Every attempt has been made to replicate the original as printed.
Some typographical errors have been corrected;
.
The [footnotes] follow the text.
—
[Contents.]
[Index]: [A], [B], [C], [D], [E], [F], [G], [H], [I], [J], [K], [L], [M], [N], [O], [P], [Q], [R], [S], [T], [U], [V], [W], [Z].
(etext transcriber's note)

A COMMENTARY
TO
K A N T’S ‘C R I T I Q U E O F
P U R E R E A S O N’

BY
NORMAN KEMP SMITH, D.Phil.
McCOSH PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
AUTHOR OF
‘STUDIES IN THE CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY’
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON
1918

COPYRIGHT

TO THE MEMORY
OF
ROBERT ADAMSON
WISE IN COUNSEL, IN FRIENDSHIP UNFAILING
GRATEFULLY DEDICATED

PREFACE

The Critique of Pure Reason is more obscure and difficult than even a metaphysical treatise has any right to be. The difficulties are not merely due to defects of exposition; they multiply rather than diminish upon detailed study; and, as I shall endeavour to show in this Commentary, are traceable to two main causes, the composite nature of the text, written at various dates throughout the period 1772-1780, and the conflicting tendencies of Kant’s own thinking.

The Commentary is both expository and critical; and in exposition no less than in criticism I have sought to subordinate the treatment of textual questions and of minor issues to the systematic discussion of the central problems. Full use is made of the various selections from Kant’s private papers that have appeared, at intervals, since the publication of his Lectures on Metaphysics in 1821. Their significance has not hitherto been generally recognised in English books upon Kant. They seem to me to be of capital importance for the right understanding of the Critique.

Some apology is perhaps required for publishing a work of this character at the present moment. It was completed, and arrangements made for its publication, shortly before the outbreak of war. The printers have, I understand, found in it a useful stop-gap to occupy them in the intervals of more pressing work; and now that the type must be released, I trust that in spite of, or even because of, the overwhelming preoccupations of the war, there may be some few readers to whom the volume may be not unwelcome. That even amidst the distractions of actual campaigning metaphysical speculation can serve as a refuge and a solace is shown by the memorable example of General Smuts. He has himself told us that on his raid into Cape Colony in the South African War he carried with him for evening reading the Critique of Pure Reason. Is it surprising that our British generals, pitted against so unconventional an opponent, should have been worsted in the battle of wits?

The Critique of Pure Reason is a philosophical classic that marks a turning-point in the history of philosophy, and no interpretation, even though now attempted after the lapse of a hundred years, can hope to be adequate or final. Some things are clearer to us than they were to Kant’s contemporaries; in other essential ways our point of view has receded from his, and the historical record, that should determine our judgments, is far from complete. But there is a further difficulty of an even more serious character. The Critique deals with issues that are still controversial, and their interpretation is possible only from a definite standpoint. The limitations of this standpoint and of the philosophical milieu in which it has been acquired unavoidably intervene to distort or obscure our apprehension of the text. Arbitrary and merely personal judgments I have, however, endeavoured to avoid. My sole aim has been to reach, as far as may prove feasible, an unbiassed understanding of Kant’s great work.

Among German commentators I owe most to Vaihinger, Adickes, B. Erdmann, Cohen, and Riehl, especially to the first named. The chief English writers upon Kant are Green, Caird, and Adamson. In so far as Green and Caird treat the Critical philosophy as a half-way stage to the Hegelian standpoint I find myself frequently in disagreement with them; but my indebtedness to their writings is much greater than my occasional criticisms of their views may seem to imply. With Robert Adamson I enjoyed the privilege of personal discussions at a time when his earlier view of Kant’s teaching was undergoing revision in a more radical manner than is apparent even in his posthumously published University lectures. To the stimulus of his suggestions the writing of this Commentary is largely due.

My first study of the Critique was under the genial and inspiring guidance of Sir Henry Jones. With characteristic kindliness he has read through my manuscript and has disclosed to me many defects of exposition and argument. The same service has been rendered me by Professor G. Dawes Hicks, whose criticisms have been very valuable, particularly since they come from a student of Kant who on many fundamental points takes an opposite view from my own.

I have also to thank my colleague, Professor Oswald Veblen, for much helpful discussion of Kant’s doctrines of space and time, and of mathematical reasoning.

Mr. H. H. Joachim has read the entire proofs, and I have made frequent modifications to meet his very searching criticisms. I have also gratefully adopted his revisions of my translations from the Critique. Similar acknowledgments are due to my colleague, Professor A. A. Bowman, and to my friend Dr. C. W. Hendel.

