must have disheartened the Spaniards very often in their weary attempts to conquer and pacify Sulu. The Sulus have never had any standing army. Every able-bodied male was a soldier and a sailor. Thousands of Sulus and Samals stood ready at a moment’s notice to man a fleet and defend a fort. Every fort the Spaniards reduced the Sulus could rebuild in a short time; every fleet destroyed they could replace with little expense. They had enough pearls to purchase guns and ammunition, and a few months after a defeat they were ready to fight again, better prepared than before. War with Sulu, in the way it was conducted, meant a war of extermination and hostilities without end. Its worst evils befell the helpless natives of the coast settlements of the Bisayas and southern Luzon to whom Spain was unable to afford safe protection. The Moros would slip through in the night or take advantage of a favorable wind and attack the Spanish forces or the defenseless villages while they were unaware of danger or unprepared for a fight. For a long while it seemed beyond the power of the Philippine Government to reëstablish peace or restrict hostilities to Sulu waters. The magnificent victory of Claveria was hailed as marking the beginning of a new era of safety and glory, but its effects did not last long, and the fear of the Moros beset the hearts of the Bisayans once more.

In the light of such profound experience as the Philippine Government had had with Moro affairs Governor Urbiztondo might have contented himself with punishing the Moros of Tonkil and their abettors and allies, but another element of serious concern entered into the problem which threatened not only to render it more vexatious and unsolvable, but dangerous in the extreme. It was not so much the evils of disturbed relations with Sulu as the harm that would arise from English occupation of or alliance with Sulu that Urbiztondo feared, for in 1849, Sir James Brooke visited Jolo and made a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu,[1] the seventh article of which declared a promise made by the Sultan of Sulu not to make any cessions of territory within his dominion nor recognize sovereignty rights nor promise fealty to any nation without the consent of Great Britain. The overt object of this treaty was “to keep open for the benefit of the mercantile world that improvable field for commercial enterprise,” but the ultimate purpose of such an agreement was not difficult to foresee. The governor of Zamboanga went to Jolo and protested strongly, declaring such a treaty an act of disloyalty to Spain, for which the Sultan and his council would be held responsible. The subject was debated with considerable feeling on both sides. The governor remained at Jolo twenty-seven days and returned without advantage.

The treaty was never ratified by Great Britain, but such endeavors on the part of a strong maritime European power made it necessary for Spain to act decisively and expeditiously. Urbiztondo then pressed to the attention of Sultan Pulalun and his council the necessity of punishing the Samals of Tonkil for their depredations on Samar and Kamigin and requested the return of the captives whom they carried away. Considerable controversy followed and the Sulus pretended that they were unable to punish Tonkil, but offered no objection to its castigation by the Philippine Government.

Aware of the seriousness of the situation, Urbiztondo made preparations for war and decided to attack not Tonkil only, but Jolo also, repeating there the example of Balangingi, and to bring Sulu under the control of Spain. Referring to this cause, Captain Keppel, in his “Visit to the Indian Archipelago,” makes the following remarks:

His [the Sultan’s] fortified position gave him weight, which he had frequently thrown into the scale of humanity: and it must now be feared that many whom he was able to hold in check will again follow their evil propensities unrestrained, as they did under previous dynasties.

The resentment of Spain, as visited upon the Sultan of Sulu, seems equally impolitic and unjust. The pretext was piracy, of which some solitary instance may very possibly have been established against a Sulu prahu; but the Sultan was certainly sincere in his wish to coöperate against that system. There is ground to fear that national jealousy was desirous of striking its puny blow at an European rival, through the degradation of the Sultan of Sulu—that he has incurred, in fact, the resentment of the Spanish colonial governors, by those commercial treaties with ourselves which were but lately concluded by Sir James Brooke.[2]

On the 11th day of December, 1850, Urbiztondo left Manila in command of a force consisting of 100 troops of artillery, 500 of infantry, 2 mountain howitzers, and a number of irregular troops and workmen. Two steamboats, one corvette, and one brigantine carried the troops to Zamboanga, where they arrived on the 20th. Here 2 companies of infantry and 102 volunteers and 6 tenders under the command of the governor of Zamboanga joined the expedition. At Belun they burned 250 houses and 20 vintas. A small force of Moros was encountered, of which they killed 3 and captured 17 prisoners, one of whom was a panglima. The chief of Bukutwan surrendered and promised to remain obedient to Spain. At Tonkil bad weather was encountered and the whole expedition turned toward Jolo.

Jolo was well fortified. It had five forts on the sea front, the strongest two of which were that of the Sultan on the right and that of Datu Daniel on the hill. Three other forts were located on prominent points at the base of the hills. The town was further defended by a double line of trenches, other fortifications and much artillery. The population was estimated at 6,000 Moros and 500 Chinese.