I have in preparation a translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, and am responsible for the translations of all passages given in the present work. In quoting from Kant’s other writings, I have made use of the renderings of Abbott, Bernard, and Mahaffy; but have occasionally allowed myself the liberty of introducing alterations.

Should readers who are already well acquainted with the Critique desire to use my Commentary for its systematic discussions of Kant’s teaching, rather than as an accompaniment to their study of the text, I may refer them to those sections which receive italicised headings in the table of contents.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

London, January 1918.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
PAGE
I. Textual—
Kant’s Method of composing the Critique of Pure Reason[xix]
II. Historical—
Kant’s Relation to Hume and to Leibniz[xxv]
III. General—
1. The Nature of the a priori[xxxiii]
2. Kant’s Contribution to the Science of Logic[xxxvi]
3. The Nature of Consciousness[xxxix]
4. Phenomenalism, Kant’s Substitute for Subjectivism[xlv]
5. The Distinction between Human and Animal Intelligence[xlvii]
6. The Nature and Conditions of Self-Consciousness[l]
7. Kant’s threefold Distinction between Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason[lii]
8. The place of the Critique of Pure Reason in Kant’s Philosophical System[lv]
THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON[1]
Title[1]
Motto[4]
Dedication to Freiherr von Zedlitz[6]
Preface To the First Edition[8]
Comment on Preface[10]
Dogmatism, Scepticism, Criticism[13]
Preface To the Second Edition[17]
The Copernican Hypothesis[22]
Introduction[26]
Comment upon the Argument of Kant’s Introduction[33]
How are Synthetic a priori Judgments possible?[43]
The Analytic and Synthetic Methods[44]
Purpose and Scope of the Critique[56]
Kant’s relation to Hume[61]
Meaning of the term Transcendental[73]
The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
Part I. The Transcendental Aesthetic[79-166]
Definition of Terms[79]
Kant’s conflicting Views of Space[88]
Section I. Space[99]
Kant’s Attitude to the Problems of Modern Geometry[117]
Section II. Time[123]
Kant’s Views regarding the Nature of Arithmetical Science[128]
Kant’s conflicting Views of Time[134]
General Observations on the Transcendental Aesthetic[143]
The Distinction between Appearance and Illusion[148]
Kant’s Relation to Berkeley[155]
The Paradox of Incongruous Counterparts[161]
Part II. The Transcendental Logic[167]
Introduction[167]
I. Logic in General[167]
II. Transcendental Logic[170]
III. The Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic[172]
Division I. The Transcendental Analytic[174]
Book I. The Analytic of Concepts[175]
Chapter I. The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding[175]
Section I. The Logical Use of the Understanding[176]
Comment on Kant’s Argument[176]
Stages in the Development of Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction[186]
Section II. The Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgment[192]
Section III. The Categories on Pure Concepts of the Understanding[194]
Distinction between Logical Forms and Categories[195]
Chapter II. Deduction of the Pure Concepts Of The Understanding[202]
Analysis of the Text: the Four Stages in the Development of Kant’s Views[202-234]
I. Enumeration of the Four Stages[203]
II. Detailed Analysis of the Four Stages[204]
Kant’s Doctrine of the Transcendental Object[204]
III. Evidence yielded by the “Reflexionen” and “LoseBlätter” in Support of the Analysis of theText[231]
IV. Connected Statement and Discussion of Kant’sSubjective and Objective Deductions in theFirst Edition[234]
Distinction between the Subjective and the ObjectiveDeductions[235]
The Subjective Deduction in its initial empiricalStages[245]
Objective Deduction as given in the First Edition[248]
The later Stages of the Subjective Deduction[263]
The Distinction between Phenomenalism and Subjectivism[270]
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in theSecond Edition[284]
The Doctrine of Inner Sense[291]
Kant’s Refutations of Idealism[298]
Inner Sense and Apperception[321]
Book II. The Analytic of Principles[332]
Chapter I. The Schematism of Pure Concepts Ofthe Understanding[334]
Chapter II. System of All Principles of Pure Understanding[342]
1. The Axioms of Intuition[347]
2. The Anticipations of Perception[349]
3. The Analogies of Experience[355]
A. First Analogy[358]
B. Second Analogy[363]
Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant’s Argument[365]
Kant’s Subjectivist and Phenomenalist Viewsof the Causal Relation[373]
Reply to Further Criticisms of Kant’s Argument[377]
C. Third Analogy[381]
Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant’s Argument[387]
4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General[391]
Chapter III. On the Ground of the Distinctionof all Objects whatever intoPhenomena and Noumena[404]
Relevant Passages in the Section on Amphiboly[410]
Alterations in the Second Edition[412]
Comment on Kant’s Argument[414]
Appendix. The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection[418]
Division II. The Transcendental Dialectic[424]
Introductory Comment upon the composite Origin andconflicting Tendencies of the Dialectic[425]