The fleet saluted the town and anchored in the roadstead. Two officers were sent ashore to notify the Sultan of the presence of the Governor-General and of his wish to have an interview with the Sultan and two of his datus, on board. The people were excited to such a high degree, that the mob grew violent and uncontrollable as the officers drew near the shore. Insults and weapons were hurled at them from every side, and the people shouted to them to return lest they be killed. They, however, pushed on in the direction of the Sultan’s fort, where some datus came out to meet and protect them. Even then spears were thrown at them, and one of the datus had to use his kampilan in order to enforce his orders. The Sultan at last came out personally, embraced the officers, and conducted them to the audience hall. There the message was delivered to the Sultan and his council, but they all refused to go on board. The officers met the same difficulty in leaving the Sultan’s house as in coming in, and as soon as they embarked five shots were discharged at them by the mob. The officers reported that the town had more than 10,000 fighting men and that it was well provisioned and well defended, and that all the women and children were removed to the mountains. Urbiztondo decided that his forces and provisions were inadequate for the occasion and did not risk a combat. On January 1, 1851, as the fleet was preparing to sail away, the Sulus fired at it, killing seven, wounding four, and damaging the hulls of some of the vessels. The fleet returned the fire, but kept moving, and sailed away in the direction of Tonkil. Here the expedition met no organized resistance. Six hundred men were disembarked, fought some armed parties, caught 4 and killed 25 men, and rescued 29 captives. About 1,000 houses and 106 boats were burned, and the fleet then returned to Zamboanga.

Here Urbiztondo made further and extensive preparations to strengthen his expedition. The commanding marine officer was sent to Manila with special instructions to augment the fleet and bring sufficient ammunition and provisions. The Augustinian friar Pascual Ibañez raised a force of 750 Cebuans and 21 barangay, or large boats, and volunteered his help. Lumber was cut at Basilan, and lankan,[3] rafts, and ladders were constructed. Volunteers were further called for, and a large fleet of war vessels and transports was assembled at Zamboanga February 12, 1851.

Besides the staff, engineers, surgeons, and chaplains, the reënforced expedition contained 11 officers and 253 privates of artillery, 1 officer and 30 privates of sappers, 123 officers and 2,593 privates of infantry, 525 volunteers from Cebu, 100 from Iloilo, and 300 from Zamboanga; in all 142 officers, 2,876 privates, and 925 volunteers, besides rowers and other workmen. The vessels carrying the forces were 1 corvette, 1 brigantine, 3 steamboats, 2 gunboats, 9 tenders, 9 transports, and 21 barangay, with various vintas,[4] lankan, and rafts. On February 19 mass was celebrated and the expedition started for the haughty and arrogant city.

Jolo was reached on the 27th and the fleet anchored in two divisions opposite both sides of the town. The troops disembarked at dawn next morning and engaged the enemy as both divisions of the fleet began a simultaneous bombardment of the town and forts. The marksmanship of the Sulus and Spaniards was splendid, and the guns of the forts were very active. The spectacle was magnificent, the attack was most valorous, and the defense most valiant. In the heat of battle one friar was killed as he was scaling the wall and three officers fell by his side and lay surrounded by 70 corpses of Sulus. After several attempts one of the forts on the northeast side was taken by storm and the escaping Sulus made for Daniel’s fort. As they were admitted into the latter, it was rushed by the Spanish troops who entered in spite of the desperate resistance the Sulus made. As the inner inclosure was gained the Sulus hurled themselves from the parapets and fled. The fighting continued until next day, when every fort was reduced, and the Sulus evacuated the town. The casualties of the attacking forces were 36 dead and 92 wounded, while the Sulus lost 300 dead. The whole town was burned to ashes and 112 pieces of artillery were taken. After four days, the Governor-General and his council decided to evacuate the town and sailed away, leaving it ungarrisoned. They evidently thought that their purpose was accomplished and that they could not afford to leave a force sufficiently strong to defend the place.

On April 30 a treaty was made with Sultan Pulalun by the politico-military governor of Zamboanga, Col. José Maria de Carlos. The treaty was declared to be “an act of incorporation of the sultanate of Sulu to the Spanish Monarchy.” The Sulus understood it to be a firm agreement and friendly union with Spain. They, however, appear to have recognized the supremacy of Spain and accepted her protectorate. They agreed to use the Spanish flag and prohibit piracy. They further bound themselves not to make any treaties with any nation other than Spain nor to build forts nor to import firearms without her permission. Spain promised to respect and recognize the ranks of the Sultan and datus and to protect Sulu boats everywhere and to the same extent as Spanish boats. Duties on foreign boats were to be paid to the Sulus. Religious liberty was guaranteed. The Sultan issued passports to the Sulus and countersigned Spanish passports given to people entering the ports of Sulu.

It was agreed that Spain would build a trading post at Jolo and establish a small garrison for its protection. The Sultan and the datus resumed their residence in the town of Jolo, with apparently very little change from former conditions.

In consideration of the losses incurred by the Sultan and datus through the destruction of their houses and town, and on condition that the Sulus aid in the construction and protection of the Jolo trading post, annuities were granted to the Sultan, three datus, and one subordinate chief.

The treaty was written in both Spanish and Sulu and was signed and sealed by both parties. Complete and exact translations of the Spanish and Sulu copies of this treaty have been carefully made and are here given in full. The Sulu copy of the treaty appears to have been written or dictated by interpreters not versed in Sulu, and the difference in text is such as would easily explain the frequent misunderstandings between the Spanish officials and the Sulu authorities in cases pertaining to the application of the terms of this treaty.