The History and Development of Kant’s Views inregard to the Problems of the Dialectic[431]
Introduction[441]
I. Transcendental Illusion[441]
II. Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion[442]
Book I. The Concepts of Pure Reason[446]
Section I. Ideas in General[447]
Section II. The Transcendental Ideas[450]
Section III. System of the Transcendental Ideas[453]
Book II. The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason[455]
Chapter I. The Paralogisms of Pure Reason[455]
First Paralogism: of Substantiality[457]
Second Paralogism: of Simplicity[458]
Third Paralogism: of Personality[461]
Fourth Paralogism: of Ideality[462]
Second Edition Statement of the Paralogisms[466]
Is the Notion of the Self a necessary Idea of Reason?[473]
Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason[478]
Section I. System of the Cosmological Ideas[478]
Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason[480]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[481]
First Antinomy[483]
Second Antinomy[488]
Third Antinomy[492]
Fourth Antinomy[495]
Section III. The Interest of Reason in this Self-Conflict[498]
Section IV. Of the Transcendental Problems of PureReason in so far as they absolutely mustbe capable of Solution[499]
Section V. Sceptical Representation of the CosmologicalQuestions[501]
Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to theSolution of the Cosmological Dialectic[503]
Section VII. Critical Decision of the CosmologicalConflict of Reason with itself[504]
Section VIII. The Regulative Principle of Pure Reasonin regard to the Cosmological Ideas[506]
Section IX. The Empirical Employment of the RegulativePrinciples of Reason in regardto all Cosmological Ideas[508]
Solution of the First and Second Antinomies[508]
Remarks on the Distinction between theMathematical-Transcendental and theDynamical-Transcendental Ideas[510]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[510]
Solution of the Third Antinomy[512]
Possibility of harmonising Causality throughFreedom with the Universal Law ofNatural Necessity[513]
Explanation of the Relation of Freedom toNecessity of Nature[514]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[517]
Solution of the Fourth Antinomy[518]
Concluding Note on the whole Antinomyof Pure Reason[519]
Concluding Comment on Kant’s Doctrineof the Antinomies[519]
Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason[522]
Section I. and II. The Transcendental Ideal[522]
Comment on Kant’s Method ofArgument[524]
Section III. The Speculative Arguments in Proof of theExistence of a Supreme Being[525]
Section IV. The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof[527]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[528]
Section V. The Impossibility of a Cosmological Proofof the Existence of God[531]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[533]
Discovery and Explanation of the TranscendentalIllusion in all TranscendentalProof of the Existence of a necessaryBeing[534]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[535]
Section VI. The Impossibility of the Physico-TheologicalProof[538]
Section VII. Criticism of all Theology based on speculativePrinciples of Reason[541]
Concluding Comment[541]
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic[543]
The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason[543]
Hypotheses not permissible in Philosophy[543]
On the Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of HumanReason[552]
Concluding Comment on the Dialectic[558]
Appendix A.
The Transcendental Doctrine of Methods[563]
Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason[563]
Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its DogmaticEmployment[563]
Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in itsPolemical Employment[567]
Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in regardto Hypotheses[568]
Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in regardto its Proofs[568]
Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason[569]
Section I. The Ultimate End of the Pure Use of ourReason[569]
Section II. The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a DeterminingGround of the Ultimate End ofPure Reason[570]
Section III. Opining, Knowing, and Believing[576]
Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason[579]
Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason[582]
Appendix B.
A more detailed Statement of Kant’s Relations to his PhilosophicalPredecessors[583]
[Index]:[A],[B],[C],[D],[E],[F],[G],[H],[I],[J],[K],[L],[M],[N],[O],[P],[Q],[R],[S],[T],[U],[V],[W],[Z][607]

NOTE

In all references to the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft I have given the original pagings of both the first and second editions. References to Kant’s other works are, whenever possible, to the volumes thus far issued in the new Berlin edition. As the Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft had not been published in this edition at the time when the Commentary was completed, the numbering given is that of B. Erdmann’s edition of 1884.

ABBREVIATIONS

Berlin edition of Kant’s worksW
Pagings in the first edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft A
Pagings in the second editionB
Adickes’ edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1889)K